Background to Invoicing Agreement
6 The background to the invoicing agreement from early 2001 to April 2003, including the ongoing default of the Boomerang companies in meeting SEA's terms of trade and the resulting build up of indebtedness, the inability of SEA to secure credit insurance for Boomerang Melbourne or even increase the cover of that provided by the Stora Enso group's internal insurance company and the prospect of cutting the supply of paper to Moore, is dealt with by the primary judge at [16] - [32] of his reasons.
7 The primary judge noted an exchange of emails between Mr Fabrello, SEA's national sales manager for carbonless paper, and Mr Koeppen, international sales manager of the Mill who was based in Germany, on 2 May 2003. His Honour observed (at [33] - [36]):
"… The first email, from Mr Fabrello, set out his understanding of the position in three numbered points. The first was that because of the poor payment history of Boomerang Melbourne, SEA could not get sufficient insurance cover. For reasons he detailed, he thought that the poor payment history was not likely to change in the short term under current ownership. He observed, as his second numbered point, that SEA had to reduce its exposure to Boomerang but in a way that allowed Boomerang to continue with all its existing business including Moore so that the cash flow would remain stable. He noted that if 'we' stopped supplying Moore and Boomerang were not able to replace the volume, then 'we' would have less exposure per month but would expect payments to get worse and the total debt would remain at the current level. Mr Fabrello proposed three options:
'The best options we have are:
A) Boomerang find another Carbonless supplier for the Moore business - in this scenario it would then be most likely that we would lose all the reel business at Boomerang as running two stocks would be a logistic nightmare. However if this allowed Boomerang to continue to operate then we would have a very good chance of getting all our money.
B) We convince Boomerang to sell and CPI to buy and takeover the outstanding debt.
C) We convince CPI to invoice Boomerang for Giroform reel sales to Moore. In this case CPI would get the commission owed to Stora Enso.
Both B and C would enable us to continue with Giroform at Boomerang…'
He then asked Mr Koeppen: 'For these scenarios are you able to make any special extra commission offer to CPI perhaps for a fixed period as a support'.
Mr Fabrello's third numbered point was:
'I have advised Boomerang that [SEA] will not support the Moore business after September and that [the Mill] will not take over the invoicing.
As far as the [SEA] board is concerned I have to advise Moore of a significant price increase in May which will force a change.
I have told Boomerang to find an alternative supply as per the option A) above quickly so that they will be able to offer the alternative option when I advise Moore.
Despite my following this up several times with Boomerang they have yet to act seriously about an alternative and appear to be basing their future on some arrangement with CPI which could take some time to negotiate.
I am having a meeting with Bernard at CPI next wednesday to get an idea of their position and will then visit Boomerang to push them along the alternative supply.
We are running out of time'.
Mr Koeppen responded by saying that for Giroform's long term strategy, 'we' had to continue with our reels business in Australia which meant continuing to do business with Boomerang. He preferred options B and C."
Mr Fabrello's reference to "Bernard at CPI" was a reference to Mr Cassell, the chief operating officer at CPI who became its managing director in September 2003. We note that Mr Koeppen, after expressing his preference for options B and C, asked Mr Fabrello: "What costs were 'we' considering? 2, 3, 4, 5 percent?"
8 On 19 May 2003, Mr Ellenberg, the managing director of SEA, and Mr Fabrello met with Mr Cassell. Each gave their own version of what was said by each of them at the meeting. At [87] of his reasons, the primary judge identified four aspects of the conversations as warranting special consideration:
"… The first is what was said by Mr Ellenberg about the reason SEA was having problems with credit insurance for Boomerang. The second is whether Mr Ellenberg said there was a credit issue with Boomerang, and the third was whether Mr Ellenberg said, in relation to Boomerang, they 'had a shaky customer here'. The last is what was said about cutting supply to Moore."
9 As to the last matter, the primary judge acknowledged that, on the pleadings, it was admitted that "on or about 19 May 2003 SEA informed CPI that SEA intended to restrict the sale and supply by it of Giroform Carbonless Paper to the Boomerang companies in respect of a particular customer, Moore Business Systems Australia Pty Ltd by 30 June 2003". But his Honour then went on to find (at [88]):
"It is probable, in my view, that what Mr Ellenberg said about cutting supply to Moore was no more than an intimation that this was a course being actively considered and which would be implemented if necessary."
In view of the admission, the relevance of this finding is not clear.
10 As to why there was a credit insurance issue with the Boomerang companies, the primary judge rejected Mr Cassell's version that Mr Ellenberg had explained the source of the problem as being a decision of the board of SEO that its internal credit insurance company would only cover products coming from mills owned by the Stora Enso group on the bases that -
(i) it was plainly a lie;
(ii) his impression of Mr Ellenberg in the witness box was not a negative one; it was not that of a dishonest person or one who gave deliberately false evidence; and
(iii) Mr Cassel would have known the explanation was false because CPI was being supplied by SEA with the same paper from the same source as the Boomerang companies and if the explanation was correct it would have impacted on the credit insurance that SEA had from its internal insurer for CPI.
11 As to whether Mr Ellenberg said there was a credit issue with the Boomerang companies and that they (SEA) "have a shaky customer here", the primary judge was satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that it was not said (at [97]). His Honour gave a number of reasons for his conclusion on this matter, including:
(1) His opinion, that it is highly unlikely that Mr Cassell would have proceeded as he did after the meeting on 19 May 2003, if he knew that there was, or was likely to be, a credit problem with the Boomerang companies.
(2) Mr Cassell did nothing to ascertain what the problem was or its extent by immediately questioning Mr Ellenberg.
(3) His opinion, that it is highly unlikely that Mr Cassell would have volunteered, at the 19 May 2003 meeting, taking over the invoicing (which is Mr Ellenberg's version of the conversation) without asking more about what the credit problems were with the Boomerang companies, had such problems been alluded to by Mr Ellenberg.
12 Notwithstanding the extensive cross-examination of both Mr Cassell and Mr Akdogan, CPI's chief financial officer, about what they had gleaned from the financial records of the Boomerang companies provided in May and June 2003, the primary judge was satisfied that neither was aware of the significant problem concerning members of the Boomerang companies paying SEA in accordance with the terms of trade and the extent of the arrears. His Honour gave two reasons for this conclusion.
(1) He accepted the evidence concerning the reaction of Mr Cassell in October 2003 when the true trading position of the Boomerang companies was revealed; one of genuine surprise and, in Mr Cassell's words, "great anger and annoyance at what had happened". That reaction was consistent with no prior knowledge of the true position and inconsistent with prior knowledge.
(2) He considered it improbable that Mr Cassell would have been so committed to the transaction to have exposed CPI to a potentially significant liability by entering the invoicing agreement with the actual knowledge of the Boomerang companies' then trading position. As his Honour observed (at [95]), for a perceived possible gross annual commission income of approximately $500,000 a year, CPI was exposing itself to underwrite the payment of sales by SEA to the Boomerang companies of well over $1 million per month with a real risk that the Boomerang companies would not, in turn, pay CPI.
13 While the primary judge was not satisfied that Mr Ellenberg had said that they (SEA) had a shaky customer and that there was a credit issue with the Boomerang companies, his Honour was satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that nothing was said by Mr Ellenberg which misled, or was intended to mislead, Mr Cassell about the reasons why Mr Ellenberg was proposing the invoicing agreement as a mechanism which would enable SEA to continue to supply the Boomerang companies, and thereby Moore, while also allowing CPI to continue pursuing its objective of acquiring the Boomerang companies (at [97]).
14 The primary judge noted an email which Mr Fabrello sent to Mr Koeppen on 27 May 2003 which was as follows:
"Update
Step 1. Bernard [Cassell] has the Boomerang financials and is rushing his study to be completed this week. (this is confidential - we are not suppose to have this info)
We should know whether CPI has intention to proceed with offer next monday - then it depends if agreements can be reached with Boomerang.
Step 2. Another attempt at getting insurance cover through alternative channels is in process. If [SEA] could get cover then there would be no problem in continuing the exposure to Boomerang. Andre believes the chances are very low of getting cover.
Step 3. If CPI decide not to proceed with purchase and insurance fails then I would ask Bernard if CPI could take over the invoicing of Boomerang sales to Moore.
Final Step 4. If there are no options left then [SEA] has to reduce exposure (invoicing) to Boomerang to a lower level. This means losing the Moore business for Giroform.
However [SEA] needs Boomerang to remain in business to ensure that we do not end up with a bad debt. By us forcing Boomerang out of Moore we actually increase the risk of this happening so we have suggested to Boomerang that they have an alternative option to offerMoore if and when we haveto take step 4.
The best solution after step 4 is for Boomerang to continue the Moore Business with an alternative so that they can maintain their cash flow and gross margin from this business.
I would anticipate that [SEA] would have to take step 4 by the end of week 24."
15 The primary judge found that as early as September 2002, Mr Fabrello and Mr Cassell had discussed the possible acquisition by CPI of the businesses of the Boomerang companies. He found that in early 2003 Mr Cassell told Mr Fabrello that if CPI purchased the Boomerang companies, it would need him (Mr Fabrello) to join CPI and manage the acquisition. His Honour was satisfied that Mr Fabrello was asked to take up employment with CPI to manage the acquisition during the process of transition and that Mr Fabrello accepted the proposal at a later date. Finally his Honour found that, on what was probably 20 June 2003, Mr Fabrello telephoned Mr Cassell advising that he had decided to retire and that he would not join CPI. He further found that Mr Cassell flew to Sydney and was with Mr Fabrello on 23 June 2003 to try to convince him to change his mind but was unable to do so.
16 The primary judge additionally found that on 5 June 2003 Mr Akdogan sent Mr Cassell spreadsheets relating to the financial position of the Boomerang companies. His Honour observed (at [47]) that is was clear from this email that Mr Akdogan was proceeding on the basis that CPI was proposing to acquire the assets of the Boomerang companies, not the companies themselves, although this was a matter that needed to be confirmed.
17 The primary judge at [48] - [49] of his reasons made certain observations concerning the financial accounts of the Boomerang companies provided to CPI between 21 May 2003 and 23 June 2003 based on an "analysis contained in SEA's submissions". We do not have the benefit of those submissions. However, it appears that the table at [49] and his Honour's observations thereon, require correction or clarification in three respects. First, while the table discloses the trading position of the Boomerang companies, it does not disclose their asset/liability position. Second, the last two lines in the second column should read: "31/12/02" and "30/04/03" not "2003" and "(30/04)". And third, a number of the figures in the last column represent accumulated losses at the particular date, not profits or losses for the 12 months or lesser period then ended.
18 On 12 and 17 June 2003, Mr Fabrello met with Mr Cassell and Mr Koeppen in Melbourne. The meeting of 12 June took place over dinner. Of particular significance was the contention of CPI that at the meeting on 17 June held in CPI's boardroom, Mr Fabrello, in response to a question from Mr Cassell whether the Boomerang companies were paying their accounts on time, had said words to the effect "yes, give or take a few days". Mr Fabrello denied this in cross-examination even though he accepted that he was asked by Mr Cassell what the terms of trade were.
19 At [104] the primary judge said:
"I have little hesitation in accepting that Mr Fabrello did not affirm that Boomerang was paying its accounts on time, give or take a few days even though he accepted that he was asked by Mr Cassell what the terms of trade were. In my opinion, Mr Cassell invented this conversation as a means of explaining what proved to be a gross misjudgement, at least with the benefit of hindsight, of entering the invoicing agreement with SEA in late June and early July 2003. He needed to explain to his board, as he did in his report to the November 2003 board meeting, why CPI was liable to underwrite, effectively, Boomerang's purchases of paper as a result of the operation of invoicing agreement. It was not sufficient for him to rely on what had in fact transpired, namely that he had not been told about the poor trading record of Boomerang and had not been alerted to it himself or been advised of it by Mr Akdogan when they looked at Boomerang's accounts in May and June 2003. It was necessary for him to contrive an account of events most favourable for him. This can be illustrated by his description in his report of the invoicing agreement as "in the nature of a handshake agreement" to diminish its significance and to say, wrongly, that he simply signed a letter from Mr Ellenberg for audit purposes. It can also be illustrated by what Mr Cassell said in the report about when Mr Fabrello made the representation about the trading record of the Boomerang companies …"
20 For a variety of reasons given at [105] and [106] of his reasons, the primary judge did not form a favourable impression of Mr Cassell as a witness generally. Indeed, while his Honour found that he could not say with certainty that Mr Cassell's evidence generally was deliberately false, he could not entirely discount the possibility that it was. His Honour concluded (at [106]):
"… I accept his evidence concerning disputed questions of fact only in so far as it is clearly corroborated by contemporaneous documents or is consistent with what, in the circumstances, is the probable course events took having regard to the evidence of others."
21 The primary judge went on to refer to other factors supportive of Mr Fabrello's denial that he indicated that the Boomerang companies were paying their accounts on time, give or take a few days, including the presence of Mr Koeppen who would have known such a statement to be wrong and who, the primary judge found, could not have been expected to stand by and say nothing in the face of the fact that the meetings of 12 and 17 June were designed to, and did, establish a relationship between CPI and the Mill which was intended to endure.
22 On 17 June 2003, a draft memorandum of understanding between CPI and the Mill was prepared to reflect the agreement reached at the June meetings. The draft was as follows:
"MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
CPI GROUP LTD
AND
[THE MILL]
BACKGROUND
a) [The Mill] is a supplier of Carbonless papers to Australia and New Zealand.
b) [SEA] is the current exclusive agent for [the Mill] in Australia and New Zealand.
c) The customers for [the Mill] product in Australia and New Zealand are CPI Group Ltd ('CPI') and the Boomerang Trading Group ('Boomerang').
d) [SEA] wishes to reduce its credit exposure to Boomerang and limit sales to them.
e) [The Mill] wishes to maintain sales to Boomerang.
f) CPI wishes to acquire the business of Boomerang.
In recognition of the above [the Mill] and CPI have agreed on the following actions set out in this Memorandum of Understanding.
1. CPI confirms that it is negotiating with Boomerang for the purchase of its business and that it intends to try and conclude this acquisition as soon as possible.
2. In the meantime CPI agrees that it will be invoiced by [SEA] for all sales to Boomerang and that it will in turn invoice Boomerang for those sales, i.e. CPI will assume Boomerang's credit risk.
3. In return for CPI assuming the credit risk on Boomerang, [the Mill] agrees to pay CPI 2% rebate calculated on the invoice value of all sales to Boomerang.
4. [The Mill] agrees that it will terminate the agency for its carbonless papers in Australia and New Zealand with [SEA] to take effect 31 December 2003 (or sooner ifmutually agreed), and that it will enter into similar arrangements with CPI effective 1 January 2004 (or sooner if mutually agreed).
5. CPI agrees that it will employ Mr Nereo Fabrello once the arrangements with [the Mill] are in place (or sooner if mutually agreed).
6. [SEA] will warrant that all invoices raised to CPI in respect ofBoomerang purchases are true and correct and have been accepted by Boomerang.
7. [The Mill] agrees that in the event that CPI is successful in its acquisition of Boomerang it will extend the current payment terms on reels to 120 days from the current 60 days (CPI) and 75 days (Boomerang). This arrangement will continue for two years following which it will be further discussed between the parties."
23 By letter dated 26 June 2003, the Mill terminated the agency agreement and distributor agreement with SEA, effective at the end of 2003. Mr Ellenberg did nothing to persuade the Mill to change its mind. The primary judge accepted Mr Ellenberg's evidence to the effect that he did not seek to persuade the Mill to change its mind because it was exercising, in an unqualified way, its right to terminate the agreements in a context in which he assumed it was likely CPI would take over the Boomerang companies and it would make no real commercial sense to the Mill to maintain SEA as its agent.
24 The final memorandum of understanding between CPI and the Mill was signed on behalf of the Mill on 27 June 2003 and by CPI on 7 July 2003. The final version was identical to the draft except that clause 5 (which referred to CPI's agreement to employ Mr Fabrello) was replaced with the following clause:
"5. CPI agrees that it will employ a suitable person to provide leadership for sales of carbonless papers."
25 From these events, emerged the invoicing agreement. On 25 June 2003, SEA sent an undated letter to CPI setting out the terms of the invoicing arrangement. The letter was prepared by Mr Fabrello to reflect what was decided at the meeting on 17 June 2003. The letter read:
"Dear Bernard [Cassell]
Re; Agreement to Invoice Boomerang Paper Companies
This is to confirm the following agreement between Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd and CPI Group Ltd.
CPI Group agrees to accept Invoices from Stora Enso Australia for all Boomerang Paper Companies purchases of Giroform Carbonless Paper.
The Boomerang Companies are Boomerang Paper (Aust) Pty Ltd, Boomerang Paper (Qld) Pty Ltd, Boomerang Paper (WA) Pty Ltd.
Stora Enso Australia agrees to pay CPI a rebate of two percent of the invoiced sales values (excluding GST) for all Boomerang Paper companies invoices. This rebate will be paid monthly by means of a credit note.
Either party can terminate this agreement by giving two months written notice.
Stora Enso Australia warrants that all invoices raised to CPI in respect Boomerang Paper purchases are true and correct and have been accepted by the Boomerang Paper company concerned.
This will be effective all Invoiced raised from July 1st 2003.
Details of invoicing procedures are attached.
Please confirm you [sic] acceptance of this agreement.
Yours truly
Juhani Ellenberg
Managing Director
Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd"
26 The attachment to the letter was as follows:
"Procedure for Boomerang Invoicing by CPI group.
1. Stora Enso will continue to raise individual invoices for the Boomerang Companies.
2. These will now be raised as pro forma invoices which will have to signed off [sic] as correct by the Boomerang companies.
3. Stora Enso will then consolidate the invoices and raise a single line invoice to CPI group for the total value of the invoices.
Separate invoices will be raised for consignment reels, Indent reels and Indent sheets as payment terms are different for each category.
Terms are
- Consignment Reels - 75 days from end of reported sales month.
- Indent Reels - 90 days from Bill of Lading Days
- Indent Sheets - 120 days from Bill of Lading Date
4. CPI group will then invoice Boomerang for the same value of these invoices.
5. CPI will make payments to Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd on the agreed terms less the value of any credit notes raised.
Juhani Ellenberg
Managing Director
Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd"
27 CPI replied with the following letter to SEA dated 2 July 2003:
"Dear Juhani [Ellenberg]
With regard to your letter of agreement between Stora Enso Australia Pty Ltd and CPI Group Ltd, CPI Group Ltd hereby confirms its acceptance of the arrangement for all invoices raised from 1 July 2003.
Please direct all correspondence (including invoices) relating to the day-to-day managing of this arrangement to our Chief Financial Officer, Mr Birol Akdogan.
Yours sincerely
Bernard P Cassell
Chief Operating Officer"