Relevant legal principles summarised
13 The relevant legal framework was helpfully summarised by Gleeson J in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, in the matter of ACN 154 520 199 Pty Ltd (in liq) v ACN 154 520 199 Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2017] FCA 755 (ACN 154 520 199 Pty Ltd) at [21]-[26], with which I respectfully agree:
21. Section 477(2B) of the Act provides:
Except with the approval of the Court, of the committee of inspection or of a resolution of the creditors, a liquidator of a company must not enter into … an agreement on the company's behalf (for example, but without limitation, a lease or an agreement under which a security interest arises or is created) if:
(a) without limiting paragraph (b), the term of the agreement may end; or
(b) obligations of a party to the agreement may, according to the terms of the agreement, be discharged by performance;
more than 3 months after the agreement is entered into, even if the term may end, or the obligations may be discharged, within those 3 months.
22. The Court's role in considering an application under s 477(2B) is to determine whether it is a proper or bona fide exercise of the liquidator's powers. In Re 7 Steel Distribution Pty Ltd (in liq) (recs and mgrs apptd) [2013] NSWSC 669; (2013) 31 ACLC 13-021 at [17], Black J said:
The Court is not concerned, in granting an approval under s 477(2B) of the Corporations Act, with matters of commercial judgment but is concerned to be satisfied that the entry into the agreement is a proper exercise of power and not ill-advised or improper on the part of the liquidator ... In Pascoe; Re Matrix Group Limited (in liq) [2011] FCA 1117 at [14], Jacobsen J [sic] noted that the question for the Court in such an application was whether the liquidator's judgment had been infected by a lack of good faith, or an error of law or principle, and whether there was a real or substantial ground for doubting the prudence of the Liquidator's conduct in seeking to enter into the funding arrangement. That question arises, in the context of s 477(2B), in the context of entry into a longer term agreement, the performance of which might otherwise delay the completion of the winding-up.
23. In Stewart, re Newtronics Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1375 ("Newtronics"), Gordon J, at [26(4)], cited with approval Austin J's statement in Corporate Affairs Commission v ASC Timber Pty Ltd (1998) 29 ACSR 109 at 118 that, in reviewing the liquidator's proposal, the task of the Court is not "to reconsider all of the issues which have been weighed up by the liquidator in developing the proposal, and to substitute its determination for his in....a hearing de novo", but rather the task of the Court is:
… simply to review the liquidator's proposal, paying due regard to his or her commercial judgment and knowledge of all of the circumstances of the liquidation, satisfying itself there is no error of law or ground for suspecting bad faith or impropriety, and weighing up whether there is any good reason to intervene in terms of the "expeditious and beneficial administration" of the winding up …
24. The standard imposed under s 477(2B) concerns an assessment by the Court as to whether entry into the agreement is a proper exercise of power and not ill-advised or improper on the part of the liquidator, rather than involving the exercise of commercial judgment: Re Gerard Cassegrain & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) [2013] NSWSC 257 at [11] per Black J citing McGrath re HIH Insurance Ltd [2010] NSWSC 404; (2010) 266 ALR 642.
25. In Pascoe; re Matrix Group Ltd (in liq) [2011] FCA 1117 at [7], Jacobson J cited with approval the following statement by Austin J of the relevant test in Leigh re King Bros [2006] NSWSC 315 at [23]:
Although the court has the statutory task [under s 477(2B)] of giving "approval" to a liquidator's agreement that may end more than three months after it is entered into, the case law shows that the court undertakes something less than a complete "merits review". As Giles J said in Re Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 9 ACSR 83 at 85-6:
"... the court is necessarily confined in attempting to second guess the liquidator in the exercise of his powers, and generally will not interfere unless there can be seen to be some lack of good faith, some error of law or principle, or real and substantial grounds for doubting the prudence of the liquidator's conduct."
26. In Fortress Credit Corporation (Australia) II Pty Ltd v Fletcher [2011] FCAFC 89; (2011) 85 ACSR 38 at [24], the Full Court endorsed the following list of factors (identified by Austin J in Leigh re King Bros at [25] and Re ACN 076 673 875 Ltd [2002] NSWSC 578; (2002) 42 ACSR 296 at [17]-[34]) relevant to the Court's assessment of a litigation funding agreement:
(1) the prospects of success of the proposed litigation;
(2) the interests of creditors other than the proposed defendant;
(3) possible oppression;
(4) the nature and complexity of the cause of action;
(5) the extent to which the liquidator has canvassed other funding options;
(6) the level of the funder's premium;
(7) consultations with creditors; and
(8) the risks involved in the claim.
14 It is also well settled that, while a liquidator should seek the Court's approval before entering into a long term agreement, the Court has power to give retrospective approval to an agreement under s 477(2B) in appropriate circumstances: see Re Kevin Jacobsen Pty Ltd (in liq) [2016] NSWSC 538; 113 ACSR 277 at [74]-[75] and the cases referred to by Gleeson J in ACN 154 520 199 Pty Ltd at [27].
15 I am satisfied that the liquidator has adequately explained that the departure from compliance with s 477(2B) was both inadvertent and unintended. I accept the liquidator's submission that it is appropriate in the circumstances to grant retrospective approval to enter into the Deed. In reaching these conclusions, I have taken into account the liquidator's evidence and submissions, as well as my review of the Deed and Retainer.
16 In respect of the Deed, I accept the liquidator's submission that:
(a) it is his commercial judgment that it is in the interest of creditors for the liquidator and the Company to enter into the Deed;
(b) the absence of creditors' approval is not significant where the absence is because the liquidator failed to obtain a quorum of creditors at two properly called meetings of creditors of the Company;
(c) there is no reason to conclude the liquidator's proposed entry to the Deed is other than a proper exercise of his power, or to conclude that it is an ill-advised or improper act on his part;
(d) it is accordingly appropriate to approve the entry into the Deed on behalf of the Company; and
(e) it is further appropriate to make the order retrospectively where the liquidator's failure to seek approval prior to entering into the Deed was inadvertent and there is no reason to believe that there is any prejudice if an order was made with that effect.
17 As to the Retainer, I accept the liquidator's submissions that:
(a) the commercial terms of the Retainer are appropriate, not unusual and are generally in the interests of creditors;
(b) there is no reason to conclude that the liquidator's proposed entry into the costs agreement with Stacks Law Firm is other than a proper exercise of the liquidator's power, or to conclude that it is an ill-advised or improper act on his part; and
(c) it is accordingly appropriate to approve the liquidator's entry into the proposed costs agreement with Stacks Law Firm on behalf of the Company.