PENALTY
55 Given the substantial absence of any evidentiary controversy, the parties invited and I agreed to the adoption of a course whereby submissions as to both liability and, if there were liability, penalty were made at the one time.
56 Section 546 of the Act empowers the Court to order a person to pay a pecuniary penalty that the Court considers is appropriate if the Court is satisfied that the person has contravened a civil remedy provision. Section 50 of the Act is a "civil remedy provision": s 539(1) and Item 4 in the table in s 539(2). The operation of s 546 of the Act can be, and in this case is, affected by s 557 of the Act in terms of what is, for the purposes of the imposition of a penalty to be taken as a single contravention.
57 The question then becomes how are these contraventions of s 50, constituted by contraventions of cl 13.7, to be treated for the purposes of s 557 of the Act? How to answer that question is not without difficulty in this case.
58 Materially, s 557 provides:
557 Course of conduct
(1) For the purposes of this Part, 2 or more contraventions of a civil remedy provision referred to in subsection (2) are, subject to subsection (3), taken to constitute a single contravention if:
(a) the contraventions are committed by the same person; and
(b) the contraventions arose out of a course of conduct by the person.
(2) The civil remedy provisions are the following:
…
(c) section 50 (which deals with contraventions of enterprise agreements);
It is common ground that a civil penalty has not previously been imposed on the company. This means that s 557(3) of the Act does not render s 557(1) inapplicable.
59 The contraventions of s 50 are, in this instance, each constituted by a contravention of but one term of the Enterprise Agreement. So construed, s 557 has a like operation to earlier analogues: Rocky Holdings Pty Ltd v Fair Work Ombudsman (2014) 221 FCR 153 (Rocky Holdings Case). Thus, the focus of inquiry in respect of what is, by s 557(1), to be taken to be a single contravention is, in this case, whether the contraventions of cl 13.7 of the Enterprise Agreement arose out of a single course of conduct by the company?
60 Neither party suggested that, so approaching the circumstances, the effect of s 557(1) was that there was nonetheless a contravention on each and every day access to sick leave was refused. That is clearly correct. Rather, the choice presented was this. The CFMEU submitted that there is a separate course of conduct with respect to each of the six workers such that, in the application of s 557(1), there are six single contraventions. For its part, the company submitted that there is but one course of conduct in respect of one term of the Enterprise Agreement such that the effect of s 557(1) is that there is a single contravention only.
61 The company did not lead any evidence from a senior officer as to the making of a particular, anterior strategic decision as to adopting a particular construction of cl 13.7 of the Enterprise Agreement with respect to its employees at the Hail Creek mine. Even so, the inference is inescapable, when one has regard to the letters respectively sent to the workers between 3 December 2013 and 31 March 2014, that there must have been such a decision, if not within the company itself then by a senior officer in another Rio Tinto controlled company providing services to the company, which has then been operationally implemented by the company. The company invited the drawing of such an inference. With that premise, the company then submitted that the operational implementation of that decision, highlighted by the six instances proved, constituted a single course of conduct.
62 The riposte to this by the CFMEU was that this analysis was made at too general a level of abstraction and that the operational implementation of the decision had had different consequences for each of the six workers. Those different consequences are evident enough from the particular differing experiences of each worker as to a need for paid sick leave between the start of December 2013 and as recently as May this year.
63 I was initially attracted to the CFMEU's submission as to the operation of s 557(1) in the circumstances of this case but, on reflection, I consider that I am compelled by prior authority, including a judgment of mine in an earlier case, to accept the company's submission.
64 I was earlier called upon to consider the operation of s 557 of the Act in Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v QR Limited (No 2) [2010] FCA 652 (Queensland Rail Case). There, too, there was but one term (the consultation clause) in each applicable industrial instrument with which particular respondents did not comply - QR Limited had contravened one term in each of 12 separate instruments, QR Passenger had contravened one term in respect of seven separate instruments and QR Network had contravened one term in the only instrument applicable to it. The union applicants in that case submitted, and I accepted, contrary to the submission of those respondents, that the operation of s 557(1) was such that there were 20 single contraventions. The respondents in that case had submitted that the effect of s 557(1) was that there was but one. On the subsequent appeal, the Full Court did not agree that the case was one for the imposition of maximum penalties in respect of those 20 contraventions, but accepted as correct my characterisation as to how s 557(1) operated in the circumstances of that case, remarking, "There may be one course of conduct in respect of each agreement associated with the relevant term in each of many agreements.": QR Limited v Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (2010) 204 IR 142 at 163 [48] per Keane CJ and Marshall J (Gray J agreeing). The contraventions by the respondents in that case affected 10,300 employees. Had the application of s 557(1) promoted by the CFMEU in this case been adopted in the Queensland Rail Case, the conclusion would have been that there were 10,300 contraventions.
65 In reaching my conclusion as to the operation of s 557(1) in the circumstances of the Queensland Rail Case, I gained assistance, as I do again in the present case, from the relevant explanatory memorandum. At [2189] and [2190] of the Explanatory Memorandum, the following examples are given as to how it was envisaged that s 557(1) would operate:
2189 For example, if a company contravenes a single term of a modern award in respect of ten employees, these ten contraventions are taken to be a single contravention. This means that the maximum penalty that the Court can impose for the contravention is 300 penalty units.
2190 Similarly, if a company contravenes five separate terms on a modern award in respect of ten employees, these 50 contraventions are taken to be five contraventions. This means that the maximum penalty that the Court can impose is five times a maximum penalty of 300 penalty units.
The first of these examples is apposite in the circumstances of this case.
66 In Fair Work Ombudsman v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 408 Buchanan J adopted a like approach to characterisation of conduct to that which I had adopted in the Queensland Rail Case. The case before Buchanan J concerned not contraventions of the Act and an enterprise agreement but rather of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (the WR Act) and an award (the Federal Meat Industry (Processing) Award 2000). The Rocky Holdings Case confirms that s 557(1) operates in a like way to its earlier analogue, s 719(2) of the WR Act. The circumstances were that ten employees had not been provided with the required notice of termination of employment, ten employees had not been paid severance pay as required and eight employees had not been paid accrued annual leave on termination of employment as required. Buchanan J rejected a submission that the effect of s 719(2) was that there were 28 contraventions, instead concluding that there were three. His Honour remarked, at [2]:
On one view, the failure to make any of the required payments arose from a single course of conduct. They all arose from a determination by the respondents that no payment would be made upon the termination of employment of any of the employees, or the employees as a group. However, this approach gives insufficient attention to the separate legal character of the three forms of obligation earlier identified. I am satisfied that each of those forms of obligation requires separate recognition. I am not, however, satisfied that each individual example of defiance of an obligation is permitted separate recognition. In my view the individual examples, constituted by the failure to make payments to particular individual employees, arise out of a course of conduct in each of the three instances.
67 In this case, there was but one strategic decision which was that one term, cl 13.7, meant that its employees had no more than an entitlement to paid personal leave as specified in the National Employment Standards. There was a resultant determination to implement that decision concerning that one term in individual cases of which six are offered by the present proceedings. Those six individual cases offer what are but examples which arise out of a single course of conduct in respect of one term of the enterprise agreement.
68 It follows that, in the circumstances of this case, the multiple failures by the company to afford access to paid sick leave are, by virtue of s 557(1) of the Act, taken to constitute not six contraventions but rather only one contravention.
69 What ought to be the penalty in respect of that deemed single contravention?
70 The penalty, as specified in s 539 of the Act, is 60 penalty units. For an individual, that specification is the maximum penalty: s 546(2)(a); for a body corporate such as the company the maximum is five times that specification, in other words, 300 penalty units: s 546(2)(b) of the Act. The amount of a penalty unit is specified in s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). The applicable specification is determined by the date of the contravening conduct: Murrihy v Betezy.com.au Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 221 FCR 118 at 121-127 [6]-[28]. At the time when the company embarked in December 2013 on what is taken by s 557 of the Act to be a single course of conduct, the effect of s 4AA of the Crimes Act 1914 was that the amount of a penalty unit was $170. Thus, expressed in dollar terms, the maximum penalty in this case is $51,000.
71 It was common ground between the parties that this was not a case warranting the imposition of the maximum penalty. I agree. Indeed, to take a contrary view would be inconsistent with the approach of the Full Court in the appeal in the Queensland Rail Case.
72 In Plancor Pty Ltd v Liquor Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union (2008) 171 FCR 357 (Plancor v LHMU), Branson and Lander JJ (at 375 [57]) referred with approval to a collation of considerations gathered by Mowbray FM in Mason v Harrington Corporation Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 7, derived from earlier judgments of this Court and described by Tracey J in Kelly v Fitzpatrick [2007] FCA 1080; (2007) 166 IR 14 as "potentially relevant and applicable" in cases entailing a need to consider the imposition of pecuniary penalties in cases such as the present. Also in Plancor v LHMU and with respect to such collations, Branson and Lander JJ particularly emphasised an observation made by Buchanan J in Australian Ophthalmic Suppliers v McAlary-Smith (2008) 165 FCR 560 at 580 [91] with respect to the need to avoid transforming these considerations into "a rigid catalogue of matters for attention". As Buchanan J further observed in that case, "At the end of the day the task of the Court is to fix a penalty which pays appropriate regard to the circumstances in which the contraventions have occurred and the need to sustain public confidence in the statutory regime which imposes the obligations".
73 More recently, in Commonwealth v Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate (2015) 90 ALJR 113, French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ observed, at 127 [55], in respect of civil penalty regimes compared with the criminal law:
No less importantly, whereas criminal penalties import notions of retribution and rehabilitation, the purpose of a civil penalty, as French J explained in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd, is primarily if not wholly protective in promoting the public interest in compliance:
"Punishment for breaches of the criminal law traditionally involves three elements: deterrence, both general and individual, retribution and rehabilitation. Neither retribution nor rehabilitation, within the sense of the Old and New Testament moralities that imbue much of our criminal law, have any part to play in economic regulation of the kind contemplated by Pt IV [of the Trade Practices Act]. ... The principal, and I think probably the only, object of the penalties imposed by s 76 is to attempt to put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravenor and by others who might be tempted to contravene the Act."
[Footnote reference omitted]
74 Though the object of civil penalties is "to attempt to put a price on contravention", it is necessary to remember that the maximum price is fixed by parliament. It would be quite wrong, in imposing penalty, for a court to fix a penalty higher than that counselled by such of the considerations collated in Mason v Harrington Corporation Pty Ltd [2007] FMCA 7 as were applicable to the circumstances of a particular case on the basis that the resultant "price" was inadequate because of a failure by parliament to adjust the maximum for the effects of inflation. One must in a case like the present make a penalisation value judgment within the limit parliament has chosen to fix.
75 The company chose not to lead any evidence as to what prompted the review of sick leave entitlements referred to in the letters sent to the workers between 3 December 2013 and 31 March 2014. As the Full Court's judgment reveals, there has been longstanding like provisions to cl 13.7 in earlier agreements applicable at the Hail Creek mine. The entitlements are more generous than those otherwise enjoyed under more generally applicable industrial regulation (as mentioned in my earlier judgment). From this one might infer, and I do, that the review was prompted by a desire on the part of the company to reduce, if lawfully possible, its overall labour costs.
76 The entitlement to paid sick leave conferred by cl 13.7 is part of the price that the company has, by the enterprise agreement, agreed to pay to attract and keep labour to and at its mine. The contravention of that agreement has not been victimless. Each of the workers and, indirectly where they have them, their dependents has been affected. The effects have not just been financial insofar as leave has been unpaid. Inferentially, there must have been an associated emotional impact on each of the workers by the disturbance of their hitherto understanding and experience of paid sick leave entitlements at the mine. In some cases, workers whose illness or effects of injury would otherwise reasonably have moved them to access paid sick leave have felt compelled to attend at work notwithstanding their condition. In other cases, the separate entitlement to annual leave has been reduced in order that an income stream be maintained while ill or suffering from the effects of injury.
77 To reduce an annual leave entitlement is to reduce a worker's enjoyment of the amenities of life away from the workplace and the greater opportunity for the related society of friends and family. That annual leave entitlement forms part of the balance between recreation and labour for which provision is made in the Enterprise Agreement. As to that balance, it is now almost two centuries since the English socialist, Robert Owen, promoted, in 1817, the ideal that workers should enjoy, "8 Hours Work, 8 Hours Recreation, 8 Hours Rest" ("888"), an ideal taken up in Australia in 1856 when, on April 21, Victorian Stonemasons downed tools at the construction site of the Old Quadrangle Building, the original site of Melbourne University and marched on parliament in support of that ideal (see: "Eight Hour Day Monument" Monument Australia: http://monumentaustralia.org.au/themes/culture/social/display/32235-eight-hour-day-monument viewed 17 June 2016). What was once an ideal is now accepted and often the subject of even more generous provision in respect of time for recreation. To recall this history is to highlight that conduct by an employer which diminishes the provision for a worker's recreation struck in an industrial bargain is not to be trivialised.
78 Accepting all this, given the conclusion earlier reached by me on the separate question in this case, I could hardly describe the company's adoption of a different construction of cl 13.7 as idiosyncratic. It is not a case where, knowing the true construction of that clause, the company wilfully set out to contravene it for the purposes of economic advantage.
79 The company has in these proceedings always co-operated in what (at least as was seen at the time) was conducive to their efficient and expeditious resolution. Though that is a form of co-operation in the administration of justice, it is not of a kind that, as a matter of sentencing principle, resonates in a discounting of a penalty otherwise applicable as does an acknowledgement of a contravention at the earliest available opportunity.
80 Even after having the benefit of the Full Court's construction of cl 13.7, the company maintained its stance that there was no resultant contravention in light of its submitted construction of cl 7.6 and asserted payment of hitherto unpaid sick leave or, as the case may be, re-crediting of hitherto appropriated annual leave. Of course it was always for the CFMEU to prove in law and in fact the asserted contraventions but the basis upon which a defence was maintained was, as I have observed above, contrary to business common sense. In these circumstances, any payments of the hitherto unpaid sick leave and any re-crediting of hitherto appropriated annual leave are not truly indicative either of insight or remorse, as opposed to the laying of a foundation for a perceived but unmeritorious defence. That the company chose to continue to deny any contravention was its right. That it chose to exercise this right is, most certainly, not, in itself, an aggravating factor in relation to penalty. It is just a case where there is neither evidenced apology based on insight derived from having had the benefit of the Full Court's judgment nor remorse.
81 Related to a lack of insight is that, even after the Full Court delivered its judgment in October last year and as recently as May this year, the company continued, on occasion, to deny particular workers access to paid sick leave, contrary to the construction of cl 13.7 determined by the Full Court.
82 Within the limit fixed by parliament, these factors to me bespeak a need to recognise deterrence both specific to the company and more generally in the imposition of a penalty. That is so even though the company has not hitherto been penalised. The company submitted that it was unlikely to re-offend. In relation to paid sick leave and given the rejection now of its cl 7.6 based defence, I am prepared to and do accept this but its promotion of a construction of cl 7.6 contrary to business common sense is of concern. Relative to the maximum, the penalty ought to be at a level which reflects an absence of remorse in relation to the consequential effects at the time, financial and otherwise, of denying access to paid sick leave.
83 No comparable penalty cases were cited by either party in submissions from which a range might be determined. The CFMEU did submit that the case was one which one might describe as within a "low to medium" range, suggesting in so doing that this would be recognised by a penalty in the order of 40 per cent of the maximum. Were this just, as the company put it, a case of misinterpretation, I should have been inclined to accept the union's suggestion as to how in percentage of maximum terms the contravening conduct might be recognised in a penalty. To me, the manifested, subsequent absence of insight or remorse once the misinterpretation was exposed by the Full Court suggests that the penalty ought to be somewhat higher.
84 When all is said and done, what is called for is a discretionary value judgment, not the application of a mathematical formula. In my view, the penalty necessary to maintain public confidence in adherence to the requirement to observe the terms of an enterprise agreement is, in the circumstances of the present case, $24,000.
85 The parties were agreed that it was appropriate, in the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 546(3) of the Act, to order that this penalty be paid to the CFMEU. That is the usual way in which, in a case like this, that discretion is exercised: Sayed v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2016] FCAFC 4. In that case, at [117], the Full Court observed:
It is as clear today, as it was in 1904, that unions will not always, or invariably, be the prosecutor in an enforcement proceeding under industrial legislation. Yet the principle adopted by the primary judge would have the effect of stultifying civil penalty proceedings by persons affected by a contravention who are not backed by industrial power of one sort or another.
It may be doubted whether, without the "industrial power" of their union, any of the workers in this case would have been able to afford to institute the civil penalty proceedings, let alone prosecute them to intermediate appellate level in order to vindicate an apprehended right and seek the penalisation in respect of its denial. Parliament has recognised that an industrial organisation such as the CFMEU has a legitimate role in securing compliance with the statutory obligation to observe the terms of an enterprise agreement by conferring standing upon such an organisation to institute a proceeding such as the present. In Construction Forestry Mining and Energy Union v North Goonyella Coal Mine Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1444, I had occasion to recall the history of trade unionism. Like that case, the present is an example of how in modern times a trade union may continue to serve both the public interest and the interests of its members. Given that, amongst other members of the Court, I have had occasion to be censorious of other behaviours of the CFMEU and certain of its officers (in my case, see: Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Cradden [2015] FCA 614) it is only fair to acknowledge that there is another side to this union. To order that the penalty be paid to the union is to recognise how that other side has served a public interest, as well as the interests of the six worker members.
86 There is also agreement between the parties that the company should be allowed one month within which to pay the penalty.
87 The CFMEU has also sought declaratory relief related to the findings of contraventions. The company questioned whether, in light of the making of payment in respect of hitherto unpaid sick leave and the re-crediting of hitherto appropriated annual leave the granting of such relief was warranted. Even assuming that these actions were evidenced, this is not a case where the underlying dispute has settled, as the promotion of the cl 7.6 based defence evidenced. Having regard to the discussion of principle by the Full Court in Cruse v Multiplex Ltd (2008) 172 FCR 279 at 296-299 [50] - [55], this is a case where it is appropriate to grant declaratory relief.
88 There will be orders accordingly.
I certify that the preceding eighty-eight (88) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Logan.