THE APPLICATION FOR THE FREEZING ORDERs
8 The Commissioner relies upon r 7.35 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 to apply for the freezing orders in respect of the assets of each of the respondents. The Commissioner contends that he has a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action which is justiciable in this Court.
9 The evidence discloses that in respect of the assessments which have been issued to each of Mr and Mrs Seabrooke, the date for the payment of the tax assessed for about half of the tax years in question has already passed. However, the date for the payment of the assessed tax for the other tax years, and the date for payment of the administrative penalties, is 19 November 2012 and 9 November 2012 respectively.
10 In my view, the evidence comprising the issue of the assessments shows that the Commissioner has an accrued or prospective cause of action in respect of the tax assessed and the administrative penalties which is justiciable in this Court. I am also satisfied that the Commissioner has a good arguable case that the amounts set out in the assessments are due and payable in respect of those amounts for which the due date has already passed, and that the amounts which are payable in November 2012, have been correctly assessed. Section 177 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and s 298-30(3) in Sch 1 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) provide that the production of a notice of assessment or copy thereof is conclusive evidence in the making of the assessment and that the amount and all the particulars of the assessment are correct. This is a sufficient basis to conclude that the Commissioner has a good arguable case sufficient to support the making of freezing orders. I note, however, in passing, that one of the issues with which the audit was concerned was whether Mr Seabrooke was resident in Australia for tax purposes in the years ended 30 June 1998 to 30 June 2011 inclusive. There is considerable discussion in the audit on this question. The issue of whether Mr Seabrooke was resident in Australia during that period for tax purposes remains for another day. However, based, of course, only on the evidence referred to in the audit the Commissioner has shown a good arguable case on this issue.
11 The fact that the time for payment of some amounts of the tax and the administrative penalties has not yet elapsed, does not preclude the freezing orders from being made (Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Sharp (1988) 91 FLR 70 at 74).
12 Further, before making a freezing order, the Court must be satisfied that there is a danger that the assets may be dissipated so that a prospective judgment would be wholly or partly unsatisfied (r 7.32(1) of the Rules). I am satisfied that such a danger exists on the evidence before me. In this regard, I take into account the following factors. First, the large amount of the tax debt in question. The assessment issued to Mr Seabrooke is for an amount in excess of $30 million. Secondly, the evidence demonstrated that Mr Seabrooke has over a number of years been able to move very large sums of money in and out of Australia through a foreign bank account. Thirdly, Mr Seabrooke has shown over a considerable period of time a distinct disinclination to pay tax in Australia. Fourthly, Mr Seabrooke has a number of business interests overseas.
13 I observe that the Commissioner also sought to rely upon the proximity in time between Mr and Mrs Seabrooke changing their names, in June 1987, and their ceasing to file tax returns in Australia. There may, however, be explanations for why Mr and Mrs Seabrooke changed their names, other than in furtherance of an intention to avoid paying tax in Australia. I, therefore, do not place much weight upon this circumstance at this time. More relevant, in my view, in assessing the danger of Mr and Mrs Seabrooke disposing of their assets so as to render any judgment wholly or partly unsatisfied, is the extent of Mr Seabrooke's business interests overseas, the structures he has in place for the transfer of funds overseas, and the fact that he has over a considerable period of time shown a propensity to move money in and out of Australia by the use of these structures and Mr and Mrs Seabrooke's demonstrable disinclination to pay tax in Australia.
14 I am also satisfied that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the freezing order. The freezing order is primarily directed at preventing the disposal of real property. In the short term, at least, this is unlikely to cause hardship to Mr and Mrs Seabrooke. Further, the freezing order makes provision for the use by Mr and Mrs Seabrooke of their assets for ordinary living expenses, reasonable legal costs and for payments made in the ordinary course of business. Also, Mr and Mrs Seabrooke have the benefit of the Commissioner's undertaking as to damages. On the other hand, for the Commissioner the risk is not being able to satisfy a judgment for a very considerable sum of money if he is successful at trial.
15 I am also satisfied that the Court may make an order for the service of the application for the freezing order upon Mr Seabrooke, notwithstanding that Mr Seabrooke is outside Australia. Rule 7.37 of the Rules provides that:
An application for a freezing order or an ancillary order may be served on a person who is outside Australia (whether or not the person is domiciled or resident in Australia) if any of the assets to which the order relates are within the jurisdiction of the Court.
16 The evidence discloses that assets to which the freezing order relates are located within Australia.