1 In the action leading to these appeals, Warren, J., on 31 October 2002 declared that the first, second and fifth defendants (the appellants) were jointly and severally liable to pay to the plaintiffs (the respondents) compensation for breach of fiduciary duty in an amount to be assessed. The appellants appealed against these orders and the respondents cross-appealed.
2 On 6 December 2002 her Honour assessed equitable compensation in favour of the respondents in the sum of $3,327,174.67 plus interest to the date of that order in the sum of $75,015.02.
3 In December 2002 both the appellants and the respondents appealed against these orders.
4 On 16 December 2002 the Court of Appeal ordered that there be a stay of the orders made in the Trial Division until the hearing and determination of the appeal. In the meantime a trust account had been established in the joint names of the parties' solicitors to hold the net proceeds of sale of the golf course which is the subject of the proceedings. By this Court's order of 16 December 2002 the appellants were ordered, as a condition of obtaining the stay, to pay further moneys into the fund held in the joint account, so that the fund there held was sufficient to satisfy the award of compensation determined by the trial judge in favour of the respondents against which both parties had appealed.
5 On 28 February 2005 this Court made orders allowing the appeal in part, and reducing the amount ordered to be paid by the appellants to the respondents by $800,000. The consequence was that the amount of compensation payable was reduced to the sum of $2,793,708 plus interest to 6 December 2002 of $61,704.09 in lieu of the compensation assessed by Warren, J. The cross-appeal of the respondents seeking an account of profits was dismissed.
6 The parties are agreed that five subsidiary issues remain for determination, and have consented to these issues being determined by two judges of the Court. We shall deal with these issues in turn.
7 The first issue is when in this case "judgment was given" within the meaning of s.101 of the Supreme Court Act 1986, which deals with post judgment interest. The appellants submit that judgment was not "given" to enliven s.101 until such time as this Court allowed the appeal as to part, dismissed the cross-appeal and assessed the plaintiffs' entitlement to equitable compensation on 28 February 2005. The respondents on the other hand submit that the Court's orders of 28 February 2005 had the effect merely of varying the judgment of Warren, J. made on 6 December 2002. They submit accordingly that this Court's judgment took effect as from the date of the original judgment, with the result that s.101 of the Supreme Court Act is applicable from 6 December 2002, and that the compensation awarded bears interest between 6 December 2002 and 7 March 2005 at the rates provided for in the Penalty Interest Rates Act 1983.
8 The appellants rely on GEF Packaging Services Ltd. v. Turner[1]. In that case it was said that when in Victoria the appellate court reassesses damages on appeal, the judgment which the Court substitutes by its order for the judgment below takes effect from the date of the order made on appeal, unless the Court, either expressly or by implication, directs that the judgment as substituted by its order takes effect from some other date, and in particular from the date of the judgment below.[2]
9 On 28 February 2005, this Court held in its supplementary[3] judgment that $800,000 for the "Buxton interests" should be deducted prior to the division of the profit of the venture between the parties, and that to that extent, and to that extent only, the appeal by the appellants was allowed. The respondents submit, and we think correctly, that it is perfectly clear from the wording of the orders made on appeal that the principal sum of compensation, excluding interest, was assessed as at 6 December 2002, and that the quantum of interest up to 6 December 2002 was varied from the amount ordered below because of the variation in the principal sum assessed. It follows that this Court has by clear implication directed that the judgment as substituted should take effect from the date of the judgment below. Furthermore the decision in GEF Packaging, unlike the present case, is to be distinguished in that it concerned considerations such as the value of money at the time of the reassessment and a reassessment of damages for personal injuries in circumstances where the original assessment was set aside and the Court reassessed for itself the damages which it regarded as warranted by the evidence; cf. Backwell v. AAA[4].
10 In light of our decision on the first issue, the second, third and fourth issues may be restated as -