Information before the Authority
8 The appellant attended an interview to discuss his protection visa application on 10 May 2016. The appellant's lawyers provided a submission in support of that protection visa application. In lengthy and detailed submissions in support of his visa application made 24 May 2016, the appellant's lawyers drew attention to the security situation in Kabul and submitted that the appellant would be at risk of harm if forced to reside in Kabul. The appellant's lawyers specifically noted that:
Recently, the Taliban perpetrated a ruthless attack in Kabul. We submit that this attack indicates the Taliban's power in Kabul is increasing. Further, the attack demonstrates that the Afghan Authorities are not in a position to prevent atrocities from occurring in the nation's capital.
Afghan Attack, Kabul Suicide Blast, Deaths Rise, BBC News, 20 April 2016
The death toll from a huge explosion in the centre of the Afghan capital Kabul on Tuesday has more than doubled to 64 people, the government says. Interior Ministry spokesman Sediq Sediqqi tweeted that 64 "innocent Afghans" were killed and 347 wounded.
A suicide attacker detonated a vehicle and a fierce gun battle followed in one of the deadliest attacks in Kabul for years. A Taliban spokesman said the group carried out the attack.
It came a week after it said it was launching its "spring offensive", warning of largescale attacks, although the group fights all year round.
Tuesday's bombing happened during the morning rush hour in Pul-e-Mahmud, a busy neighbourhood where homes, mosques, schools and businesses nestle close to the ministry of defence, other ministries and military compounds.
The blast shattered windows up to 1.6km (one mile) away. A police officer told the Associated Press it was one of the most powerful explosions he had ever heard, and he could not see or hear anything for 20 minutes after.
It appears the initial blast cleared the way for Taliban fighters to enter the area - a commonly used tactic.
It had previously been reported that at least 28 people had been killed and 329 injured.
Mr Sediqqi told reporters that most of the 64 now reported dead were civilians. He said most of the wounded were in a stable condition.
At least 71 Shia worshippers were killed in 2011 in a rare attack on a Shia shrine in Kabul. Afghan security forces regularly foil similar attacks, correspondents say, but with explosives easily available and bomb-making skills common, it is difficult to prevent all of them
(Emphasis added.)
9 The submissions also quoted the following passage from the most recent DFAT Country Information Report (September 2015):
2.5 Insurgent forces are contesting the Afghan Government's control in many areas. No part of the country can be considered totally free from conflict-related violence, which escalated markedly over the course of 2014 and 2015 (see 'Security Situation' below). As a result, economic development, health care and education services are affected in many parts of the country.
2.31 According to the UNAMA Annual Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, the conflict in Afghanistan resulted in 10,548 civilian casualties (3,699 deaths and 6,849 injured) in 2014, a 25 per cent increase in civilian deaths and a 21 per cent increase in civilian injuries compared to 2013.
The number of civilian casualties is the highest recorded since the UN began tracking civilian casualties in 2009. According to the UN, anti-government elements were responsible for 72 per cent of civilian casualties in 2014, with 12 per cent attributed to the ANDSF, two per cent to international military forces, and 14 per cent to a mixture of incidents where casualties could not be attributed to a particular party to the conflict (this includes unattributed incidents caused by explosive remnants of war, and cross-border shelling from Pakistan into Afghanistan). In its 2015 mid-year update, UNAMA recorded a further one per cent increase in civilian casualties in the first six months of 2015 compared to the same period in 2014. Soon after the release of this update, on 7 August 2015, a series of attacks in Kabul resulted in an estimated 355 civilian casualties (deaths and injuries), which is the largest number of civilian casualties in a single day since data collection started in 2009.
The significant rise in casualties in 2014 reflects an increase in the frequency and intensity of ground engagements across Afghanistan. Casualties from ground engagements increased by 52 per cent in 2014, coinciding with the withdrawal of international military forces and combat air support.
Casualties are expected to continue to rise in 2015. UNAMA reportedly documented 2,937 civilian casualties (974 deaths and 1,963 injured) in the first four months of 2015, a 16 per cent increase on the same period in 2014.
Insurgent forces contest many areas of the country and no part of the country can be considered free from conflict-related violence. The situation remains fluid. While the government retains control of much of the country, particularly in the provincial and district centres, some areas are openly contested, with varying levels of control exerted by the government and by insurgents. The security situation across the country deteriorated significantly over the last 12-18 months, as anti-government groups intensified their efforts and the international military contingent gradually withdrew.
(Emphasis added.)
10 Specifically addressing the prospect of the appellant relocating to Kabul, the submission stated:
We submit that the applicant would be at risk of serious harm in Kabul for reason of his religion, imputed political opinion and membership of a particular social group. The most recent attack in Kabul has claimed many lives of innocent civilians. Accordingly, we submit that the applicant would still be at risk of harm upon relocation.
11 On 19 July 2016, a delegate of the Minister of Immigration and Border Protection refused the visa:
I also note that s 5J(l)(c) of the Act requires that the real chance of persecution relate to all areas of the receiving country. Given that Kabul is the logical point of any future return by the applicant to Afghanistan from Australia, and 'provides the most viable option for many people for internal relocation and resettlement in Afghanistan' due to it [sic] mixed ethnic and multi-faith composition, I consider that an assessment of the applicant's claims vis a vis Kabul forms a natural starting point for considering the existence of whether a well-founded fear of persecution exists throughout the country.
12 Since the delegate's decision there had been a number of reports of a suicide bombing targeting peaceful Shia Hazara demonstrators in Kabul on 23 July 2016. These reports indicated at least 80 people were left dead, with hundreds injured.
13 The Authority decision noted that on 11 August 2016, the Authority invited the appellant to comment on information in relation to the suicide bombing and to provide information as to the reasonableness of the appellant relocating to any other areas in Afghanistan "other than Kabul". One wonders why further information was sought from the appellant as to the reasonableness of locating to areas other than Kabul, when the delegate had found the appellant, "given his low profile, did not face a real chance of persecution or a real risk of significant harm in Kabul" and that it was reasonable for the appellant to locate to Kabul.
14 The terms of the Authority's request for further information were as follows:
You are invited to comment on the following information that may be the reason, or part of the reason for affirming the decision of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection:
• Commentary from Afghanistan Analysts Network in respect to the regional group, Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP) which claimed responsibility for the bombing of Shia demonstrators in Kabul on 23 July 2016 states:
"In terms of taking over territory, ISKP's attempts to expand beyond Nangarhar have failed miserably. However, it does seem to enjoy an appeal much beyond Nangarhar and as far as Kabul in part due to the defection of militants who were previously Taleban, as well as to the presence of a more radical Salafi-jihadist cell in the largest urban centre in Afghanistan. There, it seems to be capable of planning and executing occasional operations against not so-fortified targets, with the help of local recruits, that can cause mass casualties, such as the 23 July 2016 attack. The prospect of ISKP establishing a territorial foothold in Kabul is, however, a distant one."
• Commentary from HIS Jane's Intelligence Weekly in respect to the regional group affiliated to the Islamic State, Wilayat Khorasan (WK), (the other name for ISKP) which states:
"Despite the Kabul attack, WK is unlikely to gain substantial strength in Afghanistan in at least the one-year outlook. WK has largely struggled to control territory, even in Nangarhar where its influence is strongest. The Taliban has been aggressive in eradicating any WK supporters and factions, and government counter-terrorism efforts have disproportionately targeted WK fighters in relation to the group's operational strength. Moreover, WK's leadership is dominated by former Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (UP) commanders, which alienates local communities and undermines recruitment.
Nevertheless, WK is clearly operating per the Islamic State's guidelines for evolving operations and building capacity. The group is currently operating in an insurgent mode - in which it is unable to seize and hold territory - and is therefore focused on building strength and conducting asymmetric operations to cause maximum casualties and damage. WK fighters are consequently likely to infrequent "one-off" attacks in urban areas, primarily in Jalalabad and Kabul. Likely targets include foreigners, religious minorities (mainly Shia Hazaras), security forces, and assets associated with the Pakistani state."
This information is relevant to your case because it may lead the IAA to conclude that future attacks upon Kabul's Shia population are likely to be infrequent, and not to such an extent as to pose a real chance or risk of harm to you. This may form part of the reason for affirming the decision under review.
You are invited to provide the following information in writing:
• Information as to why it would not be reasonable for you to relocate to any other areas of Afghanistan apart from those places you claim you will suffer harm.
You are also invited to comment on the following information that may be relevant to your case:
• Country information that Tajiks form one of the majority ethnic groups in Balkh province. Mazar e Sharif has in the last decade, been relatively isolated from the conflict. It is reportedly one of the safest cities in Afghanistan, much more so than Kabul. Mazar e Sharif's economy is reportedly growing stronger.
• Country information that Herat city is a Tajik-dominated enclave in a Pashtun-majority province, which has a large Shia population of Tajik and Hazara origin.
• Country information indicates there are international airports in Mazar e Sharif and Herat accepting flights from Kabul and international locations.
15 The appellant's lawyers responded on 25 August 2016, noting specifically:
We note the Authority has contended that the country information forwarded may indicate that future attacks upon Kabul's Shia population are likely to be infrequent and not to such an extent as to pose a real chance or real risk of harm to the applicant. With respect, we submit that reliance should not be placed on commentary which merely predicts whether future attacks will occur in Kabul. The reality of the situation is that only a few weeks ago, an attack was deliberately perpetrated against the Shia Muslim Community in Kabul resulting in the death of at least eighty people and leaving hundreds more injured. The recent attack is categorical evidence, the Shia Muslim Community are at risk of harm in Kabul, Afghanistan. Further as outlined within the commentary of William Maley dated 24 July 2016 and attached, DFAT reports that the 'frequency of attacks in Kabul have increased significantly'. Further, the US Department of State have stated on 22 June 2016 that 'the extremists associated with various Taliban networks, Islamic State of Iraq and Levant and members of other armed opposition groups are active throughout the country'. These sources coupled with information from a wide variety of independent sources previously forwarded to the Department and the Tribunal indicate that there is a real chance the applicant would face harm no matter where he resides in Afghanistan.
We note that the information forwarded from the Afghanistan Analyst Network notes that ISKP have not been able take over territory and therefore it seems unlikely they will establish a territorial foothold in Kabul. It is highly evident however that the report indicates that they are able to plan and execute operations which cause mass casualties. Given the most recent attack was specifically perpetrated against the Shia Muslim Community and Islamic State and associated groups have shown an ongoing disdain for the Shia Muslim Community, the fact they have the capacity to commit such atrocities is in itself enough to indicate there is a real chance the applicant may face serious harm from Islamic State in the future. Islamic State backed groups have demonstrated that they do not require territory in order to pose a serious threat to the communities including the Shia Muslim Community.
…
We conclude that it is not relevant nor reasonable for the applicant to relocate to Kabul, Herat or Mazar-e-Sharif. It is our submission the applicant is at a real risk of serious harm no matter where he resides in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
The above country information coupled with the applicant's claims for protection indicate that there continues to be a real risk that the applicant would suffer significant and serious harm if returned to Afghanistan.
(Citations omitted and emphasis added.)
16 The appellant's response also reiterates that it would not be reasonable or relevant to expect the appellant to relocate to Kabul. The response extracted the following section of the UNHCR Guidelines:
Moreover, the presence of members of the same ethnic background as the applicant in the proposed area of relocation cannot by itself be taken as evidence that the applicant would be able to benefit from meaningful support from such communities in the absence of specific pre-existing social relations connecting
The extent to which applicants are able to rely on family networks in the proposed area of relocation also has to be considered in light of the reported stigma and discrimination against those who return to Afghanistan after spending time abroad. Where the proposed area of relocation is an urban area where the applicant has no access to preidentified accommodation and livelihood options, and where he or she cannot reasonably be expected to be able to fall back on meaningful support networks, the applicant would likely find him- or herself in a situation comparable to that of other urban IDPs.
To assess the reasonableness of such an outcome, adjudicators need to take into account the scale of internal displacement in the area of prospective relocation, and the living conditions of IDPs in that location. Relevant considerations in this regard include the fact that IDPs are considered to be among the most vulnerable groups in Afghanistan, many of whom are beyond the reach of humanitarian organizations; as well as available information to the effect that urban IDPs are more vulnerable than the non-displaced urban poor, as they are particularly affected by unemployment; limited access to water and sanitation; and food insecurity
(Emphasis in original.)
17 The appellant's response cites Professor William Maley, Professor of Diplomacy at the Australian National University, who had provided information indicating it is not safe to return ethnic minorities to Kabul. The response extracts the following passage:
The mere fact that there may be people of similar ethnic background living in a potential relocation destination does not overcome this problem, since ethnic identities do not in and of themselves give rise to the ties of personal affinity and reciprocity that arise from family connections. Indeed one mistake observers, including Afghan Observers on occasion make is to underestimate the degree of differentiation amogs [sic] groups such as the Hazaras, including distinctions between elite and non-elite figures, distinctions based on district of origin and tribe and distinction based on values and ideology.
18 The appellant's response also attached a recent commentary of Professor Maley. After outlining his experience, Professor Maley's report stated:
2. Western governments continue to paint a very grim picture of the dangers affecting those in Afghanistan. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs warns as of 24 July 2016 of 'the extremely dangerous security situation and the very high threat of terrorist attack'. It goes on that the 'frequency of attacks in Kabul has increased significantly', that 'Terrorist attacks can occur anywhere, anytime, and are particularly common in Kabul, and the southern and eastern provinces', and that 'Lawlessness exists in rural areas'. The US Department of State warns as of June 22, 2016 that 'Travel to all areas of Afghanistan remains unsafe', that 'Extremists associated with various Taliban networks, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant - Khorasan Province (ISIL-KP), and members of other armed opposition groups are active throughout the country'.
3. It is essential to appreciate that the situation in Afghanistan is extremely fluid, and assessments of the situation made even a year ago do not necessarily provide an accurate picture of the situation in the first half of 2016. Roads that may have been safe to traverse in 2012, 2013, 2014 or 2015 may be unusable in 2016. In February 2016, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan reported that 'In 2015, UNAMA observed a sharp increase in the abduction and killing of civilians of Hazara ethnicity by Anti-Government Elements. Between 1 January and 31 December, Anti-Government Elements abducted at least 146 members of the Hazara community in 20 separate incidents. All but one incident took place in areas with mixed Hazara and non-Hazara communities, in Ghazni, Balkh, Sari Pul, Faryab, Uruzgan, Baghlan, Wardak, Jawzjan, and Ghor provinces' (Afghanistan: Annual Report 2015 - Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Kabul: UNAMA, 2016) p.49). With the withdrawal of foreign forces, there is a great deal of apprehension amongst Afghans about the future of the country, and there is a grave risk that Afghanistan will fall victim to what social scientists call a 'cascade', where even people who despise the Taliban decide to shift support to them because they think they are going to come out on top anyway. This is a well-recognised phenomenon (see Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) pp.94-98) and it would likely create especially grave risks for people of Hazara ethnicity since targeting Hazaras could be a device by which other groups might seek to establish their credentials in the eyes of the Taliban.
4. Given this fluidity, it is a serious mistake to conclude that Afghanistan is safe for Hazaras. The disposition of extremists to strike at them has not disappeared. This was tragically demonstrated on 6 December 2011, when a suicide bomber attacked Shiite Afghans, most of them Hazaras, at a place of commemoration in downtown Kabul during the Ashura festival that marks the anniversary of the Battle of Karbala in 680 AD. Almost simultaneously, a bomb in Mazar-e Sharif also killed Afghan Shia. The Kabul bomb killed at least 55 people, and the Mazar bomb four more (see Hashmat Baktash and Alex Rodrigues, 'Two Afghanistan bombings aimed at Shiites kill at least 59 people', Los Angeles Times, 7 December 2011). The Afghan photographer Massoud Hossaini was awarded the 2012 Pulitzer Prize for his photograph of the aftermath of the Kabul atrocity: see . A claim of responsibility was made by the Pakistani Sunni extremist group Lashkar-e Jhangvi, which has a long history of sectarian violence against Shia (see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, 'Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities', Modern Asian Studies, vol.32, no.3, 1998, pp.689-716). The key point to note is that no one with any knowledge of Afghanistan could seriously doubt that Hazara Shia were specifically targeted on this occasion. To depict this attack as an isolated incident misses the underlying history of antagonism towards Hazaras that is pertinent to assessing what the future holds. It is the kind of reasoning that would have defined the 1938 Kristallnacht experience in Germany as an isolated incident. The same conclusion flows with respect to the attack on peaceful Hazara demonstrators in Kabul on 23 July 2016, discussed in paras.8-9 (below).
…
8. This was brutally demonstrated on 23 July 2016, when a peaceful demonstration by Hazaras associated with the so-called 'Enlightening Movement' (Jumbesh-e Roshnayi) over the routing of a proposed electricity system was struck by a suicide bombing. At least 80 people were left dead, and hundreds injured; ISIS claimed responsibility for what it called 'a "martyrdom attack" on Shiites' (Mujib Mashal and Zahra Nader, 'ISIS Claims Suicide Bombing of Protest in Kabul, Killing at Least 80', The New York Times, 24 July 2016, p.A6). The implications of this attack are profound. It demonstrates a capacity on ISIS's part to strike targets in the heart of the Afghan capital, where the presence of Afghan security forces is relatively strong; in the light of ISIS's claim of responsibility, it puts on display a commitment to attack on the basis of religious identity, plainly engaging one of the bases of refugee status under Article 1.A(2) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; and it highlights particular dangers for Hazaras, who are overwhelmingly Shiite, are physically distinctive because of their East Asian phenotypes, and make up the vast bulk of the Shiite component of the Afghan population.
(Emphasis added.)
19 The appellant sought judicial review of the Authority's decision.
20 The appellant's submissions dated 6 February 2020, before the primary judge, included the following:
3. The Authority failed to properly complete its statutory task of considering the applicant's personal circumstances in assessing the reasonableness of relocation including: discrimination he may face [as] a returnee from the west, the likelihood of the applicant obtaining employment in Kabul and the nature of that employment or accommodation; and the risk of harm posed by sectarian and terrorist violence to the applicant in Kabul.
…
Discrimination and stigma for returnees from the west
12. The risk of stigma was raised in both the applicant's submissions. In the SHEV submissions it was argued the applicant would be at risk of harm anywhere in Afghanistan because he could be identified as a returnee from the west (CB 159 - 160). In relation to relocation the submission noted the applicant's risk of harm in Kabul would be "exacerbated" by the fact he was returning from a western country (CB 173).
13. The applicant's IAA submission extracted the following quote form the updated UNHCR guidelines in relation to relocation:
The extent to which applicants are able to rely on family networks in the proposed area of relocation has to be considered in light of the reported stigma and discrimination against those who return to Afghanistan after spending time abroad (CB 221).
[emphasis in original]
The excerpt was taken from a section of the UNHCR guidelines dealing on the capacity of returnees could rely on family networks upon return to Afghanistan.
Risk of harm in Kabul
14. The applicant claimed he faced a real risk of serious harm in Kabul due to the rise of the Islamic state. As a Shi'a Muslim, Tajik, and returnee from the west the applicant would be particularly at risk of sectarian violence from the Islamic state and other extremist groups (CB 173 - 174; 217 - 218). The applicant also relied on the expert opinion by William Maley regarding the fluid security situation in Kabul.
…
19. The Authority made no positive findings that the applicant would obtain employment or what type of employment the applicant may obtain. Further, the Authority made no findings as to the nature of accommodation available to the applicant. Additionally, the Authority made no reference to the risk of sectarian and militant violence in Kabul or discrimination against returnees from the west in its analysis of relocation.
…
Grounds of Review
…
23. It can be inferred that the issue of discrimination against returnees from the west was not considered for the following reasons:
a. The issue was potentially relevant to the key issue in the Authority's assessment of relocation: the applicant's capacity to obtain employment and accommodation.
b. The Authority expressly considered the submission in relation to refugee assessment at [28], but not in relation to relocation. The omission suggests the Authority only considered the issue in relation to whether any discrimination constituted persecution.
c. The Authority expressly summarized the applicant's submissions in relation to relocation at [38] of its reasons. The summary of the submissions was fulsome but omitted the applicant's status as a returnee.
…
27. The Authority has made an error of the type identified in MZACX. The applicant was at some risk of violence on account of being a Shi'a Muslim, and a civilian caught up in insurgent attacks. Had the Authority considered the risk of harm, it may have found that it was unreasonable for the applicant to relocate to Kabul given the challenging economic circumstances coupled with the risk of violence he would have to face. The Authority gave no weight to the risk of harm in its relocation analysis. The Authority asked itself the wrong question in relation to relocation: whether the applicant faced a real risk of significant harm in Kabul, and thereby overlooking the relevance of a lesser risk to the question of relocation.
(Emphasis added, citations omitted.)
21 On 1 April 2021, the FCC dismissed the appellant's application for review, finding the Authority decision was not affected by an error of law and did not deny the appellant procedural fairness.