THE PROPOSED TRADING STRATEGY
30 A lynch pin in the claims of the Famularo Parties is the proposed trading strategy that Mr Famularo says could have been put in place as at 10 April 2008. He says that the sum of $81 million, which was provided as security for contingent obligations under the call options, would have been freed by the putting in place of a strategy that was first set out in detail in affidavits sworn by Mr Famularo on 2 February 2010 and 4 February 2010. While hints of some strategy had previously been given, there was no evidence that any particular strategy was ever suggested to the Administrators in April 2008 or at any time before February 2010.
31 The strategy that Mr Famularo says could have been and should have been put in place involves several steps, all of which would have needed to be put in place at the same time, following the demand of 7 April 2008. The steps were briefly as follows:
· the shares in listed companies would be sold for approximately $345 million;
· the proceeds of sale would be applied in repaying the debt owing to Lift Partners leaving a credit balance of approximately $14 million;
· the put option positions would be sold generating a profit of approximately $16.6 million;
· the average strike price of the sold call options was $40; all sold call options having expiration dates before March 2010 would be closed out and rolled forward into an equivalent number of sold call options, with the same strike price, but having expiration dates of March 2010, generating a surplus of $19 million;
· 10,200 call options, with expiration dates of March 2009, and a strike price of $50, would be purchased, at a cost of $12 million.
32 Mr Famularo accepted that the risk in relation to the purchased call options, expiring in March 2009, as against the sold call options expiring in March 2010, would need to be managed. Mr Famularo's evidence was that, at the appropriate time, he would have sold BHP shares that enabled him to cover the liability in relation to the options.
33 There were 6,808 sold call options for BHP shares. Each option contract involved 1,000 shares. The expiry dates were June 2008, August 2008, September 2008 and March 2010. The strike price was an average of about $40. Mr Famularo says that he would have taken steps to convert all call options with an expiry date earlier than March 2010 into call options with an expiry date of March 2010 with the same strike price. That would have been achieved by buying call options with the earlier expiry dates and selling new call options expiring in March 2010. He says, having examined historical records, that rolling over the call options in that way would have generated approximately $19 million.
34 Mr Famularo then says that, shortly after 10 April 2008, and he gave no further detail as to how long after, he would have bought 10,200 call options at a strike price of $50 expiring in March 2009, as against the 6,808 sold call options expiring in March 2010 which had a strike price of $40. By further reference to historical records, Mr Famularo estimates that the cost of buying the 10,200 call options expiring in March 2009 would have been approximately $12 million.
35 Mr Famularo explained that the disparity in numbers between the 6,808 sold call options and the 10,200 bought call options was to provide further security in the event that BHP shares rose above $50. If the price of BHP shares increased significantly above $40, the open sold call options expiring in March 2010 would attract margin calls from the Clearing House, which the Famularo Parties would be liable to meet. Mr Famularo said that, in May 2008, when the price of BHP shares rose to $45 he would have purchased low exercise price options (LEPOs), expiring in December 2008, to protect against the liability for margin calls. Mr Famularo said he would have purchased 500 LEPOs, each contract being for 1000 BHP shares, at a cost of approximately $425,000. He says that, when the value of BHP shares fell below $45 in late June 2008, he would have closed out by selling the LEPOs. He estimates that the proceeds of closing out the LEPOs would have generated approximately $325,000 resulting in a loss of approximately $100,000 on the LEPOs. No indication was given as to how that loss would be funded. Indeed, in a letter to the Liquidators' solicitors, the solicitors then acting for the Famularo Parties indicated that the Famularo Parties have no assets.
36 Mr Famularo then went on to say, in his affidavit of 4 February 2010, that when, in late May or early June 2008, BHP shares reached a price of $48, he would have purchased 6,808 put options for a very small cost, with a strike price of $35 and an expiry date of March 2009. He would have taken that action because of his view that BHP shares had peaked at $48. However, he produced no record of having formed the opinion at that time, that the price of BHP shares had peaked.
37 Mr Famularo said that, once the BHP price fell below $45, the put options with a $35 strike rate would have become more valuable. He said that he would have held the put options while the BHP share price fell from $48 in May or June 2008 to $35 in September 2008. At that point, he would have sold the put options. He concludes that he would have made a profit on the sale of those put options of approximately $17 million.
38 A difficulty with the position of the Famularo Parties is that the strategy of purchasing call options to cover their liability under sold call options was not one that had been employed previously. Further, there was no suggestion that Mr Famularo, when faced with the demand of 7 April 2008, made any approach to the Administrators or Lift Partners or the Merrill Lynch Companies with a suggestion that there was a strategy that could be put in place that would have enabled the Famularo Parties to have complied with the demand, even if several days grace was needed. There was no suggestion that Mr Famularo ever asked for more time to comply with the demand. Even when faced with the proceeding in the Commercial List, the Famularo Parties failed to articulate the strategy outlined above as a basis for defending the claim by Lift Partners or as a basis for the cross-claim brought against Lift Partners.
39 In addition, in his affidavit of 2 February 2010, Mr Famularo gave evidence as to the trading strategy that he has employed for the Famularo Parties in the last 10 years. The strategy involved the following steps:
· The Famularo Parties traded only in blue chip companies, being those in the top 10 of listed securities on the ASX, which had a high probability of dividend income. The strategy involved trading principally in BHP and Telstra shares.
· Shares were bought with loan funds representing 100% of the purchase price.
· Where shares were purchased, put options would be acquired under which the Famularo Parties were entitled to require the other party to the option, at a fixed point in time, to purchase the shares at the price paid for the physical shares. The acquisition of the put option was a guarantee that, if the market value of the shares fell below the purchase price, the Famularo Parties would be able to meet the loan obligation by exercising the put option.
· Having purchased shares and put options, the Famularo Parties would then sell a call option entitling the other party to that option to purchase the shares for the price paid for the physical shares. The period of the sold call options would be a relatively long one, in the vicinity of three years. Because the period of the sold call options was a relatively long one, they attracted a premium. That is to say the other party to the call options would pay a price in excess of the price paid for the physical shares.
40 If the shares purchased in accordance with the strategy fell below the purchase price, the liability of the Famularo Parties to the lender was covered by the put options. If the share price increased above the purchase price, it was more likely that the call options would be exercised and the physical shares were available to meet those options.
41 The effect of such a strategy was that income was derived from dividends declared by the companies whose shares were purchased. Additional income was generated from the premiums received on the sale of the call options. The cost of the put options was funded by the Famularo Parties, but not with moneys lent by the financier. The combined effect of dividend income and premium payments was to generate sufficient income to meet the interest on the borrowed moneys, thereby generating a surplus or profit.
42 The strategy just outlined was adopted in relation to transactions with Lift Partners. The shares involved, as I have said, were principally BHP and Telstra shares, the purchase price for which was provided as to 100% by Lift Partners. Before any purchase, the Famularo Parties were required to outline the proposed purchase to Lift Partners and to obtain its consent, which was communicated on the basis that any purchase of shares would be covered by put options. The step of selling call options was not a requirement of Lift Partners, but was an additional strategy put in place by Mr Famularo himself. All shares purchased, together with put options, were held by Lift Nominees and were purchased by a broker approved by Lift Nominees, being Andrew West & Co or Morrison Securities. When shares and put options were purchased, the Famularo Parties received a contract note issued by one of those brokers.
43 It appears that, under trading rules of ASX the proceeds of the sale of shares are only available on the third day after the day of sale. Mr Famularo said that, had the shares owned by the Famularo Parties been available to sell when he received the notice of 7 April 2008, and he had taken immediate steps to sell them, the proceeds of sale could not have been available within the three days specified in the notice because of the trading rules just described. In any event, Mr Famularo said, the sale of the shares within three days would not have made any business sense, because such a sale would only depress the price. In that regard, Mr Famularo points to the fact that, when the Merrill Lynch Companies undertook the sale of shares, which yielded some $335 million, the sales took place over some 10 trading days. He says that selling more than $300 million worth of BHP and Telstra shares within three days would be likely to depress the sale price, thereby working to the disadvantage of both the mortgagor and the mortgagee. That is an aspect of the allegation that the giving of three days' notice, notwithstanding that it was in the contractual arrangement between the Famularo Parties and Lift Partners, was unreasonable and unconscionable, such that the notice itself was invalid or unenforceable.
44 In his affidavit of 4 February 2010, Mr Famularo said that Lift Partners, as mortgagee, could have sold the shares and put options to discharge the indebtedness to Lift Partners. It could have avoided exposing itself to a future liability under the call options by simultaneously transferring the sold call options to the Famularo Parties. He says that, by that means, the shares could have been released for sale, notwithstanding that they were held as security by the Clearing House, in circumstances where the Famularo Parties would then have had to manage the risk of exposure in the way described. Mr Famularo accepted that that would involve the provision of security. The provision of security would have been effected, he says, by the strategy that I have described.
45 While the strategy may have been feasible, it was never proposed to the Administrators of Lift Partners. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that much of the evidence summarised above was given with the benefit of hindsight.
46 In any event, Mr Famularo asserts that the Famularo Parties were deprived of a profit of approximately $51 million, determined as follows:
· net proceeds of the sale of shares and put options after
repayment of Lift Partners debt: $27 million;
· plus surplus on rolling over call options to March 2010: $19 million;
· less cost of purchasing call options expiring in March 2009: $12 million;
· less the loss on the LEPOs: $100,000;
· plus profit on the sale of further BHP options: $17 million.
That is the amount for which Mr Famularo says the Famularo Parties should be treated as creditors.