Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kainhofer
[1998] FCA 803
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
1987-04-14
Before
Foster JJ
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (10 paragraphs)
INTRODUCTION This is an appeal from a judgment of a single judge of the Court reviewing under s 21(1) of the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth) (the Act) an order made on 14 May 1997 by a magistrate, Mr Wright, in relation to the respondent, Gregory Parker, determining that he was eligible for surrender for the offences for which extradition had been sought by the applicant and issuing a warrant for his detention. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had procured the issue, on 31 October 1991, by the District Court at Koblenz of a warrant for the arrest of the respondent (the 1991 warrant) on the following charge (as translated):- The person charged is highly suspected of having traded with narcotics in a not insignificant quantity and without licence at least from July 1989 until at least June 1991 in Lahnstein, Koblenz and at other places by at least nine independent criminal acts conjointly and on a commercial basis as a member of a gang who has combined for the continued execution of such acts. On 20 May 1992, Mr Estcourt, a magistrate, held that the respondent was not eligible for surrender in respect of the offences detailed in the 1991 warrant. Subsequently, on 19 July 1996, the FRG procured the issue of a fresh warrant, also in Koblenz, seeking the arrest of a person named George Parker who was described as having been born on 1 June 1939 in Bocki, Poland and having used the alias "Gregory Parker" and some thirteen other aliases. The warrant recited that the subject was:- ...highly suspected by seven legally independent acts between November 1990 and June 1991 in Lahnstein, Koblenz (both located in Germany) and at other places having traded with narcotics in a not insignificant quantity without a license pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 1 number 1 of the Narcotics Law and thus having acted conjointly as a member of a gang who has combined for the continued commission of such acts. The warrant then detailed, with considerable particularity, activities allegedly undertaken by the subject as a member of a gang involved in purchasing heroin in Thailand, conveying it to Australia and reselling it in this country at a profit. On 10 April 1997 the respondent was arrested on a provisional warrant issued under s 12 of the Act. In the course of an application for bail, Counsel for the FRG, after an adjournment, tendered three documents which we have been told were obtained from the Australian Federal Police in Canberra. Those documents were described by the learned primary judge as "the identification documents" and we shall adopt the same nomenclature. The first identification document was a telex message from Interpol in Canberra to the Australian Federal Police in Tasmania and recited that one Grzegorz Sobolewski born on 1 June 1939 at Bocki, Poland had been sentenced to nine months' imprisonment for theft in Vienna on 15 November 1985. It went on to indicate that Sobolewski had escaped from prison and been re-arrested in Vienna on 5 October 1989. The same document recited that the subject had acquired Australian citizenship on 30 January 1985 and had changed his name by deed poll on four occasions acquiring an Australian passport in each of his new names which were listed. The second identification document was addressed to "Interpol CANBERRA - WIESBADEN - IP Lyon SG". There followed this "reference":- Canberra - IP/O/8/85/11-27 - 18321/89 of 3.11.89 Wiesbaden - EA 33-(TB 21-12) B 509 011, PR 32-22 S 279 762 The subject of the memorandum was described as:- SOBOLEWSKI Grzegorz, born 1.11.1939 (alias 1.6.39). stateless; fugitive. The body of that memorandum was in these terms:- Attached please find photograph and fingerprints of SOBOLEWSKI Grzegorz, born 1.11.39 in Bock7/Poland, Australian national. His identity has not been established with certainty. His latest recording took place in Vienna on 6.10.89 under name BENET Grzegorz, born 1.6.39 in Bocki/Poland, when he was arrested for escape from prison. Our files contain identical fingerprints, taken as follows: a) under name SOBOLEWSKI Grzegorz, b. 1.11.39 Bocki/Poland 31.1.74 Vienna, dangerous threats, 6.6.74 Vienna, burglary, 26.11.74 Vienna, shoplifting, 17.12.80 Vienna, fraud. b) under name SOBROLEWSKI Gregor, born 1.11.39 in Botzki/Poland, on 29.11.79 in Klagenfurt, for use of documents belonging to others. c) under name DIXON Gregory, born 1.6.39 in Bocki/Poland, on 4.5.85 in Vienna for theft. Please let us know all relevant information you may possess or be able to obtain about this individual. The third identification document bore, at the top, a reference number "A - 156/4 - 1994" followed by three photographs of the head, apparently of the same man, taken from different aspects and ten photographs of fingerprints labelled in French, English, Spanish and Arabic. Under the facial and fingerprint photographs appeared the legend:- PHOTOGRAPHED ON 4TH SEPTEMBER 1985 IN VIENNA, AUSTRIA FINGERPRINTED ON 10TH MARCH 1979 IN MUNICH, GERMANY The rest of the third identification document was in these terms:- PRESENT FAMILY NAME: PARKER PREVIOUS FAMILY NAME: SOBOLEWSKI FORENAME: George SEX: M DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 1st June 1939 - Bocki, Poland FATHER'S FAMILY NAME AND FORENAME: SOBOLEWSKI Mikolei MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME AND FORENAME: TIMOSEW Maria IDENTITY NOT CONFIRMED - DUAL NATIONALITY: POLISH AND AUSTRALIAN (NOT CONFIRMED) DESCRIPTION: Height 180 cm, stocky build, wavy fair hair, grey-blue eyes. ALSO KNOWN AS: PARKER Gregory, born on 1st June 1939; SOBOLEWSKI Gregor, born on 1st November 1939; SOBOLEWSKI Grzegorz, born on 1st November 1939; BENET Gregory, born on 1st November 1939; BENET Grzegorz, born on 1st June 1939; SOBOLEWSKI Gregory, born on 1st June 1938 or 1939; KENT Gregory, born on 1st June 1939; WATSON, Gregory, born on 1st June 1939; DIXON Gregory, born on 1st November 1939; JANUSCH Gregory, born on 1st November 1939; SLOGAR Gregory, born on 1st November 1939; SOBOLEWSKI Grzegorz, born on 1st June 1939; SOBOLEWSKI Grzegorz, born on 1st November 1939; GRZEGORZ Sobolewsky, born on 1st November 1939 in Bocki; SOBROLEWSKI Gregory Brun, born on 1st November 1939 IDENTITY DOCUMENTS: Passport No. T620181, issued on 25th March 1985 in Hobart, Australia, in the name DIXON Gregory; Passport No. J-0991908, issued on 6th July 1989 in Hobart, Australia, in the name BENET Gregory; Passport No. K-0213134, issued on 16th October 1990 in Australia in the name PARKER George; Passport No. J-0336340, issued on 7th September 1988 in Hobart, Australia, in the name BENET Gregory; Passport No. J-1441974, issued on 1st February 1990 in Warsaw, Poland; Passport No. G-598231; passport No. H-329397. OCCUPATION: Pet shop/zoo assistant. COUNTRIES LIKELY TO BE VISITED: Australia, Thailand. LANGUAGES SPOKEN: Polish, English, German. MAXIMUM PENALTY POSSIBLE: 15 years' imprisonment. ACCOMPLICES: KENT Bob, born on 24th June 1961, subject of red notice File No. 23720/91, Control No. A-155/4-1994; BARTOSIEWICZ Piotr, born on 7th January 1958, subject of red notice File No. 23719/91, Control No. A-154/4-1994; LASKOWSKI Andreas, born on 24th August 1950, subject of red notice File No. 25711/91, Control No. A-153/4-1994; MORGAN Mark, born on 9th December 1961, subject of red notice File No. 25956/91, Control No. A-152/4-1994. SUMMARY OF FACTS OF THE CASE: THAILAND AND AUSTRALIA: From July 1989 to July 1991, PARKER and four accomplices operated as a gang and organized the transport of heroin from Thailand to Australia. They recruited couriers in Lahnstein, Koblenz and other towns in Germany and in Austria, obtained their tickets and visas, and paid them for their courier services. On 31st August 1991, ten couriers were arrested in Germany and identified this group of five as the organizers, financial backers and suppliers of the drugs transported from Bangkok to Sydney. Known transports between 1989 and 1991 totalled 2 kg 912, 1 kg of which was seized in Sydney on 11th July 1991 (it had been smuggled from Bangkok via Poland to Germany by MORGAN). In addition, on 2nd June 1991 a female courier was arrested in Bangkok in possession of 200 g of heroin. REASON FOR NOTICE: Wanted on arrest warrant No. 30 Gs II 1735/93, issued on 22nd April 1993 by the judicial authorities in Koblenz, Germany, for organized heroin trafficking with accomplices. EXTRADITION WILL BE REQUESTED FROM ANY COUNTRY. If found, please detain and immediately inform INTERPOL WIESBADEN (Reference PR 32-03 S - 279 762 f.A. of 30th March 1994) and the ICPO-Interpol General Secretariat. The learned primary Judge, after noting that it was not in issue that the identification documents did not accompany the extradition request, identified that:- The critical question therefore is whether the identification documents, or any of them, constituted information 'available' to the Requesting State (the FRG) at the time the extradition request was made. What made that question critical was the terms of Article 9 of the Treaty between Australia and the FRG concerning Extradition done at Bonn on 14 April 1987 (the Treaty) which forms part of Australian domestic law by force of s 11 of the Act and the Extradition (Federal Republic of Germany) Regulations No. 134 of 1990 (Cth). Article 9, so far as is relevant, provides:- ARTICLE 9 (1) A request for the extradition of a person claimed shall be in writing. All documents furnished in support of a request for extradition shall be duly authenticated. (2) The request shall be accompanied by: (a) all available information concerning the identity and nationality of the person claimed; and (b) a copy of the relevant provisions of the statute, if any, creating the offence or a statement of the relevant law and in either case a statement of the punishment that can be imposed. (3) A request for the extradition of a person claimed for the purpose of prosecution shall be accompanied, in addition to the documents provided for in paragraph (2), by a warrant for the arrest, or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the person claimed, a description of each offence for which the person is claimed, and a statement of the acts or omission alleged against the person claimed in respect of each such offence. (4) A request for the extradition of a person claimed for the carrying out of a sentence shall be accompanied, in addition to the documents provided for in paragraph (2), by a summary statement of the facts of the case unless they appear from the other documents, such documents as provide evidence of the final and binding conviction and a statement that the sentence is immediately enforceable and of the extent to which that sentence has not been carried out. The learned primary judge disregarded the first identification document which he characterised as an internal Australian document from Interpol in Canberra to the Australian Federal Police in Tasmania. The second and third documents were viewed differently. As to them, his Honour said:- However, the second document, the one headed Interpol Wien, was on its face sent to Wiesbaden, which it is accepted is a city in Germany, and at a time prior to the forwarding of the request. It contains information concerning the identity and nationality of the person claimed, including the comment that the person's identity 'has not been established with certainty'. As to the third document, I infer from the reference number which includes the year 1994 that it came into existence before 1996. The concluding request to inform Interpol Wiesbaden, and the reference to 'Countries likely to be visited' as Australia and Thailand, give rise to the inference that it is not an Australian document but emanated from Weisbaden [sic]. The third document also contains information as to the identity and nationality of the person sought to be extradited. The learned primary judge met an argument that Article 9(2)(a) did not apply to information contained in the second and third identification documents which may have been outdated or superseded, by observing:- The short answer is that counsel for the FRG considered the identification documents sufficiently relevant to advance them in opposing the application for bail. Moreover, information such as birth dates, names, fingerprints and previous convictions of a person whose extradition is sought are historical events and circumstances which, if true, do not become 'outdated' in relation to the issue of identity. His Honour then turned to the concept of "all available information" erected by Article 9(2)(a) of the Treaty and, after referring to dictionary definitions of the epithet "available", continued:- In the context of Article 9(2)(a) the entity to which information has to be available is a sovereign government. Obviously it would not be enough merely to show that the information in question was physically present within the territory over which that government had jurisdiction. But if 'available' in this context means, as I think it does, that the information was 'at hand' or at the government's 'disposal', that requirement would be satisfied if the information was in the possession of that part of the apparatus of government whose function it was to hold information of the kind in question. If the person or entity holding the information was not constitutionally part of the apparatus of government, it would be nonetheless 'available' if a relevant part of the government could obtain access to that information. Such access might come as a result of the exercise of governmental power, or by arrangement in the usual course of carrying out governmental functions. The information in question came into the possession of an Interpol office in Germany. Since the particular governmental function being exercised by the FRG in the present case was obtaining extradition from another country of a person alleged to have infringed the laws of the FRG, the most logical place for the FRG government to seek information relating to the identity and nationality of such a person would be the offices of Interpol, a body whose raison d'ętre is international co-operation and intelligence sharing between law enforcement bodies. And if the government of the FRG sought such information from Interpol, there is no logical reason why the latter would not provide it. After reviewing the reasoning of the magistrate on the meaning of "all available information" his Honour suggested:- ...his Worship appears to have confused two distinct issues. First, did all available information concerning identity and nationality accompany the request? Secondly, was the person appearing before the Magistrate the person sought in the extradition request? The first issue is a matter of compliance with legal pre-conditions for a surrender order. Extradition proceedings do not involve a determination of guilt or innocence. The question is whether there has been compliance with the provisions of the Act and, where the Act gives statutory force to a Treaty, the requirements of that Treaty. Neither the Act nor the Treaty contain any provisions giving a Magistrate, or this Court, power to waive non-compliance. The argument of the FRG implicitly accepted that a failure to comply with this particular requirement (and any requirement of the Act or Treaty) would be fatal. The second issue is simply a question of fact to be determined on the evidence before the Magistrate and the inferences which can be properly drawn from such evidence. I shall shortly turn to that second issue. But on the first issue I find that the second and third identification documents constituted information concerning the identity and nationality of the person claimed, that such information was available to the FRG at the time the request for extradition was made, but did not accompany the request. Accordingly I find there has been non-compliance with Article 9(2)(a) of the Treaty. The remaining issues were whether the magistrate could have been satisfied that the respondent was the person referred to in the request, whether the 1996 request adequately described each offence and the acts or omissions alleged as constituting it, whether the earlier, unsuccessful, request for extradition in 1991 precluded the making of another request and whether the conduct alleged against the applicant would have constituted an extradition offence had it been committed in Tasmania. All those issues were resolved against the respondent and form the basis of his notice of contention in this appeal. On the basis of his finding in respect of the first issue, the learned primary judge quashed the magistrate's order and also the warrant issued by him for the detention of the respondent. He directed that the magistrate order the release of the respondent and made certain orders as to costs. THE APPEAL A number of submissions were made by the appellant and contested by the respondent to the effect that his Honour had erred in holding that there had been non-compliance with Article 9(2)(a) of the Treaty. A challenge was made to his Honour's finding that the second and third identification documents were "available" to the FRG to accompany the request for extradition. It was further submitted that, if they were so available, a reasonable and purposive construction of the Treaty would not require that they be forwarded to Australia in connection with the request. It was submitted that the terms of Article 9(2)(a) did not require that all information available to the FRG relating to identity and nationality should accompany the request. Documentary material which was out of date, superseded, of dubious relevance, or merely repetitive could be omitted without there being any breach of the Treaty obligation. As against this it was submitted on behalf of the respondent that there would not be compliance with the Treaty if a State selected, from a range of material, items of information which would assist the extradition request whilst omitting material which might have the contrary effect. These submissions, which were fully argued and supported by references to authority, proceeded on the basis that the magistrate and, consequently, the primary judge had jurisdiction as a result of the operation of the Act and the Treaty to determine whether the requirements of Article 9(2)(a) had been complied with by the FRG. After the decision on the appeal had been reserved, the Court became concerned as to whether that jurisdiction in fact existed. If it did not, the Court itself, on appeal from the learned primary judge, likewise had no jurisdiction to determine the matter. The question having thus arisen, the Court requested submissions from the appellant and the respondent as to whether the magistrate had this power when performing his duties under s 19 of the Act and also whether he was necessarily required, when exercising those powers, to satisfy himself that the person before him, whose eligibility for surrender was in question, was in fact the person in respect of whom the order was sought. Submissions were received from counsel for the appellant and the respondent. As the question of jurisdiction is a threshold matter, it is appropriate to consider it at this point in our reasons. The provisions of the Act which bear upon this question were the subject of consideration by the High Court in Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Kainhofer (1995) 185 CLR 528. Under the heading (at 533) of "A brief conspectus of the Act", reference was made in the majority judgment (Brennan CJ, Dawson & McHugh JJ) to the relevant sections of the Act and their effect. This portion of the judgment, so far as is relevant to the present case, reads as follows (at 533-538):- When an extradition country seeks the extradition of a person from Australia, it must invoke the powers of a magistrate under s 12(1) of the Act and of the Attorney-General under s 16 of the Act. Under s 12(1), an application, in statutory form, must be made to a magistrate for the issue of a warrant for the arrest of that person. The form of application for a warrant of arrest (form 4) prescribes that an affidavit be annexed setting out information showing that the person is 'an extraditable person for the purposes of that Act in relation to' the country seeking extradition. The term 'extraditable person' is defined by s 6 of the Act: ' Where: (a) either: (i) a warrant is or warrants are in force for the arrest of a person in relation to an offence or offences against the law of a country that the person is accused of having committed either before or after the commencement of this Act; ... ... (b) the offence or any of the offences is an extradition offence in relation to the country; and (c) the person is believed to be outside the country; the person is, for the purposes of this Act, an extraditable person in relation to the country.' If the magistrate is satisfied, on the basis of information given by the affidavit, that the person is an extraditable person in relation to the extradition country, the magistrate is required to issue a warrant for the arrest of the person and to send forthwith to the Attorney-General a report of the issue of the warrant together with a copy of the affidavit (s 12(1)(b), (2)). The Attorney-General's powers are enlivened by the receipt of an extradition request (s 16(1)). The action to be taken by the Attorney-General if extradition is to proceed is the issuing of a written notice directed to a magistrate stating that the request has been received. Section 16(2) prescribes the conditions governing the Attorney-General's power to give the notice (hereafter the 's 16 notice'). That sub-section provides: 'The Attorney-General shall not give the notice: (a) unless the Attorney-General is of the opinion: (i) that the person is an extraditable person in relation to the extradition country; and (ii) that, if the conduct of the person constituting the extradition offence, or any of the extradition offences, for which surrender of the person is sought, or equivalent conduct, had taken place in Australia at the time at which the extradition request was received, the conduct or the equivalent conduct would have constituted an extradition offence in relation to Australia; or (b) if the Attorney-General is of the opinion that there is an extradition objection in relation to the extradition offence, or all of the extradition offences, for which surrender of the person is sought.' The Attorney-General may receive an extradition request either before or after the person whose extradition is sought is arrested pursuant to the magistrate's warrant. If the Attorney-General decides before the arrest not to issue a s 16 notice, he directs the magistrate to cancel the warrant (s 12(3)). But if the person has been arrested under the warrant and is remanded in custody or on bail, as provided for by s 15, and the Attorney-General decides not to issue a s 16 notice, he directs the magistrate to release the person from custody or discharge the recognisances on which bail was granted (s 17(1)). Where the Attorney-General issues a s 16 notice and the person has been arrested pursuant to the magistrate's warrant and has been remanded either in custody or on bail, the extradition procedure follows one of two paths: either the person consents to being surrendered under s 18 or proceedings are conducted by a magistrate under s 19. Where the person consents to being surrendered and the procedure prescribed by s 18 is followed, a warrant is issued committing that person to prison to await surrender or release pursuant to a further determination by the Attorney-General under s 22. Where the person does not consent, he is remanded in custody or on bail pending the conduct of proceedings under s 19. The function of a magistrate who conducts proceedings under s 19 (hereafter a 's 19 magistrate') is in issue in this appeal. Section 19 provides, inter alia, as follows: '(1) Where: (a) a person is on remand under section 15; (b) the Attorney-General has given a notice under subsection 16(1) in relation to the person; (c) an application is made to a magistrate by or on behalf of the person or the extradition country concerned for proceedings to be conducted in relation to the person under this section; and (d) the magistrate considers that the person and the extradition country have had reasonable time in which to prepare for the conduct of such proceedings; the magistrate shall conduct proceedings to determine whether the person is eligible for surrender in relation to the extradition offence or extradition offences for which surrender of the person is sought by the extradition country. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the person is only eligible for surrender in relation to an extradition offence for which surrender of the person is sought by the extradition country if: (a) the supporting documents in relation to the offence have been produced to the magistrate; (b) where this Act applies in relation to the extradition country subject to any limitations, conditions, exceptions or qualifications that require the production to the magistrate of any other documents - those documents have been produced to the magistrate; (c) the magistrate is satisfied that, if the conduct of the person constituting the offence in relation to the extradition country, or equivalent conduct, had taken place in the part of Australia where the proceedings are being conducted and at the time at which the extradition request in relation to the person was received, that conduct or that equivalent conduct would have constituted an extradition offence in relation to that part of Australia; and (d) the person does not satisfy the magistrate that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is an extradition objection in relation to the offence. (3) In paragraph (2)(a), 'supporting documents', in relation to an extradition offence, means: (a) if the offence is an offence of which the person is accused - a duly authenticated warrant issued by the extradition country for the arrest of the person for the offence, or a duly authenticated copy of such a warrant; ... (c) in any case: (i) a duly authenticated statement in writing setting out a description of, and the penalty applicable in respect of, the offence; and (ii) a duly authenticated statement in writing setting out the conduct constituting the offence.' Where the s 19 magistrate determines that the person is eligible for surrender to the extradition country in relation to one or more extradition offences, a warrant is issued committing the person to prison 'to await surrender under a surrender warrant or temporary surrender warrant or release pursuant to an order under subsection 22(5)' (s 19(9)) - that is, surrender or release pursuant to a determination by the Attorney-General under s 22. If the s 19 magistrate determines that the person is not eligible for surrender, the person is released and the Attorney-General is notified (s 19(10)). Provision is made by s 21 for judicial review of the s 19 magistrate's order. A s 19 magistrate must be satisfied that the conditions of jurisdiction prescribed by sub-s (1) are satisfied. Then consideration must be given to the compliance of the supporting documents with the requirements of sub-s (2)(a) and (b). The character of "the conduct of the person constituting the offence ... or equivalent conduct" must be ascertained under sub-s (2)(c). And, finally, the magistrate must decide whether the person has shown any substantial grounds for believing that there is an extradition objection in relation to the offence: sub-s (2)(d). The term "extradition objection" is defined by s 7. When a person has been committed to prison pursuant to a magistrate's determination under s 19(9), that person becomes an 'eligible person' within the definition of that term in s 22(1) and is eligible for surrender. As soon as is reasonably practicable after the eligible person's committal, the Attorney-General is required by s 22(2) to 'determine whether the person is to be surrendered'. The Attorney General is authorised to issue a surrender warrant only if the conditions prescribed by s 22(3) are satisfied. These conditions include: '(a) the Attorney-General is satisfied that there is no extradition objection in relation to the offence;' and '(f) the Attorney-General, in his or her discretion, considers that the person should be surrendered in relation to the offence.' If any of the conditions prescribed by s 22(3) is not satisfied, the Attorney-General orders the release of the person(s 22(5)). No question arises in the present case as to the existence of an extradition objection. The magistrate, whose decision was reviewed by the learned primary judge, was performing the role of the "s 19 magistrate" referred to in the passage cited. Prior to this, the respondent had been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued under s 12 of the Act and the Attorney-General, having received an extradition request from the FRG, had issued a notice pursuant to s 16. The respondent, having been arrested pursuant to the warrant, had been brought before a magistrate to be dealt with in accordance with s 15 of the Act. That section provided that he should be remanded in custody or on bail for the period necessary for proceedings under s 19 to be conducted. The respondent had sought bail. This application was opposed by counsel for the FRG. It was in relation to this opposition that the "identification documents" were produced and tendered to the magistrate. These documents, as has been seen, referred to the respondent having previously absconded from custody. They were, accordingly, relevant to the application for bail. As was conceded, they had not accompanied the extradition request made by the FRG and, quite clearly, would not have been introduced into the case were it not for the use sought to be made of them in the bail application. Their provenance was not the subject of evidence in the s 19 proceedings nor in the review proceedings under s 21 before the learned primary judge. Indeed, there having been no evidence given before the magistrate, no further evidence could be given as to their origin before the primary judge (s 21(6)(a)(d)), the judge making his findings as to their availability at the time of the extradition request by inference from their contents. We have already referred to the circumstance that the Treaty became part of Australian domestic law by force of s 11 of the Act and the Extradition (Federal Republic of Germany) Regulations No 134 of 1990 (Cth). It is convenient at this stage to refer to relevant provisions of the Treaty in addition to Article 9, to which reference has already been made. These are Articles 10 and 11 which provide as follows:- ARTICLE 10 (1) Documents which, in accordance with Article 9, accompany a request for extradition shall be admitted in evidence, if duly authenticated, in any extradition proceedings in the Requested State. (2) Documents are duly authenticated for the purposes of this Treaty if: (a) in the case of warrants they are signed, and in any other case, they are certified, by a Judge, Magistrate or other competent authority in the requesting State, and (b) they are sealed with the official or public seal of the Requesting State or of a Minister of State, or a Department or officer of the Government, of the Requesting State. ARTICLE 11 (1) If the Requested State considers that the information furnished in support of the request for the extradition of a person claimed is not sufficient to fulfil the requirements of its law with respect to extradition, that State may request that additional information be furnished within such time as that State specifies. (2) If the person claimed is under arrest and the additional information submitted as aforesaid is not sufficient or is not received within the time specified by the Requested State, he shall be discharged from custody, but such discharge shall not bar a subsequent request in respect of the same offence.