The Co-Producer Agreement dispute
27 The plaintiff contends that the second defendant repudiated the Co-Producer Agreement by refusing it the opportunity to contribute any amount to the capitalisation of further productions of the Production in the United Kingdom as contemplated by clause 12. The refusal is alleged to have been express and contained in a letter from the second defendant's solicitors to the plaintiff's solicitors dated 8 September 2008.
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE PARTIES LEADING UP TO THE COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
28 As will appear below, submissions of the parties placed heavy reliance on the contents of pre-litigation correspondence. It is therefore necessary, albeit that some of the correspondence is lengthy, to set out the significant portions of it.
29 On 1 August 2008 the plaintiff's solicitors wrote to Mr Nicholas Weininger, the chief financial officer of the first defendant ("the 1 August 2008 letter") as follows:
"I refer to our recent telephone conversation and to Amber Jacobsen's email to Karl Sydow of 29 July 2008.
I confirm that you wish to have the maters in dispute between Dirty Dancing Investments Pty Limited and Dance with Mr D Limited regarding the proper construction and interpretation of the rights, duties and obligations of the parties to the Lenders' agreement dated 18 November 2004 ("the Agreement") determined by arbitration.
Would you please confirm that request having regard to the provisions of clause 20 of the Agreement which provides for any dispute which cannot be settled by agreement between the parties, to be referred to and determined by, a person to be agreed by the parties, to be referred to and determined by, a person to be agreed by the parties, in the first instance, or failing an agreement by them a party to be nominated on the application of either of the parties to the agreement, by the President of the Law Society of NSW.
The determination of the dispute by that person shall be deemed to have been given by that person acting as a expert and not as an arbitrator .
If you wish to have the dispute determined by arbitration, as opposed to a person acting as an expert, out client will agree to arbitration.
In either event, our client nominates the following persons to act as the expert or arbitrator in the following order of preference:
Mr Tony Fitzgerald QC
Mr David Catterns QC
Mr Richard Cobden, Barrister.
Please advise us of your nominees as soon as possible so that we can initiate the process without further delay."
30 On 15 August 2008 the first defendant's solicitor responded as follows:
"I am in the process of obtaining instructions as to the way forward and will let you have a substantive response to your letter of 1 August 2008 with due expedition.
In the meantime, my client would be grateful if your client would defer taking any further action in relation to the appointment of an arbitrator. In any event, we would ask that no further steps be taken without first notifying us."
31 On 8 September 2008 the first defendant's solicitors wrote as follows to the plaintiff's solicitors ("the 8 September 2008 letter"):
"We regret the delay in responding to your letter dated 1 August 2008 and thank you for your understanding and courtesy in this matter.
We are instructed to raise the matters below for your client's consideration.
1. FIRST PRODUCTION ROYALTY
1.1 We understand that a dispute has arisen between Dirty Dancing Investments Pty Limited (DDI) and Dance with Mr D Limited (DMD) in relation to the Lender's Agreement between DDI and DMD dated 18 November 2004 (Lender's Agreement) and the letter agreement between DDI and DMD entered into at or about the same time as the Lender's Agreement (Side Letter).
1.2 In particular, DMD disputes the quantum of the payments made by DDI to DMD in respect of DMD's alleged entitlement under the Lender's Agreement to a First Production Royalty in respect of presentations of the dramatico-musical play entitled "Dirty Dancing" (Play) outside of Australia, New Zealand and Asia.
2. DMD'S POSITION
2.1 We understand that DMD's position in respect of the payment of the First Production Royalty is as set out in your letter to Mr Sydow dated 20 June 2008, and may be summarised as follows:
(a) Under clause 2(c) of the Lender's Agreement, DMD is entitled to be repaid 125% of its initial loan of $991,721.35, and that this amount is to be repaid only from the Total Revenue of the Production.
(b) Under clause 5 of the Lender's Agreement, DMD is also entitled to its share of a First Production Royalty of 1.5% of the Gross Box Office Receipts of future presentations of the Play until 125% of its initial loan amount has been repaid. If and when DMD receives payment of 125% of its initial loan amount, DMD's entitlement to a First Production Royalty will reduce to a share of 0.5% of the Gross Box Office Receipts of future presentations of the Play.
(c) The First Production Royalty cannot be applied to the repayment of the DMD's loan, and accordingly DMD has not been repaid 125% of its initial loan amount.
(d) On this basis, DMD is entitled to a share of a First Production Royalty of 1.5% of the Gross Box Office Receipts of any presentations of the Play in the United Kingdom, Hamburg, Toronto, Holland and the United States of America.
2.2 We understand that DMD also contends that under the Lender's Agreement and the Side Letter DMD acquired the right to contribute to the capitalisation of all future productions of the Play in the United Kingdom on "100% terms".
3. DDI'S POSITION
Repayment of DMD's loan amount
3.1 DDI does not agree that amounts paid to DMD in respect of the First Production Royalty are not to be applied to the repayment of 125% of DMD's initial loan amount.
3.2 As set out in your letter dated 20 June 2008, clause 4 of the Lender's Agreement provides for the repayment of DMD's loan amount out of the Total Revenue of the Production. However, clause 4 of the Lender's Agreement does not expressly provide that payments from the Total Revenue are to be the exclusive mechanism for the repayment of the loan.
3.3 In the event that the Total Revenue is insufficient to repay DMD's loan, DMD's entitlement to further repayment of its loan is set out in clause 9 of the Lender's Agreement, which provides:
Subject to clause 5 on settlement of the Production Accounts, if there are insufficient assets to repay in full the loan made by the Lender, then there shall only be repaid to the Lender the proportion referred to in Item 3 of the Schedule of the Total Revenue and assets available for distribution as shown in the final Production Accounts prepared by the Production Accountant, as approved by the General Manager.
3.4 Accordingly, under clause 9 of the Lender's Agreement, in the event that the Total Revenue and assets of the Production are insufficient to repay DMD then, "[s]ubject to clause 5", DMD is not entitled to any further repayment from DDI.
3.5 The words "[s]ubject to clause 5" at the commencement of clause 9 will have no work to do unless clause 5 of the Lender's Agreement is capable of affecting the remainder of clause 9 of the Lender's Agreement. This will only be the case if the First Production Royalty is a mechanism by which DMD may be repaid its loan amount.
3.6 It follows that the effect of clauses 5 and 9 of the Lender's Agreement is that, if payments from the Total Revenue and the assets of the Production in proportion to DMD's contribution to the capitalisation of the Production are insufficient to repay DMD's loan amount, then DMD shall not be entitled to have its loan repaid other than by payments in respect of the First Production Royalty under clause 5 of the Lender's Agreement.
3.7 We are instructed that when the First Production Royalty Payments already made to DMD are taken into account, DMD received full repayment of 125% of its initial loan amount in about March 2008. Accordingly, as from the date on which full repayment occurred, DMD is entitled to a share of First Production Royalty of 0.5% of the relevant funds. We set out below DDI's position in relation to how that sum is to be calculated.
Rectification
3.8 Under clause 3.1.1(d) of the Lender's Agreement, DDI represented and warranted that:
DDI has disclosed to the Lender, fully and accurately, the following information and documents:
(i) full production budgets for the Production including pre production budget, weekly running budgets, ticket price analysis, tour schedule, profit pool, royalty schedules and music publishing schedules;
3.9 By clause 3.1.2 of the Lender's Agreement, DMD acknowledged that it had been provided with that information and documents. The budgets DDI provided to DMD indicated that the First Production Royalty would be calculated on the basis of a profit pool and not on the basis of Gross Box Office Receipts. Accordingly, prior to entering into the Lender's Agreement, the parties contemplated and intended that the First Production Royalty would be calculated on the basis of a profit pool and not on the basis of Gross Box Office Receipts.
3.10 The reference to "Gross Box Office Receipts" in clause 5 of the Lender's Agreement was included by mistake. DDI was not aware that this mistake had been made. Further, DDI does not know whether DMD was aware that this mistake had been made. If DMD was aware of the mistake, DMD did not bring that mistake to DDI's attention. DMD stands to derive a substantial benefit to which it would not have been entitled if clause 5 had accurately reflected the parties' common intention that the First Production Royalty was paid out of a profit pool.
3.11 In the circumstances, DDI will continue to operate clause 5 of the Lender's Agreement in accordance with the parties' common intention in respect of the calculation of the First Production Royalty and will continue to pay the First Production Royalty calculated on the basis of a profit pool and not on gross revenue. Further, DDI does not propose to pay DMD any additional amount in respect of any alleged wrongful failure by DDI to pay the First Production Royalty on the basis of Gross Box Office Receipts in the past.
3.12 In the event that DMD presses its claim for payment of the First Production Royalty on the basis of Gross Box Office Receipts rather than profit pool, DDI will seek rectification of the Lender's Agreement.
No entitlement to a First Production Royalty
3.13 Further, DMD has no entitlement to a First Production Royalty in respect of any past or current presentation of the Play outside of Australia, New Zealand and Asia.
3.14 The payment of the First Production Royalty is governed by clause 5 of the Lender's Agreement which relevantly provides:
DDI agrees with the Lender that:
(a) the lenders who have made loans to fund the Capitalisation shall be entitled, as a class, to a First Production Royalty of 1.5% of the Gross Box Office Receipts from any other presentations of the Production (which are a first class productions (sic)) after the first presentation of the Production at the Theatre Royal, Sydney, Australia ("The Sydney Production") and which are presented in the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Canada, United States of America, Australia, New Zealand and Asia, whilever (sic) their loans, remain unpaid … . (emphasis added)
3.15 Under clause 5 of the Lender's Agreement, DMD will only become entitled to a First Production Royalty if there are any "Gross Box Office Receipts from any other presentation of the Production … in the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Canada, United States of America, Australia, New Zealand and Asia".
3.16 The term "the Production" is defined under clause 1.1 of the Lender's Agreement to mean:
the production and presentation by DDI and/or DDAP in the Nominated Territories of the dramatico-musical Play entitled "Dirty Dancing". (emphasis added)
3.17 Wherever a defined term is used in the Lender's Agreement it must be given its defined meaning, so far as that is possible in the context of the clause.
3.18 As clause 5 of the Lender's Agreement refers to "presentations of the Production" in the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Canada, United States of America, Australia, New Zealand and Asia, the term "the Production" in clause 5 of the Lender's Agreement cannot be read as being restricted to the Nominated Territories. However, the deliberate use of the defined term "the Production" in clause 5 of the Lender's Agreement must mean the production and presentation of the Play by DDI and/or Dirty Dancing Asia Pacific Pty Ltd (DDAP).
3.19 Accordingly, the reference to "presentations of the Production" in clause 5(a) must be read as referring to presentations of the Play by DDI and/or DDAP.
3.20 The term "Gross Box Office Receipts" is defined in clause 1.1 of the Lender's Agreement, which provides:
"Gross Box Office Receipts" means the gross weekly sums received from the sale of tickets of admission to performances of the Production less any ticketing fees, credit card charges, block booking discounts, agency commissions, remote box office and computer booking commissions, goods and services tax, entertainment taxes and all other taxes payable out of such receipts. (emphasis added)
3.21 Reading the Lender's Agreement as a whole, the reference to "Gross Box Office Receipts" in clause 5(a) of the Lender's Agreement must mean gross weekly sums received from the sale of tickets of admission to performances of the production and presentation of the Play by DDI and/or DDAP, less the fees, charges, discounts, commissions and taxes referred to in the definition of that term.
3.22 Incidentally and relevantly, we note that the above approach to the interpretation of the terms "the Production" and "Gross Box Office Receipts" is consistent with the approach taken to the construction of the term "Total Revenue" in your letter dated 20 June 2008. In that letter you contend that the term "Total Revenue":
is a defined term and means the aggregate of the following:
(a) Gross Box Office Receipts (from the Australian Production) ;
(b) all interest earned or accrued for the benefit of the (Australian) Production on the total Gross Box Office Receipts;
(c) all cash sponsorships.
(emphasis added)
3.23 For the reasons set out above, DMD will only be entitled to a First Production Royalty if DDI and/or DDAP present the Play in the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Canada, United States of America, Australia, New Zealand or Asia.
3.24 We are instructed that DDI and/or DDAP have not presented the Play outside of Australia, New Zealand and Asia, and that:
(a) the presentation of the Play in London was by a partnership between Dirty Dancing UK Limited and Dirty Dancing Europe Pty Limited;
(b) the presentation of the Play in Hamburg was by Stage Holdings (BV);
(c) the presentation of the Play in Toronto was by Mirvish Productions, Dirty Dancing Toronto Management Inc and Ed Mirvish Enterprises Limited; and
(d) the presentation of the Play in Chicago and on the First US Tour was by DD US Inc.
3.25 As the presentations of the Play in London, Hamburg, Toronto, Chicago and the First US Tour were not undertaken by DDI and/or DDAP, DMD is not entitled to a First Production Royalty in respect of any of those presentation of the Play. On this basis, DDI will not make any further payment of a First Class Royalty in respect of any presentation of the Play that is not undertaken by DDI and/or DDAP.
3.26 Further, DMD was at no time entitled to the payment of a First Production Royalty in respect of the presentation of the Play in London, Hamburg or Toronto, and any amounts paid to DMD in respect of those presentations of the Play were paid under a mistake. DDI reserves its right to demand repayment by DMD of all amounts mistakenly paid by DDI to DMD in respect of a First Production Royalty for the Hamburg, London and Toronto presentations of the Play.
Utrecht production of the Play
3.27 In your letter dated 20 June 2008, you indicate that you understand a new production of the Play had opened in Utrecht, Holland, and assert that the production of the Play in Holland:
will be charged with/liable to pay First Production Royalties at 1.5% … .
3.28 That claim is unsupportable on any reasonable construction of the Lender's Agreement.
3.29 Clause 5 provides an exhaustive list of countries and regions in which a presentation of the Production may attract a liability for DDI to pay a First Production Royalty to DMD. That list does not include Holland. Accordingly, DDI does not agree that DMD is entitled to any First Production Royalty in respect of any presentation of the Play in Utrecht, Holland, or any other presentation of the Play outside of the countries and regions listed in clause 5(a). Any amounts paid to DMD purportedly as a First Production Royalty for the Utrecht production of the Play have been paid by mistake and DDI reserves the right to seek repayment of these amounts.
Investment in the UK Tour
3.30 Prior to August 2006, any entitlement your client might have had to invest in the UK Tour of the Play was provided by clause 20 of the Lender's Agreement and clause 7 of the Side Letter. DDI does not consider that clause 20 of the Lender's Agreement confers on DMD the right to invest in any future production on any particular terms, and in particular does not require DDI to give DMD 100% Terms for any investment. All that clause 20 requires is that DDI negotiate with DMD in respect of an investment by DDI of up to 20% of the capitalisation of future productions. As an agreement to agree, clause 20 of the Lender's Agreement is otherwise unenforceable.
3.31 Further, DMD's entitlements under clause 20 of the Lender's Agreement are expressed to be subject to a pre-condition that DMD "lends A$1million or more". Similarly, DMD's entitlements under clause 7 of the Side Letter are expressed to be granted "[in] further consideration of your agreement to contribute Your Investment Amount to the Capitalisation". The term "Investment Amount" is defined in clause 5(c) of the Side Letter as "an investment contribution to the Capitalisation in the sum of A$1 million". Accordingly, the offers in both clause 20(b) of the Lender's Agreement and clause 7 of the Side Letter were conditional on DMD contributing A$1,000,000 to the capitalisation of the Production.
3.32 The Lender Repayment Schedule in respect of DMD's investment for the period January to March 2008 indicates that DMD in fact contributed only $991,721.35 to the Capitalisation of the Production. Accordingly, DMD has failed to meet the pre-condition to its entitlement to be given investment opportunities granted under clause 20(b) of the Lender's Agreement and clause 7 of the Side Letter.
3.33 In any event, the Side Letter as a whole is unenforceable as no consideration was provided by DMD in exchange for the promises made by DDI under the Side Letter. At the time of execution of the Side Letter, DMD was already bound to contribute its loan amount according to the terms of the Lender's Agreement. Its promise to provide the Investment Amount under the terms of the Side Letter was past consideration and therefore not good consideration.
3.34 Alternatively, if clause 7 of the Side Letter was ever enforceable, it is no longer binding upon the parties. In about August 2006, DDI, Dirty Dancing UK Limited (DDUK), DMD and Mr Sydow and others, negotiated a Settlement Deed in relation to, amongst other things, DMD's entitlement to invest in the UK tour of the Play (Settlement Deed). The Settlement Deed extinguished any entitlement DMD might have had under clause 7 of the Side Letter.
3.35 We are instructed that DDI has not received an executed copy of the Settlement Deed from DMD or Mr Sydow. Notwithstanding this omission by DMD, the Settlement Deed is binding upon DMD and Mr Sydow. In reliance on a representation from DMD's legal representative that DMD had executed the Settlement Deed, DDUK entered into a Co-Producer Agreement dated 24 August 2006 and a Consultancy Letter Agreement dated 24 August 2006 with DMD. Under the Co-Producer Agreement and Consultancy Letter Agreement, DMD became entitled to receive substantial benefits to which it would not have been entitled if those agreements had not been executed. Accordingly DDUK acted to its detriment in entering into those agreements. In these circumstances, DMD is estopped from asserting that the Settlement Deed is not binding upon it.
3.36 DMD's entitlements to invest in future productions of the Play in the UK are now exclusively governed by the Co-Producer Agreement. Clause 12 of the Co-Producer Agreement provides:
In the event that DDUK decides to present the Production on tour in the United Kingdom a ("Further Production"), DDUK shall offer the Co Producer the opportunity to contribute an amount up to its Percentage Share of the Production Cost to the capitalisation of the Further Production Provided That where the Co Producer has not entered into a binding agreement with DDUK within six weeks of receipt of notice in writing from the Producer detailing the budgets for that Further Production, the Co Producer shall be taken to have declined such opportunity. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing and for the avoidance of doubt, in the event that a Further Production does not require any additional capitalisation the Co Producer's entitlement to Net Profits shall apply in respect of the Further Production.
3.37 Clause 12 of the Co-Producer Agreement refers to a decision by DDUK to present "the Production" on tour in the United Kingdom. The term "Production" is defined in clause 1.1 of the Co-Producer Agreement to have a meaning "as defined in the Introduction". Clause A of the Introduction to the Co-Producer Agreement provides:
DDUK intends but does (sic) undertake to present and produce a live stage production of the Work (as hereinafter defined) for an open ended run at the Aldwych Theatre, London opening on or around 26 October 2006 (the "Production").
3.38 The defined term "the Production" must be given the meaning ascribed to it under the Co-Producer Agreement wherever it appears in the agreement unless the context requires otherwise. When this definition is applied in the context of clause 12 of the Co-Producer Agreement, it is clear that clause 12 was intended to give DMD a right to contribute to any additional capitalisation that may be required to take the production of the Play from the Aldwych Theatre on a tour of the UK. Clause 12 was not intended to apply to new productions of the Play for the purpose of a UK tour.
3.39 We are instructed that any future UK tour of the Play will be a new production of the Play. We are further instructed that this new production will require additional capitalisation. In these circumstances, DDI denies that clause 12 of the Co-Producer Agreement entitles DMD to invest in the capitalisation of the UK tour on 100% terms.
4. RESOLUTION
4.1 If DMD wishes to submit the matters in dispute between DDI and DMD to arbitration, DDI remains willing to agree to that course. However, DDI considers that it would be to both DDI and DMD's advantage if the time and expense of an arbitration can be avoided and a commercial agreement is reached to settle all matters in dispute between the parties.
4.2 Moreover, there are issues above that are beyond the competence of an arbitrator and will require adjudication by a Court of Equity. Consequently, any arbitration could only partly resolve the matters in issue between the parties.
4.3 To this end, our client proposes a meeting between the parties and their respective legal advisers in which each of the matters in dispute may be discussed. Please let us know what your client's position is in this regard."
32 On 17 September 2008 the plaintiff's solicitors wrote to the first defendant's solicitors as follows ("the 17 September 2008 letter"):
"We refer to your letter dated 8 September 2008.