Attraction and Retention: Submissions for the Police Association
40The Police Association made, in summary, the following submissions:
a). The evidence demonstrated that there had been a significant attraction and retention problem with respect to prosecutors that had extended over the last decade and was continuing. There have been three principal features of this problem:
(i) A consistently high rate of departures of prosecutors, especially experienced prosecutors, from the PPC;
(ii) an inability to attract sufficient new recruits from within the Police Force to enable the PPC to replace departures and reach its authorised strength; and
(iii) A shortage of prosecutors 'on the ground'. That situation has now forced the PPC, in effect, to recruit outside the Police Force by way of the Accelerated Prosecutor Recruitment Program ('APRP').
b). The PPC has, at all times, been, and remains, well below its authorised strength. Although the degree to which the attraction and retention problem has existed has 'waxed and waned' over time, the underlying structural distortions in pay which underlie ensure that the problem persists.
c). The PPC's incapacity to fill its prosecutors' positions was identified in the most recently available statistics. The position at January 2010 was that there were 219 authorised prosecutor positions which, with minor variations, had been at that level since October 2008. However, there are only 196 prosecutors in those positions, and (accounting for the fact that a number of those prosecutors work part-time), 186 full-time equivalent ('FTE') prosecutors, leaving 33 FTE positions vacant. In addition, there are 36 over-strength not to be de-activated ("OSND") prosecutor positions, of which 19 are filled by prosecutors (or Court List Practitioners). This makes a total of 255 positions which can be filled by prosecutors, and a shortage of 40 FTE prosecutors (meaning a vacancy rate of about 16 per cent).
d). This shortfall has not changed significantly in recent years, despite intensive efforts by the NSW Police Force to use "non-financial" methods to increase the recruitment of new prosecutors: in July 2008, Superintendent Trichter reported a total deficit of 45 prosecutors. In 2001, 22 per cent of prosecutor positions were vacant; in 2008, the figure was 21 per cent.
e). There was clear evidence of a significant problem in terms of the rate of turnover of prosecutors, which is caused by the failure to retain prosecutors and which thereby, feeds the shortage problem. The figures for the period from 2002 to 2006 show that there were 143 new prosecutors over this period, but 179 were lost due to separations from the Police Force or transfers to other areas of the Police Force. This represents attrition rates of between 15 and 19 per cent per annum (based on authorised strength; it would be higher based on actual strength). The average number of prosecutors lost each year in the period 2001 to 2008 was 28. This turnover has led to a position where the large majority of prosecutors of the rank of constable have less than five years' experience as prosecutors.
f). Trainee prosecutors were not included in the above figures, because (unlike the TOU), trainees in the PPC do not hold OSND positions. Notwithstanding this, the evidence in any event shows that the recent position in the number of trainees had deteriorated. In October 2008, the number of trainees was 30, but in the following month it climbed to 51, and remained at 45 or above through to January 2010. Superintendent Trichter said that there were 61 trainees in December 2009. However, the latest figures showed that this has dropped to 34 by August 2010. This followed the cancellation of the first training class due to commence in 2010 due to insufficient numbers. It is likely that in the near future there will be further significant reductions in the number of trainees. Superintendent Trichter's evidence was that 19 of the existing trainees would be appointed to authorised positions in September 2010, and that the next class scheduled to commence in October 2010 would have eight definite starters with a possibility of up to eight more. That would mean by the time that class commenced, the number of trainees would be well under 30 and perhaps as low as 23. That is the lowest number ever in any month in the period from September 2008 (when the figures in the evidence commence). The declining trainee numbers point to an ongoing problem in attracting new recruits to the PPC.
g). The gravamen of Superintendent Trichter's evidence was that there had been a long-term attraction and retention problem in the PPC, but that he anticipated (largely because of the APRP) that the PPC would, at least on a 'headcount basis', shortly be available to fill its 238 prosecutor positions. That would require a net improvement in the 'headcount' of 22, in circumstances where the net improvement on a 'headcount basis' had only been 11 from October 2008 to August 2010, notwithstanding the various initiatives to improve the situation which Superintendent Trichter had described.
h). Superintendent Trichter's analysis proceeded on the following propositions:
(i) There were 19 trainees (6 from PEP 29 and 13 from PEP 30) who would be appointed to prosecutor positions by the end of September 2010.
(ii) Additional prosecutors would flow into the PPC in 2011 as a result of the APRP, with three commencing training in October 2010, and a further 10 due to start the training course in early 2011.
i). However, the time lags involved in training APRP recruits mean that (apart from one who is part of the cohort of 19 to be given positions by September) the next three will not become 'made' prosecutors until approximately October to December 2011, and the next 10 not until early 2012. Therefore, the APRP will not make any impact on numbers in the next 12 months. There are currently 15 trainee prosecutors (i.e. 34 less the 19 to be given positions by September) in PEP 32 who have the prospect of becoming 'made' prosecutors in the next 12 months. Applying the usual attrition rate of about 25 per cent, it can be expected that 11 to12 of these will fill prosecutor positions in the next 12 months. Therefore, the best projection is that there will be 30 to 31 new prosecutors appointed in the next 12 months.
j). On the other side of the equation, the departure of at least three prosecutors was imminent at the time Superintendent Trichter gave his evidence in August, and will already have occurred. In addition, it can be assumed that further prosecutors will leave the PPC in the next 12 months. The historical average annual loss rate of prosecutors is 28. If this is maintained over the next 12 months, then the total loss from the August 2010 'headcount' figure this time next year will be about 31 (28 plus three). Thus, the expected new recruits will not effect any net change, or any discernible net change, on the current number of vacancies.
k). Furthermore, the long-term effect of the APRP on attraction and recruitment patterns in the PPC is a challenging issue. That is primarily because (and as Superintendent Trichter accepted) APRP recruits will be persons whose career focus is in the legal profession rather than policing, and who, as a result, can be expected to have a significantly shorter amount of service in the PPC (compared to traditional police prosecutors) before they move on to other things. Superintendent Trichter acknowledged in his own Staff Submission in 2007 that "a high turnover of staff is expected". This may mean that although the APRP may have a long-term positive effect on the recruitment rate, it may also serve to worsen the retention rate.
l). Despite Superintendent Trichter's consideration that the position concerning the numbers of prosecutors would continue to improve, he remained firm in his support of the claim in the attraction and retention context (at least insofar as the prosecutors' pay scale element of the claim was concerned). His evidence was that:
(i) As at December 2009 and "today" he was a supporter of the prosecutors' pay scale.
(ii) As at December 2009 and "to this day" he still supported the claim in the context or framework of an attraction and retention problem.
(iii) He had assured his staff that he was wishing success to the Association's claim for prosecutors, which he linked with conditions necessary for sustaining police prosecutors long into the future and ensuring sufficient police prosecutors' numbers in the long-term, and this "absolutely" remained the case now.
(iv) In the light of the history over the past few years of attraction and retention problems, it was necessary to have a structure in place to ensure there were sufficient police prosecutors in place for the long-term.
(v) While it was not the "panacea" or "the only option", the prosecutors' pay scale would go some way in improving attraction and retention for Police Prosecutors.
(vi) An enhanced remuneration structure for Police Prosecutors remains an "important part" of the strategies that need to be implemented to resolve the attraction and retention problem over the long-term, and Superintendent Trichter wanted the Commission to implement it for that reason.
(vii) Superintendent Trichter had "no doubt at all" that the grant of the prosecutors' pay scale would "improve the command" for a number of reasons:
- It would serve to attract officers in mainstream policing who would currently be disinclined to pursue a career as a Police Prosecutor because of the significant drop in pay they would suffer in first coming over to the PPC.
- The prosecutors' pay scale would go some way to address the position of high quality officers in the PPC who have left the PPC or may leave in the future to earn more money either elsewhere in the Police Force or outside the Police Force.
- The grant of the prosecutors' pay scale would be perceived by officer in the PPC as final recognition of the value of the work they do and the regard in which they are held within the Police Force, and have a significant positive morale effect.
- It was a concern that there may be a significant negative effect on morale if the outcome of these proceedings was that prosecutors received no additional remuneration within the award.
m). Assistant Commissioner Jenkins expressed the opinion, in his statement of evidence, that there was no attraction and retention issue in the PPC that was even of concern let alone one which would justify the grant of increased remuneration for officers within those commands. He confirmed that it followed from his statement and its annexures his view was that not only was there not any attraction and retention problem in the PPC, there never had been. This obviously put him completely at odds with the other witnesses, not least Superintendent Trichter. His opinion, in this respect, was said to be the corporate position of the Police Force as a whole, based on the delegation of human resources matters to him by the Commissioner. However, he also said that he had instructions from the Commissioner about the matter.
n). The corporate view of the Police Force was premised upon the accuracy of the analysis attached to Assistant Commissioner Jenkins' statement. However, the analysis, upon which Assistant Commissioner Jenkins based his view, was clearly flawed and misleading. This can most obviously be seen in the figures it gives for "% of Authorised Positions Occupied", which has a figure in excess of 100 per cent for every year from 2001 to 2009 - that was, indicating that the number of officers in the command had always exceeded the number of available positions. On these figures it was not surprising that Assistant Commissioner Jenkins and the Commissioner thought that there was no attraction and retention problem. However, the calculation was simply wrong and the corporate position of the Police Force was based on entirely false premise.
o). In reply, the Police Association submitted that the Commissioner had attempted to count persons holding OSND positions for the purpose establishing the 'headcount' of actual prosecutors, but then failed to count OSND prosecutor positions for the purpose of establishing the total number of prosecutor positions available to be held. This resulted in 205 prosecutors holding 200 authorised positions, as if there were no vacant prosecutor positions.
p). This analysis was directly contrary to the evidence of Superintendent Trichter. He made it entirely clear that, on his most recent analysis (August 2010), there were 13 vacancies (on a 'headcount basis') in the 200 authorised prosecutor positions, making 187 positions filled - not 205. He included in his analysis of prosecutor strength 19 OSND prosecutor positions of which six were vacant, making 13 filled. He also included the 19 senior sergeant area prosecution co-ordinator positions of which three were vacant, making 22 filled. This gave a total of 22 vacant prosecutor positions (on a 'headcount basis'). A summary of his analysis is as follows:
Total Filled Vacant
Positions (headcount)
Authorised 200 187 13
OSND 19 13 6
Co-ordinators 19 16 3
TOTAL 238 216 22