The future conduct of these proceedings
63 The dismissal of both the present applications based on what are essentially common procedural defects in the notices for the meetings concerned is most unlikely to resolve the underlying dispute that clearly exists within the Bigambul NTCG. The alternative, or additional, submissions put forward on behalf of both the Carseldine applicants and the Bigambul Applicant as to what should happen in these proceedings beyond determining the present applications demonstrate this. Thus, Mr Liddy submitted that, in addition to removing Sally as an apical ancestor at this point, the Court should order a meeting of the Bigambul NTCG under s 84D of the Act: see at [43] above. For his part, at the last minute, Mr Hardie sought to amend the Bigambul Applicant's application to include an application that leave be granted to the Bigambul Applicant to discontinue the Bigambul claim on the basis that the Bigambul NTCG as reconstituted at the Cherbourg and Brisbane meetings would file a new claim within 14 days. That application to amend was opposed by Mr Liddy and subsequently rejected on case management and futility grounds.
64 Before considering Mr Liddy's submission about s 84D, it is appropriate to identify more precisely the nature of the underlying dispute that exists within the Bigambul NTCG. While one of the original sources of dispute within the claim group now appears to be agreed - that Sally was not a Bigambul person and therefore she should be removed as an apical ancestor from the Bigambul NTCG - there clearly remains a dispute about which, if any, other apical ancestors should be added to the native title claim group. It follows that the critical underlying dispute therefore relates to the composition of the native title claim group. As Dowsett J has observed in the past, that is quintessentially a matter for the native title claim group itself to determine, acting in accordance with its traditional laws and customs: see Aplin on behalf of the Waanyi Peoples v State of Queensland [2010] FCA 625 at [256]-[258].
65 For this reason, I do not consider s 84D of the Act applies, at least at this point in time, to the present situation. That section is directed to resolving questions about the authority of the authorised applicant to act at all, or to act in a particular way: see s 84D(3). It is not directed to resolving disputes about the composition of the native title claim group. Nonetheless, this should not be taken as excluding the possible use of s 84D in these proceedings if it eventually emerges that this critical underlying issue about the composition of the Bigambul native title claim group can only be resolved at a trial of these proceedings. In that event, the anterior question about the proper authorisation of the applicant by the native title claim group, the members of which are the true native title holders in the sense that they are ultimately held to be such by the Court, may well become problematic. In those circumstances, it may become necessary to consider whether s 84D(4) of the Act can be relied upon to facilitate that trial.
66 Notwithstanding this conclusion about s 84D, two things are clear: that as a first step to attempting to resolve the underlying dispute that exists within the Bigambul native title claim group, there has to be a meeting or meetings of that claim group so that it can be given the opportunity to determine its composition in accordance with its traditional laws and customs; and before any such meeting or meetings can be convened and conducted, there is a number of preliminary matters that have to be determined, including the location, timing and chairing of the meeting or meetings concerned. Whilst both Mr Liddy and Mr Hardie made some submissions about the location of such a meeting and Mr Liddy indicated on behalf of QSNTS that it would be willing to meet the costs of convening and conducting a meeting, I do not consider I received detailed and considered submissions on the full range of matters that needs to be determined before any such meeting could be convened and conducted. Furthermore, given the long history of disputation between these two groups within the Bigambul NTCG, it seems unlikely that these preliminary matters will be readily agreed without the assistance of an independent third party.
67 If these preliminary matters are not agreed, the meeting or meetings described above are not likely to be convened and conducted. In that event, the dispute about the composition of the Bigambul native title claim group is not likely to be resolved and, as a consequence, these proceedings are likely to be stifled. The Court's jurisdiction under ss 13, 81 and 213 of the Act, together with provisions such as ss 22, 23 and 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), extend to allowing it to make orders that are appropriate to protect and enforce the rights of parties in matters before it and to achieve the just resolution of proceedings before it, according to law, as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible. The Court also has the power under s 86B of the Act to refer the whole, or part, of a native title proceeding to mediation. The identification of "the persons … who, according to their traditional laws and customs, hold the common or group rights and interests comprising the particular native title claimed" is fundamental to the right of a native title claim group to authorise an applicant to make an application under s 61 of the Act. While it is possible for a native title determination application to proceed to trial without this identification issue being resolved, the usual course provided for in the scheme of the Act is for the native title claim group to resolve it, at or near the outset of proceedings, in accordance with its traditional laws and customs. Given all these considerations, I consider that, quite apart from s 84D of the Act, the Court has ample power to make orders to attempt to achieve a resolution of the present dispute within the Bigambul native title claim group so that these proceedings may proceed to trial following the usual course provided for in the Act.
68 Accordingly, I propose to refer the parties to the present applications, viz the Carseldine applicants and the Bigambul Applicant, to a mediation before the Deputy District Registrar (Native Title) directed to attempting to reach agreement about all of the preliminary matters necessary to ensure that the meeting or meetings of the Bigambul claim group described above are convened and conducted. While the following is by no means an exhaustive list, it seems to me that these matters will need to be agreed in the course of this mediation:
(a) the time, date and location of the meeting or meetings;
(b) the form of a proper notice for the meeting or meetings;
(c) the agenda for the meeting or meetings;
(d) the chairperson for the meeting or meetings;
(e) the provision of transport to those members of the claim group who reside away from the agreed location of the meeting or meetings
(f) who is to meet the costs of convening and conducting the meeting or meetings and providing transport to and from them.
69 There are two final matters I should mention before concluding these reasons. First, because the attendances at the two competing meetings held on 15 October 2011 demonstrate that these two groups within the Bigambul native title claim group are of approximately equal size (Carseldine meeting - 118 and Goondiwindi meeting - more than 150, including the descendants of Sally: see at [13] and [17] above respectively), I do not consider the Carseldine applicants can be characterised as a dissentient minority who are seeking to raise an intramural dispute: see Bidjara People #2 v Queensland [2003] FCA 324 at [7] per Ryan J and Starkey v South Australia (2011) 193 FCR 450; [2011] FCA 456 at [47]-[66], but particularly [52]-[55], per Mansfield J. Secondly, the position that prevails in these proceedings, following the dismissal of these two applications, is different from that which applied in Mandandanji. In this case, the Bigambul Applicant remains as the authorised applicant for the existing Bigambul NTCG whereas, in Mandandanji, after the applications before the Court were disposed of, there was no longer an applicant authorised by the claim group to prosecute the proceedings: see Mandandanji at [55]. For this reason, I do not consider it is presently necessary to determine whether to make preservation orders of the kind that were made by Rares J in Mandandanji (see the discussion in Mandandanji at [60]-[71] and the subsequent decision of Weribone on behalf of the Mandandanji People v State of Queensland (No 2) [2013] FCA 485). I mention this issue because the possibility that I might proceed to make similar orders was the subject of some debate during the hearing of these applications. However, I would add this rider. While Mandandanji-type orders are not necessary at this particular point in these proceedings, that does not mean that they may not be appropriate in the future if the dispute about the composition of the Bigambul native title claim group cannot be resolved and these proceedings have to proceed to trial to resolve that fundamental question.