The application under s 447A of the Act
10 Section 447A of the Act provides in so far as is presently relevant:
447A General power to make orders
(1) The Court may make such order as it thinks appropriate about how this Part is to operate in relation to a particular company.
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(4) An order may be made on the application of:
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(f) any other interested person.
11 The plaintiffs are directors of the Companies and parties to the DOCAs. I am satisfied that they have standing as interested persons (s 447A(4)(f)) to make the application.
12 I respectfully agree with, and adopt, the following summary of principles relevant to the exercise of the discretion under s 447A, set out by Halley J in Diakos (No 1) at [19]-[21]:
19. As Mr Anderson submits, the powers of the Court under s 447A of the Act are wide, but not entirely without limits: Australasian Memory Pty Limited and Another v Brien and Another (2000) 200 CLR 270; [2000] HCA 30 (Australasian Memory) at [20]; see also In the matters of MROC Car Wholesalers Pty Ltd and ors [2017] NSWSC 287 at [30]. The relevant limitations were identified in Australasian Memory at [20] in this way:
Some particular limitations, suggested in the course of argument, must be examined: first, that s 447A does not permit a court to make an order altering the times fixed by those provisions of Pt 5.3A which contain express provision for variation of the time so fixed; second, that it permits only orders having prospective effect; third, that it does not permit the making of orders affecting vested rights; and, fourth, that it does not apply unless there is a continuing administration (or, presumably, an extant deed of company arrangement).
20. Further, as Black J observed in In the matter of Maria's Farm Veggies Pty Ltd (admins appt) [2016] NSWSC 1899 at [21]:
The overriding requirement for an order under that section is that any order made and any directions given must be designed to achieve the objective of Part 5.3A as expressed in s 435A of the Corporations Act, and as Mr Cook pointed out, must have a nexus with how Part 5.3A is to operate in relation to the particular company: Ansett Australia Ground Staff Superannuation Plan Pty Ltd v Ansett Australia Ltd [2004] FCA 130; (2004) 49 ACSR 1 at 15; Correa v Whittingham [2013] NSWCA 263; (2013) 278 FLR 310 at [4].
21. More specifically for present purposes, the Court has power under s 447A to vary a deed of company arrangement. As Barrett J (as his Honour then was) observed in In the matter of Derwent Howard Media Pty Limited [2011] NSWSC 1164:
11 Ordinarily, any variation of a deed of company arrangement should be by resolution of creditors under s 445A. But it is, I think, sufficiently established that the court's power under s 447A enables it, in an appropriate case, to vary a deed of company arrangement or, more accurately, to cause Part 5.3A to operate in relation to the subject company as if some provision of the deed were varied: see, for example, Mulvaney v Rob Wintulich Pty Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 384; Re Pasminco Ltd [2003] FCA 265; (2003) 45 ACSR 1; Brandrill Pty Ltd v Newmont Yandal Operations Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 974; (2006) 24 ACLC 1179.
12 Generally speaking, however, the court should be reluctant to exercise this power (and thereby to deprive creditors of their role under s 445A) except in circumstances that are uncontentious, in the sense that no prejudice to creditors is involved: Re Paradox Digital Pty Ltd; Ex parte Smith [2001] WASC 182. That is the position here. Deferral of the 30 September 2011 deadline will avoid the possibility of untoward termination of the arrangement and preserve the basis of participation by creditors envisaged by the deed, as well as allowing time within which any proposal for substantive variation can be placed before creditors for consideration.
(See also Kipoi Holdings Mauritius Limited v Kirman and Bauer as joint and several administrators of Tiger Resources Limited (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) [2021] WASCA 194 at [50] and the cases there cited.)
13 A month has passed since the making of the orders in Diakos (No 1). Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the orders sought on this application should be made, for the following reasons.
14 First, there is no apparent prejudice to creditors. The variation, while having the effect of a deferral of up to one month of the time for finalisation and entry into the loan documents with the incoming financier, will also bring about a corresponding compression of time for payment of the "final dividend" under the creditors' trust deeds. As a result, creditors will be left in the same ultimate position as they would otherwise be under the transactions originally contemplated by the DOCAs. That is, payment of the final dividend will occur by the date originally intended.
15 Secondly, the deed administrators have indicated that they remain of the view that the DOCAs and the associated creditors' trust arrangement are in the interests of creditors. The deed administrators have also indicated to the Court that they support the present application.
16 Thirdly, if the DOCAs are carried out to completion this would be a better result for creditors than an immediate winding up.