Daniel Walton v Terence George Hartmann as executor of the Estate of Wanda Resler

Mr Walton's medical history

1. Mr Walton has had a long history of treatment for mental illness.
2. Mr Walton was born in 1975 and is currently 42 years old.
3. On 5 January 1997, he presented to the Marrickville Community Mental Health Centre. On admission he gave a history to Dr Philips that he had been more depressed than usual for about a month and was having suicidal thoughts. He however had never made a suicide attempt. He was unemployed and had worked as a chef in the past. He told Dr Phillips he had been a good student but had lost motivation and did not complete a satisfactory HSC.
4. He gave his family history which included the death of his mother when he was five from a drug overdose. For a time there was a custody battle between his grandparents and his biological father.
5. Dr Phillips thought Mr Walton was suffering from a major depressive illness. However he showed no signs of psychosis, although he thought he had some obsessive traits. He noted Mr Walton had been drinking alcohol to excess and had experimented with amphetamines but was told by Mr Walton he was not a regular user. In the past, Mr Walton had used cannabis heavily but was not doing so recently. Mr Walton further told Dr Phillips any monies he had he used on women and cocaine. Dr Phillips thought Mr Walton needed ongoing counselling. He also thought in addition to a major depressive illness, Mr Walton was financially desperate and had dependency needs arising from childhood grief and suffering, and an anger about what he saw to be the theft of his inheritance. Dr Phillips in the end however thought Mr Walton's mental state would improve with a combination of medication and counselling.
6. On 10 July 1997, Mr Walton was seen by the psychiatry department at the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital in Sydney. Mr Walton had been referred to that department by a Dr Campbell, psychiatrist, at the Marrickville Community Mental Health Centre. Dr Campbell had referred Mr Walton because of his paranoid delusions. On examination, the treating doctor noted what were described as a number of bizarre delusions. Further, it was observed Mr Walton had been abusing drugs and lived in a share house with five others who were also using drugs of various sorts. A history on similar lines given to that of Dr Phillips was taken.
7. The treating doctor observed Mr Walton was happy to be admitted and he was aware he was unwell. The diagnosis was that he was then suffering from a drug induced psychosis. It was also observed he had manic symptoms.
8. On 1 December 2004, a doctor from the Mood Disorders Unit of the Prince of Wales Hospital in Randwick wrote a report to a Dr Diana Staniforth, General Practitioner in Lane Cove. It stated that Mr Walton had presented at the clinic in a somewhat distressed state saying he had not been sleeping well, lacked motivation, and was suffering from an inability to concentrate. He gave a history he had three episodes of depression since he was fourteen. He said between the ages of sixteen to twenty one he had heavily used cannabis and alcohol. He had also used ecstasy, amphetamines and cocaine. He then smoked about thirty six cigarettes a day and had done so since he was a teenager. He said he currently lived in a flat owned by his grandmother, and as a consequence paid modest rent. He was told emphatically he should cease using all recreational drugs even if they were used intermittently. Mr Walton agreed to take that course and set himself some goals.
9. Dr Mastroianni, psychiatrist, having seen Mr Walton wrote a report to a Dr Yvonne Bloomfield on 21 November 2011. Dr Mastroianni endorsed the diagnosis of Attention Deficit Disorder since early childhood, persisting into adulthood. He went on to express the view that it had caused significant academic, social and occupational functioning under development. He thought Mr Walton suffered from chronic anxiety. Dr Mastroianni saw Mr Walton again in November and December 2011.
10. In early 2013, Mr Walton alleged he was assaulted. As a result, he sustained a significant right orbital floor fracture requiring operative intervention. On CT scan, there was no obvious intercranial injury, but he complained of memory and attention difficulties. He also reported difficulty in concentrating. He continued to receive treatment during 2013 for this injury.
11. On 28 April 2016, Mr Probets, psychologist, prepared an opinion at the request of Mr Walton's then solicitors. A forensic psychology assessment was required in connection with a sentence hearing. Mr Walton had been charged with common assault, custody of a knife in a public place, break and enter in a dwelling house or building to commit serious indictable offences and receive/dispose of stolen property. The psychologist was told Mr Walton was going to plead guilty to the assault, but not to the possession of the knife and he expressed the opinion the offences did not occur in expressly the way the Police had stated and that they were not as bad as the Police asserted. Mr Probets administered some psychometric tests. Mr Probets expressed the view he thought Mr Walton was suffering from Dysthymic Disorder, which is now called Persistent Depressive Disorder in DSM-5. Mr Probets observed, in his view, Mr Walton had abused methamphetamine for a long period, although this now appeared to be in remission. Mr Probets observed that according to Mr Walton, he had recently managed to give up methamphetamine and had requested a referral to the Drug and Alcohol Service at the Royal North Shore Hospital. Mr Probets was of the view Mr Walton needed ongoing psychological assistance, the prime focus of at least remaining drug free.
12. On 3 August 2016, Mr Walton was briefly admitted to the Royal North Shore Hospital. He stated he presented himself on the advice of Police. He told the admitting doctor he had been arrested earlier that evening for possession of methamphetamines and ten other charges. He stated he had been released on bail on condition that he presented to the Emergency Department. He told the admitting doctor he had been strangled two weeks before by an unknown person, but potentially because he was due to inherit $15 million from his grandmother. He denied recent drug or alcohol ingestion. It was observed he was suffering from paranoid or grandiose delusion with manic traits. The diagnosis was delusional thoughts and drug induced psychosis. The ultimate view expressed was that it was a likely acute stress reaction or brief psychotic episode triggered by stress and/or drugs, and/or dexamphetamine abuse. As he was thought to be over the episode, he was discharged from hospital.
13. On 15 September 2016, he was again seen at Royal North Shore Hospital with a complaint he had been assaulted by way of a punch to the face. This had been by an unknown assailant. On examination, however, he was thought to be lucid and alert with no obvious external injury and no facial bruising or bleeding. He did admit to intermittent use of crystal methamphetamine.
14. On 4 October 2016, the Edgeworth Medical Centre received a request for a toxicology test on Mr Walton. He had apparently alleged he had suffered from some sedative poisoning that almost killed him and made him fail to report for bail. The Medical Centre sent a fax to Mr Eardley of Counsel explaining why Mr Walton had not attended for his appointment. The toxicology report annexed showed some amphetamine type substances were detected on analysis.
15. Mr Walton had further difficulties with some incident involving the police and was interviewed at Chatswood Police Station on 11 January 2017. In broad terms it was said to involve trespass and drug matters.
16. On 24 January 2017, Dr George Jacobs wrote a report which he sent to Dr Samson Roberts. He had seen Mr Walton that day. Dr Jacobs expressed the view Mr Walton was "clearly psychotic with paranoia and thought disorder." He observed that he used drugs in the past and was on parole. Dr Jacobs thought he needed to be hospitalised and treated accordingly.
17. On 6 February 2017, Ms Lucinda Bennett, the Community Corrections Officer at Corrective Services NSW, sent an email to Ms Suzie Hershco at Jewish Care. She expressed the view she held concerns for what she described as Mr Walton's deteriorating mental state. He had been to see Ms Bennett that day and had attended her offices without shoes (and had been walking around for a few days without his shoes) and somehow got glass in his foot. Miss Bennett observed Mr Walton appeared unkempt and had also been neglecting his personal hygiene. Ms Bennett thought Mr Walton was in a heightened state and a high level of paranoia was evident during the interview.
18. Dr Mastroianni appears to have seen Mr Walton in January, February and April 2017.
19. Dr Mastroianni prepared a report dated 29 August 2017 for the purposes of use in connection with certain criminal proceedings concerning Mr Walton. Dr Mastroianni expressed the view that the decline in educational and occupational functioning was entirely consistent with his overall psycho, social and functional decline over at least the last decade, all of which was connected to his mental condition. Dr Mastroianni noted Mr Walton had a long history of mental illness symptoms and had been treated and hospitalised over the years. He also noted his use of illicit methamphetamine substances since his mid-twenties. Dr Mastroianni expressed the view Mr Walton had mental conditions of schizoaffective disorder and amphetamine use disorder, as defined in DSM-5. Dr Mastroianni recommended admission to a private psychiatric hospital, where his mental condition could be observed in the absence of methamphetamine use, and his psychotic mood symptoms clearly identified in order to commence appropriate mood stabilising and/or anti-psychotic medication.

Legal capacity to commence proceedings

1. The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) provide a person under legal incapacity may not commence or carry on proceedings except by his or her tutor; r 7.14(1).
2. Section 3 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) (CPA), which applies to the UCPR pursuant to section 11 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), defines a "person under legal incapacity" as: any person who is under a legal incapacity in relation to the conduct of legal proceedings (other than an incapacity arising under section 4 of the Felons (Civil Proceedings) Act 1981 ) and, in particular, includes: (a) a child under the age of 18 years, and (b) an involuntary patient, a forensic patient or a correctional patient within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 2007 , and (c) a person under guardianship within the meaning of the Guardianship Act 1987 , and (d) a protected person within the meaning of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 , and (e) an incommunicate person, being a person who has such a physical or mental disability that he or she is unable to receive communications, or express his or her will, with respect to his or her property or affairs.
3. Supplementing this definition, UCPR r 7.13 adds a "person under legal incapacity includes a person who is incapable of managing his or her affairs."
4. As Hallen J observed in Rappard v Williams [2013] NSWSC 1279 (Rappard) at [76]: [76] Whether a person is under a legal incapacity is always a task, and time, specific, matter, dependent upon whether the person has the ability to understand and evaluate the particular task that is in question at the particular time: Guthrie v Spence [2009] NSWCA 369 ; (2009) 78 NSWLR 225 at [174]-[175]; Azar v Kathirgamalingan [2012] NSWCA 429, per Campbell JA, at [168]. In this case, whether the Plaintiff is a "person who is under a legal incapacity in relation to the conduct of legal proceedings" must be considered. Thus, even though a party may be able to carry out tasks associated with daily living, she, or he, may lack the capacity to understand and evaluate the matters involved in the conduct of legal proceedings, and for that reason fall within the definition of "person under legal incapacity".
5. Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co [2002] EWCA Civ 1889 (Masterman-Lister), also cited by Hallen J in Rappard at [77] and relied upon by the Respondents in this case, involved the issue of whether or not a person was under a legal incapacity so as to be unable to commence or continue legal proceedings. The Respondents cite Hammershlag J's summary of Masterman-Lister in Murray v Williams [2010] NSWSC 1243 at [26]-[28]: [26] There is no dispute that the test to be applied in determining Christopher's mental capacity or lack of it is that applied by Chadwick LJ in Masterman-Lister v Brutton & Co [2003] 3 All ER 162 (and accepted by Price J in Farr v Queensland [2009] NSWSC 906 at [15]) which his Lordship articulated as follows: [ … ] the test to be applied, as it seems to me, is whether the party to legal proceedings is capable of understanding, with the assistance of such proper explanation from legal advisers and experts in other disciplines as the case may require, the issues on which his consent or decision is likely to be necessary in the course of those proceedings. If he has capacity to understand that which he needs to understand in order to pursue or defend a claim, I can see no reason why the law - whether substantive or procedural - should require the interposition of a next friend or guardian ad litem. ….. [28] Hence I approach the matter by considering whether with proper explanation from legal advisers and experts Christopher has capacity to understand what he needs to understand to pursue (or decide to pursue or not to pursue) the claim which Narelle has made.
6. The appointment of a tutor after the commencement of proceedings is not determinative of the question whether the proceedings should have been instituted by the Plaintiff through a tutor; Rappard at [68] per Hallen J; Chong v Mo [2010] NSWSC 251 at [70] per McLaughlin AsJ.

Court's jurisdiction to appoint tutor

1. UCPR r 7.18 provides a court may appoint a tutor where a party is or becomes under legal incapacity; r 7.18(1). Further, r 7.18(6) provides an application for appointment as tutor may be made by the Court of its own motion or on the motion of any other person, including the proposed tutor.
2. The Applicant relies on Mao v AMP Superannuation Ltd [2015] NSWCA 252 (Mao) to support their claim the Court does not have jurisdiction to appoint a tutor of its own motion under rule 7.18 UCPR, where, as is the present case, there is no identified person before the Court who has consented to act. In my view, this reliance on Mao is misplaced.
3. In the primary judgment (Mao v AMP Superannuation Ltd; Mao v BT Funds Management Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1794), Hallen J ordered the appointment of a tutor for the Plaintiff, and the Defendants continue to make attempts to nominate a tutor who consents to being appointed; at [165]. No stay of proceedings was ordered. The Court of Appeal (Beazley ACJ, Emmett and Leeming JJA) found Hallen J did not have jurisdiction under the UCPR to appoint a tutor "in gross" noting at [50]: …with the possible exception of where a tutor is removed, the regime established by Div 4 does not contemplate an occasion such as the present, where there is no one who can commence or carry on any proceedings, since there is no automatic stay of proceedings simply because a court has determined that a party is a person under legal incapacity. That could be critical in circumstances where the relevant party is a defendant. That is to say, the scheme of Div 4 generally is not consistent with the appointment of a tutor "in gross". The power of the court is to appoint a person as tutor. Unless an identified person, who has consented to act, is appointed as tutor, the power is not exercised.
4. However, this is not to say the Court cannot stay proceedings under section 67 of the CPA unless and until a tutor has been appointed, as was done for example by McCallum J in Ferrier v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 1806, delivered several months after Mao.

Parties' submissions

1. The issues in these proceedings are first, what is the meaning of legal incapacity under UCPR r 7.14 in relation to capacity to commence proceedings, secondly, whether Mr Walton fell within this meaning, thirdly whether the court lacks jurisdiction to appoint a tutor of its own motion, and fourthly, the basis on which costs should be awarded.

Meaning of legal incapacity to commence proceedings

1. The Applicant submits a person lacks legal capacity under UCPR r 7.14 at the commencement of proceedings if the person lacked the capacity to consistently make decisions and issue instructions on a day to day basis on the day of the commencement of the proceedings. The Applicant relies on the decision of Ranclaud v Cabban (NSW Supreme Court, Unreported Decision, 9 February 1988, Young J, BC8802222) (Ranclaud), McD v McD [1983] 3 NSWLR 81 and general policy considerations to support this construction (Applicant's closing submissions [7]-[11]).
2. The Respondent submits the burden of proof rests on those asserting incapacity, and cites Masterman-Lister in submitting the question of whether one lacks or lacked legal capacity to commence proceedings turns on their capacity to give clear instructions to their lawyers and understand and act on the advice they are given (Respondent's outline of submissions [7]-[9]).
3. In response to the Applicant, the Respondent submits Ranclaud is about the legal capacity to carry on proceedings, rather than commence proceedings (Respondent's closing submissions [10]).

Whether Mr Walton was under legal incapacity and unable to commence proceedings

1. The Applicant submits the evidence shows on the balance of probabilities Mr Walton lacked legal capacity at the time the proceedings were commenced. The Applicant compiles and notes from August 2016 to February 2017 in submitting he prima facie lacked legal capacity, and notes Mr Russo provided no documentary evidence in support of his alleged "assessment" of Mr Walton. Further, the Applicant submits Dr Mastroianni's expert opinion is of limited probative value as it does not accurately address the issue of legal capacity and was formed without regard to all relevant facts (Applicant's closing submissions [12]-[23]).
2. The Respondent submits Mr Walton had capacity to give instructions for an arguable pleading to be drawn and filed on 25 October 2016, relying on the evidence of Dr Mastroianni (Respondent's closing submissions [2]-[9]).
3. The Respondent does however submit that while Mr Walton had capacity to commence the proceedings, it is concerned about his capacity to consistently give instructions, and intend on putting to the Court instructions as to the appointment of a tutor when obtained (Respondent's closing submissions [11]).

Court's jurisdiction to appoint tutor of its own motion

1. The Applicant relies on Mao v AMP Superannuation Ltd [2015] NSWCA 252 (Mao) in submitting the Court cannot appoint a tutor pursuant to rule 7.18 of the UCPR or its inherent jurisdiction where no identified person who has consented to act is before the Court, as the case was in this matter (Applicant's closing submissions [24]-[27]).
2. This is in contrast to the Court's power of its own motion to commit the affairs of Mr Walton in respect of the family provision proceedings to the NSW Trustee & Guardian under section 41(2) of the NSW Trustee and Guardian Act 2009 (NSW), which the Applicant flags it would seek in the family provision proceedings if the Court were to grant their orders in these proceedings.
3. The Respondent does not make submissions on this issue.

Costs

1. The Applicant submits, irrespective of the Motion, their costs of the Motion should be paid by the Respondent's legal representatives on an indemnity basis. The Applicant submits costs should be awarded on this basis as the Respondent's legal representatives indicated Mr Walton lacked legal capacity but did not bring an application for a tutor, and Mr Russo knew Mr Walton lacked legal capacity since, at the very latest, January 2017 and yet the Applicant had to bring the Motion to force the issue of Mr Walton's capacity (Applicant's closing submission [29]-[33]).
2. The Respondent submits the Applicant's submission should be rejected as Mr Walton had the relevant capacity to give instructions and Mr Russo was able to take instructions from Mr Walton, thus the Motion should be dismissed with costs (Respondent's closing submissions [12]-[13]).

The evidence before the court

1. Two witnesses were called by the Respondent. The first was his current solicitor, Mr Salvatore Russo. The second was his treating psychiatrist, Dr Mastroianni.
2. Mr Russo had sworn an affidavit of 4 September 2017. In that affidavit he expressed the view that he had significant litigation experience in which he had to take instructions from persons who suffered from a variety of conditions, both physical and mental. He was acutely aware of the vigilance needed when dealing with elderly, fragile or persons suffering incapacities of various kinds.
3. In broad terms he expressed the view he was able to obtain instructions from Mr Walton and had no difficulty in doing so. Those views were somewhat qualified when Mr Russo gave evidence before the Court.
4. Mr Russo, for example, accepted there were periods which he described as "manic periods" when he had encountered difficulties obtaining instructions as I understood his evidence (T12/45-50).
5. Mr Russo said he had a good relationship with Mr Walton. He had known him since he was seven years old (T13/45-50).
6. Mr Russo did concede he knew Mr Walton used dexamphetamine and that was one thing he had to take into account when obtaining instructions (T23/20-35).
7. Mr Russo also made it clear there were times when he detected Mr Walton was having an "episode" and he would not take instructions from him, and would defer doing so usually for a couple of days (T26/15-25).
8. Mr Russo indicated further there were times when he simply would not accept instructions from Mr Walton because his thinking, in Mr Russo's mind, was not clear enough (T27/45-50).
9. Mr Russo thought there had been a deterioration in his condition and hence capacity to give instructions sometime in 2017 (T29/15-25). Mr Russo said he had no difficulties with Mr Walton getting instructions to commence the proceedings, and no problems had arisen between 25 October and 31 December 2016 (T35/36-50).
10. Dr Mastroianni gave evidence. He said he had Mr Walton as a patient since at least October 2011. He saw him on three occasions in that period over two or three months and then there was a gap for at least four years. He saw him next on 1 November 2016 (T39/15-20).
11. Mr Walton was initially referred to Dr Mastroianni for treatment but was also informed Mr Walton wanted him to prepare a report for court. Dr Mastroianni said Mr Walton had stated he wanted to be put on dexamphetamine for his Attention Deficit Disorder. The doctor thought that was contraindicated in someone who appeared psychotic (T40/20-30).
12. Dr Mastroianni was asked to express a view as to whether on 1 November 2016 he could have formed any medical opinion as to whether Mr Walton was able to understand the proceedings that had been commenced. Dr Mastroianni said Mr Walton was able to explain his rationale, or why proceedings were commenced. He further thought Mr Walton had been able to give instructions to commence proceedings, although he could not say categorically in what condition he might have been five or six days earlier. Dr Mastroianni based his belief on Mr Walton's ability to give instructions on his observations on 1 November, but also his hospital presentation in August 2016 and later on 15 November 2016. On the second admission, he presented with a head injury but was observed to be lucid and not confused, which Dr Mastroianni regarded as an important observation (T43/25-35).
13. As to the future, Dr Mastroianni said his mood intensity fluctuated and with potential amphetamine use, together with stress, Mr Walton could be floridly psychotic, which Dr Mastroianni observed in February 2017 (T44/5-10).
14. Dr Mastroianni expressed the view Mr Walton's ability to listen to people and understand explanations would be entirely dependent upon his mood. If he was in what the doctor described as "florid" mood, he would probably not listen. If not, he would unless he already had a fixed idea about something (T45/40-45).
15. Dr Mastroianni agreed in the report he wrote he was not specifically asked to express a view on whether or not Mr Walton had capacity to commence proceedings (T49/30-40).
16. Dr Mastroianni agreed he did rely upon other records, but also how Mr Walton presented to him on 1 November 2016 (T49/45-50).
17. Dr Mastroianni said he thought a person would be capable of commencing proceedings, with the assistance of proper legal advice, if they were aware of the issues and specific nature of the proceedings they wished to commence, and were able to give instructions to the person giving legal advice in a reasonable manner and to accept and properly evaluate that legal advice (T51/15-20).

Consideration

1. There is little doubt Mr Walton has had a somewhat chequered history in relation to his mental health. He has had a scarred personal life and has suffered, and does suffer, depression and periods of mania, especially when he is using and/or abusing amphetamines.
2. However, in my view, the Respondent is correct in its distinction between legal capacity to commence proceedings, and legal capacity to carry on proceedings. On the evidence, I am satisfied both on the basis of Mr Russo's testimony and that of Dr Mastroianni, that Mr Walton at least had capacity to give instructions to commence the proceedings on 25 October 2016.
3. I accept that several months before commencing proceedings, Mr Walton was admitted to Royal North Shore Hospital and then transferred to Macquarie Hospital (Tender Bundle pages 54-55). However, this admission on 3 August 2016 was due to a "drug induced psychosis." By 11 August 2016, Mr Walton was considered "not currently mentally ill and can be discharged." Thus, once the effect of the drugs had worn off, Mr Walton was considered to be sound in mind.
4. There is no evidence to suggest that come 25 October 2016, Mr Walton was not in the same state as he was in on 11 August 2016. Indeed, in my view the Applicant has not been able to place any compelling evidence before me challenging Dr Mastroianni's opinion, sworn five days after the filing of the Statement of Claim on 1 November 2016, that Mr Walton "on the balance of probabilities…had the capacity to give instructions in relation to the Statement of Claim…"
5. The instructions he gave Mr Russo or Counsel were such that he was able to prepare a pleading which, it is not suggested, is unintelligible or does not give rise to an arguable cause of action. Indeed there has been no attempt to take any pleading point in relation to any pleading by the Plaintiff.
6. On these grounds, I am satisfied Mr Walton was not under a legal incapacity as the term is understood under UCPR r 7.14 to commence proceedings as at 25 October 2016.
7. Notwithstanding this, as I have said I am of the view there is a distinction between the capacity to commence proceedings and the capacity to carry on proceedings. With respect to the latter, I have serious reservations about whether, given the apparent deterioration in Mr Walton's condition in 2017, he is now able to give proper instructions to Mr Russo or any lawyer for that matter. His florid moments may well be connected to amphetamine abuse, or lead him into what Dr Mastroianni describes as "florid" moments.
8. Whilst it is not impossible for a lawyer, especially one who knows his client as well as Mr Russo appears to know Mr Walton, to monitor those moods, it will not always be practicable to defer obtaining instructions until Mr Russo or someone else perceives Mr Walton to be in a more rational state. It may lead to deadlines not being met, proper instructions not being given on matters of disclosure, and quite frankly I think it places the lawyer concerned in an intolerable position, especially if Mr Russo is not there, and someone else in the practice has to deal with Mr Walton. There is no evidence that anyone else in the practice has known Mr Walton for as long, and would be able to detect the so-called "florid" moments.
9. As the preparation for the hearing progresses and new dates are fixed, I am quite certain the stress associated with that, on top of other factors, importantly his underlying medical issues, may well make it impossible for any appropriate instructions to be obtained. That will have the effect of delaying progress of the litigation, not only contrary to his interests but those of the multiple beneficiaries who would no doubt like the estate's business finalised.
10. On the evidence, and especially the apparent deterioration of his mental state in 2017, I am of the view Mr Walton no longer has the requisite capacity to conduct the litigation, thus justifying a stay of proceedings until a tutor or tutors are appointed.
11. I will hear the parties on any further appropriate orders, and determine the question on costs.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 20 October 2017