36 None of the evidence leads me to conclude that the Council's decision to grant the development consent crossed, or in any way approached, the stringent Wednesbury threshold (Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223). Again, whether I consider the assessment sound or not is beside the point as there is a "world of difference between justifiable opinion and sound opinion" (The Council of the City of Parramatta v Pestell (1972) 128 CLR 305 at 323). It was reasonably open to the Council to characterise the value of the existing views as limited, having regard to the extent of the impacts from existing development on those views, the orientation and location of the dwelling on 3 Richard Street and the fact that 3 Richard Street was located directly behind (to the west of) the development site, when the views to the ocean were to the east and northeast, largely over the development site (much as an officer had noted on Mr and Mrs Cutelli's letter of objection). In this context, it was reasonably open to the Council to characterise the impact on views as minor. In any event, it would be wrong to assume that the Council's interim findings of fact were the subject of judicial review. The decision to grant development consent is the subject of challenge. The Council, as the report to the Development Assessment Panel discloses, complied with its obligation "in the exercise of discretionary powers, to take into consideration the relevant considerations, to weigh them one against the other, and to determine what, in the light of those considerations, should be done" (BP Australia Ltd v Campbelltown City Council (1994) 83 LGERA 274 at 279. The Council's determination to grant development consent, subject to conditions, was reasonably open in all the circumstances.