Ground 4 - The sentence is manifestly excessive
31 It was submitted by counsel for the applicant that the sentence imposed on the applicant was manifestly excessive. In support of this submission counsel relied on what had been the applicant's role in the cultivation, that of a harvester, and the short period the applicant had been on the property. It was submitted that the applicant's criminal history was not such as to warrant a more severe sentence being imposed on the applicant. The sentencing judge had allowed the applicant a discount of 20 per cent for his plea of guilty, so that the sentencing judge's starting point, before allowing the discount for the plea of guilty, would have been five years. It was submitted that in sentencing the applicant the sentencing judge may have been influenced by a mistaken view about the extent to which the Court of Criminal Appeal had interfered with a sentence passed by his Honour on Demetrios Hantzis.
32 In my opinion, the sentence of four years imposed by his Honour on the applicant did not exceed the upper limit of the range of sentences within a proper exercise of his Honour's sentencing discretion. The conduct of the applicant included the making of the telephone calls in which he spoke with co-offenders about the progress of the harvesting and packing of the crop. I have found that the sentencing judge was entitled to find that the applicant's motivation for taking part in the cultivation was monetary gain. In my opinion, the applicant's criminal history, although I have found that there was a slight degree of exaggeration in his Honour's summary of it, was such that his Honour could properly conclude that considerations of deterrence, retribution and the protection of society required a more severe sentence.
33 I would reject the third ground of appeal.
Ground 1 - The sentencing judge erred in applying or failing to apply the parity principle
34 In his submissions in support of this ground counsel for the applicant relied particularly on the sentences passed by Judge Finnane on Hantzis and Madau.
35 Earlier in this judgment I outlined the history of the criminal proceedings against Hantzis.
36 On 10 June 2005 Judge Finnane sentenced Hantzis for the offence of knowingly taking part in the cultivation in 2004 of not less than a commercial quantity of cannabis plants. In sentencing Hantzis for this offence his Honour took into account a further offence of deemed supply of cannabis based on the finding of more than 10 kgs of cannabis at Hantzis' home in Sydney. There was a further charge against Hantzis for a separate offence of knowingly taking part in the supply of a commercial quantity of cannabis leaf, for which Hantzis should have been sentenced by Judge Finnane but for which he was, unaccountably, not sentenced.
37 The 2004 cannabis plantation was very large, the estimated value of the crop being $40 M. There were on the property on which the plants were being cultivated a number of sheds and a number of items of plant and equipment for the cultivation of the cannabis plants and the drying of the harvested cannabis.
38 In his remarks made on sentencing Hantzis for the 2004 offence his Honour declined to find that Hantzis had been a principal in the criminal enterprise. However, he found that Hantzis had had a major or high-level management role. His Honour found that Hantzis' functions had included running the operation of cultivating a crop of cannabis plants from the end of February 2004 to 8 April 2004, when he was arrested; arranging the harvesting and packaging and transporting of the crop; recruiting workers; and arranging for the delivery of supplies to the plantation.
39 With regard to the subjective matters, his Honour found that Hantzis had followed a legitimate occupation as a brick layer, that he had a wife who was suffering severely from multiple sclerosis and that he was a person of good character who had no previous criminal convictions and who had good prospects of rehabilitation. His Honour allowed a discount of 25 per cent for Hantzis' plea of guilty.
40 In the proceedings for the sentencing of Hantzis the Crown submitted that his Honour should adopt a starting point of 15 years, which would have been equal to the maximum sentence for the offence. His Honour declined to adopt such a starting point. His Honour held that, after allowing a discount of 25 per cent for the plea of guilty, a head sentence of nine years would be appropriate, thereby indicating that he had adopted a starting point of 12 years. His Honour proceeded to impose a head sentence of nine years with a non-parole period of five years.
41 An appeal by Hantzis to the Court of Criminal Appeal against the sentence imposed by Judge Finnane was allowed.
42 The Court of Criminal Appeal held that there had been a fundamental error in not sentencing Hantzis for the offence of knowingly taking part in the supply of not less than a commercial quantity of cannabis leaf. The Court of Criminal Appeal further held that for an offender who was not a principal, even if he had played a major role in managing the plantation, the sentencing judge had erred in adopting a starting point of 12 years before allowing a deduction for the plea of guilty. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that an appropriate starting point would be eight years, so that an appropriate head sentence, after allowing the discount for the plea of guilty, would be six years and that this head sentence should be divided into a non-parole period and a parole period in the same proportions as those in which the sentence at first instance had been divided.
43 Accordingly, the Court of Criminal Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the sentence imposed by Judge Finnane and imposed a head sentence of six years with a non-parole period of three years four months commencing on 8 April 2004 and expiring on 7 August 2007.
44 On 13 April 2007 Judge Finnane sentenced Hantzis for knowingly taking part in the 2003 cultivation.
45 In his remarks on sentence his Honour noted that he had previously sentenced Hantzis for taking part in the 2004 cultivation and that an appeal against the sentence imposed by his Honour had been allowed by the Court of Criminal Appeal. His Honour said that the result of the appeal was that "the non-parole period was reduced to three years four months but the head sentence remained".
46 The statement by his Honour that "the head sentence remained" was incorrect, because the Court of Criminal Appeal had in fact reduced the head sentence from nine years to six years. The applicant was sentenced on the same day as Hantzis was sentenced and, although his Honour in sentencing the applicant did not refer to the result of the appeal by Hantzis against his sentence for the 2004 cultivation, it does seem likely, as was submitted by counsel for the applicant, that his Honour in sentencing the applicant was under the mistaken impression that the Court of Criminal Appeal had not interfered with the head sentence of nine years which his Honour had imposed on Hantzis.
47 In his remarks on sentence his Honour noted that, at the time of sentencing Hantzis for the 2004 offence, he had been unaware of the 2003 offence and had sentenced Hantzis on the basis, which had turned out to be false, that in 2004 Hantzis had been a person of good character.
48 His Honour found that Hantzis' role in the 2003 cultivation had been a management role, much the same as the role he had played in the 2004 cultivation, the only difference being that the 2004 cultivation had been much larger.
49 His Honour made a finding that Hantzis' wife's multiple sclerosis had, if anything, become worse by 13 April 2007.
50 It was accepted in the proceedings for the sentencing of Hantzis for the 2003 offence that the sentencing principle of totality required that his Honour should have regard to the sentence he had imposed for the 2004 offence. The Crown prosecutor submitted that it would be appropriate to impose a sentence for the 2003 offence, such that the total period Hantzis would have to serve before being eligible for release on parole would be increased by one year.
51 The sentencing judge decided to impose a head sentence of five years with a non-parole period of two years. He decided to make the non-parole period of the sentence commence on 8 August 2005 so that it would expire on 7 August 2007, the same date that the non-parole period of the sentence for the 2004 offence would expire.
52 As I have already noted, Madau was sentenced by Judge Finnane on 1 May 2007 for the separate offences of taking part in the 2003 cultivation and taking part in the 2004 cultivation.
53 In his remarks on sentence his Honour described the role Madau had played in 2004 as one of harvesting. Madau had been a party to a number of telephone conversations in which he had spoken to co-offenders about the progress of the harvest and the packing of the leaf. His Honour found that Madau had played a similar role in 2003. In 2003 Madau had been on the property from 30 March 2003 to 4 April 2003. Accordingly, the role played by Madau in the 2003 cultivation was very similar to the role the applicant had played in that cultivation and the period during which each had been on the property was very similar.
54 Madau had a criminal history but it was very minor and he had never previously been sentenced to imprisonment. Madau had pleaded guilty and his Honour said that he would allow a maximum discount for the plea of guilty.
55 In his remarks his Honour said that he should endeavour to impose sentences on Madau which were consistent with the sentences he had imposed on other persons who had taken part in the cultivations. His Honour said:-
""Many of the workers from the 2004 crop received sentences of three years with non-parole periods of fifteen months and I mention Mr Mouzakis, Mr Spiliotopolous and Mr Dourampheys. Others have been sentenced to lesser periods for various reasons usually related to their background and the prospects of rehabilitation.""
56 His Honour proceeded to sentence Madau for each offence to a non-parole period of one year and a parole period of one year, making one sentence cumulative on the other to the extent of six months.
57 In his remarks on sentence in sentencing the applicant Judge Finnane demonstrated his awareness of the relevance of the principle of parity in sentencing. His Honour observed that the level of the sentence to be imposed on the applicant would have to be adjusted "to take into account sentences imposed on others both by me and on appeal from me by the Court of Criminal Appeal". His Honour said on p 3 of his remarks:-
""His case is different to that of others who have come before me for this offence; most of them for a similar offence in the following year, because he has been convicted of indictable drug offences. The other persons who have come before me, in the main have had convictions, if at all, for summary matters.""
58 It was submitted by counsel for the applicant that there was a lack of proper parity or proportionality between the sentence passed on the applicant and the sentences passed on Hantzis and Madau.
59 It was submitted that there should have been a much greater disparity between the sentence passed on the applicant and the sentences passed on Hantzis. Hantzis had had a managerial role and had been on the plantation for a much longer period than the applicant.
60 It was submitted that there was too great a disparity between the sentence passed on the applicant and the sentences passed on Madau. Madau's role in the 2003 cultivation had been very similar and of a very similar duration to that of the applicant.
61 Counsel for the applicant submitted that the ground given by the sentencing judge for distinguishing the applicant's case from those of the co-offenders, that the applicant had a criminal history including convictions for indictable offences, was an insufficient ground.
62 The principles relating to parity and proportionality in sentencing were stated by the High Court in Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606 and Postiglione v The Queen (1996-1997) 189 CLR 295. In Postiglione Dawson J and Gaudron J said at pp 301-302, (omitting citation of authority):-
""The parity principle upon which the argument in this court was mainly based is an aspect of equal justice. Equal justice requires that like should be treated alike but that, if there are relevant differences, due allowance should be made for them. In the case of co-offenders, different sentences may reflect different degrees of culpability or their different circumstances. If so, the notion of equal justice is not violated. On some occasions, different sentences may indicate that one or other of them is infected with error. Ordinarily, correction of the error will result in there being a due proportion between the sentences and there will then be equal justice. However, the parity principle, as identified and expounded in Lowe v R , recognises that equal justice requires that, as between co-offenders, there should not be a marked disparity which gives rise to "a justifiable sense of grievance". If there is, the sentence in issue should be reduced, notwithstanding that it is otherwise appropriate and within the permissible range of sentencing options.