8 Beyond attempting to introduce into evidence the unproved document to which I have referred, the defendant has taken no steps to give evidence about the meeting of December 2004. The defendant has, however, produced accounts of the plaintiff company in which "royalty deductions" of $29,510 for 2005, $50,664.17 for 2006 and $57,297.24 for 2007 are recorded as expenses. These amounts correspond with amounts in the statutory demand. The accounts concerned are for the 2006 and 2007 years. The 2006 document is signed by Mrs Radus as a director but carries no other director's signature. There is also a signed report of the accountants Kargas & Co Pty Limited, but this makes it clear that that firm relied on information provided by the directors and conducted no verification, validation, audit or review. There is no signature at all on the accounts for the 2007 year.
9 It is clear on the evidence that there is a genuine dispute as to the existence of the royalty agreement on which the defendant relies. On the material before the court there were oral discussions on or about 20 December 2004 giving rise at the most to questions of the kind that would normally be explored in accordance with the principles in Masters v Cameron [1954] HCA 72; (1954) 91 CLR 353. That would remain the case even if the defendant were to get into evidence the unsigned "Memorandum of Understanding".
10 The task of the court upon an application such as this is not to come to a conclusion on the question whether money is payable by one party to the other. It is merely to decide whether there is a dispute as to the indebtedness and, if so, whether that dispute is a genuine dispute. I refer in this connection to the well known formula in Eyota Pty Ltd v Hanave Pty Ltd (1994) 12 ACSR 785. There is on those principles, a genuine dispute in this matter. The alleged debt will be shown to exist, if at all, only if properly constituted debt proceedings are brought by the defendant and a full factual inquiry is undertaken at that level.
11 I therefore order the statutory demand dated 20 August 2008 served on the plaintiff by the defendant be set aside. I shall invite submissions on costs in a moment. Before doing so, I desire to make some observations about the history of these proceedings.
12 The originating process was, as I have said, filed on 17 September 2008. Thereafter, the matter was before the court on no less than 16 occasions for directions. The first such occasion was on 17 October 2008, the last on 29 March 2010. On many of these occasions the matter was simply stood over to a later date by consent. Directions in relation to evidence seem to have been first made on 13 July 2009, more than nine months after the proceedings were initiated. Those directions were not complied with by the defendant, at least on the face of the court file. Directions regarding evidence were again made on 29 March 2010 and the matter was at that point listed for hearing today. Again, there was no compliance by the defendant, and when the matter came before me today the defendant sought a further adjournment so that he could put on evidence. I refused that application and proceeded with the hearing in the course of which the solicitor for the defendant sought and was granted without opposition leave to file in court an affidavit of limited compass.
13 It must be emphasised that s 459G applications are not to be approached by the parties as some form of holding pattern or a formalised negotiation arena while they try to settle their differences. The procedure is expected to be a swift and efficient one under which the existence or non-existence of a genuine dispute is determined promptly and in a relatively summary way so that it can be seen without undue delay whether grounds for the presentation of a winding up position exist. A simple matter such as this should not have been before the Registrar on numerous successive occasions in the way that it was.
14 The new Practice Note SCEq 4 states in paragraph 27 that the parties to a statutory demand case must agree on a timetable that makes it ready for hearing promptly after its first return date before the Corporations Registrar. That is a requirement to which the Registrar will in future give particular attention. Parties will not be allowed simply to stand statutory demand matters over by consent time and time again. If the expectation outlined in paragraph 27 of the practice note is not taken to heart by the parties in the way that they are meant to observe it, then the Registrar will refer the matter to the Corporations Judge and a hearing date will be allocated promptly so that the matter can be brought to a head.