did the adjudicative referral create A reasonable apprehension of bias
33 Counsel for the applicant submitted that the Committee was bound to observe the requirements of natural justice. It was consequently required to act fairly. Each of the members of the Committee received a copy of the adjudicative referral. Attached to it was a copy of the investigative referral. The investigative referral, in section D, set out in par 8 of these reasons, contained material that Dr Crowley was counselled by the Commission in 1993 and 1995, that his conduct was referred to the Director in 1996 and that a determination was made in 1997 that he be counselled by the Director and disqualified for six months (the prior conduct material). The investigative referral also contained the practice statistics. The prior conduct material and the practice statistics (the contentious material), it was submitted, were both irrelevant and prejudicial. The receipt of it by the members of the Committee created an apprehension of bias. As a result the Court should restrain the Committee from further acting on the adjudicative referral.
34 It was common ground that the Committee was bound to observe the requirements of natural justice, and to act fairly. Ms Hampel SC, who appeared with Mr Maloney as counsel for the respondents, conceded that the prior conduct material was irrelevant to the consideration of the Committee.
35 What then was the position in relation to the practice statistics? The issues before the Committee are clearly defined in the adjudicative referral, namely, did Dr Crowley provide 80 or more professional attendances on 20 or more days in the period from 1 January 2000 to 31 October 2000, and, if so, were there exceptional circumstances that affected the rendering of such services on a particular day or days. Counsel for the respondents explained the possible relevance of the practice statistics:
"One can't look at the services in isolation in order to understand them, to give them context and to give them meaning. They've got to be seen against the background of the way the doctor conducts the practice and therefore they do provide relevant background, just as information in the referral about where the doctor trained and qualified, the experience and practice up until the date, information about the demographics in the area, breakdown of sex and age of patients are all potentially but sensibly potentially relevant materials to consider in shaping the investigation and in making a decision as to whether to make an adjudicative referral or to deal with it under section 91 or section 92, enter into an agreement or dismiss."
36 These justifications supply reasons for including the practice statistics in the investigative referral. The applicant conceded that the practice statistics were properly included in the investigative referral. Dr Bleechmore, however, argued that the Director had a filtering function when it came to preparation of the adjudicative referral. He should not have included the entire contents of the investigative referral in the adjudicative referral. The only basis on which the practice statistics could be relevant for inclusion in the adjudicative referral would be if they related to the issue of exceptional circumstances.
37 Having regard to the manner in which the practice statistics came to be included in the adjudicative referral, that is to say, by attachment of the investigative referral to the adjudicative referral, it seems likely that the reason for inclusion was simply to provide a record of the background steps taken prior to the making of the adjudicative referral. In other words, the practice statistics appeared by way of attachment to the adjudicative referral as a matter of history only. However, one cannot confidently say that the practice statistics bear on any issue to be considered by the Committee. Thus, for present purposes, I intend to treat the practice statistics as if they are not relevant to any issue to be considered by the Committee.
38 Assuming for present purposes that the contentious material is prejudicial to the applicant, as well as irrelevant to the determination of the adjudicative referral, in my view, its mere inclusion in the referral does not alone give reason for a reasonable apprehension of bias. In this area of discourse, bias involves a fixed state of mind which no argument or evidence is able to change. A reasonable person must apprehend from a tribunal's conduct or the circumstances in which it considers material that is said to be irrelevant and prejudicial, that it has such a state of mind caused by the material: Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 at 293-4. Irrelevant and prejudicial material might be of such a nature as to cause a reasonable person to apprehend that its mere presence will pollute the minds of the tribunal against the applicant.
39 It is premature to conclude that the Committee has been affected by the material in a way which is unalterable, or that a reasonable person viewing the situation would so conclude. A reasonable person observing the situation of the Committee would need to wait and see how the Committee deals with the material. The following factors bear on the approach the Committee will take to the contentious material.
40 First, counsel for the members of the Committee stated to the Court that the members will not take into account the prior conduct material. Naturally, this statement is made on the instructions of the members of the Committee. There is no reason to doubt that the Committee members will act in the way in which they have indicated. This is an important contextual factor to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of the reaction of an observer of the circumstances: Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at 494; [2000] HCA 48.
41 Then, s 103(2)(b) (set out in the hearing letter) permits Dr Crowley to have a lawyer present before the Committee, and to have the lawyer address the Committee on questions of law. Thus, Dr Crowley has the chance to engage a lawyer to make submissions to the Committee on the proper approach which the Committee should take to the contentious material. There is no reason to expect that the Committee will not listen to, and properly determine, such submissions. Further, the hearing letter indicates that the Committee will have its own legal adviser present at the hearing. This also contributes to the likelihood that the Committee will adopt an approach to the material as is required by the law.
42 Further, even after the hearing, Dr Crowley has an opportunity to make further submissions in response to a draft report of the Committee. Section 106KD(1) requires the Committee to prepare a draft report after the hearing. Section 106KD(3) provides:
"(3) The Committee must give to the person under review a copy of the draft report together with a notice inviting the person to make to the Committee, within 21 days after the day on which the copy of the draft report is given to the person, written submissions suggesting changes to the draft report."
43 Then, s 106L(1) relevantly provides:
"(1) After the period of 21 days referred to in subsection 106KD(3), the Committee must, after taking into account any submissions made to the Committee by the person under review within that period, prepare a final report …"
44 Dr Bleechmore argued that it was unfair to force Dr Crowley to have to highlight the contentious material in order to persuade the Committee that the material is not relevant. However, unless the material is so damaging that its mere reception for the purpose of argument will persuade a reasonable person that the Committee cannot bring an unbiased mind to the issues, there is no legal basis on which to invalidate the process. There may, perhaps, be cases where the contentious material is so poisonous that no reasonable decision-maker could proceed without being seen by a reasonable person to be influenced by a fixed view on the matter under consideration arising from the reception of the material. But that is not this case.
45 It is also significant that the issues to be considered by the Committee are clear cut, and are apparently well understood by the Committee to be limited. Thus, the notice of hearing states that "the particulars of the matter to which the hearing relates" are the professional attendances between 1 January 2000 and 31 October 2000, and that the allegation is that the provision of those services constituted a prescribed pattern of services.
46 Holmes v Mercado (2000) 111 FCR 160; [2000] FCA 1848 concerned an application by a doctor to prevent a committee proceeding to determine an adjudicative referral that included reference to the fact that the doctor had been counselled prior to the referral being made. However, unlike the present case, the proceedings were initiated after the committee's view in respect of the prior counselling material had been made clear to the doctor. The Full Court (Wilcox, Merkel and Weinberg JJ) found that the material was not irrelevant to the task of the committee, however, in obiter the Full Court said at pars 62 to 63 that there was no reasonable ground to apprehend bias in the circumstances:
"62 Even if we are wrong in holding that the material concerning prior counselling of Dr Mercado was not irrelevant to the task of the committee, we respectfully disagree with the view that the committee members' knowledge of that material leads to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The committee gave assurances to Dr Mercado, on a number of occasions, that it would restrict its findings to referred services: see the letter of 16 December ([16] above), the statement made by the chairman at the 21 January hearing ([20] above) and the letter of 16 February. The last reference is particularly important. It was the most recent statement of the committee's position before institution of the proceeding in this court. It will be recalled that Mr Irvine, on behalf of the committee, acknowledged 'that the counselling reports are not evidence before it'. He specifically stated that the committee "does not intend to make use of the report in conducting the inquiry" (see [25] above). Later in the letter, Mr Irvine wrote:
'Because the reports are irrelevant the committee is ignoring them … The committee is not influenced by matters which are irrelevant and unproved'.
63 The argument put on behalf of Dr Mercado requires the Court to disregard or discount these assurances. The argument has to be, and is, that a fair-minded and informed observer would reasonably have such doubts about the willingness or ability of a lay (as distinct from a legally-trained) tribunal to honour these assurances as to continue to harbour apprehension of bias. We see no basis for that view. The committee comprises three members of the Professional Services Review Panel. Members of the Panel are appointed by the Minister after consultation with the Australian Medical Association (AMA): see s 84(3) of the Act. The committee's chairman is a Deputy Director of Professional Services Review appointed in consultation with the AMA: see s 95(1)(a) and (2). The three members were required to be, and no doubt were, medical practitioners during the review period. We see no reason to doubt that such people are as capable as lawyers of understanding the concept of putting out of their minds an irrelevant matter, when reaching conclusions on a matter of grave importance to a practitioner, and of doing so."
47 The same applies with greater force to this case in which the Committee has not yet had the opportunity to demonstrate the way in which it will approach the contentious material.
48 It follows that this argument is also rejected.
49 I have approached this argument on the basis that the practice statistics are prejudicial and irrelevant. Because, even on that assumption, at this stage, their inclusion in the adjudicative referral does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias by the Committee. However, this assumption is not intended to preclude the Committee from drawing its own conclusions about the relevance of the practice statistics. The relevance of the practice statistics is a question for the Committee to determine. The practice statistics may turn out to be relevant to the exceptional circumstances argument. That will depend on the evidence and argument relied upon by Dr Crowley at the hearing.