(b) Unconscionable conduct
13Section 51 AB of the TPA provides that:
(1) A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a person, engage in conduct that is, in all the circumstances, unconscionable.
(2) Without in any way limiting the matters to which the court may have regard for the purpose of determining whether a corporation has contravened subsection (1) in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a person (in this subsection referred to as the consumer), the court may have regard to :
(a) the relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the corporation and the consumer;
(b) whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the corporation, the consumer was required to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate interests of the corporation;
(c) whether the consumer was able to understand any documents relating to the supply or possible supply of the goods or services;
(d) whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair tactics were used against, the consumer or a person acting on behalf of the consumer by the corporation or a person acting on behalf of the corporation in relation to the supply or possible supply of the goods or services; and
(e) the amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the consumer could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a person other than the corporation.
(3) A corporation shall not be taken for the purposes of this section to engage in unconscionable conduct in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a person by reason only that the corporation institutes legal proceedings in relation to that supply or possible supply or refers a dispute or claim in relation to that supply or possible supply to arbitration.
(4) For the purpose of determining whether a corporation has contravened subsection (1) in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services to a person:
(a) the court shall not have regard to any circumstances that were not reasonably forseeable at the time of the alleged contravention; and
(b) the court may have regard to conduct engaged in, or circumstances existing, before the commencement of this section.
(5) A reference in this section to goods or services is a reference to goods or services of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption.
(6) A reference in this section to the supply or possible supply of goods does not include a reference to the supply or possible supply of goods for the purpose of re-supply or for the purpose of using them up or transforming them in trade or commerce.
(7) Section 51A applies for the purposes of this section in the same way as it applies for the purposes of Division 1 of Part V.
See also s 43 of the FTA .
14In Director-General of the Department of Fair Trading v Monaghan [2003] NSWSC 1099, Bell J observed:
It was common ground that the principles stated by the High Court in Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio (1982-1983) 151 CLR 447 concerning unconscionability for the purposes of the common law have application when considering unconscionability for the purposes of s 43(1) of the FTA. In Amadio Mason J observed at 461:
"But relief on the ground of 'unconscionable conduct' is usually taken to refer to the class of case in which a party makes unconscientious use of his superior position or bargaining power to the detriment of a party who suffers from some special disability or is placed in some special situation of disadvantage, e.g., a catching bargain with an expectant heir or an unfair contract made by taking advantage of a person who is seriously affected by intoxicating drink. Although unconscionable conduct in this narrow sense bears some resemblance to the doctrine of undue influence, there is a difference between the two. In the latter the will of the innocent party is not independent and voluntary because it is overborne. In the former the will of the innocent party, even if independent and voluntary, is the result of the disadvantageous position in which he is placed and of the other party unconscientiously taking advantage of that position."
Deane J, in the same case, observed at 474:
"The jurisdiction of courts of equity to relieve against unconscionable dealing developed from the jurisdiction which the Court of Chancery assumed, at a very early period, to set aside transactions in which expectant heirs had dealt with their expectations without being adequately protected against the pressure put upon them by their poverty. The jurisdiction is long established as extending generally to circumstances in which (i) a party to a transaction was under a special disability in dealing with the other party with the consequence that there was an absence of any reasonable degree of equality between them and (ii) that disability was sufficiently evident to the stronger party to make it prima facie unfair or 'unconscientious' that he procure, or accept, the weaker party's assent to the impugned transaction in the circumstances in which he procured or accepted it. Where such circumstances are shown to have existed, an onus is cast upon the stronger party to show that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable: 'the burthen of shewing the fairness of the transaction is thrown on the person who seeks to obtain the benefit of the contract' (see per Lord Hatherley, O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke (1877) 2 App. Cas., at p. 823; Fry v. Lane (1888) 40 Ch.D. 312, at p. 322; Blomley v. Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362, at pp. 428-429).
The equitable principles relating to relief against unconscionable dealing and the principles relating to undue influence are closely related. The two doctrines are, however, distinct. Undue influence, like common law duress, looks to the quality of the consent or assent of the weaker party (citations omitted). Unconscionable dealing looks to the conduct of the stronger party in attempting to enforce, or retain the benefit of, a dealing with a person under a special disability in circumstances where it is not consistent with equity or good conscience that he should do so. The adverse circumstances which may constitute a special disability for the purposes of the principles relating to relief against unconscionable dealing may take a wide variety of forms and are not susceptible to being comprehensively catalogued. In Blomley v. Ryan, Fullagar J. listed some examples of such disability: 'poverty or need of any kind, sickness, age, sex, infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or lack of education, lack of assistance or explanation where assistance or explanation is necessary' As Fullagar J. remarked, the common characteristic of such adverse circumstances 'seems to be that they have the effect of placing one party at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the other'".
In Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi [2003] HCA 57; 77 ALJR 1853 the High Court discussed the concept of unconscionable conduct in a case involving a claim for equitable relief against forfeiture. In that context Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in their joint judgment observed at [23] that the phrase "unconscionable conduct" tends to mislead in the several respects that are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs. By these proceedings the Plaintiff claims orders under the FTA in respect of unconscionable conduct engaged in by the First Defendant in the supply of services to various of her clients. Section 43 of the FTA is not confined to a consideration of the circumstances as they existed at the time of the formation of the contract but includes consideration of conduct that occurs during the course of the contract. In Holloway v Witham (1990) 21 NSWLR 70 Lee CJ at CL said at 74:
"But important though it be that the Act enables the Commissioner to make applications on behalf of consumers for compensation, the real virtue in the Act, in so far as it is aimed at unfair trading, is that it enable remedies available to consumers and/or the Commissioner which are dependent, not upon breach of contract by the trader, but upon proof of specific conduct on the part of the trader as defined in the Act. The fact that the trader may by reason of the conduct engaged in be in breach of the contract, is largely irrelevant to the pursuit of remedies provided by the Act and, equally, breach of contract by the consumer will not necessarily displace the right of the consumer to the remedies provided in respect of the conduct of the supplier. In Holt v Biroka Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 629, Kearney J held that s 4(4) of the Act, in defining "conduct", produced the result that the conduct to be considered was the whole of the conduct related to the contractual bargain and its performance and I respectfully adopt that view - it plainly carries out the purpose of the Act." [at paras 11-12]
15A little later her Honour, in a passage that is particularly apposite to the present case, observed:
The Plaintiff particularises that the First Defendant took advantage of Mr Daniels' emotional vulnerability to extract large sums of money from him. A particular in like terms is pleaded with respect to the First Defendant's dealings with Mr Burns and Mr Marks. Emotional vulnerability is an inexact concept. However, it does seem to me that some clients of introduction agencies are likely to be persons who are vulnerable to pressure sales techniques because of an acute awareness of their loneliness and that such individuals may be disadvantaged in dealing with the operator of an introduction service. Abadee J acknowledged emotional vulnerability in this context as a matter that may give rise to relief against unconscionable trading in Commissioner for Consumer Affairs v Bona fide Consultants Pty Ltd (unreported), NSWSC, 28 March 1994 . I did not understand Mr Diethelm of the Second Defendant to submit that the taking advantage of emotional vulnerability in the way the Plaintiff particularised the case with respect to Mr Daniels, Mr Burns and Mr Marks may not constitute conduct that is unconscionable. Rather he contended that there was no evidence that the client was emotionally vulnerable, or if he was, there was no evidence that the vulnerability had been evident to the First Defendant or her staff. [at para 61] (emphasis added)