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[2019] FCA 1759
Federal Court of Australia
2019-10-28
Davies J
Original judgment source is linked above.
TO: MIN WANG, the First Respondent This is a 'freezing order' made against you on 25 October 2019 by Justice Davies at a hearing without notice to you after the Court was given the undertakings set out in Schedule A to this order and after the Court read the affidavits listed in Schedule B to this order. THE COURT ORDERS: INTRODUCTION
NAME AND ADDRESS OF APPLICANT'S LAWYERS The applicant's lawyers are: Australian Government Solicitor, Level 34, 600 Bourke St, Melbourne, VIC 3000 Email: Vincent.Tavolaro@ags.gov.au
DAVIES J: 1 On 25 October 2019 I heard an urgent ex parte application by the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation ("DCT") for a freezing order against the first respondent ("Ms Wang") as well as restraining orders against each of the respondents. At the conclusion of the hearing I made the orders sought and stated that I would provide written reasons. These are my reasons. 2 The power to make freezing orders is contained in r 7.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) which provides: (1) The Court may make an order (a freezing order), with or without notice to a respondent, for the purpose of preventing the frustration or inhibition of the Court's process by seeking to meet a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment of the Court will be wholly or partly unsatisfied. (2) A freezing order may be an order restraining a respondent from removing any assets located in or outside Australia or from disposing of, dealing with, or diminishing the value of, those assets. 3 Rule 7.35 deals with the circumstances in which the Court may make a freezing order against a prospective judgment debtor and a person other than a prospective judgment debtor. It relevantly provides: (1) This rule applies if: (a) … (b) an applicant has a good arguable case on an accrued or prospective cause of action that is justiciable in: (i) the Court; or (ii) …. (2) … (3) … (4) The Court may make a freezing order or an ancillary order or both against a … prospective judgment debtor if the Court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that there is a danger that a judgment or prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because any of the following might occur: (a) …; (b) the assets of the judgment debtor, prospective judgment debtor or another person are: (i) removed from Australia or from a place inside or outside Australia; or (ii) disposed of, dealt with or diminished in value. (5) The Court may make a freezing order or an ancillary order or both against a person other than a … prospective judgment debtor (a third party ) if the Court is satisfied, having regard to all the circumstances, that: (a) there is a danger that a … prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied because: (i) the third party holds or is using, or has exercised or is exercising, a power of disposition over assets (including claims and expectancies) of the judgment debtor or prospective judgment debtor; or (ii) the third party is in possession of, or in a position of control or influence concerning, assets (including claims and expectancies) of the … prospective judgment debtor; or (b) a process in the Court is or may ultimately be available to the applicant as a result of … prospective judgment, under which process the third party may be obliged to disgorge assets or contribute toward satisfying the judgment or prospective judgment. (6) Nothing in this rule affects the power of the Court to make a freezing order or ancillary order if the Court considers it is in the interests of justice to do so. 4 The DCT's application was supported by two affidavits of Mr George Khouri, a senior technical leader in the significant debt management team at the Australian Taxation Office, and an affidavit of Mr Andrew Ratnasingham, an employee of the Australian Taxation Office.
Whether a good arguable case on prospective cause of action 5 On 25 October 2019, the DCT served Ms Wang with notices of amended assessment of income tax and notices of assessment of administrative penalties for the years ended 30 June 2015 and 30 June 2016 totalling $103,135,655.93. Pursuant to s 5-5(7) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) and s 298-15 of Sch 1 to the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) ("TAA"), the taxation liabilities under those assessments are payable, but not yet due. However, once due, the DCT may sue for recovery of the amount of the tax liabilities as debts due to the Commonwealth and payable to the Commissioner of Taxation: s 255-5 of Sch 1 of the TAA. By s 350-10 of Sch 1 to the TAA, the production of copies of the assessments in debt recovery proceedings will be conclusive evidence that the assessments were properly made and the amounts and particulars of the assessments are correct. The effect of s 350-10 is that Ms Wang cannot in such recovery proceedings contest her liability to pay the tax as assessed: Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation Limited (2008) 237 CLR 146 at [23]-[25] and [64]-[68] (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ); Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Broadbeach Properties Pty Ltd (2008) 237 CLR 473 at 491-493 [40]-[45] (Gummow A-CJ, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). I was accordingly satisfied that the DCT has a good arguable case on prospective causes of action against Ms Wang in respect of those tax related liabilities.
Whether there is a danger that a prospective judgment will be wholly or partly unsatisfied 6 I was also satisfied on the available evidence that the circumstances in which the Court may make a freezing order as prescribed by r 7.35(4) and (5) were made out on the available evidence. 7 By way of background, Ms Wang and her husband, Mr Liang Chen ("Mr Chen"), are property developers in China. They have operated their property development business through a group of companies in China known as the Shandong Hengyi Group. In 2010 Ms Wang commenced property development in Australia and in March 2014, Ms Wang, Mr Chen and their children were granted Australian Business Skills - Business Talent (Permanent) visas. According to Ms Wang's income tax returns, she has been an Australian tax resident from and including the income year ended 30 June 2015 onwards. Mr Chen continues to reside in China. 8 Ms Wang is the sole director and shareholder of the second respondent ("LH 7 (SFM)"). LH 7 (SFM) is the trustee for the Wang (SFM) Trust ("SFM Trust"). The SFM Trust is a discretionary trust with a non-exhaustive list of general beneficiaries. Ms Wang is the primary beneficiary and appointor. Under clauses 20 and 21 of the SFM Trust deed, Ms Wang as the appointor has the power to remove and appoint the trustee and to nominate a successor to the position of appointor. 9 Ms Wang and her son, Ziyang Chen, are the directors of the third respondent ("LH 7 (168 Victoria)"). Ms Wang is the sole shareholder. LH 7 (168 Victoria) is the trustee of the Wang (168 Victoria) Trust, a discretionary trust of which Ms Wang is the primary beneficiary and appointor. The Wang (168 Victoria) Trust deed contains clauses in the same terms as clauses 20 and 21 of the SFM Trust. 10 Ms Wang and her son, Ziyang Chen, are also the directors of the fourth respondent ("LH 7 (168 Victoria Development)"). Ms Wang is the sole shareholder. LH 7 (168 Victoria Development) is trustee for the Wang (168 Victoria Development) Trust, another discretionary trust of which Ms Wang is primary beneficiary and appointor. The Wang (168 Victoria Development) Trust deed also contains clauses in the same terms as clauses 20 and 21 of the SFM Trust. 11 LH 7 (168 Victoria Development) holds 80% of the shares in the sixth respondent ("Hengyi (Swanston Central Developments)"), the nominee for the joint venturers in a property development known as the Swanston Central property development. LH 7 (168 Victoria Development) is one of the joint venture parties. 12 The fifth respondent ("Hengyi (Swanston Central)") is the land owner under the joint venture agreement. Ms Wang is one of the directors. LH 7 (168 Victoria) holds 80% of the shares in Hengyi (Swanston Central). 13 There are a number of reasons for being satisfied that there is a real risk of dissipation of assets. 14 First although Ms Wang is resident in Australia, she continues to have strong ties with China in that her husband, Mr Chen, continues to reside in China and carries on business there. 15 Secondly, the amount of tax liability is very significant in circumstances where she has both the means and the motive to remove assets because of her control of each of the corporate entities and of the trusts of which those corporate entities are trustees. 16 Thirdly, there is evidence that Ms Wang made false statements in her income tax returns for the 2014 and 2015 income years about her interests in China by representing that she did not have assets located outside Australia with a total value of more than $50,000 and did not have an interest in any controlled foreign company, when information obtained by the Australian Taxation Office in the course of its review and audit of Ms Wang's taxation affairs for those income years showed that in the 2014 income year, Ms Wang held shares in three foreign companies (Shandong Hengyi Investment Co Ltd ("Shandong"), Weifang Hengyi Property Co Ltd and Changyi Liyang Commercial Development Co Ltd) and, in the 2015 income year, continued to hold shares in Shandong, and that her shareholdings in those years were worth substantially more than $50,000 at the time. There is also evidence that Ms Wang gave misleading information to the Australian Taxation Office concerning the funding of the purchase and development of the property at 199 William Street, Melbourne by Hengyi Australia Pty Ltd, a company of which Ms Wang is a sole director and shareholder. 17 Fourthly, the evidence discloses that Ms Wang has experience in international financial dealings and a history of transferring assets and liabilities between related parties. She also has a history of not putting commercial agreements between related parties into writing. 18 These considerations collectively provided a sufficient basis on which to be satisfied that there is a danger that assets may be dissipated in order to frustrate recovery.
Power to make orders in respect of dealings in trusts assets 19 The orders sought included a restraining order against Ms Wang from exercising or influencing any power of distribution in respect of the SFM Trust, the Wang (168 Victoria) Trust and the Wang (168 Victoria Development) Trust, including in her capacity as a director of any trustee of the trusts and when exercising any power as appointor under those three trusts. As well, a restraining order was sought against the second to sixth respondents in their own right or as trustee of a trust from disposing of, encumbering or dealing with their assets other than in the ordinary course of business, without giving the DCT at least 14 days' written notice. 20 As each of the trusts in question are discretionary trusts, there is a question as to whether Ms Wang has a sufficient interest in the assets of those trusts to support the orders sought. Senior counsel for the DCT brought to my attention a number of authorities on that question. It is fair to say that the law is not finally settled but the decision in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Carey & Ors (No 6) (2006) 153 FCR 509; [2006] FCA 814 is strong authority supporting the proposition that the power exists in the present case. In that case, French J (as his Honour then was) held that the beneficiary who effectively controls the trustee's power of selection because he or she is the trustee and/or has the power to appoint a new trustee has something approaching a general power and the ownership of the trust property because "it is as good as certain" that the beneficiary will receive the benefits of distributions either of income or capital or both: at [29], [36]-[37], [41]. In Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Vasiliades (2014) 99 ATR 799; [2014] FCA 1250, Gordon J applied French J's reasoning to conclude that the Commissioner had a good arguable case that the taxpayer in that case had a contingent interest of the kind identified by French J sufficient to found a restraining order against the taxpayer from exercising any power of distribution in respect of the trust including any power as a director of any trustee of the trust. In the present case, the evidence shows that Ms Wang is a beneficiary who controls each of the trusts both through her control of the corporate trustees and through her power of appointment under the trusts. Accordingly, on the strength of those authorities, I was satisfied that there is a good arguable case that the orders sought could be made. 21 Additionally, if it be necessary, the DCT also relies on r 7.35(5)(b). The DCT intends to issue a garnishee notice under s 260-5 of Sch 1 to the TAA to the trustee for the (SFM) Trust in respect of Ms Wang's taxation liability. That notice will create a right in the DCT to sue the trustee in debt to recover the amount that is required to be paid by the notice when the time for payment of that amount as specified in s 260-5(5) has arrived: Commissioner of Taxation v Barnes Development Pty Ltd (2009) 178 FCR 352; [2009] FCA 830 (Gilmour J) at [35]. The trustee for the SFM Trust will have a right to be indemnified out of the assets of the trust, including any debts owing to it by the trustees for the Wang (168 Victoria) Trust and the Wang (168 Victoria Development) Trust in respect of liabilities incurred in the course of acting as trustee of the trust: Carter Holt Harvey Woodproducts Australia Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia & Ors (2019) 93 ALJR 807; [2019] HCA 20 at [29], [83] and [130]. There is evidence that the assets of the SFM Trust include a loan receivable as at 30 June 2018 from the Wang (168 Victoria) Trust of $68,369,256. Accordingly by that route the trustee of the Wang (168 Victoria) Trust may be required to disgorge funds to satisfy the taxation debt. I certify that the preceding twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Davies.
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES VID 1147of 2019 Respondents Fourth Respondent: LH 7 (168 VICTORIA DEVELOPMENT) PTY LTD (ACN 605 389 955) Fifth Respondent: HENGYI (SWANSTON CENTRAL) PTY LTD (ACN 606 191 717) Sixth Respondent: HENGYI (SWANSTON CENTRAL DEVELOPMENTS) PTY LTD (ACN 606 236 033)
Deputy Commission of Taxation
Wang
(2006) 153 FCR 509
(2019) 93 ALJR 807
(2009) 178 FCR 352
(2008) 237 CLR 146
(2008) 237 CLR 473