Mr Wiesemes' evidence:
Mr O'Connor: And it's true, isn't it, that you've never done any comprehensive testing to prove one way or another whether the pool is lifted?
Mr Wiesemes: No, I haven't jumped into the pool, I wasn't prepared to jump into the pool on that day.
…
Mr O'Connor: You've heard what Mr Nakhla said about the lack of testing to show that the pool was lifting or floating, did you accept that at the 2 June conclave that there was no testing done that proves the pool was floating or lifting?
Mr Wiesemes: No, there was no testing done.
Mr O'Connor: it is true that the basis of your conclusion is the opinion of the - sorry, I'll withdraw that. That the basis of your opinion that the pool was floating or lifting is really the observation of Mr and Mrs Luscombe or their friends and family?
Mr Wiesemes: yes, certainly Mr and Mrs Luscombe and of course, my experience.
- Leaving aside for the moment the fact that the Tribunal was not provided with a transcript for the purpose of preparing its reasons, the approach taken by the builder in making these submissions is to select elements of oral evidence to which the Tribunal has not referred as a basis for criticising the reasons provided. In effect, the builder says particular evidence should have been referred to and expressly dealt with by the Tribunal in its reasons and the failure to do so render the reasons inadequate.
- However, this approach is not consistent with what the Court of Appeal said in Orr. In this regard the following comments of Bell P are relevant:
73 In this context, in Cypressvale Pty Ltd v Retail Shop Leases Tribunal [1996] 2 Qd R 462 at 477; [1995] QCA 187, Fitzgerald P said of the Queensland Retail Shop Leases Tribunal, adapting the language of Samuels JA in the unreported decision of this Court in Strbak v Newton (Court of Appeal (NSW), Samuels JA, 18 July 1989, unrep) (Strbak), cited in Xuereb v Viola (1988) 18 NSWLR 453 at 469, that, while such a tribunal:
"might not be required to 'submit the material before [it] to the most meticulous analysis and carry into [the reasons for its decisions] a detailed exposition of every aspect of the evidence and the arguments ...' or '... incorporate an extended intellectual dissertation upon the chain of reasoning ...', at least 'a basic explanation of the fundamental reasons which led the [Tribunal] to [its] conclusion ...' is necessary".
It should be noted that Samuels JA in Strbak had been describing the duty of a District Court judge to give reasons as opposed to that of a tribunal member.
74 In Tatmar at 386, Mahoney JA (as he then was) observed in the context of the obligation to give reasons for a discretionary judgment that it was not necessary for a judge:
"who is exercising a discretionary judgment to detail each factor which he has found to be relevant or irrelevant, or to itemi[s]e, for example, in the assessment of damages for tort, each of the factual matters to which he has had regard: see O'Hara v Evans (Court of Appeal, 23rd September, 1976, unreported; Colacicco v Colacicco (Court of Appeal, 15th March, 1977, unreported). ... Nor is a judge required to make an explicit finding on each disputed piece of evidence. It will be sufficient, if the inference as to what is found is appropriately clear: see Selvanayagam v University of the West Indies [1983] 1 WLR 585, at 587, 588; [1983] 1 All ER 824 at 826.
But, subject to matters such as these, the basis of the decision of a trial judge or of an intermediate court of appeal should be made apparent. This does not mean that the reasons given need to elaborate: an elaborate argument may not require an elaborate answer. Reasons need be given only so far as is necessary to indicate to the parties why the decision was made and to allow them to exercise such rights as may be available to them in respect of it."
75 To like effect, in Public Service Association and Professional Officers' Association Amalgamated Union of New South Wales v Secretary of the Treasury [2014] NSWCA 112 at [46], Basten JA said:
"Generally, the concept of 'reasons' requires an explanation connecting any findings of fact with the ultimate decision. Where the legal test to be applied involves an evaluative judgment, it may well not be practicable to provide a detailed articulation as to how specified (and conflicting) factors have been weighed in the balance; the scope of the obligation must recognise that constraint. (A different question arises if mandatory considerations have not been identified.)" (emphasis added)
76 What constitutes adequate reasoning on the part of a tribunal is also informed, in my opinion, by statements from well-known administrative law decisions relating to the limits of judicial review and the need for practical as well as principled restraint in that context: Pozzolanic at 287.
77 These principles include the following:
(i) "Decision-makers commonly express their reasons sequentially; but that does not mean that they decide each factual issue in isolation from the others. Ordinarily they review the whole of the evidence, and consider all issues of fact, before they write anything. Expression of conclusions in a certain sequence does not indicate a failure to consider the evidence as a whole": Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Re; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002; Appellant S106/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2003] HCA 30; 77 ALJR 1165 per Gleeson CJ at [14] (Ex parte Applicant);
(ii) the court should not read passages from the reasons for decision in isolation from others to which they may be related: Re Maria Politis v Commissioner of Taxation [1988] FCA 739 at [14]; 20 ATR 108 at 111;
(iii) the reasons must be read fairly and as a whole: Ex parte Applicant at [147] per Kirby J; Wu Shan Liang at 291; Bisley at 251;
(iv) the reasons recorded ought not to be inspected with a fine tooth-comb attuned to identifying error: Collector of Customs v Pozzolanic Enterprises Pty Ltd (1993) 43 FCR 280 at 287; [1993] FCA 456 (Pozzolanic) at 287; Wu Shan Liang at 272, 291;
(v) there should be a degree of tolerance for looseness in the language of the tribunal, unhappy phrasing of the tribunal's thoughts or verbal slips: Pozzolanic at 287, Wu Shu Liang at 272 and 291.
- In the present case the Tribunal:
1. accepted the evidence of Mr Luscombe. The observations made by Mr Luscombe concerning the pool floor being spongy did not require specialist expertise. He was not challenged about those matters.
2. accepted the evidence of Mr Wiesemes and Mr Nash-Smith that the walls above, at and below the waterline were drummy when tested in a method none of the experts criticised. Indeed, all experts appear to have applied the same testing methods. In this context, the Tribunal reviewed the evidence of Mr Nakhla and noted this expert "does not disagree the tonal changes near the waterline are evidence that the backfill has moved and settled" and that Mr Nakhla "does not attempt to dispel that opinion".
3. The Tribunal identified evidence of unsuitable material being the observations made by Mr Wiesemes as to the loose, uncompacted backfill and the evidence concerning the constituency of the backfill core samples taken by Mr Nash-Smith and subject of the Boral report and a further report of Mr Nash-Smith. This supported those experts' opinions concerning their observations and assessment. The evidence of Mr Rickard in response, referred to the Tribunal at [67], commenting on some of this material, was no more than a disagreement with the opinions expressed, based on what Mr Rickard had been told by the builder and otherwise unsupported by any relevant testing. Certainly, in this appeal, we have not been referred to any evidence of Mr Rickard where he himself carried out an inspection of the backfill material, either by hand or by core sampling.
4. These findings were sufficient to justify a conclusion that the backfill had displaced and was no longer providing support.
5. As to the spongy floor, the Tribunal identified both the evidence concerning absence of any discernible concave deflection (as might be present if the base material had not been appropriately screed) and the mechanism of the side walls of the pool floor moving as explaining this defect.
6. It was not otherwise suggested that removal and replacement of the pool shell was unnecessary to rectify the defects found.
- While the evidence the builder refers to suggest that the pool had not "floated", this evidence is somewhat ambiguous in nature. In one sense, if the pool shell is unsupported either underneath or on its sides, it is floating even if the whole of the shell is not displaced around the bond beams or has not come out of the ground. Whether or not this semantic analysis has any validity, the short point is that the Tribunal clearly accepted that
1. the pool floor was spongy;
2. the walls of the pool were drummy; and
3. the backfill material was insufficient both as to its constitution and placement.
- In relation to the first matter, there was no evidence to contradict Mr Luscombe, the experts accepting that no expert had entered the pool to test whether Mr Luscombe's observations were correct. In the absence of any other evidence, including from an expert getting into the swimming pool, it was entitled to accept Mr Luscombe's observations and there is no relevant absence of reasoning.
- In relation to the second and third matters, the evidence referred to by the builder in its submissions did not contradict the findings concerning the constitution of the backfill. Further, the observations made did not displace the conclusions concerning the placement of the backfill, and that it was not compacted. Lastly, the Tribunal explained why it preferred the evidence of the owners' experts about drumminess at [115].
- It was not submitted that what was said by the Tribunal at [115] about those experts' opinions was wrong. Rather, the challenge is ultimately a criticism that there was some evidence that was not referred to, but there is no explanation why this evidence would displace the evidence of Mr Luscombe or that of the owners' experts concerning sponginess of the pool floor, drumminess of the pool walls and the use of non-conforming backfill which had not been adequately compacted. Having regard to the principles in Orr set out above, the conclusions reached did not require an analysis or explanation of the evidence to which the builder refers in the manner contended.
- In relation to ground 2, which relates to the Tribunal statement at [108] concerning cement in the aggregate base material, this issue was dealt with above.
- In relation to ground 3, which relates to the Tribunal statement of the Tribunal at [96] that it was "impossible to separate forensically" issues 2, 3 and 4, as we explained above this statement, even if erroneous, had no relevance to the Tribunal's conclusions.
- In relation to grounds 4 and 5, which concern the evidence of Mr Galea, for the reasons stated above, these grounds are not made out.