Error Below
22 I now return to the applicant's grounds of appeal. Ground 5(a) was that the Tribunal had erred in not taking into consideration evidence given by the Commissioner's own valuer concerning whether the applicant's valuation had been made in a manner not contrary to professional standards. The Commissioner's valuer had been asked by the Commissioner a series of questions about the applicant's valuation report (called the "Fifth Report") including the following:
(a) Are there professional standards recognised in Australia (Professional Standards) for the making of real property valuations? If so, please state what these professional standards are and whether they are the same as those cited in your 21 January 2010 opinion?
(b) Has the Fifth Report been completed in a manner that is contrary to any such Professional Standards? If it has, please explain in detail why, including a description of any contraventions of any such Professional Standards.
23 The Commissioner's valuer gave these answers:
Yes, there are Professional Standards/Guidelines, but no Standards specific to Margin Scheme Valuations. In this regard Valuers have been guided by legal advice.
Valuer's are governed by the Australian Property Institute (API) and guided by the Australia and New Zealand Valuation and Property Standards 2007, which have been published by the API and Property Institute of New Zealand (PINZ). Reference to International Standards 3 Section 4.4 Valuation Reporting Sub Section 3.0 Definitions, defines a Valuation Report as:
A document that records the instructions for the assignment, the basis and purpose of the valuation, and the results of the analysis that led to the opinion of value. A Valuation Report may also explain the analytical processes undertaken in carrying out the valuation, and present meaningful information used in the analysis. Valuation Reports can be either oral or written. The type, content and length of a report vary according to the intended user, legal requirements, the property type, and the nature of and complexity of the assignment.
I highlight the word "may" as being critical to the preparation of a report, as it does not state that the Valuer "must" explain or include specific supporting information. The extent of the content is left to the Valuers discretion.
….
It appears, in my opinion, that the Fifth valuation report addresses the requirements pursuant to the Professional Standards definition of Valuation Report. I do state however that in my opinion there are areas which are deficient and require further clarification.
[my emphasis]
24 None of this expert evidence, in particular the observation made by the Commissioner's valuer that the applicant's valuation report addressed the requirements of the professional standards, was considered by the Tribunal member in his reasons for decision. Those standards were the "Australian and New Zealand Valuation and Property Standards 2007". Instead, all that is said by the Tribunal about this report is contained in the last two sentences of par [18]:
Mr Murray also provided a separate report to the ATO giving his opinion about the third and fourth reports provided by Mr Gibson. It is, effectively, a critique of those reports given the significant disparity between the figures arrived at by Mr Murray and Mr Gibson.
With respect, that observation misses a material point of the report.
25 Before the Tribunal, the Commissioner's valuer was cross-examined by counsel for the applicant. He agreed that different valuers might regard differing methods as appropriate to use to value the same asset. This can be seen in the following exchange:
I will refer to them just as property standards or valuation standards. What I want to ask you is you would agree that there's no one objectively appropriate method or technique of valuation?---Yes, I agree.
And you would agree that different valuers might regard different methods as the appropriate method to use?---Certainly, yes.
And each of those valuers might disagree with one another. One might consider (a) is appropriate and not (b); the other might consider (b) is appropriate and not (a). Would you agree with that?---Certainly.
And both of them are not acting contrary to the valuation standards?---That's correct.
The Commissioner's valuer also agreed in cross examination that a valuer might have regard to directions given to him or her by others. This can be seen in the following exchange:
One of those factors might be, as I've said, the valuer's own personal skills and abilities?---Certainly.
And one of them might be directions that are received as to be object of valuation?---That's correct, yes.
So that in a case, let's say, [where] valuation is being performed through the Tax Department, instructions received from the Tax Department might cause a valuer to regard one method as appropriate which another, not receiving those instructions, might not regard as appropriate?---That's correct, yes.
And really from the point of view of the standards, they would all be appropriate?---Could well be, yes.
26 Then the following exchange took place in which the Commissioner's valuer again expressed his opinion that the applicant's valuation was made in accordance with professional standards:
You stated in your expert report that in your opinion that there were aspects of the actual report that was prepared that required further clarification?--Yes.
But if we're focusing now on the - not the way it was reported, but the actual valuation, would you say that that was made in a manner that was contrary to the valuation standards?---Not contrary to the standards, no.
27 In my view, in the context of the legislative regime I have described above, the opinion of the Commissioner's valuer that the applicant's valuation was not made in a manner contrary to professional standards was a decisive matter. Yet, as the applicant points out, it is not referred to at all by the Tribunal below. In re-examination, counsel for the applicant gallantly tried to remedy the matter - but without success. In the following exchange the Commissioner's valuer again confirmed his view that the applicant's valuation complied with professional standards:
You were asked a question about whether the - you described the fifth valuation was made in accordance with the standards. In your report at page 2 the question was:
Has the report been completed in a manner that is contrary to such professional standards?
And your answer is:
…
It appears, in my opinion, that fifth valuation report addresses the requirements pursuant to the professional standards definition of valuation report. I do state, however, that in my opinion there are areas which are deficient and require further clarification.
So is what you're saying is [in] a matter of form the valuation complied with the standards?---No. I'm basically saying it does not not comply. I think after I reviewed the latter affidavit or further statement from Mr Gibson, one of my major concerns was in relation to the instruction and the comments within the earlier reports. And he further clarifies in relation to this meeting with the ATO representatives and relies upon that as the basis of the assessment. One of the major - as I see it, one of the major statements within a valuation report is the - clearly states out the conclusions and that it is not misleading. My understanding of Mr Gibson's report, it is very definitive on how he has actually done the assessment, and basically he has emphatically stated how he has done it.
28 The answer given - "I'm basically saying it does not not comply" - whilst perhaps lacking in eloquence, nonetheless conveyed the basal view of the witness that the applicant's valuation complied with applicable professional standards. In my view, this was fundamental evidence that should have been considered by the Tribunal, but was not. In that respect, and contrary to the submission of the Commissioner, and reading the reasons as generously as one can, this evidence was not considered at par [72] of the reasons below.
29 Failing to have regard to cogent evidence is a breach of the standards of procedural fairness, and an error of law for the purposes of s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). As the Full Court of this Court said in Repatriation Commission v Hill (2002) 69 ALD 581 at [59]:
... This decision cannot be the subject of an appeal under s 44 (1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ("AAT Act"), unless, in making it, the Tribunal has acted otherwise than in accordance with the law. If a tribunal falls into an error of law "which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal's exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers": see Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179. An error of law of this kind may support an appeal under s 44 of the AAT Act on a question of law: cf The Hospital Benefit Fund of Western Australia Inc v Minister for Health, Housing and Community Services (1992) 39 FCR 225 at 231-232 per Wilcox, Burchett and French JJ.
cf Haritos v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 233 FCR 315 at [227]
30 If the evidence had gone no further than this, I would have allowed the appeal and have set aside the Commissioner's objection decision dated 12 November 2015. But, the evidence before the Tribunal was not so straightforward. That is because the applicant's valuer at one stage conceded in cross-examination that his valuation was at odds with the professional standards identified by the Commissioner's valuer, but then in re-examination he gave further evidence that he thought that it did satisfy those standards. The exchange that took place in cross-examination is as follows:
Can I then take you to 3.2.8, it says the phrase:
"… wherein the parties had each acted knowledgeably and prudently …" presumes that both the willing buyer and the willing seller are reasonably informed about the nature and characteristics of the property, its actual and potential uses, and the state of the market as of the date of valuation.
And then prudence, skipping one sentence:
Prudence is assessed by referring to the state of the market at the date of valuation, not with benefit of hindsight at some later date.
Isn't it the case that your as-is model utilises hindsight?---Yes.
So would you say that your as-is model is not consistent with the descriptions of these words from the standards? As you were instructed to do by the ATO - - - ?---Correct.
- - - that that model is not consistent with these standards?---Correct.
Then in re-examination, the following exchange takes place upon the witness being taken to another part of the standard:
Can you see 6.1.10 down the bottom? See down the very bottom, left and right-hand side is page numbers?---Yes.
6.1.10?---Yes.
If you look, you will see it says 5.25.2. Can you see that?---Yes.
And it starts with the words, "A subdivision development technique"?---Yes.
Can you see that?---I can, yes.
I want you to read - I will read it out. It says:
A subdivision development technique may also be applied to land valuation. This process entails projecting the subdivision of a particular property into a series of lots, developing incomes and expenses associated with the process, and discounting the resulting net incomes into an indication of value.
Would you say that's the discounted cash flow method?---Yes, I would.
Is that the method that you applied?---Yes, it is.
And that requires valuation on an as-is rather than as-was basis?---Yes.
31 Once again, none of this material would appear to have been considered by the Tribunal in its reasons for decision, even though it was directly relevant to the critical issue before it. In my view, ignoring the evidence of the Commissioner's witness, both in chief and in cross-examination, is sufficient to justify the allowance of this appeal and the setting aside of the Tribunal's decision. But the conflicts in the evidence set out above are not capable of resolution by me and, accordingly, it is appropriate that the proceeding be remitted back to the Tribunal to be heard in accordance with law. I shall return to the issue of the particular form of relief that should be ordered. I should add that, on this evidence, the Court is unable to accept the submission of the Commissioner that I should find that the applicant's valuation was so absurd or irrational that I should decide that it was made in a manner contrary to professional standards. The Commissioner's own expert evidence does not support that characterisation of the valuation.
32 It is unnecessary for me to consider the other grounds of appeal relied upon by the applicant as they did not affect the relief that should be granted. I should, however, mention that, in my view, the Tribunal wrongly referred to the textbook "The Valuation of Businesses, Shares and other Equity" by Mr Lonergan (4th edition, 2003). Neither party had referred to, or mentioned that textbook. Nor had either party been informed by the Tribunal of its intended reliance upon it. The book features prominently in the reasons for decision: see pars [56] to [59]. The applicant submitted that the use of this book constituted a breach of s 39 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). That provision provides:
(1) Subject to sections 35, 36 and 36B, the Tribunal shall ensure that every party to a proceeding before the Tribunal is given a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case and, in particular, to inspect any documents to which the Tribunal proposes to have regard in reaching a decision in the proceeding and to make submissions in relation to those documents.
In Jagroop v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 123 the Full Court of the Federal Court said at par [59]:
The second limb of s 39(1) of the AAT Act required the AAT, if it proposed to have regard to the documents in reaching its decision, to give the parties a reasonable opportunity to inspect those documents and to make submissions in relation to them. The terms of s 39(1) were described by Sackville J in O'Sullivan v Repatriation Commission (2003) 128 FCR 590; 74 ALD 407; [2003] FCA 387 at [56] as "unequivocal". Sackville J considered that s 39(1) "reflects a clear statutory policy that a party should have an opportunity of inspecting documents that may play a part in the AAT reaching a decision and should also have the opportunity to make submissions on those documents": at [45].
33 In my view, the Lonergan textbook played "a part in the [Tribunal] reaching a decision" here. Notwithstanding the persuasive ability of counsel for the Commissioner, I am not satisfied that the Tribunal had regard only to authorities in rejecting the applicant's valuation. I refer to the first sentence of par [65] of the reasons below, set out above. It is self-evident from that sentence that both the authorities and "the literature" formed a part of the process of reasoning. In my opinion, the Tribunal erred by not giving the parties the opportunity to make submissions about the Lonergan textbook, both with the respect to its content and the potential expertise of its author. It also erred in relying upon untested opinion.
34 Because I have decided to set aside the Tribunal's decision, I need not address the applicant's attack on the Tribunal's finding about recklessness. If it matters, there was some force in the Commissioner's submission that the applicant had not discharged its onus of proof on this point.
35 Before me, the applicant submitted that the form of any relief that might be ordered would depend upon what grounds of appeal, if any, might be accepted by me. I therefore direct the parties to file and serve within 14 days, either agreed final orders, or written submissions setting out what final orders I should make. In particular, I ask the parties to give consideration to the question of whether the matter should or should not be remitted to a differently constituted Tribunal and whether it should be remitted for a full re-hearing, or a hearing limited to the use of evidence, including oral evidence, already given.
36 I order that:
(1) the appeal be allowed with costs;
(2) the decision of the Tribunal dated 1 December 2017 be set aside; and
(3) the parties file, within 14 days, the orders that they agree ought to be made to reflect the reasons for decision published this day, or, if agreement cannot be reached, written submissions limited to eight pages, concerning the orders for final disposition of this appeal.
I certify that the preceding thirty-six (36) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Steward.