THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE ACC
66 The applicants allege that the ACC did not act lawfully in providing to the DPP the information and advice sent in February 2005 by Mr Considine to Mr Adsett and in providing the information contained in the letters from the ACC to the Attorney-General's Department in May 2005 and November 2005.
67 The respondents contend that each of these communications occurred lawfully pursuant to either s 59(7) or 59(9) of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) ("the ACC Act").
68 The ACC is established by s 7(1) of the ACC Act. It consists of the CEO, examiners and the members of the staff of the ACC. The functions of the ACC, provided for in s 7A of the Act, include the dissemination of criminal information, the investigation of conduct rendered criminal by Commonwealth laws and reporting on the outcomes of its investigations. Section 51 of the ACC Act makes it an offence for any member of the staff of the ACC to divulge or communicate to any other person any information acquired by him or her in the performance of his or her duties otherwise than in connection with the performance of those duties under a relevant Act. One relevant Act is the ACC Act itself: see s 51(4). Insofar as they are relevant subsections 59(7) and (9) provide:
"(7) The CEO may give to:
(a) any law enforcement agency; or
(b) any foreign law enforcement agency; or
(c) …
any information that is in the ACC's possession and that is relevant to the activities of the agency or body if:
(d) it appears to the CEO to be appropriate to do so; and
(e) to do so would not be contrary to the law of the Commonwealth, a State or Territory that would otherwise apply.
…
(9) Where any information relating to the performances of the functions of:
(a) a Department of State of the Commonwealth …
(b) …
(c) …
comes into the possession of the ACC in the course of any operations or investigations conducted by it, the CEO may, if he or she considers it desirable to do so:
(d) furnish that information to the Department, the Administration or the instrumentality; and
(e) …"
The term "law enforcement agency" is defined in s 4, inter alia, to mean "any other authority or person responsible for the enforcement of the laws of the Commonwealth or of the States."
69 By s 59A of the ACC Act the CEO may delegate, by writing, all or any of the CEO's powers and functions to a member of staff of the ACC of Senior Executive Service level. It was common ground that Mr Considine (the author of the February communication and the November letter) and Mr Hellings (the author of the second part of the May letter) were members of the staff of the ACC but were not delegates of the CEO for the purpose of the exercise of the CEO's powers under s 59(7) or 59 (9) of the ACC Act. Such a delegation was however held by Mr Outram who was an SES level officer. Mr Outram gave evidence which was sustained under cross-examination that:
· He had responsibility for the management, co-ordination and control of all ACC investigations including Operation Wickenby.
· Due to the strategic importance of Operation Wickenby to the ACC, he personally spent a "significant amount of [his] time" on Operation Wickenby.
· He was personally aware that it was proposed to send the information, contained in the February communication and the May and November letters, to the recipients prior to those letters being sent.
· In each case, he had formed the view that it was appropriate, desirable and relevant to the functions or activities of the DPP and the Attorney-General's Department that the provision of the information to those agencies should occur for the purpose of facilitating the making of the mutual assistance request or furnishing the Swiss authorities with information which they had requested following the making of the request.
70 The applicants contend that the information contained in the February communication to the DPP did not relate to the functions of the DPP and that the CEO did not and could not have formed the view that it was appropriate to give that information to the DPP. They further contend that the information contained in the May and November letters did not relate to the functions of Switzerland and the CEO did not and could not have formed the view that it was appropriate to give the information to the Swiss authorities. The applicants also contend that it was not the function of the ACC to send any of the letters.
71 The applicants' submissions are founded, in part at least, on certain misstatements of fact. The May letter and the November letter were both sent to the Attorney-General's Department with the intention that the information contained in them would be forwarded to the Swiss authorities. It was a matter for the Attorney-General's Department to determine whether the letters would be forwarded to the Swiss authorities. It was necessary for the information to be forwarded to the Attorney-General's Department because it was the Central Office through which, in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty, communications relating to a mutual assistance request were to be channelled.
72 The DPP was a "law enforcement agency" for the purposes of s 59(7) of the Act. In AA Pty Ltd v Australian Crime Commission [2005] FCA 1178 at [19] Finkelstein J held that a Director of Public Prosecutions or an Attorney-General were persons who had general responsibility for the enforcement of the laws of the Commonwealth and were, therefore, law enforcement agencies for the purposes of s 59(7) of the ACC Act. Although his decision was overturned on other grounds by a Full Court (see Australian Crime Commission v AA Pty Ltd (2006) 149 FCR 540), this aspect of his Honour's reasons remained undisturbed. Indeed, the Full Court took a wider view of the term "law enforcement agency" than Finkelstein J had done.
73 The Attorney-General's Department is plainly a Department of State of the Commonwealth for the purposes of s 59(9)(a) of the DPP Act. The May and November letters were directed to this department. One of the functions of the department was to act as a Central Office in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty.
74 Before information held by the ACC could be sent to another agency the CEO or his delegate must first form the opinion that such a communication was "appropriate" (s 59(7)) or "desirable" (s 59(9)). In each case Mr Outram formed the necessary opinion prior to the letter being sent. He was not, however, the author of any of the letters; nor did he forward any of the letters to the recipients. This was done, in each case, by a member of the staff of the ACC who was not a delegate of the CEO for the purposes of s 59(7) or 59(9) of the DPP Act. For this reason, the applicants contend, each of the communications was unlawful. I do not accept this submission.
75 The issue which arises is whether a delegate is required personally to perform each and every act which it is necessary to perform to exercise the delegated power. Various decisions of high authority suggest that the answer to this question, in any given case, will depend on a range of considerations. The considerations include the exigencies attaching to the exercise of the power, whether or not the delegate has the capacity to exercise the power on each and every occasion it is likely to be exercised, the potential for the exercise of the power to impinge on the rights of others and the status of the agent: see Secretary, Department of Social Security v Alvaro (1994) 50 FCR 213 at 222-5. A delegate may be able to act through the agency of subordinates in performing some or all of the incidents of the exercise of delegated power.
76 In O'Reilly v Commissioners of the State Bank of Victoria (1982) 153 CLR 1 the High Court was called upon to determine the validity of certain notices given under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth). The Commissioner of Taxation had power to give the notices and he had delegated that power to Deputy Commissioners. Notices were given which bore a facsimile of the signature of a Deputy Commissioner which was stamped on the notices by the Chief Investigation Officer who had been authorised, by the Deputy Commissioner, to do so. The majority held that the notices were valid. Gibbs CJ (with whom Murphy J agreed) considered (at 12-13) that the Deputy Commissioner's delegated powers could be exercised through "a properly authorized officer". The Chief Investigation Officer was properly authorised notwithstanding the fact that the Deputy Commissioner had no personal knowledge that the officer intended to issue the particular notices. Wilson J (at 30-31) held that delegated power could be exercised through servants or agents. Mason J, in a dissenting judgment, was prepared to countenance the performance of ministerial acts by an agent of a delegate. His Honour said (at 18-19):
"Apart from any exercise of his powers of delegation the Commissioner may appoint agents to act on his behalf and in his name. But, having regard to the statutory provisions here, I do not think that the Commissioner can appoint an agent to act on his behalf in exercising a statutory discretion or a statutory power which involves the formation of an opinion, except perhaps on the footing that the Commissioner retains to himself the substantial exercise of discretion or the substantial formation of the opinion, or the exercise of substantial control over the exercise of the discretion or the formation of the opinion, leaving to the agent the ministerial act of communicating the decision or issuing the notice."
See generally, Campbell, "The Carltona Doctrine", (2007) 18 PLR 251.
77 The power conferred, by ss 59(7) and 59(9) on the CEO of the ACC or his delegate, Mr Outram, was conferred to facilitate departures from the general rule that information in the possession of the ACC should not be disseminated outside that body. The exercise of the power was conditional on the forming of value judgments as to the appropriateness or desirability or such dissemination. Information could only be communicated to a limited number of agencies. The significance which the legislature attached to the formation of the value judgments is indicated by the fact that, in each case, the judgment was to be formed by the CEO or a delegate drawn from the senior ranks (SES level) of the ACC. There was no evidence to suggest that the occasion for the exercise of power under s 59(7) or 59(9) was so frequent as to give rise to an assumption that the legislature could not have expected the CEO or a delegate personally to exercise the power. The exercise of the power had no direct effect on the rights of third parties but might, indirectly, have such an affect if the agency to whom the information was provided acted on it to the detriment of the third party.
78 These considerations suggest that the CEO or his delegate could not authorise other ACC officers to exercise the powers conferred by s 59(7) and s 59(9). Had Mr Outram purported to authorise Mr Considine or Mr Hellings to form the value judgments which lie at the heart of these statutory discretions, I would have been disposed to hold that the relevant disclosures had been made ultra vires. That is not, however, what occurred.
79 Mr Outram formed the necessary opinions upon which the exercise of the statutory discretions, provided for in ss 59(7) and 59(9), depended. He approved the sending of each of the letters. The acts of Mr Considine and Mr Hellings in composing, signing and sending the letters were, in my opinion, ministerial acts which they performed at the behest of and under the supervision of Mr Outram. No contravention of s 59(7) or s 59(9) the ACC Act occurred in relation to the forwarding of the letters to the DPP and the Attorney-General's Department.
80 Even had I formed a contrary view on the question of whether the three letters had been sent conformably with the requirements of the ACC Act, I would not have concluded that the legal efficacy of the mutual assistance request was thereby affected. Only the February communication predated the making of the request. The request was based on information supplied by the ACC but it was made by the delegate of the Attorney-General. There was no reason to suppose that the information had been provided by the ACC other than in good faith. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that the material was not believed by the ACC to constitute a fair summary of the results of its investigation to that point. The fact that the ACC may have acted in contravention of Australian domestic law in making the communication to the DPP who, in turn, passed it onto the Attorney-General's Department does not, on the evidence, provide a legal basis for the conclusion that the request was invalid.