27 To the extent that it was relevant, the respondents' submission, that the transitional provisions were provided in Schedules to the Act, it was clear that there were other places within the Act where transitional provisions were made including Regulation Part 1 Division 2, Regulation 1.2 and Part 4 Divisions 2-12. In any event, the validity of the regulation did not depend upon it being classified as being a savings or transitional provision. Even so, the wide scope of the delegated power in s 846 could not exclude a regulation that met that description and where it was permitted by the principal Act.
28 It was also erroneous to categorise the regulation as addressing litigation and proceedings already commenced rather than the operation of State law. On its face, the regulation was expressly directed to a law of the State.
29 As to the construction of the regulation, it was not open, as suggested by the respondents, to focus upon only one aspect of a law of a State such as s 106(5). In any event, s 106(5), by its very terms, was an integral part of the power to vary or avoid unfair contracts. Further, it was established that the powers to deal with unfair contracts extended to the making of money orders against a non-party to a contract (see Visalli v Southwell (1988) 12 NSWLR 502).
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE COMMONWEALTH ATTORNEY-GENERAL
30 The Commonwealth firstly addressed the objects of s 16 of the Act submitting that, broadly speaking, it was to ensure that the Workplace Relations Act 1996 as amended by the Work Choices amendments was to operate to the exclusion of present and future State and Territory industrial regimes in their application to "employers" and "employees" who fall within the constitutional coverage of that Act. This was made plain by paragraph 70 of the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005 Explanatory Memorandum.
31 The broad position brought about by s 16(1) was conditional upon the express exceptions contained in s 16(2). A wide range of matters were excepted under sub-section 2(a), (c) and sub-section (3). Section 16(2)(b) provided a flexible mechanism for permitting State or Territory laws that would otherwise be excluded so that they could continue to have operation in the circumstances ("so far as") prescribed in the regulations. It was to be noted that s 16(4) provided a mechanism for specifying additional laws in respect to which the Workplace Relations Act 1996 was intended to apply and to the exclusion of: that specification could be achieved in regulations.
32 In relation to the applicant's submission that he had commenced proceedings under s 106 of the Industrial Relations Act (NSW) prior to the commencement of the Workplace Relations Amendment Act and had thereby accrued a right and that, according to established principles of statutory interpretation, s 16(1) of the Workplace Relations Act should not be read as extinguishing an existing right unless the contrary intention appears, the Attorney-General submitted that s 16(1) was designed to bring about a position that employment and industrial relations between "employers" and "employees" were to be governed by the Workplace Relations Act to the exclusion of State and Territory laws except where the Act specifically permitted such laws to continue to have some operation.
33 In those circumstances, there could be no doubt that pending proceedings under State laws would be rendered nugatory in many instances. For example applications for the variation of an award applying to "employers" and "employees", such variation necessarily involving the creation of new rights between such persons, would be excluded under s 16(1). It was clear that s 16(1) contained a contrary intention to any proceedings in State bodies continuing under State law if those proceedings involved or might involve the creation of new rights as between "employer" and "employee" - it was not an answer that an applicant in such a proceeding had an accrued right to have an application heard and determined.
34 An application under s 106 of the Industrial Relations Act (NSW) involved or could involve the variation of rights and hence the creation of new rights. To this extent, s 106 of the Act would be excluded in its application to "employers" and "employees" by the operation of s 16(1)(a) and (d) subject to s 16(2)(b). It was observed the right that the applicant had accrued was a right to have his application heard and determined (Colley v Futurebrand FHA Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 291 at [31]; Fisher v Madden (2002) 114 IR 119 at [12]). There was a clear contrary intention in s 16(1) against such rights continuing, at least where the pending application was the creation of new rights.
35 It was submitted that the construction of the regulation was clear - it provided that s 16(1) did not apply to a law of the State or a Territory, including a law relating to appeals to the extent to which that law related to proceedings that commenced before the reform commencement and provided for the variation or setting aside of rights and obligations arising under a contract of employment or another arrangement of employment that a court or tribunal finds unfair. The provision involved the characterisation of the law or laws in issue. In the present case, proceedings had been commenced before the reform amendments under laws making provision of the kind mentioned in the regulations. There did not appear to be any dispute between the parties that the Industrial Relations Act (NSW) to the extent that it was relied upon for the purposes of the present proceedings as against the first to ninth respondents, was a law of the kind described in the regulation.
36 In relation to the application to join the tenth respondent, the Court was required to identify the relevant provision allowing joinder and that appeared to be either s 170 of the New South Wales Act, or s 185. Given that the New South Wales Act made provision of the kind referred to in the regulation, the Court had to determine whether these laws "relate to" a proceeding that had been commenced: given the breadth of the term "relate to", that would readily be the case. The Attorney-General submitted that the effect of the regulation, in relation to the joinder of the tenth respondent, was that s 16(1) did not apply to s 170 or s 185 of the New South Wales Act to the extent to which they related to the present proceedings.
37 The submission addressed whether or not the regulation was invalid either because it was ultra vires or because the regulation or the relevant regulation-making power was unconstitutional. The question of ultra vires arose in the sense that the regulation was not made pursuant to an applicable source of power or because it was repugnant to the Workplace Relations Act.
38 Workplace Relations Regulations were made under both the Workplace Relations Act and the Workplace Relations Amendment Act (Work Choices). Section 846(1)(a) provided that the Governor-General may make regulations not inconsistent with the Act prescribing all matters "required or permitted" by the Act to be prescribed. Section 16(2)(b) referred to laws which were "prescribed by the Regulations". Section 16(2)(b) thus contemplated and "permits" that law may be prescribed for the purposes of that paragraph. Section 846(1)(a) therefore empowered the Governor-General to make regulations prescribing "laws" for the purpose of s 16(2)(b), this being "a matter" that was permitted by the Act to be prescribed. In light of this position, it was unnecessary to consider the alternative source of power under s 846(1)(b) or the authorities relied upon by the respondents concerning the phrase "necessary or convenient".
39 Whether the regulation was a valid exercise of the power to prescribe a matter for the purposes of s 16(2)(b) depended upon whether the regulation prescribed "a law" in the sense contemplated by s 16(2)(b). It was to be noted that the regulation did not prescribe a "law" by merely identifying a law by name, but prescribed a certain type of law to the extent to which it provided for certain matters and related to certain proceedings. Section 16(2)(b) provided that s 16(1) did not apply to a law of a State or Territory "so far as the law was prescribed by the regulations as a law to which sub-section (1) did not apply". It was submitted that the inclusion of the phrase "so far as" was significant in that it contemplated the regulations may prescribe certain laws to be excluded from the operation of s 16(1) to a defined extent without necessarily excluding the law for all purposes. The Legislature had intended that the regulations could do nothing more or less than identify laws which for all purposes would be excluded in their entirety from the operation of s 16(1): it could have stipulated in s 16(2) that sub-section (1) would not apply to a law that was prescribed by the regulations but, instead, the inclusion of the phrase "so far as" conferred a discretion on the maker of the regulations not only to identify the law which was to be saved from the operation of s 16(1) but also to prescribe the extent to which the law would be so saved.
40 This approach to the regulation-making power under s 16(2)(b) was consistent with the fact that s 16(1) itself dealt with the exclusion of laws "so far as" they would otherwise apply in relation to an employee or employer. Section 16(1) did not purport to exclude law simpliciter but only laws to the extent that they related to an employee or employer as defined. Section 16(2)(b) picked up the same concept in providing that sub-section (1) itself did not apply to the law of the State or Territory "so far as" the law was prescribed by the regulations as a law to which sub-section (1) did not apply. It was entirely consistent with this scheme that the regulation prescribed a law as not applying to the extent to which it provided for certain matters and related to certain proceedings rather than for all purposes.
41 It was noted in the alternative that, if there was some concern that the regulation was not validly made pursuant to the power conferred on the Governor-General by s 846, then there was an alternative source of regulation-making power in Clause 1 Schedule 4 of the Amendment Act. That clause dealt with the making of regulations for transitional provisions and consequential amendments. The regulations were described as being made under both the Workplace Relations Act and the Workplace Relations Amendment Act (Work Choices). There was nothing in the terms of Regulation 1.2(5) to indicate that the regulation was necessarily a regulation made pursuant to s 846 of the Act rather than a regulation made pursuant to Clause 1 of Schedule 4 of the Amendment Act. In any event, delegated legislation was valid if there was a source of power for the legislation even if the source of power had been misdescribed (Brown v West (1990) 169 CLR 195 at 203).
42 The regulations were concerned with preserving pending proceedings that were instituted before the commencement of the Amendment Act - as such, it was a provision of a "savings" or "transitional" nature relating to amendments introduced by the Amendment Act in the sense that it preserved pending proceedings that were otherwise effectively extinguished by the commencement of the amendment. Accordingly, the regulation was within the scope of the power conferred on the Governor-General by Clause 1, Schedule 4 of the Amendment Act. Savings provisions were, of their nature, designed to preserve aspects of the previous legal order, at least for some period, and were authorised to do so. As such, no question of repugnancy could arise from the fact that a regulation made under such a power saved identified matters or proceedings.
43 The respondents' submission that the regulation was repugnant to the Workplace Relations Act was unsustainable when s 16 was read as a whole. Section 16(1) provided that the Act was intended to apply to the exclusion of certain State and Territory laws but s 16(2) expressly provided that sub-section (1) did not apply to a law of a State or Territory so far as that law came within the terms of sub-section (a), (b) or (c). Section 16(1) was therefore clearly expressed to be subject to s 16(2). If a regulation such as regulation 1.2(5) prescribed a law for the purposes of s 16(2)(b) to be a law to which s 16(1) did not apply, that was simply giving the intended operation to the statutory scheme created in s 16: there could be no sound basis for suggesting that, in those circumstances, such a regulation was repugnant to s 16(1).
44 The respondents' contention that s 16(1)(d) manifested an intention to cover the field in respect of unfair contracts of employment in relation to unfair contract cases that were pending at the commencement of the Work Choices amendments failed to take into account that s 16 had to be read as a whole. Having regard to the provisions of s 16(2), it could not be contended that s 16(1)(d) manifested such an unconditional intention.
45 The Attorney-General also submitted that the respondents' suggestion that the regulation purported to remove an inconsistency that was created by the operation of s 109 of the Constitution in fact rested on a mischaracterisation of the regulation in s 16. Pursuant to s 16, the Commonwealth had manifested its intention to cover the field in respect of certain matters. The intention to cover a particular field will in turn affect the operation of s 109 of the Constitution (Ex parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472). Section 16 must be read as a whole. To determine the extent of the field intended to be covered by the legislation it was necessary to have regard to s 16(1) and s 16(2) and the regulations made thereunder which determine that extent. The approach did not involve a sequential two-stage process but one process of determining the field to be covered. The regulation came into effect at the same time as s 16 of the Act, contrary to the respondents' argument that this involved removing an inconsistency that arose by virtue of s 109 of the Constitution: rather, it was part of the statutory condition in respect of which s 109 of the Constitution operated. There was no constitutional principle to the effect that the Commonwealth cannot modify, by way of regulations, the statutory manifestation of its intention to cover or not cover a particular field.
46 The respondents had also submitted that any provision purporting to confer power on the Governor-General to make the regulation was invalid because it contravened the separation of powers mandated by the Constitution and/or because it constituted an abdication of legislative power by the Commonwealth. Similar issues had been raised in a recent challenge to the Amendment Act heard by the High Court in which judgment is currently reserved. The Attorney-General noted that the High Court had recognised that the separation of powers affected by the Constitution does not make the Parliament the exclusive repository of the legislative power of the Commonwealth and does not preclude the delegation of the legislative power by the Parliament to the executive in such terms that the repository of the power is free to exercise its own discretion and judgment (see Capital Duplicators).
47 In Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd & Meakes v Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73, the High Court upheld the validity of s 3 of the Transport Workers Act 1928 (Cth) which conferred upon the Governor-General the power to make regulations not inconsistent with that Act but which could be inconsistent with other Acts with respect to the employment of transport workers and, in particular, for regulating the engagement, service and discharge of such work, the licensing of persons engaged as transport workers, for the regulating or prohibiting the employment of unlicensed persons as transport workers and for the protection of transport workers. The Act did not lay down guiding principles for the exercise of the regulation-making power that it conferred but the powers were upheld. Dixon J (as he then was) noted (obiter) at 101 the possibility that a regulation-making power might be conferred in terms so broad that:
There may be such a width or such an uncertainty of the subject matters to be handed over that the enactment attempting it is not a law with respect to any particular head or heads of legislative power.
48 It was submitted that the limitation expressed by Dixon J in this passage was addressed to an extreme scenario and should not be misconstrued so as to suggest that there was a general constitutional prohibition against the delegation of legislative power to the executive. In the present case, there was no basis for contending that the power to make regulations conferred on the Governor-General by either s 846(1)(a) and the Workplace Relations Act or Clause 1, Schedule 4 of the Amendment Act infringed the limitation suggested by Dixon J. Section 846 empowered the Governor-General to make regulations prescribing matters "required or permitted" by the Act to be prescribed and this power was necessarily circumscribed by the matters covered by the Workplace Relations Act which must by definition be within the scope of Commonwealth legislative power. In such circumstances, it could not be said that there was such a "width" or "uncertainty" of subject matter delegated to the Governor-General that the regulation-making power was not a law with respect to any particular head or heads of power. In relation to Clause 1, Schedule 4 of the Amendment, Act, the Governor-General was only empowered to make regulations of a transitional, savings or application nature. The power was thus confined by the boundaries of the Act and could not be said to infringe the principles referred to by Dixon J.
49 In relation to the submission that the regulation amounted to an abdication of legislative power, the Attorney-General noted that in Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) (2004) 220 CLR 338 the Commonwealth retained the power to repeal or amend at any time any provision of the Act under consideration and there could be no abdication of the legislative power of the Parliament. Further, under that Act, there was a provision that a notice was a disallowable instrument for the purposes of s 46A of the Acts Interpretation Act thereby attracting powers of disallowance exercised by either House of Parliament: thus the submission as to impermissible delegation failed.
50 In Capital Duplicators, Mason CJ, Dawson & McHugh JJ (at 265) stated:
There are very considerable difficulties in the concept of an unconstitutional abdication of power by Parliament. So long as Parliament retains the power to repeal or amend the authority which it confers upon another body to make laws with respect to a head or heads of legislative power entrusted to the Parliament, it is not easy to see how the conferral of that authority amounts to an abdication of power. And, in the present case, Parliament not only retains its power of repeal, but also provides by means of ss 29 and 35, for the disallowance of enactments of the Assembly.