Issue (4): Does the balance of convenience favour the grant of injunctive relief?
53 The matters advanced to support the application were: (a) the alleged strength of the claim; (b) the necessary legal consequence if Ms Cooper's claim was to be upheld, namely that undertaking the proposed seismic survey would be unlawful; (c) the loss of the benefit of the performance of the alleged statutory obligation or duty to consult and adopt appropriate measures as to the impacts upon and risks for cultural features of the places and areas where the proposed survey was to be undertaken according to the beliefs and understanding of Ms Cooper, Ms Alec, their families and their community; and (d) the public law nature of the relief being sought which meant that there was a public interest involved in ensuring that NOPSEMA conformed to the limits of its authority.
54 The matters advanced in opposition were: (a) the extent of the daily financial consequences for Woodside in delaying the commencement of the proposed seismic survey which vessels and crew were standing by to undertake; (b) the real risk that, for various reasons, a delay until the scheduled expedited hearing at the end of October would mean that the seismic survey could not be completed in a manner that would allow Woodside to proceed with other scheduled activities to be undertaken to commence its proposed development of the Scarborough gas field; (c) the fact that Woodside would not be protected by an undertaking as to damages; and (d) by reason of the conditions and the terms of the environment plan, Ms Cooper would still be consulted and any matters raised would be addressed in accordance with the plan.
55 It may be accepted that both the conditions as imposed and the terms of the environment plan contemplate further and ongoing consultation by Woodside with Ms Cooper and Save Our Songlines. There is an issue between the parties as to whether that has occurred.
56 Plainly, it is a matter for NOPSEMA to determine whether in the particular circumstances the requirement for consultation has been met. The fact that it has concluded that there has not been adequate consultation with Ms Cooper and others at the time that it decided to accept the plan is a very significant matter if, as Ms Cooper claims, it had no lawful authority to accept the environment plan unless and until it was satisfied that the criteria as to consultation had been met. It is also significant because it means that NOPSEMA did not have before it the details of what would arise from the consultation when considering whether other criteria would be met.
57 Amongst other things, those criteria required NOPSEMA, not Woodside, to determine whether the environmental impacts and risks of the seismic survey will be of an acceptable level, having regard to the effect upon other measures provided for by the environment plan or whether those measures were appropriate, having regard to cultural features of the location explained by Ms Cooper. It also required NOPSEMA, not Woodside, to evaluate whether the environment plan met other criteria in the regulations.
58 In saying those things, I recognise that Woodside itself has assumed an obligation under the environment plan to carry out and continue consultation. However, at the point of deciding whether to accept the plan, arguably the effect of the conditions was to entrust that assessment to Woodside on the basis of subsequent consultation (subject to ongoing oversight to be conducted by NOPSEMA). If that is so, there may be a material difference between requiring consultation before an acceptance and the approach of imposing a condition of acceptance that required future consultation.
59 It follows that if the claim by Ms Cooper as to Ground 1 is shown to be correct, Woodside (if allowed to proceed) will be demonstrated to have been acting unlawfully assuming, as it has indicated, that it commences the survey in the meantime. It will have done so on the basis that its obligation is to comply with the environment plan as presently expressed and in circumstances where, as I have explained, there is the possibility that the outcome of further consultation (since the decision to accept the environment plan on conditions) may affect NOPSEMA's view as to the manner in which the proposed seismic survey ought to be undertaken. It will be doing so in circumstances where Ms Cooper has not been properly consulted and in circumstances where NOPSEMA did not have available to it the outcome of that consultation in deciding whether to accept the environment plan without change.
60 In my present assessment there are reasonable prospects of Ms Cooper succeeding in her claim as to Ground 1. I make that assessment recognising that I have yet to hear full argument and that here are countervailing arguments which may ultimately carry the day. I remain open to be persuaded to the correctness of the position that the conditions were properly imposed. Nevertheless, in the present case in order to determine where the balance of convenience lies, it is necessary for me to make a preliminary assessment of the merits of the claim.
61 On the other hand, Woodside has demonstrated that there will be considerable consequences for its business if it is unable to proceed to undertake the seismic survey. In the short term, they are principally financial and involve considerable sums of money. In the longer term, and by that I mean if this matter remains undetermined until the scheduled urgent final hearing, those consequences are more serious if the injunction is granted. They will be more serious because there is the prospect that Woodside will not be able to undertake the works in the remaining time permitted under the environment plan and also, on the evidence, Woodside's contractor may not be willing to standby for an extended period pending any final determination.
62 Also, there may be consequences for the project programme pursuant to which Woodside has planned to undertake the development of the relevant gas field. Although Ms Cooper submits that the schedule is one which Woodside has, in effect, set for itself and are dependent upon future uncertainties, they are, nevertheless, part of the characteristics of undertaking a substantial development and delays in steps along the way in accordance with a programme of that kind can have substantial commercial consequences.
63 The failure to consult has real consequences for Ms Cooper, her family and other members of her community on the evidence that is before the Court. They extend to concerns about consequences for their personal health if they do not speak up about cultural matters. Those consequences are not amenable to financial measure, but they are important. Ms Cooper says that they are matters that she wishes to raise in a culturally appropriate way and has not yet been able to do so. As to whether there has been an opportunity afforded to raise them since the acceptance of the environment plan by NOPSEMA, that is a matter in issue between the parties.
64 Woodside submitted that if I was to look forward and consider the possibility, contrary to its case, that the acceptance of the environment plan on conditions was beyond power, I may conclude for the purposes of determining where the balance of convenience lies that in view of what has occurred since that acceptance, that it is likely that, on any reconsideration, that NOPSEMA would approve the environment plan. As I have mentioned, it also said that consultation of the kind required has occurred since the acceptance of the environment plan, or at least that will be the position by the time of any hearing. Therefore, so it submitted, it could not be said that there is any real consequence for Ms Cooper, Ms Alec, their families and their community if the proposed seismic survey was allowed to proceed. As has been mentioned, in effect, these submissions were to the effect that no practical purpose would be served by an injunction.
65 In my view, the submission invited this Court to travel down a pathway that would usurp the statutory authority entrusted to NOPSEMA. The regulations entrust to NOPSEMA the relevant statutory task. If that task is as Ms Cooper contends then it is entirely a matter for NOPSEMA to determine whether to accept the environment plan and, importantly, what should be included in the plan, having regard to the impacts and risks to the cultural characteristics of the locations where the seismic survey is to be undertaken and having received the information about cultural matters from the consultation.
66 For that reason, I did not accept that aspect of the submission advanced by Woodside as a basis for evaluation as to whether the balance of convenience lies against the grant of the interlocutory injunction. Rather, it seemed to me that the appropriate course was to take account of the strength of the claim that the decision to accept the plan exceeds the authority of NOPSEMA, namely that the claim was reasonably arguable. That was especially the case when the jurisdiction invoked by Ground 1 is a public law jurisdiction which ensures that those entrusted with statutory authority remain within the limits of that authority. It is not for this Court in exercising that jurisdiction to take over the evaluative task entrusted to NOPSEMA.
67 In all those circumstances, I determined that the prospect of the failure to consult prior to NOPSEMA accepting the environment plan, meaning that it would be unlawful for Woodside to undertake the seismic survey by reason of the failure to adequately consult, outweighed the consequences for Woodside of an injunction of short duration. I concluded that the relative impact on the parties must be assessed having regard to the fact that the interests of Ms Cooper about which she was not consulted are matters which she has advanced as being of deep cultural significance. On the other hand, the essentially commercial consequences to Woodside must be measured having regard to its standing as an enterprise with very substantial financial resources undertaking an activity which is closely regulated and therefore always subject to the need to adhere to the lawful requirements of that regulation.
68 As to Ms Cooper's alternative claim that Woodside has not complied with the conditions that required consultation, Woodside submitted that it is a matter for NOPSEMA as the regulator to consider whether there has been compliance with the conditions and that Ms Cooper has no standing to raise that complaint. I observed that a hearing confined to Ground 1 and the standing point as to Ground 2 will be confined to matters of law. It could be convened and determined more quickly than the issue whether there has been compliance with the condition concerning consultation. The Court was available to hear and determine those issues on 26 or 27 September 2023.
69 Further, it appeared likely that a hearing confined to those issues would determine the dispute one way or the other. There was the possibility that Ground 1 would be determined against Ms Cooper and that Ground 2 would be determined in her favour, in which case there would need to be a determination as to whether the conditions as to consultation have been met. In that event, an issue would arise as to whether the injunction should be extended until the dates in late October 2023 presently set down for final hearing. That was a matter that could be considered if and when it arises.
70 Woodside submitted that it would contend that the evidence as to whether there has been consultation since the acceptance of the environment plan would bear upon whether there should be relief as a matter of discretion, even if Ground 1 was upheld. There are two aspects to this submission. First, there is a legal aspect. It is concerned with whether a point of that kind, if established, would be a sufficient basis to refuse the relief sought if Ground 1 succeeded. The second aspect is factual. It concerns what has occurred in relation to consultation. It seemed to me that the first, but not the second aspect, should form part of the hearing that I proposed would take place on 26 or 27 September 2023.