The FWC Order
9 On 10 September 2013, HYLC (both the joint venture and the individual companies) made an application to the Fair Work Commission ("FWC") for an order under subs 418(1) of the FW Act against 16 employees who worked on the site. That subsection provides that, in certain circumstances, the FWC must make an order that industrial action that is not protected industrial action and that is happening or is threatened or is being organised either stop, not occur or not be organised for a period specified in the order. The period specified in the order is referred to in the subsection as "the stop period". The concept of "protected industrial action" is defined in s 408 of the FW Act, but it is not necessary at this stage to set out the details. Subsection 418(3) of the FW Act provides that, in making the order under subs 418(1), the FWC does not have to specify the particular industrial action which is to stop, not occur or not be organised.
10 HYLC's application for an order under subs 418(1) came on for hearing before Senior Deputy President O'Callaghan. He described the rival contentions as follows:
[13] The Joint Venture position was that the nominated employees had been, up until the time the application was made, engaging in frequent unprotected industrial action in the form of stoppages of work, a refusal to work overtime and reduced work outputs and, further, that most of this industrial action was taken on the basis of assertions that it was related to safety concerns which were not based on any reasonable concern about an imminent risk to employee health and safety such that work, or attendance at the nRAH was not possible. The Joint Venture asserted that the frequency with which this action had occurred since July 2013 meant that the requirements for the essential making of an order pursuant to s.418 were satisfied.
[14] The position of the nominated employees was that the application did not enable an order of the nature sought in that the individuals involved in various alleged unprotected actions were not satisfactorily identified. Further that, to the extent that the nominated employees had engaged in industrial action that action was specifically and legitimately related to reasonable concerns about health and safety risks. The CFMEU, on behalf of the nominated employees, argued that an order could not properly be brought against only 16 employees and that the records relied upon to identify the employees and establish the times of the alleged actions were inherently flawed.
(Hansen Yuncken Pty Ltd and Others v Gareth Deegan and Others [2013] FWC 7505).
11 The Senior Deputy President referred to a document described as a HYLC Occupational Health and Safety Plan and concluded that it represented a reasonable direction to employees. He also referred to provisions in the Work Health and Safety Act 2012 (SA) which gave an employee the right to cease unsafe work.
12 The Senior Deputy President found that employees on the site had taken action relative to safety concerns and he considered whether those actions constituted unprotected industrial action. His approach was to consider whether the industrial action was based on a reasonable concern by employees about an imminent risk to their safety and, if so, it may not be regarded as unprotected industrial action. He found that none of the stoppages of work "present reasonable concerns about imminent serious risks to employee health or safety". He found that the action was unprotected industrial action and that each of the 16 named employee respondents had participated in it. He found that it was probable that further unprotected industrial action would occur in the future. The Senior Deputy President decided that it was appropriate for the FWC make an order under s 418 of the FW Act. He said that he did not consider that s 418 in its current form precluded the making of an order of a general nature relative to the nominated employees.
13 On 26 September 2013, the Senior Deputy President made the following order:
1. TITLE
This order shall be known as the HYLC Industrial Action Order 2013 (the Order).
2. APPLICATION
This order applies to work and employment regulated by The Hansen Yuncken Pty Ltd Enterprise Agreement 2012 and/or the Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd and CFMEU South Australia Enterprise Agreement 2011-2015 (the Agreements).
3. PARTIES BOUND
The parties bound by this order are:
3.1 Hansen Yuncken - Leighton Contractors Joint Venture (the Company);
3.2 the following employees of Hansen Yuncken Pty Ltd or Leighton Contractors Pty Limited or the Company who are currently engaged in construction work at the new Royal Adelaide Hospital Project site, Mr Gareth Deegan; Mr Lauchlin Duif; Mr Tim Gudgeon; Mr David Mead; Carmine Palumbo; Mr Malcolm Vass; Mr Stephen Wise; Mr David Worgan; Pius Carey; Chris Flaherty; Mr Matt Hourigan; Mr Jack Merkx; Mr Glen Metcalfe; Mr Ron Shaw; Mr Jim Spyro; Mr Michael Tsesmelis, (herein referred to as "the Employees")
4. DEFINITION
For the purposes of this Order, industrial action has the meaning prescribed by s.19 of the Act and includes:
4.1 the performance of work in a manner different from that in which it is customarily performed, or the adoption of a practice in relation to the work, the result of which is a restriction or limitation on, or delay in, the performance of the work;
4.2 a ban, limitation, or restriction on the performance of the work, or an acceptance of or offering for work by an employee;
4.3 a failure or refusal by employees to attend for work or a failure or refusal to perform any work at all by employees who attend for work; and
4.4 the aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring, authorising, directing, organising or encouraging of any person to whom this Order applies to engage in the conduct referred to in paragraphs 3.1 to 3.3 above;
but excludes:
4.5 action by an employee that is authorised or agreed to by the Company; and
4.6 action by an employee if such action was based on the employee's reasonable concern about an imminent risk to the employee's health or safety, and the employee did not unreasonably fail to comply with the directions of the employee's employer to perform other available work, whether at the same or another workplace, that was safe and appropriate for the employee to perform.
5. INDUSTRIAL ACTION NOT TO OCCUR
From the time of this Order industrial action must stop and not occur, and accordingly the Employees must not organise any industrial action.
5.1 The Employees must:
a) not continue, or engage in, any industrial action involving any of the Employees;
b) immediately stop organising any industrial action involving any of the Employees; and
c) not organise, aid, abet, direct, procure, induce, advise, authorise or encourage any Employee to engage in industrial action,
until the expiration of this Order.
5.2 Each of the Employee must:
a) immediately stop engaging in industrial action;
b) not continue or recommence any industrial action; and
c) not organise any industrial action;
until the expiration of this Order.
6. SERVICE OF ORDER
The Employer will forthwith:
6.1 Issue and distribute to all the Employees a copy of this Order and the Decision of 26 September 2013, [2013] FWC 7505.
6.2 Publish the Order on Notice Boards usually used for the purpose of communicating with employees.
7. INTERIM ORDER
The Interim Order known as the HYLC Industrial Action Interim Order (No. 1) 2013 issued on 11 September 2013 is revoked.
8. TERM AND DATE OF EFFECT
This order shall come into effect at 5:00 pm on 26 September 2013 and will remain in force until a further order or until discontinuance of the application.
14 In his reasons, the Senior Deputy President said that, in his opinion, it was appropriate that the order operate for a period of six months (at [51]). However, the order made did not reflect that conclusion in paragraph 8 and on the following day (i.e., 27 September 2013), the Senior Deputy President made the following order:
A. The Order issued by the Fair Work Commission on 26 September 2013 [PR542567] is corrected as follows:
1. By deleting the paragraph in 8. TERM AND DATE OF EFFECT and inserting the following:
This order shall come into effect at 5:00 pm on 26 September 2013 and will operate for a period of six months.
15 The respondents claim that the FWC Order is invalid and that, in those circumstances, there cannot be a contravention of s 343 of the FW Act.
16 The terms of s 343 of the FW Act are set out above. The applicant's case is that the relevant workplace right for the purposes of subs 343(1) of the FW Act is the right to initiate, or participate in, a process or proceeding under a workplace law or workplace instrument, and that includes court proceedings under the FW Act and the FWC Order (subs 341(1)(b) and (2)(b) of the FW Act). By virtue of s 421 of the FW Act, a contravention of a term of the FWC Order is the contravention of a civil remedy provision and may be restrained by an injunction sought by HYLC being a person affected by the contravention. The contravention of a FWC Order is also an offence under the FW Act (subs 675(1)).
17 I should say that, to the extent that the respondents argued in their written submissions that the Senior Deputy President did not have the power to correct the order which he made on 26 September 2013, I reject that argument. He did have the power to correct the order (s 602 of the FW Act).
18 In his reasons, the Senior Deputy President identified the industrial action as involving various employees refusing to work or leaving work without authorisation on a number of occasions in June, July, August and September 2013 (at [27], [34], see also [7]-[10]). HYLC's case before the Senior Deputy President seems to have included, in addition, a refusal to work overtime and reduced work outputs (see the passages set out in paragraph 10 of these reasons), but these additional matters were not the subject of findings by the Senior Deputy President.
19 The FWC Order identifies the employees who are subject to it and prohibits certain conduct constituting industrial action, organising industrial action or aiding and abetting industrial action.
20 "Industrial action" is defined in the FWC Order as having the meaning set out in s 19 of the FW Act. Section 19 is in the following terms:
19 Meaning of industrial action
(1) Industrial action means action of any of the following kinds:
(a) the performance of work by an employee in a manner different from that in which it is customarily performed, or the adoption of a practice in relation to work by an employee, the result of which is a restriction or limitation on, or a delay in, the performance of the work;
(b) a ban, limitation or restriction on the performance of work by an employee or on the acceptance of or offering for work by an employee;
(c) a failure or refusal by employees to attend for work or a failure or refusal to perform any work at all by employees who attend for work;
(d) the lockout of employees from their employment by the employer of the employees.
…
(2) However, industrial action does not include the following:
(a) action by employees that is authorised or agreed to by the employer of the employees;
(b) action by an employer that is authorised or agreed to by, or on behalf of, employees of the employer;
(c) action by an employee if:
(i) the action was based on a reasonable concern of the employee about an imminent risk to his or her health or safety; and
(ii) the employee did not unreasonably fail to comply with a direction of his or her employer to perform other available work, whether at the same or another workplace, that was safe and appropriate for the employee to perform.
(3) An employer locks out employees from their employment if the employer prevents the employees from performing work under their contracts of employment without terminating those contracts.
21 The FWC Order in paragraph 4 incorporates the definition of industrial action in s 19 and then, as part of a non-exhaustive list of matters, paragraphs 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 of the FWC Order pick up paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subs 19(1).
22 The respondents' principal submission is that the FWC Order is invalid because it did not specify "the industrial action" which led to the order being made. Subsection 418(1) of the FW Act is engaged if it appears to the FWC that there is unprotected industrial action that is happening or is threatened, impending or probable or is being organised and, in those circumstances, an order must be made that "the industrial action" stop, not occur or not be organised. It is that industrial action which may be the subject of an order. The respondents submit that subs 418(3) does not mean that "the industrial action" can be defined in an order simply by reference to the definition in s 19 of the FW Act and it must be defined as the particular industrial action which led to the making of the order. In this case, the FWC Order goes well beyond the industrial action which led to the making of the order.
23 The respondents contend that the argument that the industrial action which led to the making of the order and only that action should be the subject of the order is supported by the reference in subs 421(2)(b) to "the industrial action to which the order relates". As to this particular point, I think the reference is neutral and it could be a reference to particular industrial action or more general industrial action.
24 The respondents relied on the decision of Jessup J in Esso Australia Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers' Union (2015) 253 IR 304; [2015] FCA 758 ("Esso"). In that case, Jessup J noted with respect to subs 496(1) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) which was in similar terms to subs 418(1) of the FW Act, that the Full Court of this Court in Transport Workers' Union of New South Wales v Australian Industrial Relations Commission and Others (2008) 166 FCR 108 ("TWU") had said that the power and duty of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission ("AIRC") in making an order was limited to the industrial action that was the subject of the application before it. The AIRC could not make an order in relation to any or all action that might fall within the definition of industrial action (at 128-129 [39] per Gray and North JJ). Jessup J considered that it would require a higher authority than a single judge of the Court to conclude that the approach of Gray and North JJ in the TWU case was wrong. His Honour identified the steps to be taken by the FWC under subs 418(1) of the FW Act as follows:
(1) the FWC must determine whether it appears to it industrial action by one or more employees is happening, is threatened, impending or probable or is being organised;
(2) the FWC must determine whether the industrial action is not or would not be protected industrial action; and
(3) is so, the FWC must make an order and in doing so it must proceed on the basis that the subsection is to be read distributively so that it would not make an order that industrial action not be organised unless it found that it was being organised.
25 With respect to the permissible scope of an order and the effect of subs 418(3) of the FW Act, Jessup J said (at [108]-[109]):
108 Fourthly, subs (3) permits the Commission to frame its order in a way that does not "specify the particular industrial action". That is to say, it is permissible for the industrial action to be identified without specification of whether it is, or would be, a work stoppage, a ban, or something else. But that does not mean that the Commission can go beyond the findings made under subs (1). Nor, in my view, does it mean that the Commission can frame its order by reference to "industrial action", without more. The order which it is required to make may not extend beyond "the" industrial action which has been found to be happening, to be threatened, etc.
109 If these observations are sound ones, the question will inevitably arise: if the Commission is limited to the industrial action which was the subject of its findings under s 418(1), but is not required to specify the form that the industrial action being prohibited by its order might take, how is it to be expected to identify the subject-matter of its prohibition? A ready, but rather unsatisfying, answer to that question would be to say that the operation of s 418 in the way I have expressed it is sufficiently clear to make recourse to practical issues such as this both unnecessary and impermissible as on matters of construction. A more satisfying answer would be to recognise that the section contemplates that the Commission must, or at least will normally, identify the industrial action in some way. This may involve specifying the particular industrial action: the existence of subs (3) does not mean that the Commission may not so proceed. Or it may make use of some other identifier which makes sense to the parties in the facts of the case, such as the purpose of the action, the place in which it is to occur, the timing of the action, or something else. The point here is that the existence of subs (3) does not, as a matter of construction, involve the proposition that the Commission no longer need identify the industrial action which is being prohibited by its order, or the conclusion that, in making its order, the Commission may travel beyond the scope of "the" industrial action, the subject of its findings under subs (1).
26 The respondents submit that I should follow the decision in Esso and hold that the FWC Order was not authorised by the terms of s 418 of the FW Act because it went beyond the industrial action found, being a refusal to work and leaving work without authorisation. The result is that the FWC had committed a jurisdictional error and its decision is in effect, "no decision at all" (Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Bhardwaj (2002) 209 CLR 597 at 614-615 per Gaudron and Gummow JJ).
27 There was an appeal from the decision of Jessup J in Esso. The Full Court of this Court handed down its decision on 25 May 2016 (Esso Australia Pty Ltd v The Australian Workers' Union [2016] FCAFC 72). The Full Court rejected a challenge to Jessup J's decision as to the permissible scope of an order under subs 418(1). Buchanan J (with whom Siopis J agreed (at [1]) said (at [54]):
What they [i.e., orders under s 418(1)] may not do is move beyond the industrial action identified as the foundation for making the order as required by s 418(1).
(see also Bromberg J at [378]).
28 The applicant put a number of arguments in response to the respondents' submission. First, he submits that whether or not the FWC Order is valid is irrelevant because, on any view, the HYLC had the ability "to initiate or participate in a process or proceeding" under the Act in relation to the FWC Order and it is immaterial whether or not the FWC Order is subsequently held to be beyond power. Secondly, the applicant submits that the respondents' challenge is an impermissible collateral challenge to the FWC Order. Thirdly, the applicant submits that the respondents' challenge ought not be entertained in the absence of all necessary parties, including the 16 respondents to the FWC Order. Fourthly, the applicant submits that the decision in Esso is wrong and should not be followed. Finally, the applicant submits that even if Esso is followed, the respondents have not proved that the FWC Order is invalid, or alternatively, the FWC Order can be read down so that it is valid, at least as to industrial action which led to the making of the order, namely, (having regard to the reasons) a refusal to work and leaving work without authorisation.
29 In my opinion, the applicant's first submission is correct and I do not need to consider the other submissions. As at 22 November 2013, the FWC Order had not been set aside. Under s 421(1) of the FW Act, it was open to HYLC (as a person affected by the contravention) to seek an injunction restraining a contravention of the FWC Order. HYLC had an ability to initiate a proceeding seeking an injunction and that is a relevant workplace right. The same might be said about a right to participate in a proceeding, but I do not need to decide that particular question.
30 As to the impermissibility of a collateral challenge in circumstances where no express provision of the FW Act preventing a collateral challenge was identified, consideration would need to be given to, among other things, whether the provisions of the FW Act preclude, by implication, a collateral challenge. There was a right with permission to appeal from the FWC Order (subs 604(1)) and the alleged invalidity of the FWC Order could be raised in enforcement proceedings under s 421 of the FW Act. There are, of course, numerous cases which have addressed the circumstances in which a collateral challenge may be permitted (Ousley v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 69; Jacobs v OneSteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd and WorkCover Corporation of SA (2006) 93 SASR 568; Aronson M and Groves M, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th ed, Lawbook Co 2013) pp 700-706). As to the absence of all necessary parties, at least where declarations are sought, that circumstance gives rise to a discretion in the Court to refuse relief (Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd (No 6) [2015] FCA 825 at [942]-[957] per Edelman J). The point here is probably different in that declarations are not essential to a resolution of this case and the imposition of a penalty for a contravention of a civil remedy provision. As to the submission that Esso is wrong, it is not open to me to reach a decision contrary to the recent Full Court decision, even if I was otherwise disposed to take a different view of the merits of the arguments. As to the submission that the respondents have not proved that the FWC Order is invalid, the applicant relies on the fact that the respondents have not brought forward all of the evidence that was before the Senior Deputy President. That is true, but I would have been disposed to reject the applicant's argument because it seems to me that the Senior Deputy President clearly identified in his reasons the industrial action which led to the making of the FWC Order. As to reading down the FWC Order, that might be possible so that it is valid to the extent that it prohibits the type of industrial action which led to it being made, that is to say, a refusal to work and leaving work without authorisation (Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 46).
31 The applicant has established the workplace right it has pleaded.