Condon v Commissioner of Taxation

13 October 2023 In paragraph 29 the word "as" has been inserted after the words "referred to" in the last sentence.

BETWEEN: CHRISTOPHER GERARD CONDON Appellant

AND: COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION Respondent

order made by: DERRINGTON J DATE OF ORDER: 2 June 2023

1. In appeal QUD 42 of 2021: (a) the appeal be dismissed; (b) the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
2. In appeal QUD 43 of 2021: (a) the appeal be dismissed; (b) the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
3. In appeal QUD 44 of 2021: (a) the appeal be dismissed; (b) the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
4. In appeal QUD 45 of 2021: (a) the appeal be dismissed; (b) the appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Introduction 1 In these proceedings, Mr Christopher Condon appeals, pursuant to s 14ZZ(1)(a)(ii) of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (TAA), from four Objection Decisions made by the Commissioner of Taxation (the Commissioner). Those decisions concerned his objections to default and Amended Assessments made pursuant to s 167 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA36) in respect of the income years ended 30 June 2015, 30 June 2016, 30 June 2017 and 30 June 2018 (the Relevant Years). Each of the assessments had been made using the "asset betterment method". 2 The Commissioner allowed Mr Condon's objections in part and determined that alterations ought to be made to reduce his taxable income, as set out in the original assessments. However, the objections were otherwise refused, such that the assessment remained to the effect that he had understated his assessable income in each of the Relevant Years. 3 In this Court, he contended that the Commissioner's assessments of his taxable income for each of the Relevant Years was excessive. He submitted that he had proved his actual taxable income for those years and had provided a reasonable explanation for any income or appearance of the possession of assets in those years that had previously been unexplained. He asked the Court to set aside or vary each of the Commissioner's Objection Decisions. 4 Conversely, the Commissioner submitted that Mr Condon had failed to furnish sufficient evidence to discharge his onus of proving that the assessment for any of the Relevant Years was excessive or otherwise incorrect, and what the assessments should have been, as required by s 14ZZO of the TAA. The Commissioner sought orders that the appeals against each of the Objection Decisions be dismissed. 5 For the reasons that follow, Mr Condon has failed to establish what his actual taxable income was for each of the Relevant Years, and that the Commissioner's assessments were excessive. In very general terms, that conclusion is based on the following matters. First, his challenge to the assessments appears to have been diverted at an early stage of the objection process to focus on the correctness of the Commissioner's asset betterment statements for each Relevant Year. That focus was forensically inappropriate. While efforts were made to correct that, it meant ultimately that the necessary attention was not devoted to the proper issues on an appeal of this nature, as derived from the text of s 14ZZO of the TAA, such that the evidence adduced in the proceedings fell short of that which was actually required by that section. Secondly, Mr Condon's financial affairs were characterised by the regular use of cash where possible, the absence of written records of transactions, and even the absence of any correspondence referring to transactions. It followed that, in order to prove his assessable income in each of the Relevant Years, his testimony as to his affairs needed to be accepted. That became impossible once it was concluded that he was neither a reliable nor credible witness. Thirdly, he was unable to establish that expenditure or receipts by him across the Relevant Years in relation to alleged gambling, the buying and selling of motor vehicles, the receipts of so-called reimbursements from his employer, money received from a former partner and her daughter, and foreign currency transactions were not, or were not reflective of, assessable income. Fourthly, none of the Relevant Years was exceptional in any of these respects. When each was considered, the same conclusion as to the sufficiency of the evidence emerged. Fifthly, even if Mr Condon's credit was put to one side, to a very real degree the evidence that was adduced was overly general, inconsistent and confusing. That also would have prevented any conclusion that he had discharged his onus in respect of each of the Relevant Years.

Background 6 Mr Condon claimed that, over the course of the Relevant Years, he earned $453,481 in net salary and wage income (net of pay-as-you-go withholding tax and superannuation) from his employer, the Townsville Pastoral Agricultural & Industrial Association (the TPAIA). 7 For each of those years, he lodged an income tax return reporting his primary source of income as being the salary and wages he received. The parties agreed that his income from that organisation was as follows: Income year Date lodged Salary & wages Interest Deductions Tax on taxable income 2015 1 November 2016 $153,932 Nil Nil $48,010 2016 1 November 2016 $170,982 Nil Nil $55,175 2017 11 September 2019 $163,480 Nil $3,300 $51,575 2018 25 August 2018 $170,507 $3,887 $185 $54,362

8 Subject to the addition of capital gains from the sale of certain properties in the United States, the above table represented Mr Condon's position as to what was his actual taxable income for the Relevant Years.

The Commissioner's audit and default assessments 9 On 19 May 2020, the Commissioner assessed Mr Condon for each of the Relevant Years pursuant to s 167 of the ITAA36 and issued default assessments for all four years (the Amended Assessments). For each year, he formed the opinion of evasion, identifying in the income tax returns furnished by Mr Condon an avoidance of tax resulting in a shortfall. In preparing the Amended Assessments, the Commissioner applied the asset betterment methodology to determine Mr Condon's tax liability. 10 The details of the Amended Assessments are set out in the following table: Year ended Date notice of amended assessment issued Taxable income assessed (default) Tax on taxable income 30 June 2015 19 May 2020 $367,955 $139,126.75 30 June 2016 19 May 2020 $599,264 $243,215.80 30 June 2017 19 May 2020 $466,424 $183,122.80 30 June 2018 19 May 2020 $1,877,816 $818,249.20

Mr Condon's objections 11 On or around 17 July 2020, Mr Condon lodged objections to the Amended Assessments. On 23 December 2020, the Commissioner issued his Objection Decisions, allowing in part the objections for each of the Relevant Years. 12 On 25 February 2021, he issued notices of (further) amended assessment to Mr Condon for each of the Relevant Years (the Further Amended Assessments). The details of those Further Amended Assessments can be summarised as follows: Year ended Date notice of amended assessment issued Taxable income assessed (default) Tax on taxable income 30 June 2015 25 February 2021 $252,810 $87,311.50 30 June 2016 25 February 2021 $584,156 $236,417.20 30 June 2017 25 February 2021 $456,036 $178,448.20 30 June 2018 25 February 2021 $1,545,821 $668,851.45

13 More specifically, in the Objection Decisions, the Commissioner accepted that Mr Condon's taxable income was to be reduced by the following amounts, which were referable to identified non-assessable sources: (a) In respect of the 2015 year: (i) $4,820 in gambling winnings; (ii) $9,639.28 in credit card reimbursements from his employer; (iii) $16.80 in respect of an understatement of the balance of his Citibank account 431167154; (iv) $24,700 for incorrect "unexplained deposits"; and (v) $75,978.44 for transfers between Mr Condon's own accounts; (b) In respect of the 2016 year: (i) $4,000 for a transfer between Mr Condon's own accounts; and (ii) $11,107.96 in reimbursements from his employer; (c) In respect of the 2017 year: (i) $28,792.38 in reimbursements from his employer; and (d) In respect of the 2018 year: (i) $23,079 in gambling winnings; (ii) $150,000 which was withdrawn to purchase US currency; (iii) $1,898.60 interest on estate funds; (iv) $1,988.91 interest on estate funds; (v) $132,416 for distribution to beneficiaries; (vi) $14,328.77 in reimbursements from his employer; (vii) $26,000.42 for withdrawals and deposits into Mr Condon's own accounts; and (viii) $37,500 which was deposited from Mr Condon's Sportsbet account. 14 The Further Amended Assessments decreased Mr Condon's taxable income, but continued to recognise understatements. Across the Relevant Years, the further amended taxable income and the corresponding understatements were as follows: (a) for the 2015 income year, taxable income of $252,810, reflecting an alleged understatement of $98,878; (b) for the 2016 income year, taxable income of $584,156, reflecting an alleged understatement of $413,174; (c) for the 2017 income year, taxable income of $456,036, reflecting an alleged understatement of $292,556; and (d) for the 2018 income year, taxable income of $1,545,821, reflecting an alleged understatement of $1,375,314. 15 On 15 February 2021, Mr Condon filed a notice of appeal in this Court in respect of each of the Objection Decisions.

The appellant 16 As at the time of trial, Mr Condon was a 59 year old individual taxpayer who lived in Townsville, Queensland. He deposed that he has worked for the TPAIA since mid-2003 and currently held the position of Manager. He has no spouse, children or dependants, which he said is part of the reason for his ability to accumulate substantial wealth. He also claimed to have had no major expenses or liabilities other than credit card balances, his overdraft facility and certain funds that he allegedly held for other people. His ordinary living expenses were said to be modest as he lived at his mother's house where he was not required to pay rent, and his employer paid for his fuel and phone. His living expenses were limited to food and general discretionary spending on travel and entertainment. 17 Mr Condon deposed that he has been earning income since he was 15 years old, and he claimed to have accumulated wealth during his lifetime through, variously, his conduct of business enterprises until about 1995, his past work as a stevedore, and his work in several roles at the TPAIA. Throughout his 44 years of working, he claimed to have earned in excess of $2,000,000 in (net) salary and wage income. He deposed that he has had a gross salary in excess of $100,000 per annum from the TPAIA since 2008. He also claimed that he occasionally bet on boxing fights, as well as other sports and politics. He further sought to explain his wealth by reference to a gift of $75,000 from his father to assist him, through his company Bad Boys Enterprises Pty Ltd (Bad Boys), to purchase a property at 66 Ingham Road, West End 4810, in Townsville (66 Ingham Road). He also referred to an alleged gift of USD200,000 received from his close personal friend, Mr Brian Bowen. In addition, he claimed that he had been injured in a motor vehicle accident and, in 2006, received a lump sum payment of $50,000 for those injuries which amounted to $43,625.32 after legal fees. Finally, he said that he had accumulated wealth over time by investing in United States currency, collecting and selling motor vehicles, and buying and selling real property.

Agreed and disputed facts 18 During the course of these proceedings, Mr Condon and the Commissioner reached agreement on a substantial number of relevant facts. They were also able to identify certain disputed facts. These matters were set out in a joint Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts dated 18 October 2021. Although the form of that document was somewhat cumbersome, it is necessary, in order to understand precisely what was and was not agreed, to replicate its substance essentially in its entirety, making only minor changes to formatting and corrections to obvious errors. The addendum to these reasons sets out those facts, which include certain drafting irregularities from within the original text of the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts. Some additional remarks are made in parentheses.

Issues to be determined 19 In Mr Condon's written submissions, the issues requiring determination in the four appeals were identified, being whether his taxable income in the Relevant Years was as he had asserted; namely, $153,932, $170,982, $178,584 and $228,034 respectively; and whether in each income year it was less than that assessed by the Commissioner.

Relevant legislation and legal principles 20 Section 166 of the ITAA36 concerns assessments made by the Commissioner in the ordinary course. It requires him to assess the taxable income of any taxpayer, and the amount of tax payable thereon. Specifically, it provides: 166 Assessment From the returns, and from any other information in the Commissioner's possession, or from any one or more of these sources, the Commissioner must make an assessment of: (a) the amount of the taxable income (or that there is no taxable income) of any taxpayer; and (b) the amount of the tax payable thereon (or that no tax is payable); and (c) the total of the taxpayer's tax offset refunds (or that the taxpayer can get no such refunds). 21 By contrast, s 167 of the ITAA36 empowers the Commissioner to make a default assessment in certain circumstances. It provides: 167 Default assessment If: (a) any person makes default in finishing a return; or (b) the Commissioner is not satisfied with the return furnished by any person; or (c) the Commissioner has reason to believe that any person who has not furnished a return has derived taxable income; the Commissioner may make an assessment of the amount upon which in his or her judgment income tax ought to be levied, and that amount shall be the taxable income of that person for the purpose of section 166. 22 The general legal principles relating to ss 166 and 167, and to the discharge of the onus of proof when an assessment is challenged, were set out in Commissioner of Taxation v Ross (2021) 174 ALD 77 (Ross). In light of the submissions made to this Court, it is necessary and appropriate to repeat much of that discussion. 23 Section 166 of the ITAA36 requires, unequivocally, an evidence-based calculation of a person's taxable income, the tax payable thereon, and any tax offset refunds. By contrast, s 167 of the ITAA36 authorises the Commissioner to form a judgment as to the amount on which tax ought to be levied, once one of the matters in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c), on which the power is conditioned, is satisfied. Broadly speaking, the substance of those matters is that, in the circumstances, the Commissioner is unable to make an accurate assessment in accordance with s 166. 24 If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with an assessment, they may object to it in accordance with Part IVC of the TAA: s 175A ITAA36. If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the Commissioner's decision in relation to their objection, they may apply to the Tribunal for review of that decision or appeal against it to this Court: s 14ZZ TAA. 25 The onus to be satisfied by a taxpayer on an appeal to this Court is identified in s 14ZZO of the TAA in the following terms: 14ZZO Grounds of objection and burden of proof In proceedings on an appeal under section 14ZZ to a court against an objection decision: (a) the appellant is, unless the court orders otherwise, limited to the grounds stated in the taxation objection to which the decision relates; and (b) the appellant has the burden of proving: (i) if the taxation decision concerned is an assessment - that the assessment is excessive or otherwise incorrect and what the assessment should have been; or (ii) in any other case - that the taxation decision should not have been made or should have been made differently.

The onus of proof 26 The effect of s 14ZZO(b)(i) is that the taxpayer bears the onus of establishing both that the assessment is "excessive" and, also, what the assessment should have been to make it right, or "more nearly right": Trautwein v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1936) 56 CLR 63 (Trautwein) at 88 per Latham CJ; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco (1990) 168 CLR 614 (Dalco) at 623 - 625 per Brennan J and at 632 - 634 per Toohey J; Gashi v Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 209 FCR 301 (Gashi) at 314 - 315 [61] - [67] per Bennett, Edmonds and Gordon JJ. 27 Though the overarching principles concerning the onus might be succinctly stated, questions still arise as to its application in the context of a challenge to a default assessment, particularly one founded upon the "asset betterment method". As observed in Ross at 88 - 90 [48], the authorities establish the following general principles: (a) An assessment under s 166 is fundamentally different from one under s 167 and, necessarily, the manner in which they each might be challenged is also fundamentally different: Gashi at 314 - 315 [61] - [67]; Rigoli v Commissioner of Taxation (2014) 141 ALD 529 (Rigoli) at 533 [12] per Edmonds, Jessup and McKerracher JJ. (b) The assessment by the "asset betterment method" is a legitimate form of assessment: Trautwein at 86 - 87, 99 - 100 and 105: even though it necessarily involves an amount of guesswork and, whilst almost certainly inaccurate to some extent, it is no part of the Commissioner's duty to establish what judgment he has formed in making a s 167 assessment: Gashi at 313 [55]; George v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1952) 86 CLR 183 (George) at 204 per Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Williams, Webb and Fullagar JJ. Clearly enough, any inaccuracy follows from the circumstances which impel the Commissioner to make a default assessment, being that a process of calculating assessable income less deductions is not possible: Rigoli at 533 [12]. (c) It is not part of a review of an Objection Decision concerning an assessment under s 167 to seek to identify the facts that the Commissioner adopted for the purpose of making it and whether those facts disclose a taxable income: Gashi at 313 [55]; George at 204. The principal fact that the Commissioner is required to determine in making an assessment pursuant to s 167 is "the amount of income upon which … income tax ought to be levied": Gashi at 313 [56]. (d) It is insufficient to discharge the burden under s 14ZZO(b)(i) in relation to an assessment under s 167, whether based on the asset betterment method or otherwise, merely to demonstrate that the Commissioner formed a judgment about the taxpayer's taxable income on a wrong basis and that the amount assessed far exceeded the taxpayer's taxable income: Gashi at 314 [62]; Rigoli at 533 [12]. (e) In order to establish that an assessment under s 167 is excessive, a taxpayer must positively prove their "actual taxable income" and, in doing so, must demonstrate that the amount of tax levied by the assessment exceeds their actual substantive liability: Gashi at 315 [63]; Dalco at 623 - 625; Trautwein at 88; Ma v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 37 FCR 225 (Ma) at 230 per Burchett J: by, in effect, furnishing a return of actual income which involves establishing both sides of the equation: Bosanac v Commissioner of Taxation (2019) 267 FCR 169 (Bosanac (FC)) at 182 [57] per Greenwood, Burley and Colvin JJ. (f) In the context of a s 167 assessment based on the asset betterment method, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the identified unexplained accumulated wealth was derived from non-income sources, and that may be achieved by an accepted denial of any undisclosed source of income, a provision of acceptable evidence of how the taxpayer spends their time, and the demonstration of a reasonable explanation for any appearance of the possession of assets: Ma at 230; Gashi at 315 [64] - [65]. The taxpayer must account for the unexplained increase in assets by explaining the source of those assets and identifying that those sources are not taxable. "[I]f the disclosed 'actual' taxable income does not explain the increase in assets, then the taxpayer is unlikely to have discharged the burden of establishing the assessment is excessive": Gashi at 315 [65]. (g) It is insufficient for a taxpayer to prove that an item in the Commissioner's asset betterment statement was wrong or should not have been included: Gashi at 315 [63] - [67]; Rigoli at 533 [12]: if they do not also satisfactorily explain the source or sources for the other unexplained wealth, in particular by showing that it was derived from non-income sources, then the onus under s 14ZZO(b)(i) will remain unsatisfied: Gashi at 315 [66]. A deficiency in proof of the excessiveness of the assessment results in the challenge failing: Dalco at 624 - 626. Necessarily, this prevents a successful challenge to an assessment being made by a process of "picking and choosing" parts of the increased wealth relied upon by the Commissioner and attacking them as having been improperly included as part of the taxpayer's taxable income: Gashi at 315 [66]; Rigoli at 537 [25]. A process that involves attacking elements of the Commissioner's calculation or underlying factual conclusions is insufficient: Rigoli at 537 [25]. The same is true for a default assessment not based on the asset betterment method: Rigoli at 533 [12]. (h) The application of these principles lead to a situation in which a default assessment is assumed to be inaccurate in some respects but nevertheless stands on account of the taxpayer's failure to establish what their actual taxable income was: Gashi at 318 [77] - [79]; Woellner and Zetler, 'Satisfying The Taxpayer's Burden Of Proof In Challenging A Default Assessment - The Modern Labours Of Sisyphus?' [2014] 7 Journal of the Australasian Law Teachers Association 11. (i) The ultimate question in Part IVC proceedings relating to an assessment made under s 167 is whether the amount of the assessment is excessive. That places no burden on the Commissioner to show that the assessments were correctly made: Dalco at 623 - 624. The manner in which the taxpayer can discharge the burden may vary with the circumstances of the case: Gashi at 315 [63]; Dalco at 624: but, "absent agreement with the Commissioner to confine the issues for determination in a Pt IVC proceeding, the Commissioner is entitled to rely upon any deficiency in the taxpayer's proof of the excessiveness of the amount assessed in seeking to uphold the assessment": Gashi at 314 [61]; see also Dalco at 624. 28 It is worth reiterating that the rationale for the onus imposed by s 14ZZO(b)(i) is that the facts relating to a taxpayer's taxable income, including the work that they have undertaken and the transactions that they have entered into, are peculiarly within the taxpayer's knowledge, and they must be taken to know what their income is and how it was derived: Trautwein at 87. Conversely, the Commissioner has limited knowledge of those circumstances. On that basis, there is no undue harshness in requiring a taxpayer, who has failed to lodge a return or whose return is not compliant with the taxation legislation, to bear the onus of establishing their true taxable income for each relevant income year: Ross at 87 [46]. 29 Ms Chen, Counsel for Mr Condon, asserted that there was no difference between the parties as to the characterisation of the onus borne by a taxpayer when seeking to appeal an Objection Decision in relation to an assessment under s 167. That was a slightly unusual submission, given that, in paragraph 22 of Mr Condon's written final submissions dated 3 January 2023, it was suggested that all that remained in issue in this case was those amounts that constituted the difference between the amount of the Commissioner's assessment and the amount of assessable income asserted by Mr Condon, less the amounts that the Commissioner had now conceded. Characterising the issue in this way impliedly suggested that a taxpayer might succeed on an appeal to the extent that she or he could establish that certain discrete amounts included in an assessment were not reflective of assessable income. That suggestion is contrary to the principles set out above, which indicate that either the taxpayer is able to establish what their assessable income is or else the appeal fails. This is sometimes referred to as the "all or nothing" approach.

The "all or nothing" approach 30 Mr Condon's submission that, in attempting to satisfy the onus, he was not confined by the "all or nothing" approach was based on the Full Court's decision in Haritos v Commissioner of Taxation (2015) 233 FCR 315 (Haritos). There, the Court held at 392 [235] - [236], albeit observing that it was not necessary to decide the point, as follows: [235] The third way in which the appellants put their argument that the Tribunal had misused the burden of proof section is related to the second. The appellants submitted that even if Mr Haritos' evidence was correctly rejected, they had nevertheless established subcontractor expenses of at least a certain amount. The Tribunal was not entitled to adopt what the appellants described as an "all or nothing" approach. If an "at least" figure was established on the evidence, then the Tribunal should have made a finding in accordance with that evidence. [236] We think that proposition is correct. If a taxpayer claims his or her expenses were $10, but fails to prove that fact because their evidence is rejected, this does not prevent the Tribunal from finding that the expenses were $5 where there is other satisfactory evidence establishing expenses of at least that amount. In our opinion, the burden of proof section does not dictate a different conclusion. 31 Reliance was also placed on the decision in Le v Commissioner of Taxation (2021) 390 ALR 132 (Le) at 146 [54] in support of the proposition that a taxpayer was entitled to succeed on an appeal under s 14ZZO even if they could only establish that the Commissioner had incorrectly relied upon certain transactions specified in the asset betterment statement, and could not dispel the effect of all of the transactions to which the Commissioner referred. In effect, it was submitted that Mr Condon could "chip away" at the transactions referred to in the asset betterment statement and succeed to the extent that particular items in it were negated. Justice Logan in Le had said, at 146 [54] and 147 [56]: [54] The observations made by the Full Court in Haritos offer, with respect, elucidation about the operation of the statutory onus of proof in practice. If the material before, and accepted by, the Tribunal shows that the assessment is excessive in a particular amount, it is nothing to the point that an applicant contends that it is excessive to an even greater extent. Section 14ZZK does not have the effect that, because that contention fails, the applicant has not shown the assessment to be excessive or, related to that, that the Tribunal is thereby relieved from concluding, based on the material it has accepted, that the assessment is excessive to the extent revealed by that material. … [56] … [If] the applicant introduces evidence, which is accepted and which shows that the assessment is wrong by a particular amount, then that applicant will have discharged the statutory onus of proof. 32 The Commissioner took issue with Mr Condon's characterisation of the issues to be determined by this Court. He submitted that the issues to be determined were, in relation to each of the Relevant Years: (a) whether Mr Condon's actual taxable income was the amount he contended for; and (b) only if the answer to (a) is yes, whether that figure is less than the amount assessed by the Commissioner, such that the Commissioner's amount is therefore excessive. 33 So the submission went, if Mr Condon failed at the stage of the first enquiry, he would be unable to discharge his onus of proving that the default assessments were excessive. This was said to be supported by Ross at 94 [63] where it was stated that: What is in issue is whether the taxpayer is able to establish both what their actual taxable income was and that it was less than the Commissioner's assessment (which gives rise to the conclusion that the latter is excessive). 34 The Commissioner submitted that, "the better view on the authorities is that it is insufficient for Mr Condon to prove that some items should have been excluded from the assessment as non-taxable income; he must prove that his taxable income is limited to the amount he alleges, which as a matter of practicality, means he must prove that all other amounts are not taxable income".

Mr Condon's reliance on Haritos is misplaced 35 There are several reasons why Mr Condon's reliance on Haritos is misplaced. 36 First, the Full Court's observations in Haritos were obiter. This is pellucid from paragraph [229] of the judgment, where it stated that it was strictly unnecessary to address the question of whether the Tribunal misconstrued the burden of proof in s 14ZZK. It was only in deference to the parties' detailed submissions that the Full Court considered it appropriate to address the issue, assuming for the sake of argument that it was wrong to hold that the Tribunal's decision was irrational and illogical. 37 Secondly, as stated in Ross at 94 [63], the Full Court's observations in Haritos "should not be accepted in relation to circumstances where the Commissioner has made a default assessment based on the asset betterment method and the taxpayer is faced with having to establish what their actual income is and that it is less than that assessed by the Commissioner". Earlier (at 92 [57]) it was observed: Mrs Ross submitted that this latter discussion by the Full Court in Haritos [at paragraphs 235 and 236] had the consequence that, in attempting to discharge the burden imposed by s 14ZZK(b)(i) in relation to an assessment made pursuant to s 167, it was sufficient to identify that elements of the Commissioner's assessment were incorrect or partially incorrect and, to the extent error is shown, the taxpayer's taxable income is revealed by the remaining amount. With respect, although the Full Court in Haritos may have intended to overturn the earlier decisions of the Full Court in Gashi, Rigoli and Bosanac (FC) by a side-wind, it is probably unlikely. As the Commissioner submitted, Haritos concerned circumstances where the taxpayers and the Commissioner had reduced the scope of the hearing to a number of particular disputed amounts which, depending upon the manner in which they were resolved, would increase or decrease the amount which the parties had otherwise agreed represented the taxpayers' taxable income. In other words, the underlying circumstances in relation to the taxpayers' taxable income were generally agreed with the remaining disputed items to be determined by the Tribunal, with the results of those determinations altering the otherwise accepted amount of taxable income. Haritos was not a case where, before the Tribunal, the taxpayers' were still required to fully and completely establish the actual amount of their taxable income. Given the context in which the Court was discussing the effect of the taxpayer establishing some portion of its expenses, there is nothing exceptional about its comments at [235] to [236] and no reason to think the Court was departing from the orthodox principles described earlier. (Emphasis added). 38 The Commissioner correctly submitted that the present case is distinguishable from Haritos, in that the parties have not agreed on any specific amount that represents Mr Condon's taxable income subject to the Court's determination as to the character of certain disputed items. Instead, the Commissioner relied on the Further Amended Assessments. His agreement to certain facts in these proceedings did not displace the taxpayer's obligation to discharge the statutory onus. As the Commissioner submitted, it would be an unlikely and unsatisfactory outcome if, in any case where the Commissioner agreed to certain facts to assist in the timely and efficient resolution of the issues in dispute, the appellant would thereby be discharged from their burden to prove their actual taxable income, as required by the TAA. 39 It is worth reiterating the relevant distinction drawn in Ross at 89 - 90 [48(10)]: There may be cases where the amount of taxable income depends upon the legal complexion of known facts or upon specific factual questions. In such a case, a taxpayer may successfully discharge the onus by establishing that the Commissioner included in their taxable income amounts which ought not to have been included: Dalco at 624. However, such a situation would only arise where the Commissioner agrees to a process which is different to that described above by confining the scope of the dispute between him and the taxpayer to certain enumerated amounts. One might expect some clear expression of that agreement, involving as it does an abandonment of the advantages accorded to the Commissioner in s 167 in respect of defaulting taxpayers. 40 In the absence of any such agreement in this case, the Commissioner was correct to submit that Mr Condon's onus required him to identify what was his contended actual taxable income, and to prove that the amount contended for was the full extent of his assessable income. In doing so, he was required to provide acceptable explanations and evidence to the effect that his monetary receipts (other than wages from the TPAIA) and increases in wealth during the Relevant Years were from non-taxable sources. If he was able to do so, and his evidence was accepted, then the onus would be discharged. 41 Thirdly, Haritos was concerned with the statutory obligations of the AAT when conducting a review pursuant to s 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) as modified by s 14ZZJ of the TAA, and the application of the onus of proof set by s 14ZZK. Before this Court, it was submitted that the observations in Haritos applied to an appeal to this Court from a decision of the Commissioner, and the application of the onus set by s 14ZZO. However, there is nothing to suggest any equivalence between the two regimes. 42 Fourthly, the Full Court in Haritos did not go so far as to say that where the evidence before the Tribunal (as per the circumstances of that case) shows that one or more of the disputed receipts of a taxpayer are not income, the Tribunal must necessarily allow the appeal before it. Rather, it was said at paragraph [235] of the Full Court's decision that the Tribunal in that case should have made a "finding" as to the so-called "at least" amount. That is possibly correct, given that, in the discharge of its fact-finding function, it may be appropriate for the Tribunal to make findings as to the extent to which the taxpayer has established the amount of their taxable income. That is arguably one part of ascertaining, in accordance with s 14ZZK, whether the taxpayer has established what their taxable income is, and whether the Commissioner's assessment is excessive. It also may be part of the Tribunal's statutory obligation to make findings on the material questions of fact. However, it is difficult to see how that translates into an obligation to allow an appeal in this Court, applying s 14ZZO, simply because some error by the Commissioner has been shown. 43 Finally, as stated in Ross at 95 [67], there is nothing in either Haritos or Le that alters the principles concerning the operation of s 14ZZK(b)(i) (and s 14ZZO(b)(i)) set out above. It is unlikely that those decisions require a different approach now to be adopted. If they did, they would be inconsistent with the established Full Court authorities previously discussed, and should not be followed: see Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89, 151 - 152 [135], 155 [147].

The decision in Le does not assist Mr Condon 44 The passages in the judgment in Le, on which reliance was placed by Mr Condon, do not assist him. In the first place, notwithstanding the fact that the decision in Haritos seemed to underpin Logan J's decision in Le, for the reasons expressed above, it is not clear that it can properly be understood as capable of doing so. The Full Court was most clearly concerned with the Tribunal's obligations to make findings in relation to contested transactions. In any event, it does not appear that the decision in Le has the effect attributed to it by Mr Condon. There, Logan J postulated a situation in which the assessment in question was shown to be "excessive in a particular amount". In the context of an assessment under s 167 of ITAA36, and the application of the asset betterment method, such a scenario could only realistically arise where the material before the Tribunal had established the amount of the taxpayer's assessable income and demonstrated that other receipts of money or transactions that may have occurred in the relevant years and that might have suggested a greater level of income were adequately explained. That is clearly different from the situation where the taxpayer has failed to satisfy the Tribunal that all of the receipts, and unexplained expenditures or increases in wealth, were not referable to assessable income, such that the taxpayer had failed to establish what their assessable income was. The point being made by Logan J in Le can, in this way, be understood as a practical one, and not an observation as to the proper application of the onus of proof.

The High Court's decision in Bosanac v Commissioner of Taxation 45 Recent support for the "all or nothing" approach can be found in the decision of Nettle J in Bosanac v Commissioner of Taxation (2019) 374 ALR 425 (Bosanac (HC)). That case concerned an application for judicial review of a decision of the Full Court of this Court relating to an assessment by the Commissioner under s 167, in which the asset betterment method had been adopted. In the course of the appeal proceedings, the Commissioner had conceded that the sum of $600,000, which had been received by the taxpayer, was not income. It was submitted that the assessment should be reduced pro tanto. That was rejected by his Honour, who instead held as follows at 434 [24]: But, as the primary judge held, it did not follow that the plaintiff thereby succeeded in establishing that the taxable income for the 2009 year of income was overstated by that [$600,000] or any other amount. As his Honour reasoned, the plaintiff needed to go further than attack the basis on which the Commissioner had issued the Amended Assessments. He needed to lead evidence constituting "a wide survey and an exact scrutiny of [his business] activities" in order to prove positively what his taxable income was in each year. And since that was something that the plaintiff failed to do, the Commissioner's concession as to the $250,000 and $350,000 did not avail him. … (Footnotes omitted). 46 His Honour proceeded to explain that this conclusion was supported by the observations of Brennan J in Dalco at 621 and the decision of the majority of the High Court in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Australia and New Zealand Savings Bank Ltd (1994) 181 CLR 466 at 479. In this respect, Nettle J (at 435 - 436 [28]) approved the observations of Full Court in Bosanac (FC) at 182 [57], as follows: In the case of an assessment under s 167 of the ITAA there is a lump sum assessment of taxable income rather than the computational process under s 166 of the ITAA of considering allowable deductions that may produce the taxable income. So, for example, in the case of an assessment under s 166 it is possible for the taxpayer to accept aspects of the calculations (assuming the Commissioner does not seek to advance a different position on the appeal) and focus upon whether certain deductions should have been allowed. Whereas, in the case where the assessment is made under s 167, the taxpayer will have to demonstrate by evidence both sides of the equation because the assessment involves the exercise of a power to make a lump sum assessment of the taxable income based on the information available to the Commissioner. 47 His Honour compared the usual approach to be adopted upon a challenge to a s 167 assessment, explained in this way, to those occasions where the Commissioner agreed to a different approach that put only discrete amounts in issue, and accepted that the determination of specific questions of fact or law in relation to those amounts would necessitate an alteration to the taxpayer's taxable income one way or the other. That, however, is not the case here. Nor was it suggested to be.

Mr Condon must prove what his income was in the Relevant Years 48 It follows that Mr Condon's submission to the effect that he might "chip away" at the Commissioner's assessments must be rejected. In the context of his appeal from the assessments under s 167, it was instead incumbent on him to prove what his income was in the Relevant Years and that his income, so proved, was less than that assessed by the Commissioner. If he failed in this endeavour, the assessments were to stand.

Reliance on Gashi 49 Both parties made substantial references to the Full Court's decision in Gashi, which also concerned default assessments pursuant to s 167 of the ITAA36, produced by the use of the asset betterment method. There were several grounds of appeal raised by Mr and Mrs Gashi (the taxpayers), but of particular significance were those relating to the use of the asset betterment method. 50 Certain aspects of Mr Gashi's appeal (specifically, ground 4) related to the Commissioner's ability to make assessments under s 167 of the ITAA36. By ground 4(a), Mr Gashi contended that, when the Commissioner ascertained an amount under that section that was, in his judgment, taxable, he was required to go further, and identify the ordinary and charging provisions of the ITAA36 and the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (ITAA97) on which he relied. In other words, it was said that the Commissioner's formation of a judgment under s 167 of the ITAA36, of necessity, involved the formation of a view as to the sources of the income by which the taxpayer's assets were increased, and the taxable character of those sources: Gashi at 311 [47]. It was further submitted that the trial judge had erred in holding that the movement in the value of assets held by Mr Gashi in the relevant years was ordinary income under s 6-5(1) of the ITAA97: Gashi at 311 - 312 [48]. 51 This submission was rejected by the Full Court, which observed that it proceeded upon a misstatement of the trial judge's findings. It held that the "trial judge did not make a finding as to the nature of Mr Gashi's income for each of the relevant years and, in particular, did not hold that the movement in the value of assets held by Mr Gashi in the relevant years was ordinary income within the meaning of s 6-5(1) of the [ITAA97]": Gashi at 312 [49]. It added that it was not the task of the trial judge to make such findings, but to determine whether the taxpayer had discharged their onus under s 14ZZO of proving that the assessments in issue were excessive. 52 Mr Gashi's appeal ground 4(b), that the trial judge should have found that the movement in the value of assets held by him in the relevant years was not ordinary income within the meaning of s 6-5(1) of the ITAA97, was also rejected. The Full Court observed that this ground proceeded upon a misconceived construction of s 167 of the ITAA36, and that an assessment under that section proceeded upon an entirely different footing to one under s 166. First, the Court stated that the asset betterment method, and the resulting assessment, must necessarily be a guess to some extent and would be "almost certainly inaccurate in fact": Trautwein at 87. Secondly, it was "no part of the duty of the commissioner to establish affirmatively what judgment he formed [under s 167 of the ITAA36], much less the grounds of it, and even less still the truth of the facts affording the grounds": Gashi at 313 [55], citing George at 204. Thirdly, Bailey v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 136 CLR 214 (Bailey) did not stand for the "proposition that the process of assessment under s 167 of the [ITAA36] requires the Commissioner to adopt a view of the facts and for those facts to disclose a taxable income. Bailey considered s 166 of the Act, not s 167 of the [ITAA36]": Gashi at 313 [56]. Fourthly, the process of assessment under s 166 of the ITAA36 had "no resemblance or analogy to the process of assessment under s 167 of the [ITAA36]": Gashi at 313 [56]; Bailey at 218 per Barwick CJ. 53 Of greater relevance to the issues in the present case were appeal grounds 6(a) - (b), concerning the principles applicable to the discharge of the burden under s 14ZZO of the TAA. Mr Gashi contended that the trial judge had erred in holding that he had failed to show that the assessments for the relevant years were excessive by demonstrating that the asset betterment statement was wrong. He claimed that he had established that the opening net asset position should have been greater, and that the Commissioner had conceded that certain amounts should not have been included: Gashi at 313 - 314 [59]. He, therefore, claimed that he had proved that the amount assessed as his taxable income in fact exceeded his taxable income, such that he had discharged the burden of showing that the assessments were excessive. 54 On this issue, the Full Court made the following observations at 314 [61], which should firmly be borne in mind by taxpayers in Part IVC proceedings, and which are apt in the present circumstances: In seeking to establish in Pt IVC proceedings that an assessment issued under s 167 is excessive, the ultimate question was and remains whether the amount of each assessment was excessive: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Dalco (1990) 168 CLR 614 at 623. Section 14ZZO of the TAA places the burden of proving each assessment is excessive on the taxpayer: Dalco at 623 citing George at 189. The TAA does not place any onus on the Commissioner to show that the assessments were correctly made: Dalco at 624 citing Gauci v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1975) 135 CLR 81 at 89. Indeed, absent agreement with the Commissioner to confine the issues for determination in a Pt IVC proceeding, the Commissioner is entitled to rely upon any deficiency in the taxpayer's proof of the excessiveness of the amount assessed in seeking to uphold the assessment: Dalco at 624. (Emphasis added). 55 The Court then addressed the question: "What must a taxpayer do to discharge the onus of proving that a s 167 assessment is excessive?". In answer, it made the following pertinent observations, which, in the circumstances of the present matter, should be repeated in full: [63] A taxpayer who seeks to establish that a s 167 assessment based on the asset betterment method of calculation is excessive must positively prove his or her "actual taxable income" and, in doing so, must show that the amount of money for which tax is levied by the assessment exceeds the actual substantive liability of the taxpayer: Dalco at 623-625 and Trautwein at 88. The taxpayer must show that the unexplained accumulated wealth was from non-income sources. The manner in which a taxpayer discharges that burden is not defined or specified - it varies with the circumstances: Dalco at 624. [64] So, for example, in Ma v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 37 FCR 225 at 230, Burchett J said that, in seeking to establish that an assessment under s 167 was excessive, that burden may be discharged: … [I]f a taxpayer denies any undisclosed source of income, provides acceptable evidence of how he spends his time, and demonstrates a reasonable explanation for any appearance of the possession of assets, he will generally discharge his burden of proof unless some positive reason is shown why he is to be disbelieved. [65] Justice Burchett identified a number of steps - identification of sources of income, explanation of a taxpayer's activities and an explanation of the source or sources of a taxpayer's assets. The steps identified by Burchett J are not surprising. In addressing a s 167 assessment based upon an asset betterment statement, a taxpayer must account for an unexplained increase in assets. The taxpayer must explain the source or sources of those assets and then identify whether that source, or those sources, are taxable. Put another way, if the disclosed "actual" taxable income does not explain the increase in assets, then the taxpayer is unlikely to have discharged the burden of establishing the assessment is excessive. And, of course, that unexplained increase in assets cannot be viewed in isolation - it must also take into account the expenditure during that period. [66] Consistent with that view, even if a taxpayer was able to prove that an item in the Asset Betterment Statement was wrong or should not have been included, but did not adequately explain the source or sources for the otherwise unexplained increase in wealth, the taxpayer would not discharge the onus under s 14ZZO of the TAA. 56 The Court concluded that Mr Gashi's appeal grounds were misconceived. Even if he had been able to prove an error in the asset betterment statement, that, of itself, would not have been sufficient to discharge the onus that he bore. He was required to demonstrate that the unexplained accumulated wealth in each of the relevant years was from non-income sources. However, he had not attempted to show the sources of funds from which he acquired assets in each of the relevant years. It followed that he had failed to discharge the onus under s 14ZZO: Gashi at 315 [67]. As the following discussion reveals, on many occasions Mr Condon's evidence similarly did not attempt to explain the source of funds used by him to acquire assets.

The standard of proof 57 The standard of proof that the taxpayer must meet is the civil standard, being the balance of probabilities: McCormack v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 143 CLR 284 (McCormack v Federal Commissioner of Taxation) at 301 per Gibbs J. However, there is no stipulation as to how the standard can be met. That will no doubt vary with the circumstances of each case. 58 A taxpayer is not required to prove matters by reference to contemporaneous primary documentation: cf Commissioner of Taxation v Clark (2011) 190 FCR 206 at 225 [64] - [66] per Edmonds and Gordon JJ. Nor are they required to adduce every piece of evidence available in relation to each issue: Commissioner of Taxation v Cassaniti (2018) 266 FCR 385 (Cassaniti) at 409 [88] per Steward J (with whom Greenwood and Logan JJ agreed). In Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 10 - 11, Hunt J (as his Honour then was) considered that: … it is not obligatory for a taxpayer, before he can discharge his burden of proof, to call all the material witnesses and to produce all the material documents which support his evidence … It is certainly wiser for the taxpayer to do so in most cases so as to ensure that his own evidence is accepted, but even where he does not do so the tribunal of fact may nevertheless be sufficiently impressed with the taxpayer as a witness that his evidence is accepted without such corroboration or without the whole of such corroboration. 59 Although a decision-maker will, in the evaluation of the evidence, be cautious of a taxpayer's self-serving statements, they are not "prima facie unacceptable": McCormack v Federal Commissioner of Taxation at 302: and the arbiter of fact is entitled to accept them where the taxpayer is regarded as truthful. Moreover, the taxpayer is not required to corroborate each piece of evidence that is adduced before it can be accepted: Cassaniti at 409 [88]. 60 Mathematical precision is not required in order to prove on the balance of probabilities what the correct assessment should have been. The Court is entitled to decide the appeal by reference to estimates upon inexact evidence: Allard v Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 24 ATR 493 at 499 per Hill J. This approach was adopted by Burchett J in Ma at 233 in relation to an assessment based on the asset betterment method. His Honour said: Furthermore, the making of estimates upon inexact evidence, which is so much a feature of both judicial and administrative decision-making, cannot be uniquely excluded from appeals against betterment assessments. To refuse to consider the credit, not only of the applicant, but also of his independent and unchallenged witnesses, simply because the effect of the evidence was to support his accountant's generalisations about double-counting rather than to hit upon a precise figure, was to fall into an error of law. 61 In Haritos, it was accepted that this passage supported the proposition that "in performing its review function, the Tribunal may be required to make an estimate upon inexact evidence, and it cannot avoid its responsibility to make findings by relying on the burden of proof section": at 392 [234]. 62 If the appellant can, by any means, demonstrate his actual taxable income and show the assessments are excessive, he is entitled to seek relief: Ma at 232.

The practical process of establishing assessable income in a relevant year 63 Without derogating from or diminishing in any way the taxpayer's onus under s 14ZZO to prove what his income was in a particular year, it may be that in a particular case the process of making an objection to the Commissioner and the subsequent processes of this Court (or perhaps the Tribunal) have the effect of partly refining the issues that require attention. 64 In cases where an assessment has been made pursuant to s 167, and the asset betterment method has been used, the asset betterment statement prepared by the Commissioner can be an appropriate starting point for refinement of the issues, though it would be wrong to think that it operates in any way as any formal articulation of them. Instead, the statement can be used as a means by which to identify events that the Commissioner has considered to be transactions, whether they be receipts, payments, or other acquisitions of wealth, that bespeak the taxpayer having received a greater amount of assessable income than has been reflected in their returns. It should not, however, be regarded as being in any way final or conclusive. It may be that, as the objection process continues, additional sources of income or unexplained wealth emerge, on which the Commissioner might rely in any appeal. Nevertheless, the statement represents some foundation for understanding why the Commissioner assessed the taxpayer's income as he did. 65 Whilst the onus remains firmly on the taxpayer, in the crystallisation of the issues for an appeal, the taxpayer may rely on the Commissioner's Objection Decision or Appeal Statement for the purpose of identifying transactions that have been accepted as not contributing to their assessable income. That may occur, for instance (and as in this case) where the Commissioner has indicated that the receipt of an amount of money did not reflect assessable income. Indeed, here, the Commissioner issued the Amended Assessments and Further Amended Assessments to reflect his conclusions on those matters. Where that occurs, the taxpayer is relieved of the necessity of negativing the inference, otherwise available, that the relevant amounts were taxable income, to paraphrase Nettle J in Bosanac (HC) at 436 [29].

Has Mr Condon discharged the onus? 66 Mr Condon asked the Court to uphold his appeals against the Commissioner's four Objection Decisions. He submitted that he had discharged the applicable onus on the basis that he had: (a) proved his taxable income; (b) proved that he did not have any other sources of assessable income; (c) provided a reasonable explanation for any appearance of the possession of assets; (d) been able to explain previously-unexplained deposits and withdrawals as non-assessable income; and (e) proved that his capital receipts and the non-assessable income that he received during each of the Relevant Years exceeded the increase in wealth across that period. 67 In summary, it was submitted on his behalf that he had provided a reasonable explanation for any appearance of the possession of assets because he has: (a) worked for many years and accumulated significant assets over his working life; (b) maintained stable employment since he was 15 years old and has earned over $2,000,000 in salary and wage income in the last 20 years (including gross salary in excess of $100,000 per annum since 2008); and (c) deposed to his net asset base exceeding $1.2 million prior to the 2015 to 2018 income years, those assets having been amassed from his salary and other non-assessable sources. 68 More specifically, it was submitted that his net asset position as at 1 July 2014, immediately after the conclusion of the income year ending 30 June 2014 (the Base Year), was around $1,230,810.20 (in one part of the evidence, the total was said to be $1,227,240.50) and included the following assets that were not included in the Commissioner's asset betterment statement: (a) Unit 1020, 9000 Las Vegas Boulevard, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA - valued at approximately USD49,900 (AUD52,504.78); (b) Unit 1277, 9000 Las Vegas Boulevard, Las Vegas, Nevada, USA - valued at approximately USD50,000 (AUD52,610); (c) USD denominated cash - totalling approximately USD630,000 (AUD666,036); (d) motor vehicles - valued at a total of approximately AUD364,000; (e) shares in Bad Boys - valued at approximately AUD80,000 (or, one some occasions, AUD400,000); and (f) money held in Bank of America account 64549000002167775449 - totalling approximately USD16,035.23 (AUD15,239.72). 69 In broad terms, the Commissioner submitted that Mr Condon had failed to establish what his "actual taxable income" was and, accordingly, he had failed to discharge his onus of proving that the default assessments were excessive under s 14ZZO(b) of the TAA. The consequence, so it was said, is that the challenge to the Objection Decisions must fail and the Further Amended Assessments must stand. In particular, it was submitted that the evidence revealed that Mr Condon had received other income during the Relevant Years, which he had not proved was non-taxable, either because there was no evidence corroborating his assertions to the contrary, or because the evidence that he offered was unreliable and ought to be rejected.

Mr Condon's evidence was advanced at a high level of generality 70 Despite the numerous affidavits filed by Mr Condon, the substance of much of his evidence was put forward at an elevated level of abstraction. His position appeared to be that, as he had worked all of his life, he had accumulated a substantial amount of money. He claimed to have kept a large amount (in US currency) buried at his mother's house, and also claimed to have had a somewhat indeterminate amount of cash stored in a safe at his place of work. From time to time, he would use some of that cash to meet his living expenses. The problem with this evidence was that it lacked transactional specificity. 71 For whatever reason, Mr Condon did not, in the terms used by Nettle J in Bosanac, lead evidence amounting to a "wide survey and exact scrutiny of [his business] activities", nor did he demonstrate by evidence "both sides of the equation" which would reveal his taxable income. Instead, he made constant but invariably very general references to his employment income and savings, whilst being unable to provide specifics as to how his income and assets were actually used in each of the Relevant Years. Although it might be accepted that his accumulated savings enabled him to acquire a property (through his private company, Bad Boys) and two units in Las Vegas, the source of the funds used to make other acquisitions was less clear. One significant obstacle for Mr Condon was his propensity to engage in undocumented cash transactions, not to maintain records, and to use bank accounts only when he considered it necessary. 72 As the previous discussion concerning the manner in which a taxpayer may discharge his onus in cases such as this shows, even general evidence of a person's financial dealings may be sufficient for the taxpayer to succeed in an appeal of an Objection Decision. There is also no inherent issue with taxpayers engaging in undocumented cash transactions, even where those transactions concern substantial amounts. However, in the context of the present appeals, the efficacy and acceptability of Mr Condon's chosen mode of evidence as to his claimed financial dealings must ultimately depend predominantly upon his reliability as a witness, given the apparent lack of corroborating records. It is necessary to turn, then, to that issue.

Mr Condon's credit 73 Mr Condon's credit is central to the result in these appeals. However, try as one might to take him as a person whose testimony can readily be accepted, for the reasons that follow, it is not possible to do so. As his evidence emerged in the course of these proceedings, it became clear that he could not be regarded as honest, or as having any respect for the law or for appropriate behaviour. In the latter respect, for instance, he gave evidence that he has maintained a motor dealer licence since around 2012, but he denied that he carried on any business that involved dealing in motor vehicles. He effectively asserted that he held the licence in order to enable him to use dealer plates for the purposes of driving unregistered cars, and to buy vehicles for his family and friends without the need to obtain roadworthy certificates. It is said that he acquired such vehicles for his former partner, Ms Clancy, and her daughters from time to time. Although licence holders are obliged under s 74 of the Motor Dealers and Chattel Auctioneers Act 2014 (Qld) to deliver certain written statements to people to whom they sold vehicles, Mr Condon did not do so. It seems that the only reason for his non-compliance was that, quite simply, he did not regard himself as carrying on any business dealing in motor vehicles. 74 Mr Condon was also prepared to assist people he knew in hiding assets from their partners in the course of divorce proceedings. He seemingly admitted to transferring the registration of a car owned by a Mr Mendes into his name because Mr Mendes was concerned that his wife might seek to include it in the matrimonial assets in a divorce. He was also prepared to store $200,000 in the safe at his workplace, the Townsville Showgrounds, for the brother of his friend, Mr O'Connor, who was engaged in divorce proceedings. Although the precise motivation for this occurrence was not admitted by either Mr O'Connor or Mr Condon, the storing of the money in the safe can naturally be inferred to have been for the purposes of concealment in circumstances where the money was secreted away, and not mentioned until after the divorce proceedings had been completed. Mr Condon's participation in the concealing of assets of a party to ongoing divorce proceedings was, on any view, reprehensible conduct and designed to interfere with the law's due administration. 75 Although the manner in which Mr Condon performed his duties as the Manager of the TPAIA was not directly in issue, it is extremely difficult not to reach the conclusion that he was prepared to take liberties with that office for his own benefit. For instance, on his own evidence, he utilised the safe at the Showgrounds for the purpose of maintaining his personal finances, including by storing a significant amount of cash there. The safe was also used to keep funds for his friends and others. He used the TPAIA office staff for his own purposes, including having them receive money from Ms Clancy and her daughter, Jazmin, on his behalf. He used a large shed at the Showgrounds for the storage of his several motor vehicles, and those of other people. He asserted that his use of these facilities was subject to an agreement for which he provided consideration by permitting the TPAIA to use a backhoe that he owned when required. Although there was no evidence as to the occasions on which the TPAIA required the use of the backhoe, which had allegedly been gifted to Mr Condon, on its face the agreement appeared to significantly favour Mr Condon. Evidence was also given that Mr Condon and his friends would drive their cars on the Showground facilities, although the entitlement to do so was not established. Overall, it is apparent that he regarded the Showgrounds and the facilities there as being available to him to use as he pleased, without regard to the obligations that he owed as manager for his employer. Although this situation may have arisen consequent upon his personality, and a lack of attention given by those in charge of the TPAIA, it is otherwise generally evident that he tended to put his own interests above any duties that he relevantly owed. 76 It is undeniable that, in the giving of his evidence, he was often confident and self-assured. That extended to those circumstances when, after being confronted with evidence contrary to his testimony, he gave new testimony directly contradicting that which he had just given. Whilst it may be that the direct and confident manner in which a witness responds to cross-examination bespeaks forthrightness, in relation to Mr Condon no such conclusion can be drawn. Rather, his apparent confidence is an aspect of his somewhat domineering personality, which, it is apparent, he exerted over those around him. This was evident in the manner in which he attempted to speak over his interlocutor during cross-examination, some examples of which are at ts.173 lines 1-25; ts.188 lines 17-24; ts.234 lines 16-47; ts.236 line 20 - ts.237 line 27; ts.277 lines 10-45; ts.320 line 1-45; ts.371 lines 16-31. As these instances reveal, he had a tendency to attempt to direct the discussion toward those matters that he perceived assisted his case. 77 He is also an astute person, and was acutely aware of the issues in contention in the litigation. When giving his evidence, he deliberately sought to advance his position in relation to those issues whenever the opportunity arose, and he did this by volunteering self-serving answers rather than responding to the questions asked of him. This can be seen at the following transcript references: ts. 73 line 37 - ts.74 line 3; ts.160 lines 26-34; ts. 211 lines 9-35; ts.211 line 46 - ts.212 line 24; ts. 230 lines 24-35; ts. 237 line 18-25; ts.266 lines 36-45; ts. 275 lines 31-45; ts.374 lines 1-33; ts.379 lines 7-24. His tendency to promote self-serving answers was particularly acute in relation to the USD500,000 that he claimed to have buried in his mother's front yard for a number of years. That alone is not to say that his evidence should therefore not be believed on all matters, but it is necessary to observe that, where he could, he slanted his evidence in a manner favourable to his case. It was also apparent that he would often attempt to anticipate the question being posed to him and try to answer it in a manner that supported his case before the question was fully put. 78 The Commissioner's submission that Mr Condon was an evasive witness should be accepted. His awareness of the importance of particular issues in the case resulted in him attempting to avoid making concessions where doing so was obviously appropriate. The following transcript references evidence some examples of this: ts.76 lines 1-24; ts.141 lines 24-43; ts.153 line 21 - ts.156 line 11; ts.208 lines 18-28; ts.211 lines 15-31; ts.236 line 20 - ts.237 line 28; ts.274 lines 41 - ts.275 lines 42. It is also a matter worthy of comment that he did not appear to be in any way concerned that he had sworn affidavits that were shown to be untrue, or that evidence that he had given was shown to be incorrect. There were many examples of each of these occurrences. It is not unfair to observe that he was not particularly careful to make truthful statements under oath. 79 As mentioned already, a significant difficulty for Mr Condon in this matter is that he habitually entered into undocumented transactions involving payments that were made in cash. Indeed, he conducted his affairs on a cash basis, and asserted that he did not trust or like banks and did not believe in leaving money in them. Rather, his evidence was that, variously, he kept large amounts of cash in the safe at his work premises at the Showgrounds, under a bed at his friend's house in the United States, and buried in the unfenced front yard of his mother's home. Whilst the veracity of these matters is questionable, the point to be made is that, in the absence of agreements, contracts or other transactional documentation or records, proof of the occurrence of the various transactions on which Mr Condon relied was dependent upon acceptance of his evidence alone. The absence of documentation from which he could refresh his memory resulted in him often giving evidence of what he wanted to believe the transaction was or, perhaps, what he guessed it might have been. Neither version was credible. This extended to proof of the manner in which he dealt with the cash that he claimed he kept in the safe. There, the problem was exacerbated because, while he claimed he kept cash on behalf of other persons and for himself, he did not maintain any record of how the cash was used. 80 A further hindrance to acceptance of his evidence was that transactions that he sought to rely upon as justifying his receipt of money were explained in extremely vague and uncertain terms. He was only able to assert their broad character, and this tended to undermine the veracity of his evidence about them. Even then, he was often imprecise in the language that he used when describing the legal relations between third parties and himself. For instance, he asserted that he was holding money belonging to Mr O'Connor whilst asserting that his liability was, in fact, that of a debtor. On the evidence he gave, and allowing for the fact that he did not have legal qualifications, the arrangements that he put in place with those around him were both ambiguous and legally dubious. This extended to the ownership of the several vehicles that he purchased or acquired in and prior to the Relevant Years. His evidence as to the ownership of the vehicles that Ms Clancy drove, in particular, was nebulous and changed dramatically from time to time. 81 It is, therefore, unsurprising that there were many occasions on which Mr Condon claimed that he was unable to recall the nature of particular transactions. The absence of any document initiating them, or recording them or their performance, effectively denied him the opportunity to refresh his memory about them. He was thus often in the position of being unable to recall the purpose of, or reason for, many financial dealings. Even on those occasions when he was able to recall a transaction in issue, the absence of any documentary context resulted in his evidence being of a very general nature and, indeed, often caused him to proffer evidence that turned out to be incorrect. A particular instance was his inability to recall his dealings in relation to $200,000 cash, which was allegedly given to him in a shoebox by or on behalf of Mr O'Connor for storage in the safe. Similarly, he was vague about his acquisition and sale of the units in Las Vegas, and whether he had a further USD125,000 in addition to the USD500,000 that he claimed he buried in his mother's front yard. Whilst, from time to time, he acknowledged his inability to recall certain matters, his lack of recollection was not uniform and, occasionally, he claimed to have a good memory of other events that had occurred prior to or at around the same time as the events which he said that he was unable to recall. Mr Brennan, for the Commissioner, identified in his written submissions that Mr Condon was able to specifically recall the constituent parts making up the sum of $5,000 deposited into his account on a particular day, the constituent elements of a deposit of $20,790 made in December 2014, and the price paid for a lawnmower, but was unable to remember more recent and objectively more significant matters. 82 It is not unfair to observe that, when faced with obvious errors in his affidavits or his previous testimony, Mr Condon would regularly resort to a claim of lack of recollection. On other occasions, he was prone to dissembling. This was particularly evident in relation to his evidence surrounding a particular bank cheque that he claimed he gave to Ms Clancy. 83 Similarly, some of his explanations for his conduct, or that of others, was difficult to accept. For instance, he asserted that he was content to pay interest on a line of credit, despite simultaneously asserting that he had sufficient funds in his safe to substantially pay down the indebtedness; that he had entered into an arrangement whereby he accepted Mr Mendes' $50,000 Mustang as collateral for a loan of $20,000, as a result of which Mr Mendes forfeited the car; that he borrowed $20,000 of Mr O'Connor's money, which was being kept in his safe, rather than using an equivalent amount of his own money that was stored in the same safe; that he hid a USD550,000 bank cheque behind a picture at a friend's house in the USA; and that he hid a significant amount of cash under a bed at the same house. 84 Likewise, his assertion that he was unable to prove certain matters due to the conduct of the Australian Federal Police, which had raided and searched his premises and taken away some of his documents in 2020 or thereabouts, was somewhat disingenuous. It appears that the AFP had returned certain of the documents in early to mid-2022, and some were used for the purposes of his final affidavit. Even if, as Mr Condon claimed, some had not been returned, no explanation was given as to why his solicitors had not required their production. 85 It is also unsurprising that Mr Condon's evidence lacked consistency. He made six separate affidavits for the purposes of these proceedings, and in the later ones he sought to "correct" errors in the earlier ones. Unfortunately, very little explanation was given as to why the earlier affidavits, which purported to truthfully explain his dealings and financial circumstances, were in error and needed correction. A good example of this is the document behind Tab 2 to the annexure to Mr Condon's affidavit of 11 June 2021 in which he purported to set out his assets and liabilities as at 30 June 2014. In the circumstances, one might expect that some care would have been taken in the compilation of that document, which was central to a number of important issues. However, as the cross-examination of Mr Condon in relation to the document revealed, it was seriously flawed in numerous respects. 86 Further, Mr Condon's evidence in cross-examination often conflicted with his sworn evidence in his affidavits, though he was especially reluctant to acknowledge that dissonance. See for example ts.253 line 42 - ts.254 line 21 in relation to the preparation of schedules; ts.119 lines 1-26 in relation to the ownership of a Nissan Patrol motor vehicle; ts.189 line 1 - ts.190 line 26 in relation to a loan that Mr Condon had claimed that he had made; ts.193 lines 1-6 in relation to identified payments allegedly made to him and banked on the same day; ts.225 line 1 - ts.226 line 18 in relation to the making of payments into an account; ts.262 line 42 - ts.265 line 15 in relation to USD86,500 allegedly held in one of his Bank of America accounts. 87 Further, in his submissions in reply, he accepted that the evidence as it emerged indicated that, as at 30 June 2014, he "held" or owned more motor vehicles than he had listed in his asset statement. Whilst this was advanced as a positive by Ms Chen, in that it showed his asset position prior to the Relevant Years to be better than had been assumed by the Commissioner, given the extent of the discrepancy, it generally undermined the accuracy of anything that Mr Condon had said either in his affidavits or in the course of his oral evidence. 88 In the Commissioner's written submissions, specific reference was made to Mr Condon's evidence concerning the circumstances in which he acquired a Cadillac motor vehicle for a Mr Darmenia. It was submitted that this evidence was emblematic of the deficiencies in Mr Condon's overall approach to his evidence. That submission should be accepted. 89 Initially, in his affidavit of 23 August 2021, Mr Condon asserted that prior to the audit period he had lent his friend, Mr Darmenia, the sum of $25,600 to purchase a Cadillac, and that in the period between June 2016 and January 2018 he had received 23 part payments from Mr Darmenia as repayment of the loan. In cross-examination, he initially refused to accept that these statements were untrue, although subsequently he accepted their falsity. There was, in fact, no loan for $25,600. Mr Condon then sought to introduce a further allegation that he had lent Mr Darmenia a lesser sum of $3,000, which he said was paid off by payments of $100 per week during the audit period. It is relevant to note that Mr Darmenia rejected that characterisation of the arrangement, and claimed that the payments were made for repairs to a differential in relation to another car. That latter point appears to have been accepted by Mr Condon, as Mr Darmenia was not re-examined on that issue. When Mr Condon was confronted with the allegation that he had made a $10,000 profit from the sale of the Cadillac to Mr Darmenia, he denied it, even though that appeared to be the case from the payments that Mr Condon said had been made. Mr Condon then sought to justify the difference by asserting that he had done additional work on the car by putting new wheels on it as well as installing air-conditioning. Ultimately, it was apparent from his evidence that Mr Condon was unable or unwilling to explain clearly the substance of the transaction and what costs had been incurred in relation to it. It was not explained in any of his six affidavits, or in the affidavit of Mr Darmenia, and he was unable to show that he did not make a profit on the transaction. 90 The foregoing difficulties with Mr Condon's evidence lead to the inevitable conclusion that he was not a reliable witness. Nor was he an honest witness, who endeavoured to give his evidence accurately. Even if I were to conclude that he was attempting to give honest answers, his evidence was often so vague and inaccurate in so many details that it could not be accepted as being reliable unless it was corroborated. This conclusion is supported to some extent by the necessarily appropriate concession in Ms Chen's written submissions in reply, whereby Mr Condon's difficult nature was acknowledged and it was said (at [43]) that, "[t]he Applicant's evidence should be considered reliable where it is corroborated by other witnesses' evidence, documents, and where it seems logical in the circumstances". However, that submission impermissibly elevates the reliability and veracity of Mr Condon's evidence. It was not possible to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, of the truthfulness of any matter asserted by him unless, at a minimum, the assertion was supported by other reliable evidence. It may be that some of the matters advanced by Mr Condon were actually true but, in the absence of credible buttressing evidence, the Court could not be satisfied that they were to the requisite degree. 91 This gives rise to the major difficulty for Mr Condon's appeals, being that many of the transactions in which he was involved during the Relevant Years were undocumented cash transactions and the only evidence in support of them was his testimony. Where that is the case, his evidence must be considered insufficient to establish the relevant facts on the balance of probabilities.

The credit of other witnesses 92 Although the parties made specific submissions in relation to the credit of the other witnesses, the veracity of the evidence given by these witnesses can be dealt with, if needed, when the transactions to which that evidence related are addressed in the course of the reasons that follow.

Mr Condon's approach to satisfaction of the onus 93 Mr Brennan, for the Commissioner, submitted that Mr Condon's approach to discharging the onus was fatally flawed. It was submitted that he had merely adopted the Commissioner's asset betterment statement and sought to make adjustments to demonstrate his actual income for each of the Relevant Years, but had failed to establish the actual amount of his income. There is some force in that submission. As the Full Court in Gashi indicated, the accuracy or otherwise of the asset betterment statement is somewhat irrelevant to the discharge of the taxpayer's onus to establish what their actual income was. 94 However, Mr Brennan's description of Mr Condon's approach in this case was not entirely accurate. At least by the conclusion of the hearing, Mr Condon's legal representatives had undertaken substantial work collating the documents and evidence surrounding his numerous transactions in the Relevant Years as best as they could, and had sought to provide an analysis of them. The 250-page schedule to Mr Condon's submissions in reply supports that contention. In that document, there was an attempt to deal with the specific impugned transactions in which Mr Condon was involved, and to explain why he did not receive income from or in relation to them, other than the amounts that he had reported. It might not be inappropriate to observe that this task ought to have been undertaken prior to the submissions in reply, and Mr Condon's omission to do so has certainly resulted in this matter being more complicated than it otherwise might have been. 95 Nevertheless, Mr Brennan submitted that, even if Mr Condon had generally adopted the correct approach, the evidence adduced in furtherance of it was incomplete, in that there remained a substantial number of unexplained matters. As a result, it was said that Mr Condon had not discharged his onus. In particular, reference was made to the fact that not all of Mr Condon's dealings or transactions involving his overseas bank accounts were adduced in evidence, and that many of his purchases were not shown to have occurred by the use of money that was demonstrated not to be assessable income. This latter point is not lacking in significance. Whilst Mr Condon spent some considerable time identifying his expenditure during the Relevant Years, he regularly neglected to explain the source of the funds used to make the relevant purchases. His general evidence was that, when he needed something, he used funds that he claimed to have accumulated over his lifetime as savings and which he kept in his safe. However, that assertion typically lacked any further particularity and, because his evidence was not credible, such assertions alone could not substantiate his case.

Events prior to Relevant Years 96 The assessment of the veracity of Mr Condon's claims in relation to the Relevant Years calls for consideration of his circumstances immediately prior to that period. That is because he sought to explain many of the transactions entered into during the Relevant Years by reference to his claimed accumulated wealth. In particular, he asserted that he had amassed some hundreds of thousands of US dollars in cash, as well as large amounts of Australian denominated currency, which he said he stored in the safe at his place of work and had resort to when the circumstances required. He also claimed to have participated in several other dealings and arrangements that had allowed him to accumulate wealth. 97 He sought to explain his accumulated wealth as at 30 June 2014, the end of the Base Year, partly by claiming that he had saved substantial funds over his lifetime, since he commenced working at the age of 15. He said that he had not been required to pay rent, as he had lived with his mother or in property that she owned, that he did not drink or smoke, and that his living expenses were minimal. He gave general evidence of his employment over the years, and of his involvement in a business that he started. This evidence was advanced at a high level of generality and provided little, if any, detail to illustrate his progressive accumulation of wealth to what it was said to be as at 30 June 2014. Whilst some attempt was made to show his assets, very little attempt was made to demonstrate his living expenses or how and where his money was accumulated. This was not unimportant in the present case, where Mr Condon regularly travelled overseas, often spending between about 16 to 20 weeks abroad each year. It is also relevant that, whilst he said he was not married and that this contributed to his ability to amass wealth, he was seemingly in a committed relationship with Ms Clancy for an extended period between about 2009 to 2015, and Ms Clancy had two daughters that he said he treated as his own. No explanation was provided as to how this impacted his wealth. 98 Nevertheless, by the end of the hearing, Mr Condon claimed to have net assets of approximately $1.9 million as at 30 June 2014. That was said to include approximately $750,000 worth of US denominated currency, $150,000 in Australian dollars, two units in Las Vegas valued at $105,000, a collection of motor vehicles valued at around $500,000 (albeit that valuation seemed to adopt the price of those vehicles when they were subsequently sold, and the vehicles were earlier valued at $364,000), and shares in Bad Boys which were worth approximately $400,000. This was substantially in excess of the $1.16 million worth of assets that he claimed to have had as at that date in his affidavit of 11 June 2021. 99 In relation to the US denominated currency, he said that he had approximately $731,000 worth in cash. Of that, he claimed that roughly $526,000 (being USD500,000) was buried in the front yard of his mother's house, and that the remainder was kept in the safe at the office of the TPAIA along with the $150,000 in Australian denominated currency. In general terms, he claimed that many of the transactions to which the Commissioner pointed as being indicative of unexplained wealth or income were merely his use of this capital, which he had amassed by the Base Year. He further, more specifically, explained that his depositing and withdrawing of large amounts of American denominated currency in the Relevant Years, and especially in the year ended 30 June 2018, was simply the movement of his own funds.

The buried US currency 100 A significant issue was Mr Condon's claim that, as at 30 June 2014, he had USD500,000 buried in the unfenced front yard of his mother's property in Townsville. He claimed that many of his transactions in US denominated currency from 2016 onwards were funded from this source, which he claimed to have retrieved and accessed in that year. 101 Although there is some evidence, beyond that given by Mr Condon, from which it might be inferred that he had actually buried USD500,000 in cash at his mother's property, there was generally very little to verify that this had taken place. Whilst due regard must be had to the infinite variety of ways in which people organise their affairs, the particular way in which Mr Condon claimed to have dealt with the US currency was, on any view, most unusual. 102 It was claimed that USD200,000 of the alleged buried funds originated from a Mr Bowen, though the evidence in relation to this claim was not entirely clear. In his 11 June 2014 affidavit, Mr Condon deposed that in around 2007 and 2008 Mr Bowen, who had been his long-time friend, asked him to be the executor of his estate, and told him that he wanted to give him a gift for agreeing to carry out the terms of his will. Mr Condon further deposed that Mr Bowen died in August 2012 and, since then, he had distributed some $320,000 of the estate's funds. He later deposed that, in 2009, Mr Bowen had given him a biscuit tin containing USD200,000 as a gift for undertaking the executor's duties and, at that time, Mr Bowen had advised him to invest in US currency. Mr Condon said he did so. The veracity of the claim that he was gifted USD200,000 by Mr Bowen is discussed below. 103 Mr Condon gave further evidence that the remaining USD300,000 was acquired by his drawing down on a line of credit that his company, Bad Boys, had taken out and which was secured by a mortgage over 66 Ingham Road. The evidence supports a finding that Bad Boys took out a line of credit in late 2009, from which it or Mr Condon drew down an amount sufficient for him to have acquired USD300,000. Nevertheless, the evidence about the purpose of the withdrawal contained elements that were difficult to accept. Clearly enough, the drawing down on the line of credit would have incurred interest, yet Mr Condon refused to accept that, instead of drawing down on the facility, he might have used cash that he held in his safe to acquire USD currency. By this, he indicated that he would rather pay interest than use the cash that he claimed he held in his safe, which was not earning interest. The supporting rationale was not clearly explained, and it did not appear that he ever thought to weigh the benefits of exchange rate gains against the cost of borrowing. On the other hand, it should also be noted that he claimed that he did not recall how much cash he had in his safe at the time of drawing down on the line of credit. 104 His evidence that he buried USD500,000 in the front yard of his mother's home was also difficult to accept. Mr Brennan, for the Commissioner, submitted that it was "inherently improbable" and there is some force in that. On the other hand, the fact that he withdrew the equivalent of USD300,000 in Australian dollars around October 2009 lends some tangential support to it, because there is no evidence as to how that money was otherwise used or dealt with. Mr Condon's claim that, at the time, he was not able to operate a bank account in Australia in US dollars may also justify his acquisition of hard US currency for investment purposes. 105 However, the alleged circumstances surrounding the burial of the money in 2009, if not the burial itself, were rather unusual. Mr Condon said that he brought a backhoe (which he claimed was not registered) from the Showgrounds to his mother's home one afternoon to dig the required hole, that he did this at around 4:00 pm to 5:00 pm that day, that the hole was about a metre and a half deep and located in the unfenced front of the yard, visible from both the road and neighbouring land, as well as being close to a major road. He also said that the USD300,000 in cash was placed in a plastic storage box, together with the USD200,000 in cash from Mr Bowen, which remained in the biscuit tin in which he had received it. 106 Mr Condon's explanation for burying the money was that he had no intention of "cashing it in" until the Australian dollar "dropped to 66 cents" and he thought that burying it was the safest thing to do. Its security was apparently ensured because he did not tell anyone that it was there. The implicit suggestion that he would not have to retrieve the cash for some time because he would not have any interest in retrieving it until the value of the Australian dollar reached "66c American" appears to rely on the benefit of hindsight. At the time he allegedly buried the money, he could not have known the future exchange rate movements, and he professed no expertise in the long-term forecasting of such things. It is notorious that currency exchange rates can change dramatically and rapidly, and Mr Condon did not identify anything in particular that influenced him to believe that changes to the USD/AUD exchange rate would only occur in the long term, so as to justify the burying of the US currency. 107 His explanation that burying the money was the safest thing to do is also improbable. The series of events explained by Mr Condon suggests that the burial did not occur in private, leaving open the possibility that someone may have witnessed it happening from the surrounding streets or houses. Moreover, as the chronology of Mr Condon's international flights reveals, he was absent from Australia for extended periods while the money was allegedly buried. If he had been seen burying the money, there was a clear risk that it might be stolen. Further, on his own evidence, he had a readily available location at which to store the US currency, being the TPAIA offices, and he acknowledged that he kept substantial amounts of his personal cash there. Those facilities, which were formerly used as a bank, had a large bank safe, and Mr Condon kept a smaller personal safe within it. It was far from clear why he did not keep the USD500,000 there, in the safe within a safe, along with his other cash. Even putting this to one side, it is improbable that, in the ordinary course, no other more orthodox alternatives presented themselves to Mr Condon, such as storing the cash in a safe deposit box or other secured premises. The choice to bury it in a plastic storage container in the front yard of a residential house is potentially the least probable one that he could reasonably have made in the circumstances. 108 It is also relevant to note that, at that time, Mr Condon had a Bank of America account in the United States to which he could have transferred the funds. Had he done so, he would have received the same benefits of exchange rate movements as he would if he held the funds in cash. Although he said that he had an aversion to holding funds in banks, that did not appear to inhibit him from having numerous accounts that he used as and when the circumstances required. The fact that he held an existing US bank account into which he might have banked the funds, and perhaps received the benefit of interest or other facilities that his bank offered, renders it even more difficult to accept that he really held a belief that it was safer to keep the money buried in the ground. 109 The money was certainly not physically safe whilst buried in a plastic storage container, as claimed. That was hardly a substantial receptacle for that amount of cash, as it had the potential to deteriorate, especially if buried under approximately one and a half metres of earth. This must surely have been obvious to Mr Condon, who was no doubt an intelligent person. It further undermines the acceptability of his evidence on this point. 110 Similarly, the security of the buried money could be maintained only if Mr Condon did not disclose what he had done. However, if he adopted that strategy, it would follow that if some misfortune befell him no one would ever know to retrieve the cash and it would be lost forever. This rendered his supposed security strategy exceptionally high-risk. However, Mr Condon subsequently claimed that he had told one person about what he had done; this being Ms Chantelle Clancy (Chantelle), one of his partner's daughters. It is not particularly clear why he told her, in particular, of the existence of the buried money. He later said that Chantelle subsequently developed a drug problem and went "off the rails", which is why he recovered the money. Again, there was no explanation as to why, of all the persons Mr Condon might have told of the existence of the buried money, he chose a relatively young person who was related to his then-partner and who, on the available evidence, did not appear to have done anything to earn his trust. Moreover, the evidence suggests that Chantelle ceased living in the same house as Mr Condon in or around 2013 or 2014, and no explanation was given as to why he would continue to trust Chantelle with the highly confidential information, even though she was no longer living under his roof. The suggestion that he told Chantelle of the buried money is yet another improbable aspect of this part of Mr Condon's evidence. Chantelle was not called to give evidence. 111 There was also some inconsistency in the evidence relating to Mr Condon's motivation for recovering the buried money. Ms Jessica Casey, who worked for the TPAIA, said that Mr Condon had told her that he had money buried somewhere and that, following a discussion about heavy rain that had recently occurred in the region, he said that he thought that it would be a good idea to check on it. Ms Casey said that he went away and collected the money that day and brought it back to the office at the Showgrounds. When it was produced, the money was water-damaged and she apparently assisted Mr Condon to dry out the notes and then clean them on that day. If Ms Casey's evidence is accepted on this issue, it would follow that Mr Condon's evidence as to his rationale for recovering it, being that Chantelle, who had developed a drug problem, knew where it was buried, was incorrect. On the other hand, it is possible that Mr Condon did tell Ms Casey the things that she said he did, but that they were untrue. 112 There must also be a degree of scepticism about what Ms Casey said she was told by Mr Condon. She indicated that the money was recovered the same day as the conversation about the heavy rain in the region. However, it is unlikely that Mr Condon could immediately cease performing his managerial duties, arrange for the necessary equipment to be acquired to dig down the one and a half metres, undertake the excavation and then return with the money that day. That is most implausible. 113 Despite the improbability of Mr Condon's claim that the money had been buried for seven years, it has some support from the content of two photographs of large amounts of US currency which he annexed to his 11 June 2021 affidavit. He initially said that they were taken shortly after he had dug up and recovered the money in 2016. The first photograph shows a quantity of significantly damaged notes, and a substantially greater quantity of less damaged notes. Mr Condon said that it depicted some of the notes that had been acquired in October 2009 with the funds drawn from Bad Boys' line of credit. He sought to bolster that statement by observing that the money in the photograph taken in 2016 was of currency printed before 2013, as US100 bills printed after that time had a vertical blue line on them. None of the notes in the photograph had that line. He also identified that the bundles of notes had been secured by paper ribbons, coloured yellow in the photograph, which he said were on them when they were purchased brand new. 114 The second photograph depicts what appears to be bundles of older notes which are held together with string or rubber bands. The bundles are standing on their side in a red plastic bucket or container. At paragraph 163 of his affidavit of 11 June 2021, Mr Condon said that he took USD156,000 of undamaged notes to the United States and, on 19 September 2016, deposited USD147,600 and USD3,600 of it into his BOA 5449 account. He explained in cross-examination that he had deposited the money in two separate transfers on the same day because the first Bank of America branch to which he went refused to accept some of the cash on account of it being too severely damaged. In his affidavit of 16 November 2022, he stated at paragraph 139 that the second photograph was taken by him on 19 September 2016, and depicted some of the money that he had deposited into his account in the United States on that day. The records of Mr Condon's air travel show that he left Australia on 7 September 2016 and returned on 22 September 2016, which, if Mr Condon's evidence were to be accepted, supports the conclusion that the second photograph was taken in the United States. Apart from the difficulty in ascertaining whether all or only some of the money depicted in the photograph was deposited, the evidence about what the photograph actually showed became confused and somewhat incredible in the course of the oral evidence. 115 The evidence that Ms Casey gave under cross-examination was to the effect that she was present at the offices of the TPAIA with Mr Condon when the second photograph was taken, and that it was some two weeks after she had assisted in cleaning the money. She was not re-examined on this point. Contrary to his affidavit evidence, Mr Condon also said under cross-examination that it had been taken at the TPAIA offices, and that the amount shown was USD110,000. He accepted that he was in the United States on 19 September 2016, but was unable to explain why the second photograph in his affidavit had that date on it but was allegedly taken in Australia. He later said that he did not take the photograph. He also seemed to deny that the money in the photograph was part of the money that he deposited in his US bank account, which was contrary to his sworn affidavit evidence. 116 Ultimately, it is not possible to reconcile this evidence in relation to the second photograph, or the evidence as to how Mr Condon dealt with the money. 117 As a consequence of Mr Condon's lack of credit, and the inability of the Court to accept his evidence in the absence of reasonable corroboration, it is not possible to conclude that he did bury USD500,000 in the front yard of his mother's house in 2009. There was no substantive corroboration at all for that assertion. It would seem that, in 2016, he brought into the TPAIA offices a large number of US denominated notes in a plastic storage container and that many of the notes were in a damaged condition. However, I do not accept his explanation for their origin. Whilst it also appears that, in 2009, Mr Condon drew down on the Bad Boys' line of credit and may have used the funds to purchase USD300,000, there is insufficient credible evidence to support the narrative that he buried that money, in cash, along with another USD200,000, and proceeded to keep that money buried for seven years.

Executor's payment 118 It is also not possible to accept Mr Condon's evidence in relation to the origin of the USD200,000, which he claims to have received as a gift. 119 As mentioned, he deposed that, in or around 2009, Mr Brian Bowen told him that he would like to give him USD200,000 for his being prepared to assume the obligations of executor under Mr Bowen's will. The Commissioner contended that Mr Condon's evidence on this point should not be accepted unless corroborated, or otherwise substantiated by credible testimony or contemporaneous objective documents. Even if his evidence was accepted, it was contended that the payment should be treated as assessable income. 120 The evidence relating to Mr Bowen and the administration of his estate is relatively straightforward. Mr Bowen passed away on 20 August 2012 and Mr Condon was the named executor in his last will and testament. On 28 November 2012, Mr Condon was granted probate of the estate and he engaged Giudes & Elliott Solicitors to assist him with its administration. On or around 6 April 2013, he opened an account with the Bank of Queensland (BOQ), with account number 21979915 (BOQ 9915 Estate Account) styled Christopher Condon as Executor for the Estate of the Late Brian Bowen, and on 30 April 2013 Giudes & Elliott Solicitors transferred $360,148.51 of the estate funds into that account. These funds constituted the residue of Mr Bowen's estate. Pursuant to Mr Bowen's will, Mr Condon was required to hold the residuary estate on trust for the six named beneficiaries until they each attained 25 years of age. Between 6 April 2013 and the first beneficiary attaining 25 years of age, the estate funds in the BOQ 9915 Estate Account grew to $391,487.58. The increase is attributable to interest earned in the account. It appeared that the Commissioner accepted these facts, and they help to explain some of the payments made by Mr Condon in the Relevant Years. 121 The remaining issue concerning the receipt of USD200,000 from Mr Bowen is, however, far more problematic. 122 As noted earlier, Mr Condon claimed to have had a close personal friendship with Mr Bowen, being friends with him from 1971 until the latter's death in August 2012, and claimed that he referred to Mr Bowen as "Uncle" Brian. During his evidence-in-chief, Mr Condon stated that Mr Bowen did not want his estate to go to any of his children. It was on this basis that he apparently gave him the USD200,000 in an old Arnott's-style biscuit tin. Although Mr Condon claimed an initial reluctance to accept the money, he later indicated that he would be willing to keep it even if he did not perform his role as executor because "nobody knew about it". This latter comment reflects poorly on him. 123 The Commissioner did not appear to dispute the existence of the relationship between Mr Condon and Mr Bowen and there is no reason to suggest that it did not exist. However, it does not follow that Mr Condon's evidence that Mr Bowen gifted him USD200,000 should be accepted. In Mr Condon's final written submissions, it was expressly acknowledged that his evidence of the "gift" could not be corroborated. No other witnesses were called to support it and Mr Condon had expressly stated in cross-examination that nobody else knew about it. On the basis that his evidence is inherently unreliable, his assertions about the money being a gift are insufficient. 124 Even if Mr Condon's credibility was not in issue, evidence of this nature would need to be scrutinised: Weston v Public Trustee (1986) 4 NSWLR 407 at 409 per Young J. In this respect, it is relevant that the existence of this alleged gift did not receive mention in the objection or a subsequent "Information Request Response" provided by Mr Condon. As noted by the Commissioner, it was raised by him for the first time in his first affidavit sworn 11 June 2021. The only objective documentary evidence produced in relation to it was Mr Bowen's handwritten will dated 22 December 2008. By its terms, Mr Condon was appointed as Mr Bowen's executor, but the will did not make any express provision for payment to him for the performance of that role. That fact is, itself, telling and supports the Commissioner's submission that Mr Condon did not receive the amount as alleged. 125 Mr Condon was initially adamant during cross-examination that the USD200,000 was payment for his role as executor of Mr Bowen's estate. Despite this initial confidence, his evidence became more equivocal when he stated that the payment was not for his role as executor at all, but because Mr Bowen simply wanted him to have his entire estate: [MR BRENNAN]: So you knew - sorry, I withdraw that. At paragraph 55 - I read this to you before: He said words to the effect that the tin contained US$200,000 and he was giving this to me as a gift for taking on the role as executor under his will. They were the effect of the words that he spoke to you? [MR CONDON]: But - but - - - [MR BRENNAN]: Is that right? Is that right? [MR CONDON]: Those type of words, but - - - [MR BRENNAN]: It's right or it's not? [MR CONDON]: Those type of words, yes. [MR BRENNAN]: Okay. And you knew that if you did not perform the role of an executor, you would have had to give that money back to the estate, the $200,000? [MR CONDON]: No. [MR BRENNAN]: Well, that's the only reason why you got it, was because you said to Mr Bowen that you would be the executor of his estate? [MR CONDON]: Yes, but he didn't give it to - give it to me because of that. He gave it to me because - he wanted to give me everything. He give it to me because he was my friend and he didn't want - he didn't want the kids to get anything. (Emphasis added). 126 On any view, USD200,000 is a substantial amount of money. That is especially so when it appears that Mr Bowen's estate was otherwise worth just over AUD360,000. Of itself, it is an extremely generous gift from a person of limited means. It is also unusual that Mr Bowen would make that gift in 2008 or 2009, rather than providing for it in his will. It was not suggested that, at the time the gift was made, he apprehended that he was close to death and knew that he would not have any need for that money during the remainder of his lifetime. 127 The timeline of the arrangement between Mr Bowen and Mr Condon is also far from straightforward. In his affidavit of 11 June 2021, Mr Condon produced what he said was Mr Bowen's draft will "from 1999", in which he was appointed as executor. Thereafter, in the same affidavit, he deposed to having been asked by Mr Bowen to be his executor only "sometime around 2007 or 2008". Strangely, an executed will dated 22 December 2008 appeared in the material attached to the affidavit, but was merely identified as being the will in respect of which probate was granted. By that will, Mr Condon was also appointed executor. 128 It is somewhat odd that Mr Condon claimed to have been appointed as an executor by the 1999 will, but was allegedly only asked to fulfil that role in 2007 or 2008. One would have thought that the request would have been made at the time of the preparation of the draft will. 129 As discussed above, there was also uncertainty in Mr Condon's evidence as to whether the USD200,000 was a gift or remuneration for carrying out the terms of the will. This renders his evidence even more difficult to accept. 130 Ultimately, there was no reliable evidence that Mr Bowen made a gift of USD200,000 to Mr Condon in 2008, or at any time. There is also no reliable evidence that it was buried in 2009 and retrieved in 2016.

Base Year 131 The Commissioner's asset betterment calculation adopted the 2014 income year as the "Base Year"; that is, the starting point for the identification of Mr Condon's income in the following Relevant Years. His methodology involved comparing Mr Condon's net asset position at the end of the income year ended 30 June 2015 to the equivalent position at the end of the Base Year so as to identify any change that might reflect the receipt of taxable income. This comparison was then repeated for the Relevant Years that followed by comparing the position at the end of each year to the position at the end of the previous year so as to calculate the change in Mr Condon's net assets. 132 The asset betterment statement prepared by the Commissioner indicated that Mr Condon had a deficiency of net assets as at 1 July 2014 of $5,797.52. Mr Condon challenged this starting point and, in his affidavit of 11 June 2021, deposed that the Commissioner had failed to include assets totalling $1,227,089.03. That figure changed over the course of the hearing and, by the time of the final submissions, it was suggested that his net asset position at the end of the Base Year was closer to $1.9 million. 133 In general terms, Mr Condon submitted that he held significant assets as at 30 June 2014, which should have been taken into account in the Commissioner's asset betterment calculation. They fall broadly into five categories, being: (a) US currency which comprised the USD500,000 allegedly buried in the front yard of his mother's house in addition to other amounts kept in his safe at the Showgrounds (and perhaps at his Urara Street property); (b) the Las Vegas units; (c) his shareholding in Bad Boys; (d) his "hobby vehicles"; and (e) an amount of Australian currency, which he also kept in his safe at the Showgrounds. 134 The Commissioner's main contention was that Mr Condon's recollection of events was unreliable and that he was a discredited witness whose evidence, absent any independent objective corroboration, should not be accepted as being truthful. As is apparent from the earlier parts of these reasons, that characterisation of Mr Condon's evidence should be accepted. 135 For the reasons that follow, Mr Condon did not establish on the balance of probabilities that the Base Year calculation was other than what the Commissioner ultimately contended, having regard to his ownership of the Las Vegas Units and his shareholding in Bad Boys. Each aspect of Mr Condon's purported Base Year calculation is addressed in turn.

US currency and the Base Year 136 Mr Condon claimed that, as at 30 June 2014, he was possessed of a substantial quantity of US denominated notes. He claimed that he had USD500,000 buried in the front yard of his mother's property, as well as a further substantial amount of US currency kept in his safe at the TPAIA premises or at his home at Urara Street. The precise amount claimed to exist was difficult to ascertain, and his evidence on this topic tended to vacillate. At different times, the additional amount was either USD195,000, USD147,000 or USD130,000. 137 The difficulty for Mr Condon in attempting to establish his US cash position as at 30 June 2014 was that his claims were based solely upon his own evidence, which, by itself, was not credible. His assertion that he had buried USD500,000 in the front yard of his mother's property has already been rejected. Whilst it was accepted that, in 2016, he seemed to be possessed of a large amount of damaged US currency, his explanation as to the source of that money has not been established to the relevant standard. It is possible to accept that, in 2009, he drew down on the Bad Boys' line of credit, and even that he thereafter acquired USD300,000 with that money. However, having rejected his assertions about the burying of the money, there is no evidence left as to what he did with it, or if it formed part of the US currency that he claimed to have in 2016. In reaching that conclusion, I take into account the fact that the US currency appearing in the photographs annexed to his affidavit appears to have been printed before 2013. However, that is insufficient to sustain Mr Condon's claim. Ultimately, it is only a possibility that he had amassed such funds as at the end of the Base Year, but that has not been established on the balance of probabilities. 138 In relation to the other US currency, his assertions as to the amount kept in the safe varied between his objection, Appeal Statement and his first affidavit. That lack of consistency reflected the general unreliability of his evidence and, in the course of cross-examination, the position did not become clearer. In fact, it is apparent that he sought to obfuscate his evidence in this regard. He was seemingly cognisant of the fact that it was in his interests to establish that he had a substantial amount of US currency as at 30 June 2014, and he sought to avoid being tied down to a precise position. Ultimately, he said that he did not keep track of the amount of money that he had. That statement was possibly true, but it only served to support the conclusion that he could not give any accurate evidence as to the amount of US currency he held in the Base Year. 139 It follows that there was an absence of credible evidence as to the amount of US currency, if any, that was held by Mr Condon immediately prior to the commencement of the first Relevant Year.

Las Vegas units and the Base Year 140 The facts in relation to Mr Condon's purchase and sale of certain real property interests in Las Vegas were the subject of agreement between the parties. As at 1 July 2014, Mr Condon owned two units in Las Vegas referred to as Units 1020 and 1277. Both were subsequently sold. During the 2017 income year, Unit 1277 was sold for USD85,000, as a result of which Mr Condon was liable to pay tax in the US and Australia. This was disclosed in the objection lodged on or around 17 July 2020, and appears to have been accepted by the Commissioner in his Objection Decision dated 23 December 2020. During the 2018 income year, Mr Condon sold Unit 1020 for USD135,000 and, again, was liable to pay tax in the US and Australia. In respect of both years, Mr Condon was entitled to a foreign income tax offset in order to alleviate double taxation. 141 Mr Condon contended that the value of Unit 1020 and Unit 1277 should have been reflected in the opening net asset position as at 1 July 2014. In that regard, Mr Brennan submitted that the Las Vegas units "were not conceded at the base year; they were conceded appropriately when they were sold and they were brought to account, because they didn't know - or, rather, the objection decision-maker didn't know exactly when they were purchased, but they were certainly purchased before that time". It would seem, therefore, that the reason that the Commissioner did not make an adjustment to the asset betterment calculation for the value of these units was because he did not have enough details in respect of them at the time of the Objection Decision. 142 It is worth recalling that the Full Court in Gashi, at 315 [66], stated that, "even if a taxpayer was able to prove that an item in the Asset Betterment Statement was wrong or should not have been included, but did not adequately explain the source or sources for the otherwise unexplained increase in wealth, the taxpayer would not discharge the onus under s 14ZZO of the TAA". It follows that the Commissioner is not required to make any amendments to the net asset position as at the Base Year to reflect the value of the two Las Vegas units, despite them subsequently being subject to an agreed set of facts. Nevertheless, the evidence of the existence and sale of the two units goes some way to explaining the source of funds available to Mr Condon in the 2017 and 2018 income years.

Shareholding in Bad Boys and the Base Year 143 A key issue in relation to Bad Boys was its value as at 1 July 2014. Mr Condon deposed in his affidavit of 11 June 2021 that on or around 7 January 2003, he caused Bad Boys to be incorporated and that he had been its sole director and shareholder ever since. This became an agreed fact between the parties. He also deposed that this company was established so that he could secure and protect the name "Bad Boys". Although the relevant ASIC historical company search revealed that it had at certain times had various other business names, such as "Miss Townsville", "Headline Security", "Miss Teen Townsville", "Clancy's Chips" and "Badboys Securities Services", minimal reference was made to those businesses or to other activities associated with them during the Relevant Years, save that Mr Condon did refer to some security work that he undertook as part of his role at the TPAIA. Mr Condon also deposed that, during the Relevant Years, Bad Boys had no income and no profits, as reflected in its financial statements for the years ended 30 June 2014 to 30 June 2018. 144 The evidence as to the value, if any, of the shares in Bad Boys was perhaps more confusing than it ought to have been. It was an agreed fact between the parties that Bad Boys owned 66 Ingham Road and, as at 26 October 2009, BOQ valued that property at AUD400,000. In Mr Condon's Appeal Statement, he alleged that the shares in Bad Boys, which were not included in the Commissioner's asset betterment statement at the commencement of the Base Year, had a value of $400,000. However, in his affidavit of 11 June 2021, he deposed that the value of the shares was $80,000 once the BOQ line of credit facility of $320,000 was taken into account. The Commissioner's position was that the shares in Bad Boys were a "nil integer" because they were not disposed of across the Relevant Years. 145 Somewhat inconsistently with the evidence of Mr Condon just referred to, it was submitted by his Counsel, Ms Chen, that the value of the shares in Bad Boys may have been understated because, as at 30 October 2013, the BOQ line of credit was $691.53 in credit. On that basis, it was said that the shares ought to have been valued at around $400,000, being the approximate value of 66 Ingham Road. A BOQ statement was tendered in evidence, and referred to in Mr Condon's written submissions, which disclosed an opening credit balance of $691.63 at 31 October 2014. During her oral address, Ms Chen repeated the submission that, as at 30 June 2014, the overdraft had been repaid in full and that the bank statement for the line of credit from BOQ had shown a credit balance. Another bank statement was produced which disclosed the account balance between January and April 2013, and indicated that, at the end of that period, no money was owed on the account. However, again, Mr Condon's lack of records created difficulties, because he failed to adduce evidence establishing the account balance specifically as at 30 June 2014. Whilst it is not possible to make any conclusive finding as to the value of the shares in Bad Boys as at that date, it is possible that there was some equity in the company, which was available for Mr Condon to draw upon from time to time. 146 If it is assumed that the overdraft of $320,000 had been repaid in full by 30 June 2014, it would necessarily follow that Mr Condon had sourced from somewhere the funds that were required to make the repayment. While there was no obligation on him to explain away transactions in the years prior to the Relevant Years, a large part of his case was that he had a substantial net asset position as at 30 June 2014 of $1,227,240.50, and he relied on this Base Year asset position for the purpose of explaining his source of funds in the Relevant Years. Therefore, some attempt at explaining the origin of the funds used to pay down the line of credit as alleged may have assisted him. General statements to the effect that he "was earning over $100,000 a year" did little to help, not least because such statements seemed to refer to gross income and not net income. 147 Again, even if it is concluded that the value of the shares in Bad Boys as at 30 June 2014 was about $400,000, and that value was a source of funds for Mr Condon, the fact that the Commissioner's asset betterment statement may have been incorrect in that respect does not mean that Mr Condon has discharged the onus on him.

Hobby vehicles and the Base Year 148 Mr Condon alleged that the asset betterment calculation did not take into account the value of certain motor vehicles, referred to as "hobby vehicles", and that this value should have been reflected in his net asset position as at 30 June 2014. He also relied on receipts from the sale of certain of the vehicles as an explanation of revenue regularly received by him during the Relevant Years. 149 The reply submissions for Mr Condon emphasised that, during his cross-examination he had identified that he had even more vehicles than were initially declared in his objection. It was submitted that "[t]his fact supports Mr Condon's contention that he collected vehicles as a hobby and had a significant number of them". However, rather than advancing Mr Condon's case, this submission draws attention to his limited recollection as to what his true position was with respect to his motor vehicle ownership as at 30 June 2014 and the general unreliability of his evidence. That, combined with the incomplete records he kept of his purchases and sales, and his failure to maintain any account of the vehicles that he held at a particular point in time, can only lead to the conclusion that he simply did not know what vehicles he held at 30 June 2014, let alone their value. 150 Reference should also be made to the schedule of vehicles that Mr Condon deposed to "holding" as at 1 July 2014, which he indicated he "owned", in that they were listed as part of "his" assets and liabilities. The Commissioner drew attention to his concession during cross-examination that some of the listed vehicles were not actually his assets at the relevant time, because they had already been sold and paid for, or sold and partly paid for, or were part of the sale price of other vehicles. The asserted reason for his including in the schedule these vehicles that he did not own, but that he was "holding" at the time, was that he was instructed to do so by his former lawyer who allegedly "said just list anything beyond - so list anything that you had [at the Showgrounds]". This yet again highlights the difficulties involved in reconciling Mr Condon's evidence, and emphasises his inability to prove what motor vehicles he, in fact, owned as at the end of the Base Year. 151 A recurring theme in Mr Condon's submissions was that the vehicles that he owned as at the Base Year were "hobby vehicles" and were not part of his carrying on a business of buying and selling cars as a motor vehicle dealer. However, this subjective assessment that his activities constituted a hobby is of limited to no utility when the broader circumstances of his conduct are taken into account. As will be discussed later, his buying and selling of motor vehicles had all the hallmarks of business activity.

The Australian currency and the Base Year 152 The parties do not dispute that, as at 30 June 2014, Mr Condon had a total of $7,950 in his Australian bank accounts. However, he alleged that he held a significant amount of Australian currency in his safe at the TPAIA offices, which was not reflected in the Base Year calculation. Specifically, he claimed that he was then holding AUD150,000 of his own money and a further AUD200,000 belonging to Mr O'Connor. 153 On Mr Condon's behalf, it was submitted that there was sufficient evidence to support this claim, including the following. First, that he had only $7,950 as at 30 June 2014 in his Australian bank accounts. Secondly, that he was earning over $100,000 a year, did not have any dependants, and was not paying rent or significant expenses, such that he was able to save substantial amounts. Thirdly, that it was his practice to deal in cash and use cash for his day-to-day living expenses and, for those purposes, he was required to hold cash. He claimed that this was supported by his bank accounts, which do not show any regular supermarket, fuel, restaurant or other daily living expense transactions. 154 Despite these matters, for the reasons that follow, Mr Condon has been unable to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that he held a total of AUD350,000 in his safe as at 30 June 2014. 155 As was typical of his evidence generally, his claims in relation to this issue were inconsistent. Whilst it was asserted in correspondence from his solicitors that he was holding these amounts as at 30 June 2014, his Notice of Objection dated 17 July 2020 made no reference to any Australian dollar amounts. This discrepancy was unexplained. 156 The Commissioner also submitted that Mr Condon was both unwilling and unable to respond adequately to questions put to him during cross-examination as to his purported cash holding as at 1 July 2014. The following exchange from the first day of the trial is particularly revealing, and highlights Mr Condon's lack of recollection on this issue: [MR BRENNAN]: Well, I'm just going from this assets and liabilities document, Mr Condon. You realise that I know nothing about what's in that safe as at 30 June? [MR CONDON]: And I don't recall what's in the safe in O - '14 either. [MR BRENNAN]: Okay? [MR CONDON]: It's eight years ago. [MR BRENNAN]: Okay. But when you came to do this document, this assets and liabilities document - - -? [MR CONDON]: This is - that's six years later. Six years. … [MR BRENNAN]: No. Okay. And you don't even estimate how much Australian cash that you were holding in your safe on this document, do you? [MR CONDON]: No. [MR BRENNAN]: So you said it could be $5000. What would be the maximum that it could be? [MR CONDON]: I wouldn't have a clue. It's eight years ago and when I done this it was 6 years. [MR BRENNAN]: Well, what is the maximum amount of Australian cash that you held in your safe that you can recall? [MR CONDON]: Over 200, because I had Peter O'Connor's 200,000. [MR BRENNAN]: No, I'm not talking about Mr O'Connor's money here, okay. I'm talking about your money. So how much of your money, the maximum amount of your money, were you holding in that safe that you can recall? [MR CONDON]: I don't recall. I don't - I couldn't put a figure on it, an exact figure. [MR BRENNAN]: I'm not asking for an exact figure. Just an estimate. 50,000, 100,000, more or less? [MR CONDON]: I don't recall because I - like, because what I had done was I worked and I was - I don't - I can't a finger on it, your Honour. I don't know. In '014, I don't know because I brought the money for the US that I wire transferred to the United States and then I brought that back - the US dollars back with me. … [MR BRENNAN]: Yes. So you brought the money back in US dollars. Did you convert it then into Australia dollars? [MR CONDON]: No. Not that I recall, no. (Emphasis added). 157 This effectively undermined any other assertion that he made as to the amount of Australian currency he allegedly held in his safe as at 30 June 2014. His answers necessarily demonstrate the difficulties that arise in a case such as the present, when a person's affairs are carried out by way of undocumented cash transactions and no record is made or maintained of the true state of their accounts. 158 On the third day of the trial, Mr Condon said that he had given further thought to his net asset position as at 30 June 2014, and claimed that there was an amount of Australian currency that should have been included but had not yet been mentioned by him. However, as the following exchange highlights, he was unable to take the Court to any point in his six affidavits where he deposed to what his approximate cash balance was in his safe as at 30 June 2014: [MR BRENNAN]: Okay. So that refers to the A3 sheet that I gave you of asset and liabilities - assets and liabilities. You understand that - - -? [MR CONDON]: Yes. [MR BRENNAN]: That where it says there: CGC-1 tab 2 is a true copy of table of my assets and liabilities - that's the document it's referring to. So can you just now tell the court where in this affidavit or in another affidavit you say that you've set out the approximate cash that you had in your safe as at 30 June 2014? [MR CONDON]: Well, it doesn't list it on here, but it doesn't - doesn't list it on here cash - cash that I had in the safe. It doesn't list on this. So last - - - 159 Although it is repetitive to say so, this acutely reiterates the difficulty with Mr Condon's evidence generally; namely, that it was inconsistent, lacking in accuracy, and he was prepared to say whatever he believed would advance his case at any particular time. It is not possible to accept his late claim that he was suddenly able to remember the amount of cash in his safe as at 30 June 2014. 160 Ms Chen sought to use some email correspondence from Ms Jazmin Clancy, on Mr Condon's behalf, to his solicitors on 16 July 2020 to re-establish his credibility on this issue. In that email correspondence, reference was made to his having AUD150,000 of his own money in his safe. It seems that the Court was being asked to infer that his solicitors made an error by failing to include that amount in his objection statement. However, there was insufficient evidence as to the process by which the statement was prepared from which to infer the existence of an error. In any event, as Mr Condon was unable throughout the proceedings to relate historical facts in a reliable manner, the assertion in the email also lacks credibility. There was no other corroborating evidence to support the allegation. It is, therefore, not possible to accept that, as at 30 June 2014, he held any amount of Australian currency in his safe. Even if it could be accepted that he was possessed of some funds, it is not possible to ascertain the amount. After all, not even he knew that.

Common factual issues 161 In accordance with the manner in which the parties addressed the Court, it is appropriate to undertake a detailed consideration of some common factual issues, which generally traverse the Relevant Years. The topics considered are Mr Condon's claimed gambling successes, his motor vehicle collection and whether he was engaged in a business of dealing in motor vehicles, the extent to which amounts received by him were reimbursements from the TPAIA, amounts received by him from Ms Rowena Clancy and Ms Jazmin Clancy, and amounts referable to Mr Condon's claimed foreign currency transactions.

Gambling 162 A plank of Mr Condon's appeals was that, during the Relevant Period, he received money in the form of gambling winnings, mainly from betting on boxing matches, which were non-taxable and did not form part of his assessable income. He deposed that he had gambling winnings totalling $41,070 for which he had kept records, and that he had also made successful bets on other occasions in respect of which he did not keep any records. He asserted that these bets were made in cash and he had not kept any betting stub or ticket. He annexed to one of his affidavits a copy of a table summarising what he said were his betting wins and losses, copies of betting statements, and other betting records. The summary commences in the 2011 income year and runs to the 2019 income year. To give some context to the extent of his gambling activities, he contended that, for the period from 2011 to 2019, he made an overall gain of approximately $86,000. That figure reflected approximately $100,000 in winnings, less losses of approximately $14,000. It was common ground that he was not carrying on business as a professional gambler. 163 On his behalf, it was submitted that, as the Commissioner had accepted that he had engaged in some gambling activities and made some winnings, all amounts characterised by him as gambling winnings ought also to be accepted as such. Even putting aside Mr Condon's lack of credibility, that submission cannot be accepted. In the first place, the focus of both his evidence and his written and oral submissions was on his alleged "winnings". Besides the summary table provided, there was scant reference to the detail surrounding his gambling losses, save that he gave evidence that he "[hadn't] lost too much". By his own admission, he "had other cash bets that [he had] not been able to find records of which are not included in [the] summary". He did not, with any degree of specificity, attempt to explain the source of the funds that allowed him to undertake his gambling activities, including the bets on which he made losses. His failure to do so for each of the income years in the Relevant Period indicated that he had only approached half of the task that he was required to undertake in order to discharge his onus. 164 It can be accepted, as it was by the Commissioner, that amounts paid from betting accounts with William Hill, UniTAB and Sportsbet into Mr Condon's bank accounts, and verified by betting statements, were not assessable income. However, where his claims to successful betting have not been supported by other credible testimony or documentary evidence, it must be concluded that he has not established the origin of those receipts on the balance of probabilities.

Motor vehicles 165 At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr Condon claimed that, as at the Base Year, his wealth included a car collection valued at approximately $500,000, albeit that this assessment used the prices for which he had subsequently sold some of the cars. His collection, and the circumstances of his dealing in motor vehicles, consumed a not insignificant portion of the hearing. In broad terms, the Commissioner submitted that Mr Condon could not establish that his collection of vehicles, or the receipts from sales of some of the cars, resulted from a hobby. It was contended that the more likely conclusion was that Mr Condon was engaged in a business of buying and selling motor vehicles for profit, albeit not on a large scale. Conversely, Mr Condon maintained that, although he repeatedly bought and sold motor vehicles, sometimes at a profit, those activities were only part of his pursuit of a hobby. As the Commissioner put Mr Condon to proof as to the amount of his assessable income in each of the Relevant Years, it was necessary for him to establish that his transactions involving the buying and selling of motor vehicles were part of, or ancillary to, a hobby. If he was able to do so, he would demonstrate that the resulting revenue that he received was not assessable.

The evidence concerning the dealings with motor vehicles 166 As was typical of Mr Condon's evidence, that which he gave in relation to his ownership of, and dealings with, numerous motor vehicles was confusing and frequently contradictory. Across his six affidavits and the annexures thereto, it was not uncommon for the same vehicle to be referred to by different labels, for the details of the acquisition and disposal of particular vehicles to be inconsistent or incomplete, and for information of apparent relevance to his activities in respect of motor vehicles to be mentioned only in passing without further elaboration. In multiple instances, his affidavit evidence differed from the evidence contained in affidavits sworn by other deponents, from his own evidence in cross-examination, and from additional exhibits tendered by the Commissioner. 167 It is, therefore, difficult to gather, from the evidence as a whole, any clear indication as to what vehicles Mr Condon owned or held at the Base Year, and precisely what subsequent sales and purchases occurred during and after the Relevant Years. The convoluted nature of the evidence undermined his attempt to demonstrate that his dealings with motor vehicles constituted only a hobby and not a business. Ultimately, the picture that emerged was that, prior to, during and after the Relevant Years: (a) he was the holder of a motor dealer licence under the Motor Dealers and Chattels Auctioneers Act 2014 (Qld); (b) he owned and/or dealt with a considerable number of vehicles, the origin and final whereabouts of which were not always disclosed; (c) he sold a number of vehicles at a profit, sold some at an approximately breakeven price, and disposed of others at a price not revealed on the evidence; (d) although in several instances his dealings were with friends or family members, on multiple occasions he also dealt with wholesalers and persons with whom he was not well acquainted; (e) in relation to a number of dealings, he acted or purported to act in his capacity as a licenced motor vehicle dealer or otherwise made use of a dealer plate (though various explanations were given for this conduct); and (f) there was reason to believe that he owned or dealt with a number of additional vehicles not specifically identified in the evidence. 168 These conclusions, and the evidence from which they are drawn, are relevant in four respects. First, and most directly, they undermine Mr Condon's contention that his dealings with motor vehicles constituted a hobby and not a business. Were it appropriate to determine whether or not he was carrying on a business in each of the Relevant Years, it would be necessary to have regard to the nature and extent of the motor vehicle transactions entered into by him during those years. It would also be appropriate to consider his conduct prior to and after those years, insofar as it might demonstrate a degree of consistency and scale in his dealings that may be characteristic of a business. While not sufficient in and of itself to found a conclusion that he was carrying on a business during the Relevant Years, consideration of that conduct may support a finding to that effect, based on other material in the proceedings. Secondly, and relatedly, the evidence may be relevant insofar as it identifies certain deposits and withdrawals made by him in each of the Relevant Years as reflecting payments from or to income or non-income sources. Thirdly, the evidence may assist in demonstrating his net asset position as at the Base Year (as addressed above). Finally, it is relevant to his credit. His evidence in relation to motor vehicles was extensive, and ultimately proved an ample wellspring of inaccuracies and contradictions, which are more than sufficient to support the findings set out above as to his lack of honesty, unreliability, and poor credibility as a witness. 169 As this issue was the subject of substantial evidence and, on its own, may be pivotal, it is necessary to consider the constituent parts in some detail. What follows is an analysis of the evidence regarding Mr Condon's activities with respect to the subject motor vehicles. However, before turning to it, two things should be noted. The first is that the evidence in relation to some vehicles was substantially more detailed than that in relation to others, which results in a differentiation of the detail of consideration. The second is that three vehicles attracted particular attention at trial on account of some uncertainty as to whether they were owned by Mr Condon or by Ms Rowena Clancy (hereinafter referred to as Rowena), and it is appropriate that these be dealt with together. 170 It is convenient to turn to a consideration of the evidence surrounding each of the vehicles known to have been disposed of by Mr Condon (whether by sale or otherwise) before addressing the three vehicles allegedly owned by Rowena. Consideration will then be given to the vehicles known to have been in Mr Condon's possession at the time of trial and, finally, the vehicles the whereabouts of which was not disclosed. Within these categories, the vehicles are listed by the year of their make and alphabetically. In accordance with Mr Condon's customary mode of business, the dealings by him were almost invariably oral, and the transactions often completed in cash, such that there is minimal documentation, if any, at hand to support his oral and affidavit evidence.

1927 Black Ford Model T Utility / 1927 Hot Rod / 1927 Orange Ford T-Bucket 171 The relevance of a 1927 Black Ford Model T Utility to these proceedings only became apparent when it was brought to Mr Condon's attention during cross-examination. In response to preliminary questioning, he immediately and confidently volunteered that he had sold such a vehicle since the commencement of the proceedings in order to pay for legal costs. He stated that he had purchased it "over 20 years ago". When asked whether he had sold it to a person called Natasha Kim Burns, he gave no clear response, but proceeded, abruptly, to deny ever having owned a vehicle meeting the relevant description: that is, a 1927 Ford Model T Utility, 8 cylinder, petrol, black, two-seater, left-hand drive, with number plate "064XCC". This is yet a further example of how he would confidently make wholly contradictory statements within close temporal proximity to one another. 172 During cross-examination the following day, he was shown a photograph, which was tendered as an exhibit, of a number of vehicles stored inside a shed at the Showgrounds (Exhibit 11). He identified one as a "1927 Hot Rod" and said that he had taken the cross-examination of the previous day to be referring to that vehicle. The two vehicles were apparently different. He then stated that he had purchased the vehicle depicted in the photograph in around 2005 or 2007 and sold it in May 2022 for $50,000, the buyer taking possession in July 2022. He also identified that the number plate for the vehicle was, at one time, "TKO", although it is worth noting that Mr Gregory Heffler in his subsequent cross-examination identified that as the number plate for the HSV Senator that he purchased from Mr Condon in 2017 (as addressed below). 173 Sometime later, in re-examination, Mr Condon distinguished between the two vehicles that he had previously confused - namely, the 1927 Black Ford Model T Utility referred to by the Commissioner, and a 1927 Orange Ford T-Bucket sometimes referred to as a "Hot Rod" that he identified in the photograph. The explanation for the alleged confusion was somewhat difficult to follow. He seemed to suggest that he had only ever owned the latter vehicle, but he had mistaken the reference to the 1927 Black Ford Model T Utility as a reference to it. It was for this reason that he had claimed that he had made a number of statements suggesting ownership of, or at least familiarity with, the 1927 Black Ford Model T Utility. He asserted that at no time did he own the 1927 Black Ford Model T Utility, and it was for this reason that he had flatly denied ownership of such a vehicle towards the end of the first round of cross-examination referred to above. He did, however, go on to explain that he had obtained a roadworthy for the 1927 Black Ford Model T Utility and assisted a person called Lincoln Hudson to obtain registration for the vehicle in New South Wales. Specifically, he said as follows: [MR CONDON]: … what had actually happened was I had got a roadworthy for it and got it registered for him because he sold it to a guy in New South Wales, and he sold it to a guy in New South Wales by the name of Lincoln Hudson, and he talked - he talked a lot about it. I remember. And Hudson rang me and asked if I could get it registered for him because it would be easier if we could - he could register it in New South Wales. 174 The individual referred to as "he" and "him" was never identified. Mr Hudson did not give evidence. 175 The cumulative effect of the evidence seemed to be that, in about mid-2021, Mr Condon sold a 1927 Orange Ford T-Bucket vehicle for $50,000. As he was not a credible witness and his evidence was otherwise often inaccurate, it is not possible to reach any conclusion as to when the vehicle was acquired. There was also no evidence as to its original purchase price and it is not possible to determine whether any profit was made on its sale. Otherwise, it is possible, but not established, that Mr Condon had, at some point, been involved in procuring a roadworthy and registration for a 1927 Black Ford Model T Utility, though the details surrounding that dealing were far from clear. Given Mr Condon's admissions, it is also possible that he had sold the 1927 Black Ford Model T Utility to Natasha Kim Burns. It is unclear whether that transaction was profitable or not.

1965 Volkswagen Beetle 176 In his affidavit sworn 11 June 2021, Mr Condon deposed that he had "[s]ometime in 2009" purchased a 1965 Volkswagen Beetle from Ms Jacqui Maciver for $4,000. The number plate for the vehicle was 705HGH and its Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) was said to be variously 195300593, or 195399593. Under cross-examination, he said that the vehicle had been purchased for around $3,000 or $4,000 and in his affidavit of 11 June 2021 he said it was sold to Mr Wayne Smithers on or about 21 December 2015 for $14,000, which funds were transferred into his CBA 5162 account that same day. Schedules of deposits and withdrawals annexed to Mr Condon's affidavits sworn 11 June 2021, 23 March 2022 and 16 November 2022 reveal a single deposit on that date in that amount. However, at multiple points in cross-examination, Mr Condon asserted that Mr Smithers had made payments for the vehicle over time. In particular, he claimed that payments were still being made as at 30 June 2014, but admitted he was uncertain as to the relevant dates. There was no specific evidence as to why the value of the car increased over time, and it might be assumed that this was a vehicle on which Mr Condon worked by improving it in various ways. 177 Although it could be concluded that a substantial profit was made on the sale of the Volkswagen, the evidence as to when the payments for the vehicle were received by Mr Condon was both uncertain and inconsistent. It is not possible to accept his evidence that any payments from the sale of this vehicle were received by him in any of the Relevant Years, such that the amounts that he claimed were payments for the car remain unexplained. There is also a paucity of credible evidence surrounding the vehicle's acquisition. Whilst he claimed that he bought it sometime in 2009 and he annexed a copy of a registration certificate from 2005, the latter does not assist with the date of its acquisition. For the reasons referred to above in relation to Mr Condon's credibility and accuracy, it is not possible to accept his evidence in relation to the sale of the Volkswagen.

1966 Red Ford Mustang 178 In his 11 June 2021 affidavit, Mr Condon deposed to having purchased a "1966 Ford Mustang coup [sic]" in 2008 for $3,000. It had the number plate "BAD1" and its VIN was 6R07C150269. In his 23 March 2022 affidavit, he added that it had been imported from the United States using an import approval dated 4 September 2007 and was not driven during the period that he owned it. In cross-examination, he said that he had purchased it for $3,000 or $4,000. 179 The evidence relating to the vehicle's subsequent disposal was substantially more opaque. In his 11 June 2021 affidavit, Mr Condon deposed to having sold the "red Ford Mustang" in 2013 to Mr Washington Mendes, who purchased it through his company, Queensland REO Pty Ltd. Again, the agreement was allegedly wholly oral and not supported by documentation. Mr Condon gave evidence that Mr Mendes had paid $35,000 cash for the vehicle in several instalments, each of which he said was received during the 2014 income year. The timing of the payments was important because it would, on Mr Condon's case, justify certain receipts in that income year as non-assessable income. During cross-examination, Mr Condon was referred to a page from a diary which appeared to record payments having been received from Mr Mendes in respect of the Mustang from 16 September 2013 to 26 November 2013, which totalled $35,000. That page was attached as an exhibit to Mr Condon's own affidavit of 11 June 2021 and was said to have originated from his diary. In his affidavit, he described it as being his practice to note the payments that were made. Under cross-examination, however, he appeared to contest the veracity of the entries from his own diary and could not explain why the entries were not in chronological order. He became evasive when pressed about when the payments for the car were made, and asserted that further payments were made because a new engine was acquired for the car for $15,000 and that other payments were to be made in relation to its upgrading. That sat in contrast to a statement by his previous solicitors in a letter to the Commissioner on 30 September 2020, to the effect that the payment of $15,000 was the final payment received in relation to the sale of the vehicle. 180 Somewhat unusually, Mr Condon retained possession of the Red Ford Mustang as at the time of trial. He said that, although the total purchase price had been paid, he later lent Mr Mendes the sum of $20,000 and held the car, which was apparently worth $50,000, as collateral. He said that Mr Mendes had not repaid the loan so he retained the car. It seems highly improbable that Mr Mendes would surrender his ownership of the car in that fashion in circumstances where he might have, at least, sold it and recovered the excess amount remaining after he had paid his alleged debt. 181 Mr Condon also gave some evidence, albeit rather unclear, to the effect that he took the car and changed its registration so as to conceal its existence from Mr Mendes' wife, with whom Mr Mendes was having matrimonial difficulties. 182 Again, it is not possible to accept Mr Condon's evidence that any payments received in the Relevant Years were in respect of the sale of this vehicle. That is particularly so given his own records and sworn evidence to the contrary. His testimony in relation to this vehicle, again, exemplifies his general inaccuracy and lack of reliability.

1968 Red Chevrolet Corvette 183 Mr Condon deposed in his 11 June 2021 affidavit that he had "[s]ometime in 2012" purchased a "Red Chevrolet Corvette" for $9,000. Generally, his evidence in relation to this acquisition was consistent, and was supported by an import approval dated 13 April 2012, issued by the Administrator of Vehicle Standards of the Department of Infrastructure and Transport in respect of a 1968 Chevrolet Corvette and two other vehicles. Although there was some discrepancy in the recording of the VIN for this vehicle in the available documentation, in general terms, the assertion that the vehicle was purchased for around $9,000 can be accepted despite the absence of any written agreement. 184 In his affidavit of 11 June 2021, Mr Condon recorded the vehicle's value as $50,000 as at 1 July 2014, and a similar statement to this effect is recorded in the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts. 185 His evidence was that he sold the Chevrolet Corvette to Mr Phillip Thompson, though the precise details of the sale were difficult to ascertain and the agreement was neither written nor recorded in any correspondence. Mr Thompson gave evidence in the proceedings, and deposed that he had purchased the vehicle in or around "the middle of 2014" in exchange for $40,000 and a boat that he had then owned. He also deposed that Mr Condon had allowed him to pay off the vehicle in a number of cash instalments between 2014 and 2016. This version of events was somewhat supported by other evidence, but there were several notable instances in which it was contradicted. 186 First, there was some ambiguity as to the precise date of the transaction. In cross-examination, Mr Condon indicated that by around 30 June 2014 he no longer owned the vehicle, and that at that time it was being "paid off" by Mr Thompson. He later accepted that the vehicle was sold to Mr Thompson sometime after 1 July 2014 which was consistent with the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts, in which it was agreed that the vehicle was sold during the 2015 income year. Mr Thompson indicated in cross-examination that the arrangement to sell the vehicle was concluded in 2014, without specifying any particular point in that year. The weight of the evidence indicates that it was probably sold to Mr Thompson at some point in 2014. However, this is difficult to reconcile with the events detailed below. 187 The most significant inconsistency concerned the evidence as to the price of the vehicle. Mr Thompson departed from his affidavit in cross-examination, identifying that the price for the vehicle was in fact $70,000, comprising $40,000 and the boat. By contrast, Mr Condon suggested that the boat was worth only about $10,000 at the time of the purchase, and was subsequently valued at about $30,000 only once it he had "done it all up" such that, on his assessment, the purchase price was $50,000. However, the boat was identified in other documents adduced by Mr Condon as a "Baja" boat with a price or estimated value of $30,000, which had been acquired by him at least by 1 July 2014, without mention being made of repairs or modifications. Other documents produced by Mr Condon listed the price of the vehicle as $40,000 without mentioning the boat at all. 188 The evidence as to the means by which the purchase price was paid was especially obscure. This was, no doubt, a consequence of the sale being an undocumented cash transaction in respect of which no records were kept. Despite that, Mr Condon identified certain deposits into his bank accounts that he said were likely to have been, or likely to have been made on account of, payments by Mr Thompson towards the vehicle's purchase. There are, however, several reasons to doubt the veracity of his evidence. The specific deposits were as follows: (a) In his affidavits sworn 11 June 2021 and 16 November 2022, Mr Condon deposed to having deposited $3,300 into his bank account on 28 July 2015, this amount being said to have reflected a cash part-payment by Mr Thompson. In a schedule of deposits and withdrawals annexed to his 11 June 2021 affidavit, labelled "Schedule B", he annotated a $3,300 deposit into his Westpac 9868 account on 28 July 2015 as "MAYBE Phil corvette". His affidavits of 23 March 2022 and 16 November 2022 contained schedules with identical entries. In cross-examination, he explained that he had included the word "MAYBE" in the annotation because he could not be sure that the deposit reflected a payment by Mr Thompson. (b) It was an agreed fact that, on 7 September 2016, Mr Condon received a deposit of $8,800 into the same Westpac 9868 account for the sale of the vehicle to Mr Thompson. (c) Similarly, in his 11 June 2021 affidavit, he deposed to having received a deposit of $4,000 into the Westpac 9868 account on 23 November 2016. This deposit was annotated "Sale Corvette Phil" in Schedule C to that affidavit, and in Schedule C to his 23 March 2022 affidavit. (d) In a schedule of deposits and withdrawals annexed to his 11 June 2021 affidavit, labelled "Schedule D", he annotated three deposits into his ANZ 7912 account of $1,000 on 7 July 2017, $3,000 on 21 July 2017 and $1,380 on 26 July 2017 as "Maybe Phil Corvette". These were identically annotated in Schedule D to his 23 March 2022 affidavit. (e) Again in Schedule D to his 11 June 2021 affidavit, Mr Condon annotated a $2,000 deposit into his CBA 5162 account on 19 September 2017 as "Maybe Phil Corvette". This was identically annotated in Schedule D to his 23 March 2022 affidavit and an equivalent schedule in his 16 November 2022 affidavit. (f) In Schedule D to his 23 March 2022 affidavit, he annotated a $3,000 deposit into his ANZ 7912 account on 5 September 2017 as "Cash deposit - Maybe Phil Corvette". This deposit was identically annotated in an equivalent schedule in his 16 November 2022 affidavit. (g) In Schedule D to his 23 March 2022 affidavit, he also annotated a $7,500 deposit into his BOQ 8201 account on 22 December 2017 as "Maybe Phil Corvette", and a $5,000 deposit into the same account on 5 January 2018 as "Maybe Phil Corvette". These were identically annotated in an equivalent schedule in his 16 November 2022 affidavit. (h) In his 16 November 2022 affidavit, he deposed to having deposited $4,000 into his Westpac 7477 account on 23 November 2016, the funds being "cash savings that [he] held in [his] safe that [he] received from Phil Thompson". This deposit was reflected in a schedule annexed to that affidavit. 189 There are, at least, three difficulties with this evidence. In the first place, the history of the deposits indicates that payment for the vehicle took place over the period 28 July 2015 to 5 January 2018. That is substantially after the date of the sale of the car to Mr Thompson that was suggested by the other evidence in the proceedings, and contradicts the related affidavit evidence from both Mr Condon and Mr Thompson that the vehicle was paid off over two years from 2014 to 2016. The second point is that the sum of the deposits said by Mr Condon to have been payments for the vehicle exceeded $40,000, which was the alleged purchase price for the vehicle according to Mr Condon's and Mr Thompson's other evidence (putting to one side the additional value of the boat). Finally, the deposits of $8,800 and $7,500 contradict Mr Thompson's evidence in cross-examination that the most he paid to Mr Condon at any one time was "maybe four to five thousand". 190 These difficulties render it impossible to reach any satisfactory conclusion, to the required standard of proof, as to the date on which the vehicle was sold and paid for, or the price paid for it. It is nevertheless apparent that, whatever the case, Mr Condon seems to have made a substantial profit upon its sale to Mr Thompson. Although it may be possible to infer that this was another of the vehicles that Mr Condon refurbished, there is no evidence as to the cost to him of doing so.

1969 Chevrolet Impala 191 Mr Condon deposed in his 11 June 2021 affidavit that he had purchased a "1969 Impala" on 10 June 2016 for $1,200. In his subsequent affidavit of 16 November 2022 he said that he had purchased it in 2016, and annexed a vehicle import approval for it dated 31 March 2016. He clarified in cross-examination that the purchase price of $1,200 was in fact USD1,200. However, he later stated that he had purchased the vehicle for around $1,500 or $2,000, acknowledging that he could not recall the exact price. He also said that he had sold the vehicle for $20,000 a couple of months prior to trial in order to pay for legal costs. 192 While it is apparent that he made a substantial profit on the sale of this vehicle, account must be taken of his evidence that he bore fairly substantial costs in transporting it to Townsville. In his 16 November 2022 affidavit, he deposed to having paid $8,857.17 to Townsville Customs & Forwarding Services Pty Ltd to arrange for its transportation alongside a 1994 Green Cadillac 4D (addressed below) from Long Beach to Brisbane. Annexed to that affidavit was a tax invoice from that company dated 13 June 2016 showing the amount of $8,857.17, though it did not specify the vehicles to which it related. In the same affidavit, he deposed to having paid $1,475 to transport the vehicles from Brisbane to Townsville by rail, in support of which he pointed to a particular withdrawal of that amount from his CBA 5162 account on 11 July 2016, set out in a schedule of deposits and withdrawals annexed to the affidavit. 193 His oral evidence about these matters departed substantially from his affidavit evidence. He denied that the tax invoice reflected the cost of getting only the 1969 Chevrolet Impala and the 1994 Green Cadillac 4D to Australia, and instead stated that the invoice was for the importation of four vehicles: the Impala, the Cadillac, a 1964 F100 (which is likely, but not certainly, that referred to below), and a Mustang (the precise model not being specified). 194 Again, his evidence in relation to this transaction was vague and inconsistent. Nevertheless, it is another instance of his buying a vehicle, presumably repairing or restoring it, and subsequently selling it at an increased price.

1971 Red Chevrolet Corvette 4-Speed Coupe 195 Mr Declan Carnes deposed in an affidavit filed in these proceedings that, on or about 12 December 2011, he purchased from Mr Condon an unregistered vehicle described as a "red Chevrolet 4 Speed Coup with VIN #194 371 5117 938". This is broadly consistent with the evidence appearing in Mr Condon's affidavit of 11 June 2021, where the vehicle was described as a "red 1971 Chevrolet Corvette 4 speed coup with VIN number 194 371 5117 938". A photograph annexed to Mr Carnes' affidavit shows the vehicle to have the number plate "1ARW040". 196 Mr Carnes deposed that the vehicle was purchased from Mr Condon for $50,000, paid by bank cheque, though no record of the purchase was or could be produced. In cross-examination, Mr Condon also identified a sale price of $50,000. However, in his cross-examination, Mr Carnes waivered and said the price was "around the 50,000 mark". A degree of doubt must remain as to the true price of the vehicle, but for present purposes it is reasonable to proceed on the basis that it was sold to Mr Carnes for $50,000. 197 Mr Carnes also deposed that the vehicle was not registered after its purchase, but was owned by him and remained in his possession. In cross-examination, he gave conflicting evidence that it had been stored at the Showgrounds since 2011. He also conceded that he held no documentation that might be used to prove that he owned the vehicle. 198 No part of the evidence specifically explained how Mr Condon came to be in possession of the vehicle prior to its sale to Mr Carnes. In particular, no evidence was given as to the date at which he acquired it or the price he paid for it. Whilst it is not possible to determine with any certainty whether or not it was sold to Mr Carnes for a profit, the dealings surrounding it suggest that it was part of Mr Condon's pattern of behaviour of dealing in motor vehicles.

1994 Chevrolet Silverado Monster Truck 199 In his 11 June 2021 affidavit, Mr Condon deposed that "[s]ometime in 2009" he purchased a "Monster Truck" from Mr Quentin Day for USD20,000. It was described more precisely in a sales agreement annexed to the affidavit as a "1994 Chevrolet Monster Truck". He later deposed with more specificity in his 23 March 2022 affidavit that the Monster Truck was purchased on 10 August 2009 for USD20,000. However, in the "Spreadsheet of motor vehicles sold 2014-2018" in his response to the Commissioner's 10 September 2020 information request, the Monster Truck was listed as having been purchased in 2011 for $20,000, the denomination of that amount appearing, in the context of the spreadsheet, to be Australian dollars. 200 The evidence as to the eventual sale of the vehicle was even less coherent. Mr Condon deposed in his 11 June 2021 affidavit that it was sold in August 2016 to Mr Kevin "Terry" Brooks for $50,000. Mr Brooks allegedly paid the purchase price in two instalments: the first in August 2016 in the amount of $20,000 and the second in August 2017 in the amount of $30,000. All of these details were listed in the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts as having been agreed. The August 2016 date of sale and $50,000 sale price were also supported by Mr Condon's 23 March 2022 affidavit. Included in Mr Condon's response to the 10 September 2020 information request was a handwritten statutory declaration signed by Mr Brooks, which stated in effect that Mr Brooks had paid $20,000 to Mr Condon in August 2016 by way of part payment and then the "balance" of $30,000 in August 2017. 201 However, in Schedule D to his 23 March 2022 affidavit, Mr Condon annotated a $7,000 deposit on 27 December 2017, a $5,000 deposit on 28 December 2017 and a $6,000 deposit on 4 January 2018 as "Cash deposit - cash received for Monster truck". He also annotated a $5,000 deposit on 5 January 2018 as "Cash deposit - cash received for Monster truck + 3k of personal savings". He suggested in cross-examination that these amounts reflected the belated deposit of the $20,000 first instalment paid for the vehicle. In response, the Commissioner suggested that it was extraordinary that, whilst annotating the schedule during the preparation of his evidence, Mr Condon, who did not have any records, had allegedly been able to recall that $2,000 of the $5,000 cash he deposited on 5 January 2018 was in fact cash received specifically from Mr Brooks over a year earlier in August 2016 for the sale of the Monster Truck. Given the apparent fallibility of Mr Condon's memory in so many other contexts throughout these proceedings and his persistent reliance on his inability to recall events that occurred in previous years, the Commissioner's incredulity was neither unfair nor misplaced. The improbability of Mr Condon's explanation is all the more apparent in circumstances where, almost immediately prior to Mr Condon asserting that the four deposits in late-2017 and early-2018 reflected the $20,000 first instalment, Mr Condon had expressly stated that he did not recall what he had done with the $20,000 lump sum payment. He said that he "probably put it into savings", but then immediately reiterated "I don't recall exactly what I done [sic] with it". 202 More difficulty arose in relation to the $30,000 payment. In his 11 June 2021 affidavit, Mr Condon deposed as follows: In August 2017, I also received a $30,000 payment from Terry Brooks for the sale of the Monster Truck … I deposited these funds in four tranches into my BOQ Account #9681, as follows: (a) $5,000 on 15 August 2017; (b) $10,000 on 17 October 2017; (c) $8,000 on 18 October 2017; and (d) $7,000 on 19 October 2017. 203 This paragraph was reproduced almost verbatim in the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts, where it was marked as agreed. Schedules of deposits and withdrawals annexed to Mr Condon's 11 June 2021 and 23 March 2022 affidavits confirmed the receipt of the relevant sums on the specified days, each entry in the schedules being annotated "Cash deposit monster truck". The most natural understanding of this evidence is that the $30,000 amount was received in one cash lump sum in August 2017 and then deposited by Mr Condon into his bank account in parts over time. However, this understanding is essentially impossible to reconcile with the remainder of the evidence, and the claims that subsequent amounts banked by Mr Condon were also parts of the purchase price. 204 In cross-examination, Mr Condon agreed that he had received from Mr Brooks a series of payments ending in August 2017 that added up to $30,000, not a single payment of $30,000 in August 2017. He had kept no receipts for these payments because Mr Brooks was his friend. He later retreated from his statement that all payments had been received by the end of August 2017 and, instead, stated that it took Mr Brooks over a year to pay the full amount. Mr Brooks, in his affidavit sworn 18 November 2022, deposed similarly that he had paid a total of $50,000 "in several tranches", but he could not recall the details of all the individual payments. In cross-examination, he suggested that he had paid for the Monster Truck "over about a six month period". He remembered going to the bank on three separate occasions in 2016 and transferring money to Mr Condon's account, and then on two later occasions giving Mr Condon $10,000 cash in person. 205 Given the extent of the contradiction, it is difficult to accept Mr Condon's evidence as to exactly how much was paid for the Monster Truck, at what times, and in what forms. It is open to conclude, however, that he turned a substantial profit on its sale, having purchased it for USD20,000 and sold it, assuming the general thrust of the evidence about price to be correct, for about $50,000.

1994 Green Cadillac 4D 206 In his 11 June 2021 affidavit, Mr Condon deposed that he had purchased a "1994 Cadillac" on 10 June 2016 for $8,000. This event was substantially re-characterised in his 23 March 2022 affidavit, where he deposed that "[p]rior to the audit period", he had loaned $25,600 to a long-time friend, Mr Guy Darmenia, to purchase a "green Cadillac". He identified the vehicle as being unregistered and having the VIN number 1G6DW529088709031. He then deposed that he had been repaid the loan amount by Mr Darmenia in 23 instalments between June 2016 and January 2018. In his 16 November 2022 affidavit, he deposed that he had purchased a "1994 Cadillac 4D" from the United States in 2016, along with the 1969 Chevrolet Impala addressed above and had arranged for the two vehicles to be transported to Townsville, seemingly at his own cost. 207 In cross-examination, he reiterated that the vehicle had been imported from the United States but was in fact purchased for USD8,000, not accounting for GST and shipping costs. He stated that he had purchased the vehicle himself with his own money, but on behalf of Mr Darmenia. Once imported, he "put wheels on it, painted it, fixed it up" and sold it to Mr Darmenia for "exactly what it cost". Later, he described other repairs and modifications, and seemed to suggest that the $25,600 amount appearing in the documentary evidence included a $3,000 loan that Mr Darmenia was repaying to him. In this way, he essentially denied having made any profit on the vehicle's sale, despite the documentary evidence strongly indicating to the contrary. In keeping with his usual practice, he kept no receipts in respect of the various repairs and modifications allegedly made to the vehicle. 208 In Mr Darmenia's affidavit sworn 10 November 2022, he deposed to having had a conversation with Mr Condon in around June 2016 about purchasing a green Cadillac, the result of which was that Mr Darmenia agreed to pay Mr Condon $25,600 for the vehicle in instalments. The transaction was undocumented. According to Mr Darmenia, he paid around $23,000 of the agreed purchase price in cash, deposing more specifically that: (a) in around June 2016, he had paid $9,000 to Mr Condon in cash; (b) from October 2016 to May 2017, he had regularly transferred $100 or $200 amounts into Mr Condon's bank account, using his first name as a reference; and (c) on 2 and 4 January 2018, he had paid to Mr Condon the amounts of $8,000 and $6,000, respectively, which repaid the debt in full. 209 This account of events was supported by Mr Condon's 16 November 2022 affidavit, in which he deposed that Mr Darmenia had first paid $9,000 towards the vehicle in cash, which was deposited into his account on 20 June 2016, and thereafter made a number of payments across the 2017 and 2018 income years. In Schedule B to Mr Condon's 11 June 2021 affidavit, a $9,000 deposit was identified as having been made into Mr Condon's CBA 5162 account on 17 June 2016, which was annotated "Guy Darmenia deposit towards car". The same deposit appeared in schedules to Mr Condon's 23 March 2022 and 16 November 2022 affidavits. It should be kept in mind that these schedules are not contemporaneous records of the transactions but are Mr Condon's claims as to what the particular payments were. 210 The schedules to the 11 June 2021 and 23 March 2022 affidavits also indicated that Mr Condon had received direct deposits of $100 or $200 over the period 14 October 2016 to 11 May 2017 in the total amount of $2,600, though in his 16 November 2022 affidavit, the total amount was incorrectly deposed to having been $2,500. The schedules to the 23 March 2022 and 16 November 2022 affidavits showed deposits of $8,000 and $6,000 on 2 and 4 January 2018, respectively, which were annotated "Deposit guys [sic] money for car". However, in cross-examination, Mr Darmenia stated that the true purchase price for the vehicle was $23,000 and the remaining amount, said to be $2,500, was for "diff repairs" to a different car. 211 Finally, consistent evidence was given by both Mr Condon and Mr Darmenia that the vehicle was never registered, since it was a collectible, and was stored at the pavilion at the Showgrounds, being driven only occasionally using Mr Condon's dealer plate. 212 Again, the evidence in relation to the dealings with this car was vague. Although Mr Condon was astute to suggest that he had purchased the vehicle for Mr Darmenia, the more plausible understanding of the evidence was that he had acquired it for himself and on-sold it for a considerably higher price.

1998 Holden Commodore 213 As was the case with the 1927 Ford Model T Utility, the 1998 Holden Commodore surfaced in these proceedings only when, in the course of cross-examination, the Commissioner tendered and drew Mr Condon's attention to a Queensland Government Registration History Detail for the vehicle, current as at 9 August 2019. That document indicated that the Commodore had been registered to Mr Condon as at 6 November 2017, and had subsequently been registered to Mr Terence John Rooney as at 29 March 2018. 214 Mr Condon appeared initially to indicate that he had acquired the Commodore through a person called "Terry", who "works at the caravan park", for a price of $500 or $1,000. However, shortly thereafter, he denied that he had purchased it from someone at the caravan park and stated instead that he did not recall from whom he had acquired it. He explained that it had been purchased for use around the Showgrounds, and clarified that he had given it to Mr Rooney, who worked at the caravan park on the Showgrounds, for no payment. 215 Notably, the Registration History Detail listed the vehicle's purpose of use, upon its becoming registered to Mr Condon, as "DEALER". The document also identified that a fee exemption had been granted on account of "VEH TRADE STOCK", indicating that the exemption had been granted on the basis that the vehicle was acquired by a motor vehicle dealer as trading stock. In cross-examination, Mr Condon attempted to explain that the word "DEALER" appeared automatically on forms of this nature as it was his "customer reference number", given that he had a Northern Territory driver's licence. The logical progression of that explanation was impossible to ascertain. He subsequently accepted that he had applied for the relevant fee exemption, but then proceeded to say that he had never intended to use the vehicle as trading stock in his capacity as a dealer; the vehicle was used on the Showgrounds "to go and get gasoline and things such as that". In the absence of any other evidence, neither of Mr Condon's explanations for the words appearing on the Registration History Detail is especially compelling. On the contrary, at a minimum, his explanation tends to reinforce the conclusion that he is not an honest person and is prepared to misrepresent facts if he believes that he will obtain a benefit from doing so. 216 As much of the evidence in relation to this vehicle emanates from Mr Condon and is not otherwise supported, it cannot be accepted. At most, the evidence, including that relating to the other vehicle transactions, suggests that the Commodore was yet another vehicle bought and sold by him during the Relevant Years.

2007 Honda Civic Hatchback 217 As was the case in respect of several vehicles in these proceedings, no mention of the purchase, ownership and subsequent sale of the 2007 Honda Civic Hatchback was made in any of Mr Condon's written evidence, including his six affidavits. In his 23 March 2022 affidavit, he merely deposed to having drawn $401.45 by cheque "to pay for Chantelle's [that is, Ms Chantelle Clancy's] Honda registration". In the schedule of deposits and withdrawals accompanying that affidavit, a withdrawal on 4 February 2015 in this amount was annotated "Deposit cheque Honda Rego (Chantelle's Car)". One might have understood from this evidence that Mr Condon, on or about 4 February 2015, simply made a registration payment on behalf of Chantelle for a car that she owned, or perhaps assisted her in making such a payment. However, the remainder of the evidence complicated the matter substantially. 218 In cross-examination, Mr Condon initially agreed that the car had been purchased and owned by Chantelle, and that he had paid the registration because she was "like a daughter" to him. However, his attention was subsequently drawn to the fact that the stub for the $401.45 cheque mentioned in his 23 March 2022 affidavit, stated "3-2-15 Honda Rego as Dealer". The words "as Dealer" were especially noteworthy, given that he was, at that time, a licenced motor vehicle dealer. So much was put to Mr Condon, alongside a further exhibit tendered by the Commissioner: specifically, a Queensland Government Registration History Detail for the vehicle, current as at 9 August 2019, which identified it as having been registered to Mr Condon as at 3 February 2015, and noted the purpose of use for the vehicle to be "DEALER". 219 In response, Mr Condon immediately suggested that the handwriting on the cheque stub was not his. No explanation was ever offered as to whom the handwriting belonged, or why any other person would be writing in his chequebook. In any event, shortly after denying that he had written the note on the cheque stub, he stated that the vehicle may have been registered in his name or Chantelle's name, and that he could not be sure. Then, seemingly changing his position entirely, he asserted that he had purchased the vehicle as a dealer so as to avoid the need for a roadworthy certificate, and estimated that he may have purchased it for about $8,000, drawn from the money in his safe. He then explained that he had subsequently sold it after repossessing it from "drug dealers", with whom he said Chantelle had "got mixed up". 220 Later in cross-examination, he described the Honda Civic as "Chantelle's car" but acknowledged that he had borne the full purchase price for it himself, and that the $8,000 figure previously offered in cross-examination was simply his opinion as to its value when purchased, not a price that he was sure that he had paid. He claimed that he could not recall from whom he had purchased it. This left very few concrete details as to the purchase, other than the fact that it took place in February 2015 and the vehicle was initially registered in Mr Condon's name. 221 As to its sale, Mr Condon first stated that he had sold the car to a car yard with which he was familiar and that the sale was completed without a written contract because, in his view, no contract was required when selling to a dealer. Again, this made the details of the transaction difficult to ascertain. The Registration History Detail document relating to this vehicle identified that it had been registered in the name of Jade Paterson on or about 24 July 2018. Mr Condon denied that he had sold the vehicle to a person of that name, and instead suggested that he had sold it to Mr Darryl Chapman, who must have on-sold it without transferring the registration into his own name in the interim period between sales. He claimed that he had been paid about $8,000 for the vehicle, which led him to believe that he himself had paid about this amount when purchasing it, although he did not explain why he believed that the sale price and purchase price of the vehicle must have been the same. In any event, the Registration History Detail identified the dutiable value of the vehicle upon its registration to Ms Paterson in 2018 as $10,623. 222 Ultimately, Mr Condon's evidence in relation to the purchase and sale of the Honda Civic cannot be accepted. Given his lack of credit as a witness, and his inability to recall key details, it is difficult to conclude that he paid $8,000 for the vehicle or that he received $8,000 from its sale. It is not possible to accept his uncorroborated assertion that the vehicle was actually owned or used by Chantelle, who was not called as a witness. 223 All that can be said is that the Honda was yet a further vehicle that Mr Condon bought and/or sold during or around the Relevant Years. It may be that he allowed his partner's daughter to drive it for a while, but that does not diminish the conclusion that the purchase and sale formed part of the recurring activities in which he was engaged.

4-Wheeler 224 In his 16 November 2022 affidavit, Mr Condon deposed to having sold a vehicle described as a "4-Wheeler" to Mr Richard Stevens, a carnival worker at the Townsville Show, for $1,100 in or about March 2016. The vehicle was described as "an off-road motor bike", which he claimed he had owned for ten years and had stored at the pavilion at the Showgrounds, and which had not been registered. A receipt of the $1,100 payment was supported by other evidence, which established that such an amount had been credited to his CBA 5162 account on 22 March 2016. 225 As the purchase price of the vehicle was not disclosed, it is not possible to determine whether or not the sale to Mr Stevens was profitable.

Acco Garbage Truck / Tipper Truck 226 It was an agreed fact, supported relatively consistently by Mr Condon's evidence, that he had purchased an Acco Garbage Truck (more often described as a "Tipper Truck") on 21 December 2015 from the automotive auction service provider, Manheim Pty Ltd (Manheim), for $5,750.20. Manheim was referred to by several different names in the proceedings, including Manheim Fowles, Manheim Group and Manheim Auctions, but it seems that the same entity was intended in all instances. In Mr Condon's 23 March 2022 affidavit, he deposed that the vehicle was purchased for $5,750.32, but this minor inconsistency is ultimately of no consequence. 227 It was also agreed, and the evidence was equally consistent in establishing, that the vehicle was sold on 28 October 2016 to Manheim for $5,950. Mr Condon, therefore, turned a small profit of about $200 on the sale. 228 In cross-examination, he stated that the vehicle was purchased merely "to use on the showgrounds" but that does not explain why, having been acquired for this purpose, it was sold back to the original vendor only about ten months later at a higher price. It is also unclear why he, rather than TPAIA, would purchase it. Again, his uncorroborated evidence on this issue should not be accepted.

HSV Senator 229 In his 11 June 2021 affidavit, Mr Condon deposed to having purchased a "Holden" on 29 August 2017 for $13,792.75. He later deposed in his 23 March 2022 affidavit that he had purchased a "Holden Special Vehicle branded car" for his best friend, Mr Gregory Heffler, at auction in accordance with Mr Heffler's prior instruction. In his 16 November 2022 affidavit, he deposed to similar effect that, in August 2017, he had purchased a "HSV Commodore" from Pickles Auctions on behalf of Mr Heffler. Exhibited to that affidavit was a tax invoice from Pickles Auctions, which identified that on 29 August 2017 he had purchased an HSV Senator for $13,792.75 at a damaged motor vehicle auction. Schedules of deposits and withdrawals annexed to his various affidavits showed a withdrawal of $13,792.75 on 29 August 2017, seemingly reflecting his payment for it. 230 In his affidavit sworn 7 November 2022, Mr Heffler deposed that he had asked Mr Condon to attend an auction to purchase the vehicle on his behalf, but deposed that Mr Condon had paid approximately $15,000 for it. In cross-examination, he conceded that he had never seen a receipt for its purchase at auction, and had merely accepted Mr Condon's assurance that it cost $15,000. 231 Mr Heffler also deposed that Mr Condon had purchased a number of new parts for the vehicle, such that Mr Heffler "owed … $19,500 as reimbursement for the purchase of the HSV and the car parts necessary to repair the HSV". He further deposed to having paid this amount to Mr Condon over three months from cash savings in instalments of $8,000, $6,500 and $5,000. No part of these dealings was documented, and the vehicle was only registered in 2020 after a roadworthy certificate was obtained. Mr Condon gave evidence to much the same effect in his 16 November 2022 affidavit, identifying certain repairs and modifications that had been made to the vehicle, such that its total cost was $19,500, and stating more specifically that he had received into his CBA 5162 account deposits of $8,000 on 30 August 2017, $6,500 on 20 September 2017 and $5,000 on 19 October 2017. The only evidence to support the fact that repairs had been conducted was a tax invoice from JAX Tyres & Auto Townsville in the amount of $2,590. The $6,500 and $5,000 payments were identifiable in the schedules of withdrawals and deposits annexed to Mr Condon's various affidavits, the former being annotated "Payment from Greg for HSV at auction" and the latter "Greg Heffler final payment total paid $19,500". A deposit of $8,000 received on 30 August 2017 was annotated "Payment Cash Dep", without specifically being identified as having been associated with the vehicle. 232 On the state of the evidence before the Court, it should be concluded that this was yet another vehicle bought and sold by Mr Condon in or around the Relevant Years. It is not possible to conclude that he did not make any profit on its sale. Mr Condon only adduced evidence that the vehicle had cost him $13,792.75 and certain parts had cost him $2,590, giving a total cost of $16,382.75. It is sufficiently clear that Mr Heffler paid $19,500 for the vehicle, not having been informed of the amount paid at auction or the price paid for the various additional parts.

Isuzu Garbage Truck / G Truck 233 The evidence consistently demonstrated that Mr Condon had purchased an Isuzu Garbage Truck (more often described as a "G Truck") on 21 December 2015 from Manheim for $11,989.78, despite this fact having been both agreed and disputed in the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts. It was also agreed, and the evidence established, that the G Truck had been sold back to Manheim on 11 July 2017 for $12,232.20, being approximately $240 more than the purchase price. 234 Mr Condon explained in cross-examination that he had purchased the vehicle to convert it into a "tilt tray", but ultimately found it to be too much work and so sold it. His evidence seemed, implicitly, to suggest that the tilt tray was to be used by him to transport vehicles. In particular, he said that the existing four-tonne tilt tray that he owned (which may or may not be the 1984 Purple Mazda Tilt Tray addressed below) was "too small for anything bigger than … a lighter car", perhaps implying that a larger tilt tray built from the G Truck was intended to be used to transport heavier vehicles. The fact that he may have been looking to acquire a larger truck for the purpose of transporting heavier vehicles might be taken to support the characterisation of his broader dealings with motor vehicles as a business. The use of a large tilt tray would indicate an operation of a scale substantially different to that which might be expected of a mere hobbyist. On the other hand, it would be inappropriate to make any such findings at present, given the lack of evidence from either party in relation to the purpose for which the G Truck was acquired.

Unidentified vehicle 235 In his 16 November 2022 affidavit, Mr Condon deposed that, on 7 November 2014, he had deposited into his BOQ 8201 account the amount of $7,000, received "from the sale of a car before the Income Years". A schedule of deposits and withdrawals annexed to that affidavit shows the relevant deposit with the annotation "Money from Sale of Car". No further details were ever provided in relation to this vehicle.

Vehicles alleged to have been owned by Rowena Clancy 236 As previously mentioned, a significant amount of the evidence in relation to Mr Condon's dealings with motor vehicles was centred on three particular vehicles, which he seemingly claimed were owned by Rowena: a Nissan Patrol, a Silver BMW X5, and a vehicle described only as a "Mercedes". The disproportionate amount of time devoted to the consideration of these vehicles in the course of the hearing was due, at least in part, to the fact that the evidence in question was replete with contradictions and incomplete in several material respects.

Nissan Patrol 237 In his 11 June 2021 affidavit, Mr Condon deposed that he had purchased a Nissan Patrol at some point in 2012 for $12,000. The "Spreadsheet of motor vehicles sold 2014-2018" provided by him in response to the 10 September 2020 information request listed it as having been purchased in 2012 for $12,000 and sold on 7 March 2016 for $15,950 to "Wholesale Cars". This was affirmed in his 23 March 2022 affidavit. He further deposed in a later section of the same affidavit as follows: 57. In 2012, I purchased a Nissan Patrol for $12,000. 58. During the period I owned the Nissan Patrol, it was stored in the Pavilion. 59. I did not insure the Nissan Patrol while I owned it as it was not driven and stored in a secure location. 238 In his Appeal Statement dated 4 May 2021, he stated that he had "sold … his Nissan Patrol to TSV Wholesale Cars for $15,950" during the 2015 income year. In his 11 June 2021 affidavit, he deposed to similar effect that during the Relevant Years he received $15,950 for selling the Nissan Patrol, which he specifically described as one of the "motor vehicles I held". In the same affidavit, he deposed that the vehicle had been sold to TSV Wholesale Cars on 7 March 2016. Schedule B to the affidavit showed three deposits into his CBA 5162 account, each annotated "Nissan Patrol payment"; specifically, a deposit of $10,000 on 7 March 2016, a deposit of $2,300 on 8 March 2016 and a deposit of $3,650 on 10 March 2016. These deposits were explained in his response to the 10 September 2020 information request as being "the proceeds from the sale of a Nissan Patrol to Wholesale Cars on 7 March 2016". The deposits were identically annotated in Schedule B to his 23 March 2022 affidavit. Each of these points was corroborated by Mr Justin Freeman, the Managing Director of Townsville Auto Wholesalers, in his affidavit sworn 7 November 2022. Mr Freeman deposed to having had a conversation with Mr Condon in around March 2016 regarding "the sale of his Nissan Patrol", in which the following exchange allegedly took place (in the words of Mr Freeman): Chris: How much would you pay for my Nissan Patrol? Me: $15,950? Chris: Ok, I'd be happy with that. 239 Mr Freeman deposed that, on this basis, he had caused his company to purchase the Nissan Patrol for $15,950 and to pay the amount in three instalments as previously described. Mr Condon confirmed as much in his 16 November 2022 affidavit, deposing that in around March 2016 he had a conversation with Mr Freeman "about selling my Nissan Patrol to him", and that he received three payments totalling $15,950 in March 2016, each with the description "tsvautowholesalers". 240 Given the foregoing, it might have been thought to be beyond any doubt that the vehicle had been purchased by Mr Condon in 2012 for $12,000, sold by him in 2016 for $15,950, and owned by him throughout the intervening period. However, in cross-examination, he almost completely disavowed this evidence, offering instead a wholly different explanation of his association with the vehicle. In particular, he repeatedly asserted that it had in fact been owned and dealt with all but exclusively by Rowena. 241 When the vehicle was first mentioned in the course of cross-examination, Mr Condon, unprompted, volunteered that Rowena had "come back" from New Zealand in possession of it. He went on to explain that it had been Rowena, not him, who had purchased it and that she later sold it to Townsville Auto Wholesalers. He repeated this version of events later in cross-examination, insisting multiple times that Rowena had purchased and sold the vehicle herself, although there was some vague suggestion that he had played at least some part in arranging the sale. In response to questioning as to why Rowena had never before been identified as its owner in any part of his affidavit evidence, he stated simply, "I never needed to say. It was never asked". He later said that he had listed the vehicle as being owned by him in prior documentary evidence "because the money [that is, from its sale] went into [his] bank account". With respect, that explanation is wanting in many respects. 242 Further, and again contrary to the evidence referred to above, Mr Condon suggested at one point that Mr Freeman had sold the car for him and Rowena, rather than simply purchasing it from them. Shortly thereafter, however, he seemed to accept that he had sold the Nissan Patrol to Mr Freeman on behalf of Rowena. Mr Freeman seemed to validate the latter of these explanations in his cross-examination, when he stated that he had purchased the vehicle off Mr Condon after negotiations between the two of them. He noted, however, that the contract for the purchase was with Rowena since the vehicle was registered to her. When asked why he had not mentioned Rowena at all in his affidavit, he stated, "Well, I wasn't asked about it". He then explained that Rowena had given him a letter stating that she wanted the purchase price for the vehicle deposited into Mr Condon's account. When asked why this detail was not mentioned in his affidavit, he stated that he "didn't realise it was important". 243 Mr Condon's evidence in cross-examination cannot be believed, particularly in light of the more general findings made as to his general lack of credibility. To the extent that Mr Freeman's evidence in cross-examination followed the same course, it too lacks credibility. The affidavit and other documentary evidence established a consistent narrative in respect of the Nissan Patrol: that it was purchased, owned and sold by Mr Condon. The suggestion that Rowena's ownership of, and dealings with, the vehicle were omitted from that narrative in their entirety merely because Mr Condon and Mr Freeman were not asked expressly to address such matters is especially implausible. That explanation does not account for the many statements in the affidavits, prepared with the aid of Mr Condon's solicitors over an extended period of time, that are directly inconsistent with Rowena having had ownership of the vehicle, or any role in its purchase and sale. Notably, Rowena was not herself called to give evidence in these proceedings. As matters stand, the finding most readily available on the material before the Court is that Mr Condon purchased the Nissan Patrol, owned it, and later sold it at a profit.

Silver BMW X5 244 The Silver BMW X5 was the subject of very limited documentary evidence. Schedule B to Mr Condon's 23 March 2022 affidavit contained an entry showing a $522.10 withdrawal from his CBA 5162 account on 10 November 2015, which was annotated "QLD Transport Rego BMW". Annexed to the same affidavit was a photocopy of a cheque stub with a handwritten note, "9/11/15 QLD TRANSPORT BMW", which was explained in the body of the affidavit to correspond to the entry in Schedule B. 245 Mr Condon's attention was drawn in cross-examination to this entry in Schedule B and he immediately recognised the BMW mentioned in the annotation as being "Rowena's car", and explained that she had reimbursed him the amount in cash. Although he denied that he had ever owned the vehicle, or that it was ever registered in his name, he acknowledged that he might have been the one who purchased it. He did not, however, recall the purchase price or from where he had bought it, other than to say that it was "probably a wholesale". He explained that Rowena had initially owned the Nissan Patrol, and then sold it and acquired the BMW, that it was driven by her daughter and then eventually sold, after which time Rowena purchased a Mercedes. This is not consistent with the above findings as to the ownership of the Nissan Patrol. 246 He added further details to this version of events as cross-examination progressed, particularly when the Commissioner introduced the Queensland Government Registration History Detail for the vehicle, the details of which were inconsistent with his prior evidence. This gave rise to the following: (a) Mr Condon conceded that the vehicle had been transferred into his name on 23 October 2013, after its purchase. This contradicted his earlier denial that the vehicle had ever been registered in his name, as well as his evidence that the vehicle had been obtained after the sale of the Nissan Patrol, which did not take place until 2016. He later stated that he had told Rowena that her daughter could not drive the vehicle because it was registered in his name, confirming his position that the vehicle was indeed registered to him. Despite this, in re-examination, he continued to assert that the vehicle was owned by Rowena. (b) Mr Condon twice made mention of the fact that the vehicle was side-swiped, writing it off, and that Rowena received an insurance payment in respect of this incident. However, nothing was ever produced to substantiate this, and it was never explained how Rowena came to be the insured in respect of the vehicle. (c) In a particularly confusing statement, Mr Condon seemed to suggest that the vehicle's windscreen had been smashed while it was in the car yard at Townsville Auto Wholesalers around 2015 or 2016. This was all but impossible to reconcile with the fact that he had conceded that, by this time, the vehicle had been registered in his name in 2013, and was transferred into Rowena's name on 21 October 2016. There is no explanation as to why the vehicle, while registered to him or Rowena, would be kept in a car yard. (d) He also stated that he did not recall buying the car, which directly contradicted his earlier evidence that he might have bought the vehicle but been reimbursed by Rowena. 247 Notably, the Registration History Detail tendered by the Commissioner also listed the purpose of use for the BMW as "DEALER". When this was put to Mr Condon, he indicated that the description was used merely to avoid the need for a roadworthy certificate. There is little reason to believe this explanation in circumstances where his evidence in relation to the vehicle was so consistently unreliable. 248 Ultimately, it is not known whether the BMW was sold at a profit, or whether any of the proceeds of the sale were received by Mr Condon. The Commissioner submitted that the inference remained open that the BMW was in fact sold by him to Rowena around October 2016, after they had separated, this being the time at which the registration was transferred from his name into hers. Mr Condon submitted that the transfer of the vehicle to Rowena at this time merely supported his evidence that it was owned by her. Both accounts are possible, but Mr Condon bore the onus of explaining his dealings with motor vehicles. His evidence, while perhaps tending loosely against the conclusion that he sold the vehicle to Rowena, was simply too disordered to dispel that inference altogether. It is potentially another example of his practice of buying and selling motor vehicles.

Mercedes 249 The Mercedes came to be addressed in the proceedings in much the same way as the BMW. Schedule D to Mr Condon's 23 March 2022 affidavit contained an entry for a withdrawal of $593.45 on 22 December 2017, which was annotated "QLD Transport - Mercedes Rego". Annexed to that affidavit was a photocopy of a cheque, the stub for which had a handwritten note stating "QLD TRANSPORT 21/12/17 MERCEDES". The cheque was noted in the body of the affidavit to correspond to the $593.45 withdrawal in Schedule D. 250 Whilst the Mercedes was said by Mr Condon in cross-examination to have been Rowena's vehicle, owned by her at some point after the Nissan Patrol and BMW, he later said that he had purchased it himself for about $17,000, the money having come from his savings. He further said that he had purchased it from a private seller, but he had not kept any records in respect of the transaction. He acknowledged that he had not obtained from the seller any of the paperwork that he was required to produce as a licensed motor vehicle dealer. The precise whereabouts of the Mercedes as at the time of trial was not clarified.

Vehicles held by Mr Condon at the time of trial 251 Mr Condon identified that he held the following vehicles as at the time of trial. They are listed by the year of their make and alphabetically: (a) A 1931 Chevrolet Pick Up, which was said in cross-examination to have been purchased for around $6,000. It was listed on the import approval dated 13 April 2012, which has been addressed above in relation to the 1968 Red Chevrolet Corvette. (b) A 1968 Red Chevrolet Corvette with the number plate "WAR44", which was at one stage suggested in cross-examination to have been acquired in 2003 for $5,000, but which was listed in an annexure to Mr Condon's 11 June 2021 affidavit labelled "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" as having a price of $50,000. (c) A 1968 Pontiac GTO, also described as a "drag car", which was said in re-examination to be worth about $8,000 or $12,000. The vehicle was listed on the import approval dated 13 April 2012 in relation to the 1968 Red Chevrolet Corvette. (d) A 1986 Chevrolet Corvette, which was said in cross-examination to have been purchased from Mr Dale Katthagen for about $12,000 in cash. A Queensland Government Registration History Summary tendered by the Commissioner at trial identified that its registration had been transferred to Mr Condon on 27 July 2015 and cancelled on 14 June 2016. Mr Condon did not contest these facts when they were put to him in cross-examination. (e) A backhoe, which was initially identified in the course of cross-examination as having been given to Mr Condon in about 2004 or 2005 and thereafter used by the TPAIA without a registration. In re-examination, Mr Condon stated that the vehicle had been given to him by "a bloke" in 2002 or 2003. (f) A tractor, described as a "pulling tractor", which Mr Condon deposed in his 16 November 2022 affidavit to having purchased from Ms Ann Schmidt on 30 July 2014 for $15,337.56. AUSTRAC records filed in the proceedings on 10 November 2022 identified a payment for a tractor purchase on 30 July 2014 of USD14,000, and a payment for "tractor shipping cost" on 4 August 2014 of USD1,650.

Unaccounted for vehicles 252 Having listed the vehicles disposed of by Mr Condon, the vehicles alleged to have been owned by Rowena, and the vehicles held by him at the time of trial, it is necessary to give consideration to those mentioned in the evidence in respect of which there is no explanation of their present whereabouts. The vehicles falling within this residual category were as follows, again listed by the year of their make and alphabetically: (a) A 1954 Red Harley Davidson motorcycle, identified in Mr Condon's Appeal Statement dated 19 March 2021 and in his affidavit sworn 11 June 2021 as having been owned by him by 2001, but said in cross-examination to have been purchased in about 2003 or 2005. The motorcycle was listed in an annexure to Mr Condon's 11 June 2021 affidavit labelled "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" as having a price of $12,000 and a number plate of "211BK". (b) A 1964 Ford F100 or F150, identified in Mr Condon's affidavit sworn 11 June 2021 as having been purchased on 10 June 2016 for $7,000. In cross-examination, he was shown a photograph annexed to his affidavit sworn 23 March 2022 showing certain vehicles stored inside a pavilion at the Showgrounds, from which he identified the vehicle as belonging to him (whether at the time of the photograph, or the time of trial, it was unclear). During cross-examination he initially reiterated that the purchase price was USD7,000, but subsequently suggested that it had been purchased for $6,000 or $7,000 without specifying the currency. (c) A 1984 Purple Mazda Tilt Tray truck, identified in the "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" as having a price of $10,000 and a number plate of "HIT 00". In cross-examination, Mr Condon suggested that it might have been registered, and some documentary evidence indicated that he had paid $1,926.65 for the registration of a "tilt tray" on 22 January 2016 by cheque. Other documentary evidence indicated that he had paid $1,000 for registration for a "tilt tray" on 25 December 2016. (d) A 1986 Black and Red Harley Davidson Low Rider, identified from a Queensland Government Registration History Summary tendered by the Commissioner at trial as having been purchased by Mr Condon on 22 July 2015 and having a number plate of "887MX 2". When this was put to him in cross-examination, he indicated that it may have been a motorcycle that he "brought into the country in '15". Other documentary evidence relevantly indicated that he paid $293.60 for its registration on or about 22 July 2015 by cheque, the cheque stub of that date bearing the description "DMV MOTORCYCLE". (e) A 1990 Yellow Chevrolet Corvette, identified in the "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" as having a price of $20,000 and a number plate of "CHRIS". In cross-examination, Mr Condon stated that he had acquired this car in the year 2000, and suggested that it would not have been registered. (f) A 1998 Red Chevrolet Corvette, identified in the "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" as having a price of $25,000 and a number plate of "SEXCESS". Mr Condon stated that he acquired it in 2002 or 2003, and suggested that it would probably have been registered. There was documentary evidence indicating that Mr Condon had paid $997.85 for registration of the vehicle on or about 11 October 2016 by cheque. (g) A 2004 Blue Haval Big Dog, identified in the "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" as having a price of $9,000. (h) A 2005 Red Haval Big Dog, identified in the "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" as having a price of $8,000. (i) A 2006 Black Haval Big Dog, identified in the "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" as having a price of $9,000. (j) A 2007 Corvette, identified when, in cross-examination, Mr Condon was shown the photograph from inside the pavilion at the Showgrounds, annexed to his affidavit sworn 23 March 2022. By reference to that photograph, he stated that he had purchased the vehicle in around 2010. (k) A 2008 Maroon Haval Big Dog, identified in the "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" as having a price of $10,000. (l) A 2010 Mustang, identified in Mr Condon's affidavit sworn 11 June 2021 as having been purchased on 10 June 2016 for $10,000. (m) A 2011 Red Chevrolet Corvette, identified in the "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" as having a price of $50,000 and a number plate of "FAT C6". In cross-examination, Mr Condon initially suggested that he acquired the vehicle in 2011, 2012 or 2013, but later clarified that he thought that he acquired the vehicle in 2013. He also accepted in questioning that the vehicle had been purchased for $50,000, and indicated that the vehicle would have been registered. (n) A Camaro, identified when in cross-examination Mr Condon was shown the photograph from inside the pavilion, annexed to his affidavit sworn 23 March 2022. He suggested that it might belong to his brother-in-law, since his brother-in-law had purchased a Camaro that was stored in the pavilion while the engine was rebuilt, sometime after 2016 but before 2020. The identity of his brother-in-law was not made clear and the evidence about him is somewhat difficult to square with Mr Condon's evidence that he had never married. (o) A Ford Falcon GT, identified in Mr Condon's Appeal Statement dated 19 March 2021 and Mr Condon's affidavit sworn 11 June 2021 as having been owned by him by 2001. (p) A Green Ford F100, identified in Mr Condon's Appeal Statement dated 19 March 2021 and in his affidavit of 11 June 2021 as having been owned by him by 2001, but said in cross-examination to have been purchased in about 2003 or 2004 for about $1,500. In cross-examination, he was shown the photograph from inside the pavilion, annexed to his affidavit sworn 23 March 2022, by reference to which he identified the car and said that it belonged to him (whether at the time of the photograph, or the time of trial, it was unclear). (q) A Honda 750 motorcycle, identified in Mr Condon's Appeal Statement dated 19 March 2021 and his affidavit sworn 11 June 2021 as having been owned by him from 2001. (r) A "hot rod", for which Mr Condon paid $566.95 in registration on 30 September 2016 by cheque, as deposed in his affidavit sworn 23 March 2022. Ultimately, it was impossible to tell whether or not this was the same vehicle as the 1927 Hot Rod addressed above. (s) An International Prime Mover, identified in the "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" as having a price of $10,000. (t) A Maroon Chopper, identified in Mr Condon's affidavit sworn 11 June 2021 as having been purchased on 10 June 2016 for $8,000. In cross-examination, Mr Condon clarified that the purchase price was USD8,000. (u) A Semi Trailer identified in the "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" as having a price of $2,000. In cross-examination, Mr Condon described the Semi Trailer as a "Prime Mover" with a water tank. 253 There is also an unexplained withdrawal of $5,000 in Schedule A to Mr Condon's 23 March 2022 affidavit, described as "Transfer To QLD Muscle Car Pl" and annotated "Payment for cars". Conceivably, this might indicate the existence of other vehicles. 254 A degree of inexactness in Mr Condon's evidence as to his activities involving motor vehicles might reasonably have been expected given the passage of time, his generally haphazard or non-existent record-keeping practices, his propensity to engage in undocumented cash transactions, the claimed destruction of documents during the 2019 Townsville floods, and the misplacing of certain documents during police raids and seizures at premises with which Mr Condon was associated. However, his inability or failure to account for the whereabouts of so many vehicles as at the time of trial, even after filing six of his own affidavits, far exceeded anything that might have been considered reasonable. The onus was on him to account for the ownership of and dealings with these vehicles, regardless of whether they were bought, sold or merely stored during the Relevant Years, so as to establish the scale of his activities involving motor vehicles, this being central to the determination as to whether he was engaged in a hobby in relation to the vehicles, or instead conducting a business. 255 Although it is unnecessary at this point to reach any final conclusion on the matter, the deficiencies in Mr Condon's evidence, coupled with his doubtful credibility as a witness, leave open the possibility that at least some of the vehicles were sold in circumstances that evidence the carrying on of a business. There is, in fact, reason to believe that a number of them were bought and sold or otherwise disposed of, since it is apparent that not all were stored in the shed at the Showgrounds. In his cross-examination and re-examination, Mr Mark Ryland recognised that, during his time as President of the TPAIA from 2002 to 2013, he only saw six or eight "bombs" stored in the shed at any one time. More recent photographs taken inside the shed, which were included in Mr Condon's evidence and tendered separately in the course of the proceedings, did not show anywhere near the number of vehicles listed above. Several shown in these photographs were, in any event, already accounted for as set out previously. The unaccounted ones were seemingly not kept in the pavilion used by Mr Condon, and it is open to infer that they were sold or otherwise disposed of by him. 256 It is also possible, as was suggested by the Commissioner, that even more vehicles might have been owned or dealt with by Mr Condon but never brought to the Court's attention, such that the true scale of Mr Condon's activities involving motor vehicles was never fully apparent. Ultimately, it suffices to observe that, in circumstances where Mr Condon bore the onus of demonstrating that he was carrying on a hobby, the vast number of vehicles left unaccounted for could only tend to weigh against him.

Registration payments 257 A relevant matter, which was not addressed at any great length in the parties' submissions, was the numerous registration payments scattered throughout the schedules of deposits and withdrawals annexed to Mr Condon's affidavits. In the course of the Commissioner's submissions, it was noted that Mr Condon, despite his suggestions in cross-examination to the contrary, must have had a number of registered vehicles during the Relevant Years as the schedules to his affidavits were "littered with registration payments for trucks, cars and motorcycles". Mention was made of this during cross-examination, in response to which Mr Condon identified that three of the vehicles in the "Document detailing vehicles held as at 1 July 2014" exhibited to his 11 June 2021 affidavit would likely have been registered; specifically, the 2011 Chevrolet Corvette, the 1998 Chevrolet Corvette and the 1984 Purple Mazda Tilt Tray. 258 Based on the evidence set out above, a number of other registered vehicles can be added to that list. Mr Condon identified in cross-examination that a 1968 Corvette was still registered to him. At a certain point, the 1966 Red Ford Mustang came to be registered to him, though this was only after he repossessed the vehicle from Mr Mendes. The 1998 Holden Commodore was registered to him as at 6 November 2017, as was the 2007 Honda Civic Hatchback as at 4 February 2015, and he made at least one registration payment in respect of that vehicle. He also made registration payments in respect of the Silver BMW X5 and the Mercedes, the former in November 2015 and the latter in December 2017. He also held the registration for the 1986 Chevrolet Corvette between August 2015 and June 2016, and he had made a registration payment in respect of the 1986 Black and Red Harley Davidson Low Rider in July 2015. He made a further registration payment in respect of a "hot rod" in September 2016. 259 Assuming, in Mr Condon's favour, that all of these vehicles were registered in his name at the same time throughout the Relevant Years (despite the evidence suggesting that they were not), and that he made registration payments on an annual basis (a point not addressed in evidence), this would account for 12 registration payments per year. Yet the schedules to his affidavits showed substantially more than 12 registration payments being made in some of the Relevant Years. For example, focussing only on the entries in the schedules to his 23 March 2022 affidavit for the 2016 calendar year, the following may be observed: (a) On 11 January 2016, $995.15 was withdrawn from his CBA 5162 account by presentation of cheque 002089. This entry is annotated "Registration corvette NT Transport Department". A scanned copy of the cheque stub is annexed to the affidavit, and contains the handwritten note "4/1/16 NT Corvette CHRIS". It is not clear in respect of which Corvette the payment was made. (b) On 2 March 2016, $1,552.85 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's Westpac 7477 account. The description for the entry is a series of numbers, without any identifying information. The entry is annotated "Registration". The withdrawal is explained in Mr Condon's 16 November 2022 affidavit as being "a payment made to QLD Government to register a car". (c) On 10 March 2016, $99.54 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's Westpac 7477 account. The description for the entry contains the words "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT SPRING HILL AU", and the entry is annotated "TPAIA reimbursement". However, in his 16 November 2022 affidavit, the withdrawal was described as a registration payment "made to QLD Government for motor bike registration". (d) On 10 March 2016, $325.24 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's Westpac 7477 account. The description for the entry contains the words "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT SPRING HILL AU", and the entry is annotated "Motorcycle registration". (e) On 10 March 2016, $320.82 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's Westpac 7477 account. The description for the entry contains the words "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT SPRING HILL AU", and the entry is annotated "Motorcycle registration". (f) On 10 March 2016, $98.64 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's Westpac 7477 account. The description for the entry contains the words "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT SPRING HILL AU", and the entry is annotated "TPAIA reimbursement". However, in his 16 November 2022 affidavit, the withdrawal is described as a registration payment "made to QLD Government for motor bike registration". (g) On 3 May 2016, $771.60 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's Westpac 7477 account. The description for the entry contains the words "VICROADS ONLINE PAYMENTKEW AU", and the entry is annotated "Car registration". (h) On 3 May 2016, $528.00 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's Westpac 7477 account. The description for the entry contains the words "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT SPRING HILL AU", and the entry is annotated "Registration". (i) On 7 May 2016, $327.25 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's Westpac 7477 account. The description for the entry contains the words "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT SPRING HILL AU", and the entry is annotated "Bike registration". (j) On 29 June 2016, $378.10 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's Westpac 7477 account. The description for the entry contains the words "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT SPRING HILL AU", and the entry is annotated "Registration". (k) As explained above, on 30 September 2016, $566.95 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's CBA 5162 account by presentation of cheque 002105. The entry is annotated "Hot rod registration Queensland. A scanned copy of the cheque stub is annexed to the affidavit, and contains the handwritten note "HOT ROD REGO". (l) On 18 October 2016, $150.00 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's CBA 5162 account by presentation of cheque 002108. This is annotated "Rego Fee". A scanned copy of the cheque stub is annexed to the affidavit, and contains the handwritten note "11.10.16 Rego fee". (m) On 25 October 2016, $334.48 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's Westpac 9868 account. The description for the entry contains the words "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT SPRING HILL AU", and the entry is annotated "Registration". (n) On 25 October 2016, $939.79 was withdrawn from Mr Condon's Westpac 9868 account. The description for the entry contains the words "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT SPRING HILL AU", and the entry is annotated "Registration". (o) On 21 November 2016, two withdrawals were made from Mr Condon's Westpac 9868 account in the amounts of $212.09 and $1,089.13. The description for each entry contains the words "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT SPRING HILL AU", and the entries are both annotated "Registration TPAIA". The withdrawals were described in Mr Condon's 16 November 2022 affidavit as "registration payments", but were dealt with beneath the subheading "TPAIA". It was never explained whether the "registration" was motor vehicle registration and, if it was, for what reason Mr Condon was purporting to make such payments on behalf of the TPAIA. (p) Withdrawals were also made from certain accounts with the description "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT SPRING HILL AU" on 2 March 2016 in the amount of $102.40, and on 30 August 2016 in the amount of $209.28. However, these entries were annotated as "QLD Gov Permit" and "License", respectively. 260 If Mr Condon can be assumed to have accurately annotated all of the relevant entries in the schedules, it follows that he made 16 registration payments in the 2016 calendar year alone, though two appear to have some affiliation with the TPAIA. The number rises to 18 if the additional withdrawals with the description "QUEENSLAND GOVERNMENT SPRING HILL AU" are included. These payments are not sufficiently repetitive to suggest that he was making multiple registration payments in respect of the same vehicle within the one year. Necessarily, there is reason to believe that the number of payments comfortably exceeded a total of 12 registered vehicles, such that the assumption that Mr Condon had only 12 registered vehicles is incorrect. It is more likely that, in 2016, he in fact had more, with the result that there has been no accounting for these additional registration payments. 261 Three alternative explanations for the anomaly seem most plausible. First, Mr Condon's annotations may simply be inaccurate, such that fewer of the entries in the schedules should have been identified as registration payments. Secondly, he may have had registered in his name more of the vehicles addressed above than were disclosed at trial. Thirdly, he may have had additional vehicles registered in his name that were not mentioned in the evidence at all. Ultimately, all of those potential explanations further undermine the reliability of his evidence in respect of his dealings with motor vehicles. In particular, if the third explanation is true, it may suggest that the scale of his dealings with motor vehicles was even greater than previously appreciated. Again, in circumstances where he bore the onus of demonstrating that he was engaged in a hobby, this necessarily weighed heavily against him.

Conclusion in relation to Mr Condon's dealings with motor vehicles 262 As set out above, in the course of these proceedings, 44 vehicles were identified as having been owned or dealt with by Mr Condon. This assumes, in his favour, that the Camaro did belong to his "brother-in-law" and that the "hot rod" in respect of which he made the 30 September 2016 registration payment was, in fact, the same vehicle as the 1927 Hot Rod otherwise addressed in the evidence. That being said, the evidence indicates that there are good reasons to believe that the number of vehicles dealt with by Mr Condon is higher. As explained, he gave evidence that he had made more registration payments in certain income years than there were vehicles that he acknowledged were registered in his name at the relevant times, and this, of itself, might indicate the existence of additional vehicles. Even putting this to one side, his evidence in relation to motor vehicles was so disordered and so clearly incomplete that it is not at all farfetched to suppose that the existence of certain vehicles was simply never brought to the Court's attention. 263 Of the 44 vehicles identified, 18 are known to have been sold or otherwise disposed of by Mr Condon (including the 1966 Red Ford Mustang, though it was ultimately repossessed by him), 6 were still owned or used by him at the time of trial, and the present whereabouts of 20 was not disclosed (including the Mercedes alleged to have been owned by Rowena). 264 Turning attention to the 18 that were sold or disposed of, the evidence indicates that 8 were sold at an apparent profit, 7 were sold without the evidence disclosing clearly whether or not the sales were profitable, 2 were purportedly sold by other persons with Mr Condon's involvement, and 1 was allegedly given away. Certain profitable, or potentially profitable, sales are of particular note: (a) The 1965 Volkswagen Beetle was allegedly purchased in about 2009 for $4,000 and sold on or about 21 December 2015 for $14,000. (b) The 1966 Red Ford Mustang was allegedly purchased in about 2008 for $3,000 and sold in about 2013 for $35,000, although there is significant confusion as to how the new engine purchased by Mr Condon for this vehicle and the payment of $15,000 on 11 January 2016 were factored into the sale price. (c) The 1968 Red Chevrolet Corvette was allegedly purchased in about April 2012 for $9,000 and sold sometime in or after 2014 for $40,000 and a boat, which was itself worth at the very least about $10,000. (d) The 1969 Chevrolet Impala was allegedly purchased on 10 June 2016 for USD1,200 and sold shortly before trial for $20,000. Although there was some suggestion that the difference between the purchase and sale prices was accounted for by importation fees, this was not substantiated on the evidence. (e) The 1994 Chevrolet Silverado Monster Truck was allegedly purchased in 2009 for USD20,000 and sold in or after August 2016 for $50,000. (f) The 1994 Green Cadillac 4D was allegedly purchased on 10 June 2016 for USD8,000 and sold in or after June 2016 for $25,600. Although Mr Condon asserted that the vehicle was sold at-cost, the difference between the purchase and sale prices being explicable by some combination of new parts purchased for the vehicle, a loan repayment and/or repairs to another vehicle, there was no substantiation of any of these matters. (g) The 2007 Honda Civic Hatchback was allegedly purchased for $8,000 and sold for $8,000. However, Mr Condon's evidence as to these figures was especially inexact, and it is conceivable that the vehicle was sold at a profit on the basis that the Registration History Detail for the vehicle, tendered in these proceedings, listed the dutiable value of the vehicle in 2018 at $10,623. (h) The Acco Garbage Truck was allegedly purchased on 21 December 2015 for $5,750.20 and sold on 28 October 2016 for $5,950. Although the profit was only $200, this might nevertheless be regarded as material in light of the fact that Mr Condon only owned the vehicle for about ten months. (i) The HSV Senator was allegedly purchased on 29 August 2017 for $13,792.75 and sold shortly thereafter for $19,500. Although Mr Condon again asserted that the vehicle was sold at-cost, the difference being made up by additional parts purchased for the vehicle, his evidence only went as far as establishing that the vehicle and additional parts had cost a total of $16,382.75. (j) The Isuzu Garbage Truck was allegedly purchased on 21 December 2015 for $11,989.78 and sold on 11 July 2017 for $12,232.20. (k) The Nissan Patrol was allegedly purchased in 2012 for $12,000 and sold on 7 March 2016 for $15,950. 265 The foregoing does not take into account the further vehicles that were quite likely sold at a profit, even though the evidence about that was inconclusive. For instance, given the nature of the transactions, it seems likely that Mr Condon derived some profit when he sold the 1927 Orange Ford T-Bucket in mid-2021 for $50,000, and sold the 1971 Red Chevrolet 4-Speed Coup on or about 12 December 2012 for $50,000. 266 As emphasised by the Commissioner in his written submissions, the dissembling nature of Mr Condon's evidence, his tendency to deal in cash, and his inadequate record keeping results in a considerable deal of uncertainty as to many of the relevant dates and the amounts received from the various sales and purchases. Nevertheless, the evidence as a whole can still be taken to permit the finding that Mr Condon has, for some time, including during the Relevant Years, been buying and selling motor vehicles with at least some view to making a profit. This is a substantial obstacle to his attempt to prove that his dealings with motor vehicles constituted a mere hobby. 267 The alleged hobby that was conducted by Mr Condon over a period that included the Relevant Years was variously described as being "to collect and renovate cars and motorcycles", "owning vehicles as a hobby", "fixing up cars", "owning collectable cars which he restored", "collecting cars and vehicles", "collecting vehicles" and "collecting American vintage cars". The difficulty with several of these varying descriptions is that Mr Condon did not collect cars, but rather sold them on a regular basis. The whereabouts of a significant number of other vehicles is presently unknown. Whilst he sought to advance the proposition that his acquisition of motor vehicles was limited, the evidence reveals that it was extensive. This leaves no room for a conclusion that his activities reflected his mere collecting of motor vehicles. 268 Further, as is apparent from the foregoing discussion, the cars dealt with by Mr Condon were not limited to collectable cars or American cars. He purchased and sold a wide range of vehicles and, in respect of a large number of them, he made no claim that they were unusual, exotic or special. 269 Although it was claimed that part of his hobby involved restoring cars, there was very little evidence as to when or how this took place. Whilst the evidence showed that he purchased car parts and the like, there was little sign that he was interested in the restoration process, or how often or for how long he devoted time to this alleged hobby. It was also difficult to ascertain when he might have indulged in this hobby. The evidence showed that he spent considerable time each year out of the country, up to 18 or 20 weeks. On this point, he said that he had five weeks holiday and the rest was TOIL (time off in lieu), earned from the extended hours that he claimed to work each week. There was an almost complete lack of any explanation as to how or when the vehicle restoration part of the purported hobby occurred. 270 Overall, it is not possible to conclude that his dealings in motor vehicles during the period including the Relevant Years was an activity, or part of an activity, that could be properly described as a hobby or pastime. It follows that he has not established that the revenue he received from selling vehicles during the Relevant Years was not assessable income. It should be added that he regularly omitted to identify the source of the money that he used to make the relevant vehicle-related purchases during the Relevant Years.

Was Mr Condon carrying on a business? 271 The consequence of the foregoing is that, in relation to the money that he received in connection with his dealings in motor vehicles, Mr Condon has failed to prove that the corresponding assessments are excessive. The Commissioner is entitled to rely, in seeking to uphold the assessments, upon any deficiency in Mr Condon's attempted proof of the excessiveness of the amount assessed: Dalco at 624. It is, therefore, strictly unnecessary to consider whether his activities constituted a business. However, in deference to the parties' submissions on this point, it is not inappropriate to address it.

Legal principles of "carrying on a business" 272 It is well established that the assessable income of a taxpayer includes "business income": Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Montgomery (1999) 198 CLR 639, 661 - 663 [63] - [68] per Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. Under the ITAA97, s 995-1 (definitions), it is provided that, "In this Act, except so far as the contrary intention appears … 'business' includes any profession, trade, employment, vocation or calling, but does not include occupation as an employee". 273 The question of whether a particular activity constitutes a business has been acknowledged to be a "difficult one, involving as it does questions of fact and degree": Evans v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 20 ATR 922, 939 per Hill J. Nevertheless, the indicia relevant to determining whether a taxpayer's activities constitute the carrying on of a business are well settled. They were alluded to in Ferguson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 37 FLR 310 at 314 by Bowen CJ and Franki J. Their Honours said: There are many elements to be considered. The nature of the activities, particularly whether they have the purpose of profit-making, may be important. However, an immediate purpose of profit-making in a particular income year does not appear to be essential. Certainly it may be held a person is carrying on business notwithstanding his profit is small or even where he is making a loss. Repetition and regularity of the activities is also important. However, every business has to begin and even isolated activities may in the circumstances be held to be the commencement of carrying on business. Again, organization of activities in a business-like manner, the keeping of books, records and the use of system may all serve to indicate that a business is being carried on. The fact that, concurrently with the activities in question, the taxpayer carries on the practice of a profession or another business, does not preclude a finding that his additional activities constitute the carrying on of a business. The volume of his operations and the amount of capital employed by him may be significant. However, if what he is doing is more properly described as the pursuit of a hobby or recreation or an addiction to a sport, he will not be held to be carrying on a business even though his operations are fairly substantial. 274 In Puzey v Commissioner of Taxation (2003) 131 FCR 244 (Puzey) at 256 - 257 [46] - [48], Hill and Carr JJ (with whom French J agreed) relevantly observed: [46] The question whether a person is carrying on a business is a conclusion to be drawn from all relevant facts and circumstances. There are some relevant propositions which can, however, be stated. First … every business must have a first transaction. And there may be a business, even if that business is small in scope …. A person may carry on a business, notwithstanding that the person had some other activity, such as full-time employment. It is not necessary in concluding that a business is carried on that the acts to be undertaken are acts of the person seeking to establish he or she is carrying on a business. So a person may appoint another to take the steps which constitute the business activity …. [47] It will be relevant in deciding whether a business is carried on that there is some repetition of acts and that the activities in question have "something of a permanent character" …. What is required is that activities be engaged upon "on a continuous and repetitive basis" …. However, perhaps not too much attention should be given to the concept of repetition where the activity is one, such as plantation operation, where the activity will continue over a relatively long period of time but where there will be significant periods of what may be referred to as inactivity. Business does not mean being busy. [48] In deciding whether or not a business is carried on, courts have pointed to what have been called in the United Kingdom the "badges of trade," indicia which, while no one of them will be determinative of whether a business is carried on, collectively will demonstrate a business. These include the profit motive (although a non-profit company may still carry on a business), acting in a business-like way (although many businesses may be found which operate in a non-business-like way), the keeping of books of account and records (although the fact that there are none will not necessitate the conclusion that a business is not carried on) and repetition (although a fixed term project may still be a business). 275 A summary of the factors indicative of the carrying on of a business was also helpfully articulated by Sackville J in Woods v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 43 ATR 491 at 497 [35], and is repeated as follows: (i) Whether the activities were undertaken as a commercial enterprise for the purpose of making a profit: Hope v Bathurst City Council (1980) 144 CLR 1; 12 ATR 231 at CLR 8-9, per Mason J; Thomas v FCT (1972) 3 ATR 165; 72 ATC 4094 (HC) at 4099, per Walsh J (commercial purpose or character). But it is not necessary that there was an immediate purpose of profit-making in a particular year: Ferguson, at ATC 4264, per Bowen CJ and Franki J. A business may, for example, be conducted in a limited way as preparatory to or in preparation for a larger scale business: Ferguson, at ATC 4269, per Fisher J; FCT v Walker (1985) 16 ATR 331; 85 ATC 4179 (S Ct Qld/Ryan J), at ATR 334. (ii) Whether the activities were engaged in on a continuous and repetitive basis: Hope, at CLR 9, per Mason J. But even isolated transactions may be part of a business if, for example, they can be seen as the beginning of a larger scale undertaking: Ferguson, at ATC 4264. (iii) Whether the activities were carried on in a business-like manner: Ferguson, at ATC 4264; Martin, at CLR 479 (systematic and organized). It will therefore be relevant to inquire whether the taxpayer kept adequate books and records and employed a systematic approach to the conduct of the undertaking. (iv) Whether ordinary commercial principles were applied to the conduct of the undertaking, characteristic of the line of business of which the undertaking is said to have formed part: Evans, at ATC 4555. (v) Whether the scale and volume of the undertaking (including the amount of capital employed) were substantial, especially where the question is whether the taxpayer was conducting a business or was engaging in a hobby or recreational activity: Ferguson, at ATC 4265; Trautwein v FCT (1936) 56 CLR 196 (Evatt J), at 206-207. There may be overlap among the various factors and not all criteria will necessarily suggest the same result. 276 More recently, in Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union v Personnel Contracting Pty Ltd (2022) 96 ALJR 89 at 138 [204], Steward J observed that: … care should be taken before concluding that even very unskilled or simple activities are not capable of constituting a business. A business can arise from limited activities which are passive in nature and can exist in the absence of any entrepreneurial skill. It can also exist where a profit motive is entirely lacking. (Citations omitted).

Mr Condon's activities constituted the carrying on of a business 277 Mr Condon's primary submission was that he was not operating a business but, instead, was engaging in a hobby or pastime, being the collection and restoration of vehicles and, as such, the money he received from his motor vehicle related activities was not assessable income under s 6-5 of the ITAA97. His various contentions in support of this overarching submission are considered in turn. 278 First, it was submitted that Mr Condon was not operating a business as he did not conduct his relevant activities in a business-like manner and did not attempt to operate efficiently, like a business. His evidence was that, whilst he had a motor vehicle dealer licence, it was not held for the purpose of carrying on the business of a motor vehicle dealer, but to enable him to drive unregistered cars and purchase vehicles that did not have a roadworthy certificate. 279 As the Commissioner rightly submitted, his registration as a dealer and the true extent of his activities in that capacity were facts that he failed to disclose, or tried to understate, or disguised in his correspondence with the Commissioner prior to these proceedings, and in his objection and six affidavits. The evidence suggests that he has held the licence for all of the Relevant Years, from around 2013, and it should not be overlooked that holding a licence is a fundamental requirement for conducting the business of being a motor vehicle dealer in Queensland. It was put to him during cross-examination that he did not reveal that he was a registered motor vehicle dealer in any of his affidavits because wanted to conceal that fact in connection with his purchasing and selling of vehicles in the Relevant Years. Although he denied that, the repetitive and continuous nature of his dealings in motor vehicles during and around the Relevant Years suggested that he was indeed carrying on such a business and wished to use the benefits of the licence to facilitate it. 280 Whilst it might be true that Mr Condon did not comply with the statutory obligations of a licence holder, but simply took the benefits of the licence along with the benefits of his use of dealer plates, that does not preclude it from being concluded that he was carrying on a business. Rather, on the evidence, his failure to comply with a licensee's obligations, such as those concerning the documenting of transactions, was more likely to have been an attempt by him to conceal his business activities. 281 Secondly, he submitted that the sales were not of the requisite volume, and not sufficiently recurrent or periodic for the revenue received to be characterised as income. However, even if the volume of sales was low, that fact alone would not be determinative, given that courts have repeatedly stated that a taxpayer may carry on a business even though the scale of the activity is small by comparison to industry standards: see, for example, Thomas v Commissioner of Taxation (1972) 46 ALJR 397. In any event, as a matter of fact, his submission cannot be sustained. The preceding analysis reveals his dealings with vehicles were much more extensive than he was prepared to acknowledge. Further, he imported a number of vehicles both before and during the Relevant Years, and those imports were regular and seemed to require a considerable degree of organisation, including the sourcing of the vehicles in the United States and the arranging of their transport to Australia. This repetitive and organised conduct is indicative of the carrying on of a business. 282 Thirdly, the fact that he sold a couple of vehicles per year to his friends did not detract from the businesslike nature of his actions. His catalogue of customers was much more extensive, and the evidence suggests that he sold to strangers and to, or through, motor vehicle dealers, such as Sean Fenton Motors or Townsville Auto Wholesalers (which may also have been called "TSV Wholesale Cars" at certain times in these proceedings). 283 Fourthly, it was submitted that his activities lacked the requisite profit-making purpose, in that he assisted his family and friends to buy and sell cars, and did not make a significant profit on all transactions (for instance, the sale of the G Truck and the Tipper Truck). It was further submitted that the mere fact that he made a "profit" on some of the sales did not, in and of itself, mean that he was carrying on a business. It was also suggested that, because he did not sell to the general public, and would use a motor vehicle dealer to sell cars to people other than his friends and family, his actions lacked a business flavour. 284 These submissions are also properly rejected. The authorities cited above indicate that the question as to whether or not a taxpayer has engaged in activities with the intention of turning a profit may be important, but will not be determinative. A taxpayer may be found to be carrying on a business even where a small profit (or a loss) is made. In this case, however, the evidence did in fact indicate that not insignificant profits were often made by Mr Condon upon the sale of his motor vehicles. These included the sales to: (a) Mr Smithers of the Volkswagen for $14,000 when the vehicle cost him $4,000; (b) Mr Mendes of the Mustang for $35,000 when the vehicle cost him $3,000; (c) Mr Darmenia of the Green Cadillac for approximately $23,000 when the vehicle cost USD8,000; (d) Mr Thompson of the Corvette for approximately $50,000 to $70,000 when the vehicle was acquired for $9,000; and (e) Mr Brooks of the Monster Truck for $50,000 when the vehicle cost Mr Condon USD20,000. 285 These dealings alone reveal that his activities very likely involved at least some profit-making purpose, which points towards him carrying on a business. 286 The submission that he was not selling the cars to the general public, and would use a motor vehicle dealer (or an auction house) to sell to people other than his friends and family, is unpersuasive. It was not advanced with any great vigour, and no authority was cited in support of the contention that a taxpayer cannot be carrying on a business because they trade predominantly with family and friends. Likewise, no authority was relied upon to support the contention that selling vehicles through a wholesaler (or at auction) somehow took the transactions outside the purview of a business. 287 Fifthly, and relatedly, it was submitted that the "profit" identified by the Commissioner did not take into account the spare parts, and repair and maintenance costs, for the vehicles, as well as the time taken by Mr Condon to refurbish the cars, and his intention of collecting the cars. Whilst there is some force in this submission in principle, it cannot be sustained. It was open to Mr Condon to give evidence of the cost of the parts that he used, and the work that went into repairing or restoring the vehicles, but he did not do so. The Court can only proceed on the basis of the evidence before it and, on that material, the conclusion most readily available is that his dealings with vehicles generally resulted in the receipt of a profit, even after accounting for any reimbursement for his labours. 288 As a general proposition, the fact that he may have expended his time and effort in working on the vehicles that he sold cannot assist his case. That activity would constitute the application of work to the vehicles, which generally enhanced their value and enabled them to be sold at a price that was higher (in some cases, seemingly, substantially higher) than the original purchase price that he paid. The fact that he did not engage others to do that work, if that was assumed to be true, would simply have resulted in a higher return for him and the labour which he applied. 289 Sixthly, it was submitted that he purchased vehicles with a view to restoring or using them, rather than as tradestock to be sold in the short term. This submission, like many of the others made by Mr Condon, was overly general in nature. It did not refer to, let alone engage with, the meaning of "trading stock" under s 70-10(1)(a) of the ITAA97. Relevantly, that definition states that trading stock includes "anything produced, manufactured or acquired that is held for purposes of manufacture, sale or exchange in the ordinary course of a business". Mr Condon may have encountered some difficulty in attempting to argue that the vehicles did not fall within this definition, but it is unnecessary to make any finding on that point. It suffices to say that the frequency of his purchases and sales tended to suggest that the vehicles were purchased as trading stock. Additionally, the fact that several of the registration forms relating to vehicles acquired by him identified the "Purpose of Use" for the vehicles as "Dealer" is a strong indication that they were intended to be inventory for sale. On certain forms, the vehicles were identified as being "fee exempt" because they were "trade stock". Again, this is a strong indication of the use to which he intended for them. Although he claimed that the insertion of his identity as a dealer was automatic, there was no evidence to corroborate that claim and it can be rejected. 290 Seventhly, it was submitted that his omission to keep books, records, receipts or invoices for his purchases and expenses relating to cars and car parts dispelled the conclusion that he was carrying on a business. However, his lack of such records is entirely equivocal. As was emphasised in Puzey by Hill and Carr JJ, although the keeping of books and records is a relevant indication of the carrying on of business, "the fact that there are none will not necessitate the conclusion that a business is not carried on": at 257 [48]. Indeed, in this case, the absence of records was entirely consistent with his practice of engaging in undocumented cash transactions. That was his avowed mode of business. 291 Eighthly, it was submitted that the fact that he did not declare income or claim deductions in relation to any of his motor vehicles showed an absence of an intention to carry on a business. There is not insignificant difficulty with this submission, especially in light of the above reasoning in respect of the other indicia of a business. Again, this fact is, at best, equivocal. His failure to declare income may indicate an absence of any intention on his part to carry on business, but it may also be just another example of his disregard for the law. If he was found, on account of other indicia, to be carrying on a business, it would follow that he was required to declare his income at the relevant times and, had he done so, he would have been entitled to claim deductions in accordance with the relevant provisions of the ITAA97. The difficulty is that, because he did not (for whatever reason) declare income arising from his business activities, it was most unlikely that he would seek to claim deductions. His failure to declare income or claim deductions cannot possibly support a finding that he was not carrying on a business. Further, his subjective intention or belief that his dealings and activities with motor vehicles constituted a hobby carries no weight in light of the objective facts, considered in their totality, as set out above.

Conclusion as to business activities 292 The Commissioner rightly contended that the full extent of Mr Condon's activities in relation to motor vehicles will never be known. This is not only a consequence of his not retaining adequate records for the vehicles that he purchased and sold before, during or after the Relevant Years, but also because of his unreliability as a witness (in terms of recollection) and his inherent lack of credit as a witness of the truth. 293 Nevertheless, for the reasons that have been given above, there is sufficient basis to positively conclude on the balance of probabilities that he was carrying on the business of a "motor vehicle dealer" during the Relevant Years. The nature and the extent of his identified actions of repeatedly buying, fixing or restoring, and selling motor vehicles with an apparent intent to derive a profit, sufficiently support that conclusion. Such a finding is buttressed by his use of a motor dealer licence to engage in a number of these transactions.

Reimbursements 294 Mr Condon sought to explain his receipt of several amounts during the Relevant Years as reflecting reimbursements from the TPAIA for expenses that he claimed to have paid on its behalf. It can be accepted that the TPAIA did not have its own corporate credit card and that, from time to time, he paid certain of its expenses using his personal one. It can also be accepted that a system of some sort was put in place, whereby approval would be given by the TPAIA for reimbursements to him for such sums that he paid and, thereafter, invoices and receipts would be generated that evidenced the reimbursements having taken place. Given that supporting documentation, it should be accepted that such a system for reimbursement did exist, and that it was implemented on a number of occasions. 295 During the objection process, the Commissioner accepted that a number of payments from the TPAIA could be characterised as reimbursements in circumstances where receipts and invoices were produced. However, Mr Condon has asserted that other amounts received by him during the Relevant Years were also reimbursements, despite the absence of any supporting documentary evidence. 296 As was submitted on the Commissioner's behalf, on the available evidence, the TPAIA only authorised the use of Mr Condon's credit card for its purposes, and agreed to reimburse expenditure from that card, on 9 September 2015. The nature of the arrangement was revealed during Mr Condon's re-examination, where he said that the invoices in respect of which reimbursement was claimed went to a committee meeting, at which two committee members would sign off on them, if the relevant reimbursements were approved. Once that had occurred, the TPAIA accounts department would make payment to him in the amount of the invoices. 297 There was a paucity of documents supporting Mr Condon's claims that certain amounts received by him were reimbursements. In particular, there was an absence of any evidence of committee approval for many of the payments, despite there being evidence of the approval process having been followed in respect of other payments; including, most notably, the existence of receipts that were signed by two committee members. Indeed, in evidence was a relatively substantial number of receipts that appeared to have been produced as part of this approval regime, each of them bearing two different signatures. They also had the imprint of a stamp, presumably applied subsequent to the approval, together with writing indicating that the amount in question was paid to Mr Condon as a reimbursement and identifying the date on which the amounts were paid. The exhibited invoices related to dates from 2015 to 2018. 298 Mr Condon asserted in relation to the reimbursement process that "everything went through the committee". Assuming that to be so, it must be doubted whether any reimbursement arrangement was in place prior to 9 September 2015. The receipt by him of money prior to that date, through what he claimed was a process of reimbursement, cannot readily be so characterised. Such a characterisation derives no support from, and is in fact at odds with, his evidence. 299 Furthermore, in the absence of accompanying documentary evidence, in the form of receipts or invoices signed by committee members, his claims that other amounts received by him at various times were reimbursements cannot be accepted. His evidence alone is insufficiently credible to sustain those claims. Further, the evidence of Ms Casey supported the existence of the system by which two TPAIA committee members would sign a receipt before any payment to him could be made. The absence of such documents must substantially undermine Mr Condon's attempted characterisation of particular payments as reimbursements. 300 Mr Condon sought to explain the absence of confirmatory documentation as being the result of the loss of TPAIA records in 2019 during flooding in Townsville. The immediate problem is that acceptance of that explanation would require reliance to be placed on his unsupported evidence, which is not possible for reasons set out previously. It is also difficult to reconcile his attempted explanation with the fact that the evidence included numerous examples of invoices dated in 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 that were apparently approved by the TPAIA committee. For these reasons, the suggestion that the TPAIA records relating to his claims for reimbursement were destroyed in a flood is unlikely to have a basis in truth. 301 He also submitted that all of the payments from the TPAIA that were claimed to be reimbursements should be accepted as such on the basis that the TPAIA's finances were audited every year. By this, he seemed to suggest that all payments to him were approved by the auditors as having been made in compliance with the required processes. However, no such inference can be drawn merely from the fact of the audits having taking place. The audit documentation is not before the Court, and so it is not apparent that they were "clear audits". Even if they were, the extent and accuracy of the audit process cannot be determined. 302 Ultimately, his lack of credibility and the exposed inaccuracy of his evidence creates insurmountable hurdles for him in attempting to establish, in the absence of other confirmatory evidence, that particular amounts paid to him by the TPAIA were reimbursements. It follows that, generally, he has not been able to demonstrate that those amounts that were received from the TPAIA into his account, without an accompanying receipt indicating approval by the TPAIA committee, were not assessable income in the Relevant Years.

Rowena and Jazmin Clancy 303 Mr Condon was in a relationship with Rowena from approximately 2009 to 2015. Although that relationship ended, he claimed that they remained close until 2020. As mentioned previously, Rowena is the mother of Ms Jazmin Clancy (Jazmin) and Chantelle. It appears that, throughout most of the period of Mr Condon's and Rowena's relationship, all three of Rowena, Jazmin and Chantelle lived at the same address with Mr Condon. Mr Condon claimed that, during the continuance of that relationship, he considered Jazmin and Chantelle as his daughters and treated them as such, although what he meant by that is not entirely clear. 304 The relevance of these relationships is that, from 2010 to 2011, and during the Relevant Years, Rowena and Jazmin made regular deposits into Mr Condon's safe or his bank accounts. He claimed that the purpose of these payments was for Rowena and Jazmin to accumulate savings, and that he would return their money to them when they wished to purchase something. In other words, he acted as a bank for them, allowing them to save up for whatever it was that they wished to acquire. It was neither immediately clear nor sufficiently explained why they simply did not open their own bank accounts. Indeed, if it was in fact the case that Mr Condon would return their money to them when they asked for it, as he contended, there did not seem to be any apparent point to his purported guardianship of their funds. Further, the arrangement allegedly put in place was only vaguely detailed. Although it was said that he was keeping the money as savings, it is apparent that he used it for his own purposes as and when he desired, and did not set it aside or keep it separated from his own funds. He did not, himself, keep any account of the amounts that he received from Rowena and Jazmin. It is also relevant, as explained further below, that, at least from late 2015, the money was paid by Rowena and Jazmin into his BOQ 8201 account and that, when making those payments, they included a notation as to the alleged purpose of the payments which was often inconsistent with the notion that they were savings. 305 Mr Condon gave evidence to the effect that the payments to him from Rowena or Jazmin were made in 2010 to 2011, as well as subsequently. In relation to the Relevant Years, it seems that Rowena commenced making payments in or around early November 2015, and Jazmin commenced doing so in or around late January 2017. It is not irrelevant to note that, in this respect, they commenced after the relationship between Rowena and Mr Condon had come to an end and, in the case of Rowena, in particular, only quite shortly after that time. It is also not irrelevant that, throughout the period in which these payments were made, Rowena and Jazmin were residing at 66 Ingham Road. 306 In his affidavit of 11 June 2021, at paragraph [138], Mr Condon made the following statement: I have reviewed my records and have prepared a table, for the purpose of these proceedings, detailing the payments I received from Rowena Clancy throughout the Relevant Period. Annexed to this affidavit and marked CGC-1 Tab 54 is a true copy of a table summarising the payments I received from Rowena Clancy throughout the Relevant Period. 307 Tab 54 is headed, "Funds held for Rowena Clancy in BOQ account 21678201", and contains a schedule purporting to list the payments received from Rowena by date, along with the amount of the payments, whether the amounts were withdrawals or deposits, and the alleged balance held by Mr Condon after each. This document seems to have been prepared for the purposes of this litigation, and does not constitute a contemporaneous record. The same can be said for a similar document concerning the amounts received from Jazmin, which was behind Tab 67 of the affidavit. Neither of these documents adds to the weight of the evidence adduced by Mr Condon. They merely assist in setting out that evidence. 308 Despite what Mr Condon said in paragraph [138] of his affidavit, in cross-examination, he agreed that he had not prepared the schedules at Tabs 54 and 67 at all, but that his solicitors had done so from bank statements that he had given to them. He did not recall whether he had made any annotation on these statements indicating the origin of the various recorded payments. It is plain that he did not review the records in question, and he acknowledged that he did not have any independent recollection of the receipt of any specific payments. He also admitted that there were no other documents that showed what payments into his bank account were made by Rowena and Jazmin, with the result that there is presently nothing before the Court to verify the accuracy of the entries in the tables. Ultimately, there was no evidence as to how his solicitors were able to ascertain the amounts that had been received from either Rowena or Jazmin. As was noted in the Commissioner's written submissions, there was also no evidence at all as to the origin of certain payments included in the schedules. In particular, there were two payments in January 2018 of $1,500 each for which there was no description of any payee or purpose for payment, and yet these payments were apparently designated by Mr Condon (or someone else on his behalf) as payments made by Jazmin. The same is true of the regular payments of $250 allegedly made by Jazmin from 11 January 2018. The reality is that there was no real evidential basis for assuming that these payments were actually made by Jazmin. The assertions that she made the payments were no more than conjecture. 309 The Commissioner's submission that, throughout the course of his evidence, Mr Condon's recollection of the payments made by Rowena and Jazmin was poor at best must also be accepted. It was clear that he was uncertain as to the basic facts surrounding those payments. 310 Tabs 54 and 67 of Mr Condon's affidavit of 11 June 2021 do not prove the facts to which they purport to relate and, on that basis, Mr Condon has failed to establish that the payments set out in the schedules behind those tabs were from Rowena or Jazmin, or that they were in fact received on the dates alleged. 311 Tab 54, which purports to record the payments from Rowena, indicates that they were made from 3 November 2015. As explained by Mr Condon, this was after a particular period of time during which Rowena had left Townsville but subsequently returned. He and Rowena were not, at that time, in a relationship, though Rowena continued to live at 66 Ingham Road. The document records the receipt of approximately $100 per week, although different amounts were paid in from time to time. The amounts increase over time and, in the 2018 income year, Rowena was making regular payments of $1,000 per month. From the evidence, it appears that, during the 2016 to 2018 income years, Rowena paid Mr Condon a total of $34,502. 312 Mr Condon asserted that some of these payments were, in fact, made by Rowena's father. It was not explained why they were then described as being from Rowena. Similarly, two payments into Mr Condon's account, being $1,000 on 12 January 2018 and $1,250 on 9 March 2013, were identified as being from Rowena despite there being nothing indicating that to be the case. 313 As Mr Condon admitted, when Rowena paid the funds into his account, she regularly included, as a description for the deposits, the words "rent" or "savings rent" or sometimes "savings". That fact did not appear to be disputed, although the actual bank statements containing those notations were not adduced. Rowena did not give evidence on behalf of Mr Condon. The natural inference that arises from Rowena paying amounts into Mr Condon's bank account, at a time when they were not in a relationship and she was living in a house owned by his company, and her describing those payments as "rent", is that the payments were in fact in the nature of rent. This inference is made stronger by the fact that many of the payments were of regular sums, such as $250 per week or $1,000 per month. 314 As noted previously, Mr Condon claimed that the amounts so received were Rowena's savings, and that she was effectively using his bank account as her own. This explanation was sought to be buttressed by evidence that she had previously saved money with him, which had accumulated to a total of $50,000, and he had paid that amount to her by bank cheque on or around 9 February 2015. A significant amount of time at trial was taken up cross-examining Mr Condon as to the veracity of this evidence, including the alleged obtaining of the bank cheque and its delivery to Rowena. Despite that, the evidence remained somewhat scant. In his affidavit of 23 March 2022, Mr Condon deposed, at paragraph [65], that he had obtained a copy of the bank cheque and annexed it to his affidavit. However, the document attached was not a copy of the bank cheque, but instead a copy of a page from a statement for his BOQ 9681 account, which showed that, on 9 February 2015, immediately after depositing $50,000 into the account, he withdrew that same amount. He confirmed the withdrawal of that amount in his affidavit of 16 November 2022, and he also referred there to the bank cheque attached to his earlier affidavit. This evidence also did not establish that a bank cheque had been drawn in the amount of $50,000 and given to Rowena. However, as it transpired, other evidence was produced to verify the existence of the cheque. 315 This evidence in relation to the bank cheque was poor and disorganised, though it was sufficient to establish that the cheque was drawn in favour of Rowena on 9 February 2015. Even if these facts were accepted, however, there was very little else which supported the contention that the cheque related to an arrangement by which Rowena had deposited money into Mr Condon's account for saving. The only evidence of the alleged depositing of the money prior to the production of the cheque was his testimony, which itself must be regarded as insufficient for reasons expressed above. In addition, the circumstances described in this testimony suggested substantially different arrangements. Mr Condon said that, prior to February 2015, Rowena had been putting money into his safe and that was how it had accumulated. It was alleged that, from November 2015, Rowena made regular deposits into his bank account. That would seem to suggest some other type of arrangement. 316 Rowena was not called to verify whether or not the payments made by her to Mr Condon were "rent" or "rent / savings", as identified in Mr Condon's own documentary evidence. The matter must therefore be determined in reliance on this evidence, together with any available corroborating material. The difficulty here is that, whilst there was some corroboration of Mr Condon's assertion that he drew a bank cheque in favour of Rowena, his evidence as to the reason for which he drew the cheque remained unsupported. The fact that he drew a bank cheque for Rowena in early 2015 does not explain why he did so, nor does it explain the subsequent deposits that were contended to reflect savings. One must rely solely upon his uncorroborated evidence to draw the necessary connection between the drawing of the bank cheque and those subsequent deposits into his account. 317 Whilst the payments made by Rowena were not uniform over the entire period, they were largely so. Though there were some more sizeable payments made from time to time, that does not negate the proposition that the payments were mostly rent. For instance, though Ms Chen pointed to a payment of $13,000 to Mr Condon as an example of an extraordinary payment, that does not affect the characterisation of the other payments. 318 Relevantly, there was no evidence that Mr Condon had repaid Rowena the sum of $34,502, which had allegedly accumulated as a result of her deposits since 2015. In particular, there was nothing to indicate that a further bank cheque was drawn in her favour in repayment of that amount, or that the amount had been repaid in some other manner. It was not even alleged that an attempt had been made to repay it, or that Rowena had asked for it. It is most unlikely that, if the $34,502 did belong to Rowena, she would not have sought repayment at some time, especially since the payments comprising that total amount were made after the end of her relationship with Mr Condon. 319 Mr Condon sought to rely upon the evidence of Ms Jessica Casey, an office worker at the TPAIA, to the effect that she had had a conversation or conversations with Rowena, in the course of which the latter had said that her payments to Mr Condon were savings. Ms Casey said that, when Rowena came into the TPAIA office, she had assisted her to identify in Mr Condon's bank statements payments that were either her savings or Jazmin's savings. Objection was taken to Ms Casey's evidence on the basis that it was hearsay, and that objection should be sustained. Ms Chen was given leave to adduce whatever admissible evidence Ms Casey could give on this issue, but there was none. That said, in cross-examination, Ms Casey did indicate that she went through bank statements from BOQ with Rowena, and identified on them which of the payments were Rowena's savings and which were Jazmin's. Ms Casey claimed that she checked over the tallying of the amounts that Rowena identified as savings for herself and for Jazmin, as Rowena was uncertain in her ability to do so. It was not suggested that Mr Condon was involved in this activity. 320 Although the hearsay evidence of Ms Casey adduced in cross-examination is admissible, it is of little weight in the circumstances. That is especially so given that Rowena identified the payments as deposits for "rent" from time to time. Moreover, Ms Casey's evidence is only of what was said to her, and she had no independent understanding of the nature of the deposits. To accept her statements as evidence of the truth of the fact that Rowena and Jazmin were saving money by depositing it into Mr Condon's account requires it to be accepted, first of all, that Rowena's prior statements to Ms Casey were truthful. That step should not be taken. Regardless, in Mr Condon's written submissions in reply, it was accepted that Ms Casey's assertions as to what she was told by Rowena amounted only to evidence of the fact that those things were said to her, and not evidence of their truth. On that basis, her evidence does not establish the facts in issue. 321 The alleged records of this arrangement, comprising the bank statements marked up by Rowena and Ms Casey, were supposedly kept in a manila folder in the TPAIA office but were not produced. It was submitted that Mr Condon could not find them, and that they may have been taken by the AFP or destroyed in the 2019 floods. However, the references to particular evidence in Mr Condon's written submissions in support of that explanation do not assist. Ms Casey's evidence was that the documents were kept in Mr Condon's office, which was not said to have been flooded. Ultimately, there was no evidence as to the whereabouts of those documents, and Mr Condon's failure to produce them permits an inference to be drawn that their contents would not assist his case. 322 In support of the contention that the amounts were savings, Ms Chen also relied on the fact that the total of the amounts exceeded what might be considered reasonable rent for a house in the Townsville area at the relevant time. However, there was no substantive evidence to support that proposition and it was mere assertion. 323 Mr Condon's evidence in relation to the money received from Jazmin was to much the same effect as that in relation to the money received from Rowena. The payments from Jazmin were made in the 2017 and 2018 income years and totalled $15,500. Again, it appears that Jazmin was living at 66 Ingham Road at the time. The payment made from 24 January 2017 to 2 January 2018 were regular, at $120 per week. There followed two payments of $250 on 4 January 2018, then two subsequent payments of $1,500 and then, from 11 January 2018 to 22 June 2018, payments of $250 per week. It seemed to be accepted that Jazmin also described the payments that she made to Mr Condon's account as "rent" or "rent savings" from time to time. It can be inferred, in the absence of any compelling evidence to the contrary, that such descriptions were deliberately given as an indication of the nature of the payments. Again, the parties were content to proceed on the basis that the payments had been so described, despite the corresponding bank statements not being put into evidence. 324 Mr Condon claimed that he was unable to repay the amounts to Jazmin because his accounts had been frozen as a result of the actions of the Australian Taxation Office and the making of a garnishee order. Again, however, there was no evidence of any demand by Jazmin for repayment of the $15,500, either before or after the freezing of the account. This was no doubt unusual, given that the amounts had been "saved" for multiple years and Mr Condon was no longer in a relationship with Rowena. On the basis of Mr Condon's evidence, the Court is to believe that both Jazmin and Rowena have effectively abandoned their interest in substantial sums of money, which they had saved over relatively long periods of time. That is an unlikely scenario. 325 An unusual issue arose as to the amount that Mr Condon claimed that he held for, or owed to, Jazmin. In evidence, he claimed that the amount owing was $35,000, but it is unclear from where that figure was derived, as the document at Tab 67 of his affidavit of 11 June 2021 indicated that the total sum paid into his account by Jazmin was $15,500, as at the end of the 2018 income year. However, in his affidavit of 23 March 2022, he identified a bank cheque that he paid to Jazmin in the sum of $20,000, dated 21 March 2019. The annexed document is, in fact, a request for a bank cheque, but it does seem to suggest that a cheque in that amount was drawn. No explanation was given for this payment, nor was it taken into account in Mr Condon's discussion of his financial arrangements with Jazmin.

The payments allegedly received from Rowena and Jazmin have not been explained 326 The key question in relation to the deposits of money by Rowena and Jazmin into Mr Condon's bank account during the Relevant Years is not whether they amounted to or reflected payments of rent or, instead, savings by the two women. It was correctly submitted on behalf of the Commissioner that the appropriate question is whether the Court is satisfied that the amounts received were not assessable income; that is, whether Mr Condon has provided a reasonable explanation for his receipt of that money. 327 In this case, there was an insufficient amount of reliable or admissible evidence from which the Court could be satisfied that the payments received by Mr Condon were being held for Rowena and Jazmin as their savings. Mr Condon's evidence about the alleged arrangements was general, and unreliable insofar as it stood on its own. It is apparent that he has identified certain payments as being from Rowena or Jazmin despite the absence of any substantiating evidence to that effect. The fact that the payers of the money themselves had regularly attributed to the relevant deposits the labels "rent" and "rent/savings" undermines his claims that those deposits were savings. Indeed, it weighs significantly against that conclusion. The same effect arises from the circumstances that the accumulated amounts were not repaid to Rowena and Jazmin, and there is no evidence that either of them have at any point sought repayment. Although Ms Chen submitted that, because the amounts allegedly paid by Rowena fluctuated substantially, they were unlikely to be rent, these fluctuations might also indicate that the payments were not regular savings from Rowena's usual income. It was suggested that Rowena was attempting to put aside as savings what she could from week to week but, if that was the case, it is equally unlikely that the amounts saved from time to time would have varied so greatly. The fluctuations therefore do not point one way or the other. 328 Although support was sought to be drawn from the alleged previous arrangement between Rowena and Mr Condon, involving the repayment of $50,000 by a bank cheque, the evidence surrounding that series of events was unreliable. Mr Condon's testimony about those matters was an insufficient foundation from which to suggest any propensity or similar fact evidence. No contemporaneous records were produced in respect of the arrangement or the amounts paid to Mr Condon over time, and no explanation was given for that omission. 329 Ms Casey's evidence did lend some support to the existence of an arrangement between Mr Condon on the one hand and Rowena and Jazmin on the other. However, it was not possible to discern from her evidence the true nature of that arrangement. Her understanding was based on hearsay (which Counsel for Mr Condon rightly conceded), and was apparently inconsistent with the purpose of the payments expressly indicated by Rowena and Jazmin; that is, in numerous instances, "rent". Ms Casey's evidence was also incomplete, and she was only able to speak in general terms about some occasions on which Rowena came into the TPAIA office. Ultimately, her evidence, together with the other evidence relied upon by Mr Condon, was insufficient to establish that the amounts received from Rowena and Jazmin were not assessable income. 330 It follows that the amounts said to have been received from Rowena and Jazmin in the 2016, 2017 and 2018 income years have not been shown to be from non-assessable sources.

Foreign currency transactions 331 The evidence also disclosed that Mr Condon engaged in a number of foreign currency transactions prior to and during the Relevant Years. The Commissioner produced a spreadsheet of transactions reported through AUSTRAC, which was ultimately accepted by Mr Condon as accurately recording his foreign currency transactions, save for the fact that certain of those transactions were said to have been made for or on behalf of the TPAIA. The Commissioner did not contest that these latter transactions, which occurred on 23 July 2014 in the amount of $250,000, on 5 July 2016 in the amount of $100,000 and on 28 June 2017 in the amount of $100,000, did not relate to Mr Condon's assessable income. 332 Nevertheless, the AUSTRAC records revealed that, on several occasions over the Relevant Years, Mr Condon transferred large sums of money to bank accounts in the United States and, more unusually, that he carried exceptionally large sums in cash with him when departing to and returning from the United States. Specifically, the records indicated that he carried USD90,000 to the United States on 10 November 2015, carried USD55,000 to the United States on 2 February 2016, brought USD156,000 into Australia on 18 August 2016, and on 7 September 2016 returned to the United States carrying USD156,000. Some of these amounts were said to be drawn from USD186,500 cash that he had allegedly purchased from the TPAIA during the 2016 income year. 333 At several points during the course of the trial, Mr Condon asserted that certain of the AUSTRAC records were erroneous, on the basis that he had not been carrying the specified amount of cash, or had not been travelling with cash at all, on the relevant dates. However, he subsequently agreed that, save for certain agreed transactions, these records were accurate. 334 In connection with some of the amounts appearing in the AUSTRAC records, Mr Condon mentioned under cross-examination that he had been in the practice of storing large sums of cash at the house of his friend, Mr Jose Gonzales, in Los Angeles. In particular, the cash was said to have been stored under the bed in a guest room while Mr Condon travelled overseas to Panama and back to Australia. 335 On 16 November 2016, Mr Condon deposited USD335,500 cash into a Bank of America account via a branch in Los Angeles. He claimed that he had carried this cash from Australia to the United States, and that he had declared it to the relevant customs officials. However, he acknowledged that no record was made of this movement of currency from Australia to the United States. He said that the USD335,500 was part of the USD500,000 in US denominated notes that had previously been buried in the yard of his mother's home. 336 During the 2017 income year, he moved large sums of money between various accounts in the United States and Australia. Ultimately, the funds were amassed into a single amount of USD817,770.35, which was transferred into an Australian USD account on 6 March 2018. On his evidence, this amount comprised parts of the allegedly buried US currency, which he claimed to have transferred to the United States, the proceeds of the sale of one of his Las Vegas units, and a number of other smaller amounts, the origin of which was not always explained. 337 The specific dealings by Mr Condon in relation to these large US currency transactions are discussed below in the context of each of the Relevant Years. However, as a result of the previous findings concerning his credibility and his general unreliability as a witness, in those instances where his oral evidence was left unsupported by other acceptable material, it has necessarily been considered insufficient to establish the facts in question to the required standard of proof. This was particularly so in circumstances where his oral evidence was ambiguous, inconsistent, or contrary to ordinary experience. There were several instances in which such issues of credibility loomed large, including his assertions that the AUSTRAC records were inaccurate, and his explanation of the origin of certain sums paid into, and transferred between, his various United States bank accounts.

Conclusion in relation to the common factual issues 338 The foregoing discussion of the five common factual issues reveals that in relation to none of them could it be said that Mr Condon has discharged the onus of showing that the relevant monies received by him were non-assessable. In a very real sense, that conclusion is fatal to each of the appeals, even though not all of the factual issues traverse all of the Relevant Years in the same way as does the issue concerning Mr Condon's dealings with motor vehicles. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to deal individually with each of the Relevant Years, addressing the range of issues arising within them.

Gambling during 2015 income year 339 It was an agreed fact that Mr Condon engaged in various gambling activities during the 2015 income year. It was submitted on his behalf that the amounts won by him were not income, and that he was able to establish that those amounts were the proceeds of gambling by reference to various gambling account records and other evidence. The Commissioner accepted as part of his Objection Decision that $4,820 received by Mr Condon in this income year were gambling winnings. The Commissioner otherwise submitted that it was unclear what conclusion the Court was being asked to draw in respect of the remaining amounts. 340 There are several issues with this part of Mr Condon's case. First, apart from the $3,500 that he won on a boxing match on 9 November 2014, there was insufficient evidence provided in relation to the receipts of money to justify the conclusion that those receipts reflected the proceeds of gambling. In Mr Condon's written reply submissions, he maintained his claim that the amounts that he identified as being related to his gambling activities should not be regarded as income. It was submitted that, as he had established that he periodically engaged in gambling, all of the amounts that he identified as gambling winnings should also be so regarded. However, that is insufficient in the present case, given Mr Condon's unreliability and lack of credit. The mere fact that money is deposited into, or withdrawn from, a betting account does not establish anything other than the movement of money. Mr Condon seemed to move money in and out of his betting accounts with some regularity, seemingly without any betting activity actually occurring. The fact that funds were withdrawn from his betting accounts did not mean that they must automatically be assumed to be the result of his gambling activities. 341 Secondly, and more generally, Mr Condon did not explain the source of the funds that allowed him to undertake his gambling activities, nor did he attempt to prove that such sources were non-assessable. Accordingly, he has failed to demonstrate whether those amounts were assessable or not and, in this regard, failed to demonstrate the true amount of his assessable income during the 2015 income year.

Reimbursements during 2015 income year 342 The Commissioner accepted as part of his Objection Decision that some amounts received by Mr Condon during the 2015 income year, totalling $9,639.28 were reimbursements from the TPAIA for expenses that he had paid on its behalf. There were, however, two separate issues raised in respect of the alleged reimbursements in that year. 343 The first related to the agreed fact that Mr Condon had received reimbursements of $23,907.26 in respect of expenses that he had incurred during that year. In the course of the hearing, the Commissioner acknowledged his admission in relation to this amount, but then submitted that the Court should not accept that all of the payments comprising that amount were reimbursements. Instead, it was submitted that no payment should be so regarded if it was made prior to 9 September 2015, that being the date on which the TPAIA passed a resolution to reimburse Mr Condon for the amounts that he paid on its behalf using his credit card. In that regard, it was identified that Mr Condon had not given evidence as to any other arrangement between himself and the TPAIA by reason of which he would have received reimbursement payments prior to the date of that resolution. Ultimately, although the Commissioner's desire to resile from this agreed fact is understandable given the opacity of the information available at the time that the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts was produced, it is not now possible for him to do so. That is especially so given that additional evidence could have been adduced by Mr Condon in relation to this point, had the issue with the current evidence been raised earlier. Regardless, this conclusion has no impact on the ultimate outcome for Mr Condon in respect of the 2015 income year. 344 The second issue concerned a transaction in the 2015 income year in respect of which Mr Condon claimed he was reimbursed the amount of $15,790.50 for a cash payment made to Mr Mendes or his company, NQ General Business Supply, on the TPAIA's behalf. The reimbursement was allegedly paid by way of a TPAIA cheque, which Mr Condon deposited into his BOQ 9861 account on 15 December 2014 together with cash in the amount of $5,000. 345 Mr Condon's evidence in respect of both deposits was problematic, and should not be accepted. No invoices were produced to substantiate the amount of $15,790.50, or the purpose for which any payment was made on the TPAIA's behalf. Instead, Mr Condon produced an invoice dated 2 October 2013 from NQ General Business Supply to the TPAIA for $7,052.22. He said that this invoice was for only part of certain work undertaken by that company, and that there must be another invoice for the remaining amount. He, again, relied on the TPAIA's annual audit to support the veracity of the payment. Nevertheless, he was unable to produce a cheque butt for the cheque allegedly drawn in his favour, or any other invoice. He merely asserted that these documents must have been lost in the flood in 2019. It is worth noting that no explanation was provided as to how the 2013 invoice from NQ General Business Supply survived while this other relevant material was lost. 346 The only evidence that the amount of $15,790.50 (or $20,790.50, taking into account the $5,000 cash allegedly deposited alongside the cheque) was paid to Mr Condon by the TPAIA as a reimbursement comes from Mr Condon himself. As his evidence was, in general, neither credible nor reliable, this was insufficient. 347 In addition, the single invoice used to justify the alleged payment was dated 2 October 2013, this being some nine months before the commencement of the 2015 income year and around 14 months before the alleged reimbursement. It is difficult to accept that the payment for the work done, or the reimbursement of the corresponding sum, could be delayed for that period of time. Although the evidence on this point was unclear, it seems that the alleged payment on behalf of the TPAIA was made shortly prior to the alleged reimbursement on 15 December 2014 and, so, within the 2015 income year. That indicates an expenditure by Mr Condon, unaccompanied by any adequate explanation as to the origin of the funds with which the payment was made. His standard explanation was that he maintained a store of cash in his safe at the Showgrounds and drew upon those funds to make any payment. However, as it is not possible to ascertain how much money, if any, was kept in the safe at any particular time, it cannot be accepted that the safe was indeed the source of the funds in this instance. 348 In relation to the $5,000 cash allegedly deposited with the TPAIA cheque, Mr Condon could not recall any particular details, save that it was a cash deposit. He made no attempt to explain the source of the funds. 349 Accordingly, Mr Condon has failed to demonstrate whether the amount of $20,790.50 was assessable or not. This has contributed to his inability to identify the true amount of his assessable income during the 2015 income year. It needs to be mentioned that it was difficult to ascertain whether the claimed reimbursement of $15,790.50 was part of the agreed reimbursements of $23,907.26.

Foreign currency transactions during 2015 income year 350 In the course of the objection process, the Commissioner accepted that the foreign currency transactions in which Mr Condon engaged in the 2015 income year, totalling $75,968.44 or USD63,327.70, did not reflect the receipt of assessable income. The relevant transactions were transfers from either Mr Condon's CBA 5162 account or his BOQ 9681 account in Australia to his BOA 5449 account in the United States. These transactions are not the source of unexplained income in this income year.

Rowena Clancy during 2015 income year 351 The parties agreed, seemingly at a high level and without specific reference to a particular income year, that Rowena made cash deposits to Mr Condon's safe and bank account. Otherwise, the facts pertaining to this issue were disputed. Previously in these reasons, it has been accepted that Mr Condon gave Rowena a bank cheque for $50,000 on or about 9 February 2015. However, the evidence did not establish that the payment of the $50,000 was his returning to her money that she had saved by depositing it with him over some prior period. Given Mr Condon's lack of credibility and accuracy as a witness, he was not able to establish that the money that he used to pay Rowena came from a non-assessable source. 352 It follows that, once again, Mr Condon was unable to show that the money that he had, and used, was from non-assessable sources.

Motor vehicles during 2015 income year 353 The parties' written submissions in respect of Mr Condon's motor vehicle dealings during the 2015 income year focussed exclusively on the 1968 Red Chevrolet Corvette said to have been sold to Mr Thompson. It was agreed that the vehicle had been sold to Mr Thompson for $40,000 (paid in several ad hoc instalments over two years) and the transfer of a boat. The Commissioner submitted that Mr Condon could not discharge his onus of proving that any alleged payment that he had received for the vehicle was from a non-income source and, in any event, the evidence did not establish that the purchase price was in fact paid during the 2015 income year. In response, Mr Condon submitted that, if it was proved that his motor vehicle dealings as a whole constituted a hobby and not a business, then the income year in which the purchase price was received was irrelevant since, no matter when it was received, it would not constitute assessable income. 354 For the reasons set out earlier, the Commissioner's primary submission should be accepted. Mr Condon did not discharge his onus of proving that his motor vehicle dealings constituted a hobby. On the contrary, the Commissioner established that he was, in fact, carrying on a business such that any money received by him was revenue from that activity. Accordingly, the proceeds of the sale of the 1968 Red Chevrolet Corvette to Mr Thompson were properly regarded by the Commissioner as being assessable income. 355 It can be added, consistently with the Commissioner's second point, that Mr Condon was not able to establish with any particular clarity when the $40,000 was paid by Mr Thompson. This was a consequence of him having to rely, once again, upon his generally inaccurate recollection of the carrying out of an undocumented cash transaction. Indeed, he did not even purport to keep a record of the payments received from Mr Thompson. 356 It follows that Mr Condon was unable to establish that any money he received in the 2015 income year from his selling of motor vehicles was non-assessable.

Other amounts during 2015 income year 357 There are several other amounts, or categories of amounts, that were identified by the Commissioner as being unexplained by Mr Condon, or merely explained by him as being sourced from his "savings", in the 2015 income year. Those, relevantly, include: (a) $8,000 used by him to purchase the Honda Civic; (b) $20,000 allegedly loaned to Mr Mendes "after 1 July 2014", which he said he took out of his safe; (c) the repayment of the $20,000 that he allegedly "borrowed" from Mr O'Connor's money, which was in a shoebox in his safe; and (d) the amounts listed at paragraphs [38] - [42] of his affidavit of 16 November 2022, totalling approximately $19,000, being the face value of five cheques deposited to his CBA 5162 account, for which he could not account. These are dealt with specifically in the following paragraphs.

Honda Civic 358 The key findings in relation to the Honda Civic have been set out above, as has Mr Condon's conflicting testimony in relation to it. It has been concluded that this was yet another vehicle which Mr Condon dealt with in the course of his business of buying and selling motor vehicles. For the present purposes, it has not been established that the funds used by Mr Condon to acquire this vehicle were from non-assessable sources. In the absence of any reliable supporting documentary evidence, his claim that he paid for it with $8,000 of the cash that he kept in his safe at the Showgrounds cannot be accepted.

Loan of $20,000 to Mr Mendes 359 In the course of cross-examination, Mr Condon asserted for the first time that he had loaned $20,000 to Mr Mendes during the 2015 income year. He said that Mr Mendes had paid all of the instalments on the 1966 Ford Mustang in 2013, but subsequently borrowed $20,000 to pay his workers' wages. He added that it was agreed that, if Mr Mendes failed to repay that loan, he would take back the Mustang, which was held as "collateral". Again, the source of the funds for the loan was said to be the cash kept in the safe. Ultimately, however, it is not possible to accept Mr Condon's evidence that he made this alleged loan to Mr Mendes using that cash. The loan was not evidenced by any particular documentation, and was not referred to in any of his six affidavits. These points alone are sufficient to dispose of this issue, but it can be added that Mr Mendes was not called as a witness to corroborate the existence of the loan and, in accordance with the usual rule, it can be assumed that Mr Mendes' evidence would not have assisted Mr Condon's case: Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298, 320 - 321. It follows that the origin of the $20,000 allegedly used to advance the loan to Mr Mendes remains unexplained.

Repayment of $20,000 borrowing from Mr O'Connor 360 Mr Condon gave evidence that on 8 September 2014, he deposited into a bank account $20,000 of the money that he held for Mr O'Connor, which was purportedly stored inside a shoebox in the safe. On the same day, he allegedly transferred it to another account, but could not recall why. He said that he was charged a $5 bank fee, which he believes that the bank had imposed as they transferred the money from the branch. Eventually, he repaid the money in cash back into his safe. He submitted that this narrative ought to be accepted on the basis that he was holding $200,000 in cash in his safe for the O'Connors (or at least one of them) at the relevant time. 361 It is not possible to accept this narrative. In the first place, Mr Condon was unable to provide any explanation as to why he used Mr O'Connor's cash rather than his own in these transactions. Secondly, he had only a vague recollection as to the nature and purpose of these transactions. He stated expressly that he could not remember what the funds had been used for, as it was "eight years before". Thirdly, in the absence of some credible supporting evidence, his assertions as to what occurred are insufficient to establish any of the relevant facts to the required standard. 362 Again, the source of the funds for this transaction must be regarded as having been left unexplained.

Other amounts in sixth affidavit 363 Finally, there were five amounts listed at paragraphs [38] - [42] of Mr Condon's affidavit of 16 November 2022, totalling approximately $19,000. The five amounts allegedly related to cheques deposited to into one of his Commonwealth Bank accounts. He deposed that he could not "recall what [each] transaction relates to". It necessarily follows that he has failed to demonstrate that these amounts were non-assessable. That said, in the broader scheme of this matter, that fact alone would be unlikely to prevent Mr Condon from discharging his onus.

Mr Condon's assessable income was not established 364 As a result of the determinations made earlier in these reasons under the heading "Common Factual Issues", and the more specific findings set out above, the necessary conclusion is that Mr Condon has not shown what his assessable income was in the 2015 income year.

Gambling during 2016 income year 365 In the 2016 income year, Mr Condon alleged that he had gambling winnings from UNITAB in the amount of $15,900, although it is noted that the Objection Decision referred to winnings of only $15,000. The Commissioner did not accept that these amounts were the proceeds of gambling because Mr Condon did not provide evidence as to where the funds had been deposited, or how much cash had been gambled in order to produce those alleged winnings. In his letter of objection, Mr Condon claimed that the total of $15,900 was comprised of the following amounts, which were won from gambling through UNITAB: (i) 9 November 2014 - $3,500; (ii) 27 August 2017 - $8,400; and (iii) 11 December 2017 - $4,000. He alleged that a further withdrawal of $5,000 was for "boxing bets". 366 As the Commissioner rightly submitted, Mr Condon did not identify by reference to the specific betting account when the money was deposited, and he did not provide details of the particular bets which were said to be successful. Further, there appears to be some confusion on his part as to the income year within which certain of the amounts were allegedly won. In that regard, the Commissioner submitted that the table in Mr Condon's objection letter setting out his alleged winnings suggested that only $3,500 was "won" in the 2016 income year from the UNITAB account, and that the total winnings across all Relevant Years from the UNITAB account was $15,900. However, that is itself not entirely accurate, as none of the alleged winnings appear to have been made during the period 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016. This leaves the evidence as to the source and timing of the alleged betting winnings in a state of uncertainty. That uncertainty is a significant obstacle to the success of Mr Condon's appeal. Further, and in any event, his success on this issue is dependent upon the acceptance of his unsupported evidence. For the reasons set out above, that cannot occur in this case. 367 Additionally, in order to discharge the onus that he bore, Mr Condon was required to provide an explanation of the source of the further $5,000 sum. He chose not to. 368 Accordingly, he has failed to demonstrate that the amounts claimed to be gambling winnings during the 2016 income year were non-assessable, and, therefore, he failed to demonstrate the true amount of his assessable income in that year.

Reimbursements during 2016 income year 369 During the 2016 income year, Mr Condon received payments totalling $11,396.39 into his Westpac 7477 account from the TPAIA as reimbursement of expenses that he had paid on its behalf. This explanation of the amount was accepted by the Commissioner in his final submissions, and the amount is not in issue in this proceeding.

Foreign currency transactions during 2016 income year 370 In their respective written submissions, both parties addressed Mr Condon's foreign currency transactions during the 2016 income year in two parts. The first dealt with his purchase of USD186,500 cash from the TPAIA. The second concerned the AUSTRAC records that identified Mr Condon as having carried a total of USD145,000 in cash from Australia to the United States in two trips. The two matters are related, in that it was agreed between the parties that the cash identified in the AUSTRAC records was sourced from the cash purchased by Mr Condon from the TPAIA. It nevertheless remains appropriate to consider separately the evidence relating to each matter.

Purchase from TPAIA 371 As set out in the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts, it was agreed between the parties that Mr Condon had, in or around October 2015, agreed to purchase from the TPAIA USD186,500 in cash for the price of AUD242,000. The purchase price was paid in four instalments (in fact totalling $242,905.04), each of which was deposited into a Westpac account in the name of the TPAIA by 12 January 2016. Despite this agreement, in his written submissions, the Commissioner advanced an argument that the transaction had never taken place. The Commissioner relied principally on the fact that, although there was some indication that the TPAIA had received the four instalment amounts into its accounts (one of which was seemingly paid into a BOQ account, not a Westpac account), there was nothing to indicate that Mr Condon had paid them. It was also contended that there was no probative evidence of any agreement between Mr Condon and the TPAIA. 372 Ultimately, whatever the merits of the Commissioner's arguments, he is not entitled to resile from the effect of the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts. The existence of the agreement between Mr Condon and the TPAIA, and Mr Condon's making of the four payments in the total amount of approximately $242,000, were not so obviously unsubstantiated by the evidence as to make it appropriate to overlook the Commissioner's concession. 373 By contrast, less certainty attended the evidence as to the origin of the $242,000 amount itself. Mr Condon submitted that this had been drawn from his safe and his BOQ line of credit account. Whilst the Commissioner acknowledged that the evidence indicated that Mr Condon had withdrawn two amounts totalling $64,926.64 from his CBA 5162 and BOQ 9681 accounts on 12 January 2016 and paid them to the TPAIA, the source of the balance of approximately $177,978.60 was essentially unexplained. In cross-examination, Mr Condon was directed to a $113,051.75 deposit into an account in the name of the TPAIA, alleged to be a component part of the $242,000 payment, which he ultimately indicated had "probably come out of [his] safe". However, he readily admitted that he had no distinct memory of the payment. He likewise asserted that a further $64,926.85 had come from his cash savings, although his recollection of this payment was similarly vague. When asked where the cash savings had come from, he said only that they had come from his "work and salary". 374 The source of the $242,000 was, in this way, sought to be established, in part, in reliance on Mr Condon's credit in circumstances where no records were kept and no other evidence was adduced to identify its origin. For the reasons already set out, his credit alone cannot provide a sufficient foundation for a finding of fact in these proceedings. Accordingly, he has not discharged his onus of establishing that the source of the $177,978.60 used to purchase the USD186,500 was not assessable income.

AUSTRAC records 375 The AUSTRAC records received in evidence indicated that Mr Condon had travelled to the United States on 10 November 2015 with USD90,000 cash, and on 2 February 2016 with USD55,000 cash. In his 11 June 2021 affidavit, he deposed that he was not sure that the amount he had taken to the United States on 10 November 2015 was in fact USD90,000. However, he then proceeded to say that, on 10 November 2015, he had deposited USD50,000 of the USD90,000 into his BOA 5449 account. USD55,000 was deposited into the same account on 3 February 2016. The source of the two cash amounts was identified as the USD186,500 purchased from the TPAIA. Mr Condon identified the same source of the funds in his 16 November 2022 affidavit. 376 In his 16 November 2022 affidavit, he deposed to having deposited USD50,000 and not USD90,000 into his BOA 5449 account, correcting an erroneous reference to the latter figure apparently made by the Commissioner. He then stated, somewhat imprecisely, that "[t]he remaining USD I had taken out of Australia was retained by me in cash". It is not clear whether Mr Condon, in referring to the "remaining USD", meant the USD40,000 remaining of the USD90,000 once the amount of USD50,000 had been deposited, or if he simply meant the USD55,000 the subject of the other AUSTRAC record, which was also mentioned in the same section of the 16 November 2022 affidavit. In either case, the statement would be inconsistent with his 11 June 2021 affidavit, in which it was deposed that the USD90,000 figure was simply a mistake (such that there could be no "remaining USD" after the USD50,000 had been deposited), and that the USD55,000 was deposited into his BOA 5449 account on 3 February 2016 (and therefore not retained as cash). 377 In oral evidence, he reiterated his belief that the USD90,000 figure was an error and said that the true amount that he had taken out of Australia was USD50,000. In cross-examination, in particular, he maintained that he could not recall having travelled with USD90,000. He also stated that he could not recall having waited one day after arriving in the United States on 2 February 2016 before depositing the USD55,000 into his bank account. 378 Notwithstanding the difficulties in this evidence, the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts identified agreement between the parties that: (a) the source of the USD90,000 and USD55,000 amounts was part of the USD186,500 that Mr Condon had purchased from the TPAIA in October 2015; (b) on 10 November 2015, he deposited USD50,000 of the USD90,000 into his BOA 5449 account (seemingly an implicit concession that the true amount of cash brought to the United States on this occasion was USD90,000); and (c) on 3 February 2016, he deposited USD55,000 into his BOA 5449 account. 379 This position can be accepted, albeit with some hesitation. Most significantly for the present purposes, it follows that the USD145,000 total amount must be treated as part of the USD186,500 purchased from the TPAIA. Although the concessions made by the Commissioner must stand, the evidential difficulties around this issue only emphasise the consequences of Mr Condon's mode of managing his finances. This is exacerbated by Mr Condon's evidence being at odds with the facts in the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts.

Rowena Clancy during 2016 income year 380 It is apparent that Rowena paid $5,400 into Mr Condon's BOQ 8201 account in the 2016 income year. For the reasons set out above, Mr Condon has not established that the payments to him from Rowena were non-assessable income.

Motor vehicles during 2016 income year 381 The parties' written submissions made reference to several different motor vehicle dealings by Mr Condon that appeared, on the evidence, to have taken place within the 2016 income year. These are addressed in the order that they were raised. 382 First, Mr Condon submitted that, on 28 July 2015, $3,300 was deposited into his Westpac 9868 account by Mr Thompson as part payment for the purchase of the 1968 Red Chevrolet Corvette. This fact was disputed between the parties and there is little concrete evidence to verify its truth. Nevertheless, whilst the matter is attended by some uncertainty, given the circumstances of the previous findings made, Mr Condon's position can be accepted. The consequence of this, given the conclusion that Mr Condon has not established that his dealings with motor vehicles constituted or took place as part of a hobby, is that the $3,300 amount was properly treated by the Commissioner as an unexplained receipt, in that it was not shown to be non-assessable income. 383 Secondly, Mr Condon submitted that, on 21 December 2015, he purchased a "G Truck" from Manheim for $11,989.78 and a "Tipper Truck" from Manheim for $5,570.32. Somewhat curiously, these matters were both agreed and disputed in the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts. However, the available evidence consistently supported Mr Condon's claims that these vehicles were acquired as alleged, and that should be accepted. On the other hand, the source of funds used to acquire them was insufficiently explained. 384 Thirdly, Mr Condon submitted that, on 21 December 2015, $14,000 was deposited into his CBA 5162 account as payment for the 1965 Volkswagen Beetle sold to Mr Smithers. This was a disputed fact and, as discussed above, Mr Condon's evidence in relation to the nature and timing of this payment was contradictory. The Commissioner submitted that there could be no certainty that the purchase price for the vehicle was received in the income year in which it was sought to be brought to account. In reply, Mr Condon submitted that this question of timing was irrelevant since the funds were not assessable income derived in the conduct of a business and, even if he was found to have been carrying on a business, the Amended Assessments should be remitted to the Commissioner and the question of timing of the receipt of income determined in that context. 385 These submissions should be rejected. If the $14,000 was received on 21 December 2015 for the sale of the 1965 Volkswagen Beetle, it was not shown to be non-assessable income derived from a hobby. Mr Condon's inability to establish that fact has the consequence that he has failed to discharge his onus. Further, for the reasons that have been set out previously in relation to the discharge of the onus, there is no justification for remitting the assessments back to the Commissioner. 386 Fourthly, Mr Condon submitted that, on 11 January 2016, he received $15,000 from Queensland REO Pty Ltd for the purchase of a new motor for the 1966 Red Ford Mustang sold to Mr Mendes. He said that the motor was purchased on or around 21 April 2016 for $16,071.40. The Commissioner's written submissions drew attention to the fact that Mr Condon had inconsistently characterised the $15,000 amount as being payment for an engine and as part-payment of the purchase price. In reply, Mr Condon submitted that, regardless of the characterisation, the amount was not assessable. Here also, Mr Condon's claims were dependent upon his evidence alone, which was internally inconsistent. His evidence is insufficient to establish the purpose of the payment with any sufficient exactitude. In any event, as his attempt to demonstrate that the payment was received in the course of a hobby failed, that payment has not been shown to be non-assessable income. 387 Finally, Mr Condon submitted that, on 7 March 2016, he sold the Nissan Patrol to TSV Wholesale Cars for $15,950. He further submitted that his contention that the vehicle was owned by Rowena, and that he had merely assisted her to sell it, ought to be accepted on the basis that his evidence was supported by the evidence of Mr Freeman (of TSV Wholesale Cars), and was "consistent with him helping [to] purchase and sell other vehicles for Rowena and her daughters". 388 For the reasons given previously, these contentions cannot be accepted. There was substantial doubt in these proceedings as to the ownership of this vehicle. The conflicting evidence of Mr Condon has been discussed above. The assertion that the vehicle belonged to Rowena was sought to be supported by the evidence of Mr Freeman, the used-car salesman in Townsville who acquired it. He has known Mr Condon since 1998. In his affidavit, he deposed that, in around March 2016, Mr Condon had said to him words to the effect of, "How much would you pay for my Nissan Patrol?" (emphasis added) and, subsequently, he had caused his company to purchase the vehicle from Mr Condon. Under cross-examination, Mr Freeman also said that he bought the vehicle from Mr Condon. Subsequently, he said that the contract was with Rowena because it was registered in her name. However, he also gave evidence that he had paid the purchase price to Mr Condon. None of this disturbs the conclusion that the vehicle was owned by Mr Condon. Indeed, it strengthens that conclusion, because it suggests that Mr Condon negotiated the sale and received the purchase price. The fact that Mr Freeman entered into a written contract with the person to whom the vehicle was registered, if that is indeed true, may well have been a mere matter of prudence. At its best, the evidence of Mr Freeman was equivocal. 389 It follows that Mr Condon must be taken to have received the purchase price in 2016 for the sale of the Nissan Patrol for himself and not for Rowena. He did not demonstrate that this was non-assessable income. 390 The Commissioner's written submissions also made mention of the following additional matters: (a) the receipt of $9,000 from Mr Darmenia on 27 June 2016 for the 1994 Green Cadillac 4D; (b) the sale of the "4-Wheeler" to Mr Stevens, for which Mr Condon was paid $1,100 in about March 2016; and (c) the 1986 Chevrolet Corvette purchased from Mr Katthagen in about August 2015 for around $12,000 in cash, which Mr Condon said in cross-examination "could have been" from his safe. 391 The sales of the first two motor vehicles have been dealt with above. It is not accepted that they occurred as part of a hobby. The amounts of $9,000 and $1,100 have not been established to be non-assessable income. 392 As to the amount of $12,000, spent on the purchase of the 1986 Chevrolet Corvette, Mr Condon was unable to provide any credible evidence as to the source of those funds, such that the amount must be taken to reflect unexplained income. His assertions in cross-examination that the cash "could have been" from his safe, and was derived from the savings that he had accrued from "working for the last 60 years", were essentially in the nature of guesses. Even if these assertions were based on his general understanding of his own affairs, they could not be regarded as evidentially sufficient to discharge the onus that he bore.

Other amounts during 2016 income year 393 The parties also addressed other sundry amounts that were dealt with by Mr Condon in the 2016 income year and which appeared in his bank statements as deposits or withdrawals. 394 Several transactions were identified by Mr Condon in his evidence as being "personal transfers" or "account deposits" or "personal savings", but he was unable to explain them further or to identify their source. For the reasons set out above, his evidence alone must be considered insufficient to establish their provenance or to establish that they were non-assessable income. To the extent that they are said to have been the receipt by him of payments for the sale of cars, they cannot be found to be non-assessable income because he has failed to establish that his dealings with motor vehicles constituted a hobby. 395 On 15 March 2016, Mr Condon deposited $140,000 cash into his BOQ 9681 account and arranged for a bank cheque to be drawn in favour of Ross Lawyers Trust Account. He claimed that the funds used for this transaction were taken from the shoebox in his safe containing the $200,000 that he was holding for his friend, Mr Tony O'Connor. Mr O'Connor's affidavit asserted that, in around Christmas 2013, he visited his mother at the house of his brother, Mr Peter O'Connor, and discovered that she had $200,000 in cash in a cupboard. He did not think that this was safe, so he took the cash to Mr Condon, who agreed to keep it in his safe at the Showgrounds. He further said that Mr Condon used $140,000 of it in 2016 to draw a bank cheque for the purpose of Mr O'Connor's brother's divorce settlement. Under cross-examination, Mr O'Connor appeared to indicate that he wanted to put the money into Mr Condon's account to keep it away from his brother's estranged wife. 396 Although the evidence of Mr O'Connor and Mr Condon on this issue was not entirely reconcilable, relevant parts of it were sufficiently consistent to permit the conclusion that Mr Condon was in fact keeping $200,000 of the O'Connor family's money in his safe. It seems to be fairly clear that the purpose of this arrangement was to conceal the money from Mr Peter O'Connor's estranged wife during divorce proceedings. 397 It follows that the deposit of $140,000 into Mr Condon's BOQ 9681 account on or about 15 March 2016 has been shown to have been derived from a non-assessable source.

Conclusion as to 2016 income year 398 Again, Mr Condon's failure to sufficiently explain a number of transactions relating to the 2016 income year has the consequence that he failed to discharge the onus imposed upon him by s 14ZZO(b)(i). This is in addition to his general failure to explain his income, as discussed earlier in these reasons.

Gambling during 2017 income year 399 Mr Condon deposed in his 16 November 2022 affidavit that, in February 2017, he flew to Adelaide to attend a boxing match between Anthony Mundine and Danny Green, and that he won $14,000 from a bet of $5,000 that he placed on the outcome of the fight at odds of $3.80. He said that, on 6 February 2017, he deposited his winnings of $14,000 into his Westpac 9868 account. He gave evidence that the bet was made with an on-site bookmaker, and he held no written record of the bet as his betting slip was retained by the bookmaker when he collected his winnings. 400 He was cross-examined in relation to this alleged gambling win. In particular, he was asked whether a withdrawal of $8,000 made on 6 February 2017 from his Westpac 7477 account formed part of the $14,000 deposit. Whilst he adhered to his assertion that he had won $14,000 betting on the fight, he had no explanation as to why he had withdrawn $8,000 from one account on the relevant day, only to deposit $14,000 into another account. Ultimately, even if Mr Condon's evidence on this issue was accepted, he has failed to proffer any explanation in his evidence as to the source of the funds that allowed him to place a bet of $5,000 in the first instance. 401 Further, as has been noted a number of times previously, Mr Condon's evidence is not sufficient to meet the applicable standard of proof in circumstances where, as here, there was no supporting documentation or other evidence to buttress his claim. Accordingly, he has failed to demonstrate that the alleged gambling winnings during the 2017 income year were non-assessable, and, for this reason, he has failed to demonstrate the true amount of his assessable income during that year.

Reimbursements during 2017 income year 402 The parties' respective positions in relation to the claimed reimbursements for the 2017 income year lacked clarity. It seems that, during this period, Mr Condon received payments totalling $35,066.23 from the TPAIA which Mr Condon claimed were by way of reimbursement for expenses that he had incurred on its behalf. In the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts the Commissioner appeared to agree that all of that amount, save for a specific amount of $1,105.75 deposited into Mr Condon's Westpac 7477 account on 7 July 2016, had been paid to Mr Condon by way of reimbursement. 403 In the Objection Decision, the Commissioner had accepted that Mr Condon had received reimbursements on account of his meeting the TPAIA's expenses, for which invoices had been provided, in the amount of $28,792.38. However, in his written submissions on these appeals, he took issue with what he said was Mr Condon's attempts to increase the claimed reimbursements to $35,066.33. He submitted that there was no cross-referencing between what was accepted in the Objection Decision and what was therefore asserted to be an authorised "reimbursement", and no attempt was made to link the purported additional "reimbursements" to identifiable invoices or receipts produced in compliance with the TPAIA's usual reimbursement process. 404 By these submissions, it appeared that the Commissioner was again seeking to resile from his concessions in the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts. Whilst it can generally be accepted that the form in which the facts were agreed or disputed in that document was far from clear and left some matters open to interpretation, it does appear to be beyond doubt in this instance that the Commissioner accepted that $33,960.58 was indeed the total amount reimbursed during the relevant period. Even if the evidence of the additional reimbursements might fall below that which would otherwise have been required in this case, it is not possible to ignore the formal agreement already reached on this point. 405 It follows that, save for the relatively minor amount of $1,105.75 which remained in dispute, Mr Condon has satisfactorily explained that the amounts received from the TPAIA during the 2017 income year were reimbursements for amounts that he paid on its behalf, and were non-assessable income.

Foreign currency transactions during 2017 income year 406 Central to the parties' submissions in respect of the disputed foreign currency transactions in the 2017 income year was Mr Condon's evidence in relation to the buried USD500,000 cash. That has been addressed above, leading to the finding that his recounting of events is not to be believed. Nevertheless, it has been accepted that he did acquire USD300,000 in 2007 after drawing down on the BOQ line of credit, which was secured by a mortgage over 66 Ingham Road. The foreign currency dealings must be considered in light of these findings. It is most convenient to address these dealings chronologically in groups comprised of particular transactions that relate closely to one another.

August and September 2016 407 The Commissioner's written final submissions in respect of the foreign currency transactions in the 2017 income year initially drew attention to a USD125,000 withdrawal from Mr Condon's BOA 5449 account on 16 August 2016. That withdrawal was addressed only in Mr Condon's reply submissions, and no real explanation was provided for it. The documentary evidence concerning the withdrawal comprised a single bank statement for the period 1 August 2016 to 31 August 2016, in which the relevant entry was attributed the generic description "Customer Withdrawal Image". The surrounding monthly statements suggest that, as at 1 August 2016, the account had approximately USD84,000 in it, and a further USD64,000 was deposited subsequently in that month. Mr Condon provided no sufficient explanation for the origin of these funds in his BOA account, although the statements show that, as at 1 July 2016, there was USD88,681.83 in the account. The source of the USD64,000 remains unexplained. 408 The USD125,000 withdrawal assumed some prominence in cross-examination. The Commissioner pointed out that the withdrawal on 16 August 2016 occurred in temporal proximity to Mr Condon's carrying USD156,000 in cash back into Australia on 18 August 2016, as indicated in AUSTRAC records. Mr Condon not only denied any connection between the two events, but denied that he had ever travelled to Australia with USD156,000 cash on 18 August 2016. He asserted instead that he had left the USD125,000 "under the bed", which he later clarified to mean the bed at the house of his friend, Mr Gonzales. Unusually, he later denied having any recollection of leaving the money at the house, but concluded nonetheless that, in the circumstances, he "must have left it there". 409 Mr Condon made no attempt to substantiate his assertion that the AUSTRAC records indicating that he brought USD156,000 into Australia on 18 August 2016 were incorrect. Instead, he simply stated that he did not recall having brought USD156,000 back into the country at that time. As it was, on the final day of the hearing, Mr Condon, by his Counsel, accepted the accuracy of the AUSTRAC records. That somewhat diminished his prior evidence in relation to these foreign currency amounts. 410 It is not irrelevant to note that the AUSTRAC records then showed Mr Condon travelling to the United States less than one month later, on 7 September 2016, with exactly USD156,000 in cash. Whilst it is natural to suppose that this was the same cash that had been carried into Australia not long prior, Mr Condon baldly denied this. 411 His position was that, in early September 2016, he had dug up the USD500,000 buried in the front yard of his mother's house and then, on 7 September 2016, had taken USD156,000 of that money with him to the United States. He had thereafter holidayed in Panama with a girlfriend, where he had spent some of it. On 19 September 2016, he deposited the remainder into his BOA 5449 account in two instalments of USD147,600 and USD3,600. 412 Relevantly, it was agreed between the parties that Mr Condon had travelled to the United States with the sum of USD156,000 on 7 September 2016, deposited the amounts of USD147,600 and USD3,600 into his account on 19 September 2016, and had then spent the remainder. However, the origin of the USD156,000 that had previously been brought back to Australia was not agreed. 413 In cross-examination, Mr Condon made mention on several occasions of the fact that the USD156,000 that he took to the United States was damaged currency, consequent upon it having been buried by him. He was cross-examined about what he had done with it upon arriving back in the United States. He initially denied leaving it at Mr Gonzales' house, along with the USD125,000 that he claimed he had left under the bed there while he returned to Australia. However, he subsequently revised this position, saying that he had taken only some of the USD156,000 with him to Panama and had hidden the rest at Mr Gonzales' house. He conceded that the total amount hidden in Mr Gonzales' house at this time may have been about USD270,000. He then explained that, upon his returning to the United States from Panama, he had retrieved some of the damaged money and attempted to deposit it at a particular branch, which had ultimately accepted only USD147,600. He said that the remaining USD3,600 was deemed by the first branch to be too damaged to accept, but that money was accepted at another nearby branch later on the same day. 414 The central issue here concerns the origin of the USD156,000 taken by Mr Condon to the United States on 7 September 2016. On the evidence, two explanations most readily present themselves: (a) as put forward by Mr Condon, the cash may have been drawn from the USD500,000 that he contended that he dug up in early September 2016; or (b) as the various links drawn by the Commissioner seemed to suggest, the cash may have been the same USD156,000 that was indicated in the AUSTRAC records has having been brought into Australia from the United States on 18 August 2016, which in turn may have included the USD125,000 withdrawn from Mr Condon's BOA 5449 account on 16 August 2016. 415 Of course, it may be that there are other plausible explanations not explored during these proceedings, but it is unnecessary to consider that possibility. The onus was on Mr Condon to demonstrate that the source of the money was not assessable income. Though he attempted to do so by contending that it was part of the USD500,000 that had been buried prior to the Relevant Years, for the reasons previously given, that contention cannot be accepted. There was no set of contemporaneous records, other documentary evidence or supporting testimony on which he could rely to support his claim in this regard. 416 While the Commissioner was not required to provide a competing explanation for the origin of the various foreign currency amounts, including the USD156,000 cash taken to the United States, the links drawn by him to rationalise Mr Condon's holding the USD156,000 cash as at 7 September 2016 do have some common-sense appeal. Mr Condon's attempts to explain away those links, by contrast, do not. 417 In particular, it is difficult to accept Mr Condon's evidence that he hid the USD125,000 in cash under a bed at Mr Gonzales' house while he returned to Australia. Although he gave evidence that the bed at Mr Gonzales' house was in a separate converted garage area and not in the main dwelling, perhaps suggesting that it was in this way more secure, he also seemed to indicate later, when discussing other amounts of USD cash, that he did not trust Mr Gonzales enough to tell him expressly about the money stored in his house. 418 When deciding how best to deal with USD125,000 cash while travelling abroad for an extended period of time, one might consider it needlessly high-risk to conceal it under a bed in a house owned by a person who, although a friend, is not regarded as entirely trustworthy. A more attractive option might simply be to carry the cash while travelling. There is evidence to suggest that this is precisely what Mr Condon did. He attempted to controvert this evidence by asserting that the AUSTRAC records showing his returning to Australia in possession of USD156,000 must be wrong. But this assertion was, with respect, entirely unsubstantiated. Regardless, the AUSTRAC record was subsequently accepted as evidencing the truth of the facts that it conveyed. The disparity between Mr Condon's evidence and the probative force of the AUSTRAC record was never explained. 419 It is unnecessary to go further and attempt to piece together a full chronology of the transactions that preceded and followed these events. It is safe to conclude that Mr Condon has failed to discharge his onus of establishing the origin of the USD156,000, which eventually became the USD147,600 and USD3,600 amounts deposited into his BOA 5449 account.

October and November 2016 420 Mr Condon returned to Australia on about 21 or 22 September 2016. It was agreed in these proceedings that, on 3 October 2016, while in Australia, he sent an email to the Mutilated Currency Division of the United States Department of Treasury regarding his damaged cash. By that email, he requested that approximately USD30,000 of damaged notes be replaced or reimbursed. He subsequently received a cheque from the Mutilated Currency Division on 9 November 2017 in the amount of USD20,100, which noted that the payment was "short $9,900". 421 It was also agreed that, on 16 November 2016, he "travelled to the United States with USD$335,500" and that deposited it into his BOA 5449 account. The relevant words of the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts are quoted in the preceding sentence because it came to be contended by the Commissioner that Mr Condon had not in fact travelled with that money. Instead, the Commissioner drew attention in his written submissions to the fact that this alleged movement of cash was not the subject of any AUSTRAC record, and pointed out that Mr Condon's explanation in cross-examination for why this was so was inherently improbable. The Commissioner submitted that the funds ultimately deposited into the BOA 5449 account were not in fact carried from Australia to the United States. 422 There is potentially some merit to these points. Mr Condon's explanation for the absence of any AUSTRAC records was that, although he had declared that he was travelling with the cash when leaving Australia, the Border Force agent in Brisbane had allowed him to proceed through to his flight after making only some cursory remarks about the large quantity of cash, and no one had subsequently reported its movement. The money was examined at customs on arrival in Los Angeles, but again no record was produced to note the movement of cash. On any view, it is unlikely that the events unfolded in this way. However, once again, the Commissioner should not be permitted to resile from the position that he adopted in the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts. He must be left to contend, as he did in the alternative, that Mr Condon might have travelled with the USD335,500 and simply omitted to declare it. Whether this was the case, however, is of little consequence for present purposes. 423 In the result, the only real controversy in respect of the foreign currency transactions during the period of October and November 2016 was whether the USD335,500 was in fact drawn from the cash that Mr Condon had allegedly dug up. For reasons previously set out, the evidence in these proceedings is insufficient to support such a finding.

December 2016 and January 2017 424 It was agreed in these proceedings that, on 13 December 2016, Mr Condon travelled to the United States and arranged for USD500,000 to be transferred from his BOA 5449 account to his BOA 6831 account. This amount was largely comprised of funds said to have been drawn from the buried cash, as dealt with above. Somewhat unusually, however, the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts did not address the USD50,000 that was deposited into Mr Condon's BOA 5449 account as "Counter Credit" on the same day. In fact, the transaction was not the subject of any explanation in the documentary evidence. In cross-examination, Mr Condon stated only that the USD50,000 was money from Mr Gonzales' house. Although neither party took this matter further, the onus was at all times on Mr Condon to demonstrate that the transaction did not reflect the receipt of assessable income. He did not discharge that onus in relation to this issue, particularly having regard to the inherent unreliability of his evidence in these proceedings more generally, and the fact that the full extent of his explanation for the origin of the funds was a single remark in response to questioning in cross-examination. 425 Separately, it was disputed that, on 9 January 2017, Mr Condon had deposited USD50,000 cash into his BOA 6831 account that was not in the nature of taxable income. A bank statement for that account over the relevant period, being 13 December 2016 to 11 January 2017, showed the USD50,000 to be comprised of two amounts: USD30,000 described as "Counter Credit" and USD20,000 described as "CA TLR transfer". These amounts were not the subject of detailed submissions by either party. Mr Condon's written submissions merely identified the character of the USD50,000 total amount as being disputed. The Commissioner's written final submissions did not make mention of the amount at all. 426 It can fairly readily be concluded that the USD20,000 amount was transferred from Mr Condon's BOA 5449 account. That is apparent from the bank statement for the BOA 5449 account for the relevant period and, in any event, seemed to be common ground in cross-examination. The origin of the USD30,000, meanwhile, was never satisfactorily explained. Mr Condon's affidavit of 11 June 2021 stated merely that, on 9 January 2017, he had deposited USD50,000 into his BOA 6831 account and this seemed to have included the unexplained USD30,000. In cross-examination, he was asked specifically if the USD30,000 was part of the deposit he made. He responded by stating that he did not recall the deposit, though he would have made it because "[n]o one else puts money into the account but me". This oblique response came despite the fact that, in his 16 November 2022 affidavit, he had deposed with some precision that the USD30,000 was a cash deposit that he had made using the money that he had purchased from the TPAIA. 427 That explanation is, itself, not without difficulty. As discussed in relation to the 2016 income year, his position was that he had purchased the United States currency from the TPAIA and taken USD105,000 in cash with him to the United States over two trips: the first with USD50,000, which he says was erroneously reported in AUSTRAC records as USD90,000, and the second with USD55,000. His evidence was that he deposited all of the USD105,000 into his BOA 5449 account. His bank statements suggest that he did deposit such an amount. There is no indication that he subsequently travelled to the United States with another USD30,000 drawn from the USD186,500 purchased from the TPAIA. Nor is there any indication that he withdrew USD30,000 from his BOA 5449 account, which was thereafter identified as reflecting part of the amount purchased from the TPAIA. Accordingly, the evidence fails to disclose how he had USD30,000 of the TPAIA cash with him in the United States on 9 January 2017. 428 There may be two possible answers to this difficulty. First, his evidence that he travelled to the United States with only USD105,000 may have been incorrect. More specifically, he may have been incorrect in asserting that the AUSTRAC records identifying him as having travelled with USD90,000 must be mistaken. Secondly, it may be that his evidence to the effect that the USD30,000 deposit on 9 January 2017 was made with money purchased from the TPAIA was incorrect. These answers are not mutually exclusive. 429 On the evidence, the first answer is quite possibly the more accurate. As already set out above, there was little reason to believe Mr Condon's assertion that the USD90,000 amount appearing in the AUSTRAC records was mistaken. Indeed, he himself appeared to suggest in other evidence that he had deposited USD50,000 of the USD90,000 amount into his BOA 5449 account, and retained the remaining USD40,000 in cash. This would account for the USD30,000 in cash deposited on 9 January 2017. However, acceptance of that answer would require, at least to some extent, an acknowledgment of the accuracy of his evidence, which would be unjustified. His affidavit evidence that the USD30,000 was drawn from the cash purchased from the TPAIA had a surprising degree of exactness to it, but that was not remotely maintained in cross-examination. Moreover, if he had retained USD40,000 of the USD90,000 cash that he had carried over to the United States on 10 November 2015, no explanation was provided as to where, or why, he had stored that cash for approximately one year and one month before depositing USD30,000 of it into his BOA 5449 account. 430 Ultimately, his explanation for the origin of the USD30,000 cannot be believed. Again, it depends on acceptance of his unsupported evidence and, in this instance, in circumstances where it is even more improbable than usual. He has not discharged his onus of establishing that the deposit did not constitute assessable income.

Motor vehicles during 2017 income year 431 In connection with the 2017 income year, Mr Condon's written final submissions made reference to four dealings, as follows: (a) in August 2016, he sold the Monster Truck to Mr Brooks for $50,000, who paid him $20,000 in August 2016 and then a further $30,000 in August 2017; (b) on 7 September 2016, he deposited into his Westpac 9868 account $8,800 in cash received from the sale of the 1968 Red Chevrolet Corvette to Mr Thompson; (c) on 28 October 2016, he sold his Tipper Truck to Manheim for $5,950, the proceeds of which were deposited into his CBA 5162 account; and (d) on 23 November 2016, he received $4,000 into his Westpac 9868 account from the sale of the 1969 Red Chevrolet Corvette to Mr Thompson. 432 The Commissioner submitted that all of the payments received in the course of these dealings were sourced from Mr Condon's motor vehicle activities, which he was unable to establish were merely a hobby. In the alternative, it was submitted that there remained some ambiguity as to the timing of the receipt of the payments in respect of the 1968 Red Chevrolet Corvette and the Monster Truck, such that "there can be no certainty that they were monies received in the income year in which they are sought to be brought to account". 433 The Commissioner's primary submission ought to be accepted. For the reasons already given, Mr Condon has been unable to establish that the payments which he identified as having been received in the 2017 income year from the sale of motor vehicles were non-assessable income derived from a hobby. 434 Assuming that it is necessary to consider, the Commissioner's alternative submission must be rejected in respect of at least the first three of the dealings set out above. The facts of those dealings, including the dates on which particular funds were received, were listed as having been agreed in the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts. While the facts of the fourth dealing were disputed, it can be concluded that, even if the $4,000 received on 23 November 2016 was not income derived from the sale of a motor vehicle, it was an unexplained deposit that Mr Condon has not satisfactorily demonstrated to be non-assessable. As set out above, the evidence in relation to the characterisation of this payment relied solely on his recollection, which was unreliable and was, in any event, contradicted by other evidence.

Conclusion as to 2017 income year 435 Whilst Mr Condon was able to explain some of the receipts of funds by him in the 2017 income year, particularly in relation to reimbursements, the transactions in which he engaged in respect of foreign currency and motor vehicles were, for the most part, not shown to involve non-assessable income. In particular, he was unable or unwilling to clarify to any sufficient degree his dealings in US currency and, although some transactions can be explained as him moving his own money about, that explanation does not extend to them all. It follows that Mr Condon has failed to prove what his assessable income was in the 2017 income year.

Gambling during 2018 income year 436 Mr Condon deposed to having received various gambling winnings during the 2018 income year, totalling $49,320. More specifically, it was said that: on 10 December 2017, he won $22,500 by betting on a fight using funds deposited into his Sportsbet account; on 27 August 2017, he placed a $5,000 bet on a Floyd Mayweather fight and won $9,000; and, on 19 June 2018, he placed a $9,900 bet on a boxing match at Garbutt Tab Corp in cash and won $17,820, which he collected in cash on 10 June 2018. There seemed to be some error in relation to this last alleged win, in that the winnings were said to have been collected in cash on a date prior when the bet was said to have been placed. This was never corrected. 437 In any event, the Commissioner disputed these alleged winnings, and that position should be accepted. As the alleged winnings were not substantiated by any independent documentary evidence, such as betting statements of account, and given Mr Condon's lack of credit, it is not possible to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the amounts in question were received as contended. 438 Accordingly, Mr Condon has failed to demonstrate that the amounts allegedly relating to gambling during the 2018 income year were non-assessable.

Reimbursements during 2018 income year 439 During the 2018 income year, Mr Condon received payments totalling $22,058.46 from the TPAIA, which he claimed were reimbursements of expenses that he had incurred on its behalf. By the Objection Decision, the Commissioner accepted that Mr Condon had been reimbursed for his payment of certain of the TPAIA's expenses, for which invoices had been provided, in the amount of $14,328.77. The Commissioner submitted that the remaining $7,729.69 should not be so characterised on the basis that such a characterisation was not independently verified, and the alleged manner in which it was paid to Mr Condon by the TPAIA did not comply with the TPAIA's usual reimbursement process. 440 Whether or not the reimbursement process was complied with is ultimately beside the point. The issue is whether Mr Condon has discharged the onus of proving that the amount in dispute reflected reimbursements from the TPAIA. He might have done so by pointing out that there had been compliance with the reimbursement process, but that was not the only means available to him. Mr Condon provided some additional information at paragraphs [133] - [136] of his affidavit of 16 November 2022 as to the expenditure for which he claimed that he had received reimbursement. Nevertheless, to succeed on this point he still required the Court to accept his evidence that the payments made by him were for the TPAIA, and that the payments received by him were reimbursements. For reasons set out previously, it is not possible to accept such evidence in this case. The payments in question were not self-evidently payments made on behalf of the TPAIA. 441 Although Mr Condon was not cross-examined specifically as to these amounts, the cross-examination generally and sufficiently put him on notice that his overall credit was being impugned. The findings as to his credit already set out in these reasons are decisive on this point. It follows that he was unable to establish that the amounts claimed as reimbursements in the 2018 income year were non-assessable income.

Foreign currency transactions during 2018 income year 442 A large number of foreign currency transactions took place during the 2018 income year and it was ultimately agreed between the parties that most were transfers between Mr Condon's various bank accounts held in the United States and Australia. Those which can be so characterised ought not to have been treated as taxable income, and should not have been accounted for separately in the Commissioner's asset betterment calculations. More specifically, it was agreed that: (a) on 7 August 2017, Mr Condon withdrew USD550,000 from his BOA 6831 account by way of bank cheque, intending to close that account; (b) on 22 September 2017, he deposited that USD550,000 bank cheque plus an additional USD5,000 cash into his new BOA 4992 account; (c) on 1 October 2017, he opened his CBA FX 3226 account, being an Australian account for USD; (d) on 11 October 2017, he transferred USD550,000 from his BOA 4992 account to his CBA FX 3226 account; (e) on 27 November 2017, he transferred a further USD155,014.66 from his BOA 4992 account to his CBA FX 3226 account (which was received, after payment of fees, as USD154,986.70); (f) on 30 November 2017, he transferred the balance of his CBA FX 3226 account (being USD706,098.52) to his Citi 1235 DBCP account; (g) on 5 December 2017, the funds in his Citi 1235 DBCP account were converted into a term deposit, such that they remained within the same account but were attributed the reference Citi 1235 DBUT; (h) on 9 January 2018, he purchased USD116,685 from World First for AUD150,000, which was paid by electronic funds transfer from his CBA 5162 account; (i) on 16 January 2018, he deposited the USD116,685 into his Citi 1235 DBCP account; (j) as at 31 January 2018, his Citi 1235 account had USD707,105.89 on term deposit and USD110,664.46 in overnight multi-currency; (k) on 14 February 2018, the USD110,664.46 was converted into a term deposit, such that the balance of the funds in his Citi 1235 DBUT account became USD817,770.35; and (l) on 6 March 2018, he transferred USD817,770.35 from his Citi 1235 account to his BOQ USD 8201 account, where the funds remained for the rest of the income year after the transaction cleared on 7 March 2018. 443 For the purposes of these proceedings, it is unnecessary to explore the reasons given by Mr Condon for moving such large sums of money between so many accounts over the space of only about seven months. It suffices to say that the behaviour was peculiar, the reasons given not entirely convincing, and the accompanying records neither clear nor complete. Indeed, in cross-examination, he appeared to retreat from the agreed fact that he had opened his CBA FX 3226 account on 1 October 2017, suggesting that aspects of the agreed narrative might be unreliable. However, this ultimately had little bearing on the determination of the issues. 444 In his written final submissions, he simply recited the series of transactions set out above, drawing attention to the fact that the Bank Consolidation Worksheet prepared by the Commissioner had characterised the final transfer of USD817,770.35 as a "US FX transaction", which was then converted to AUD and treated as taxable income. For the reasons that have been given, it can be accepted that this characterisation was in error. The Commissioner's written final submissions, meanwhile, noted only one particular concession in relation to the purchase of the USD116,685 from World First before stating that, because the transactions under consideration were merely "transfers of funds held in Mr Condon's American bank accounts to Australian foreign currency accounts and then movement of US currency between those (domestic) accounts", the inquiry was properly to be directed to determining the source of the funds at the commencement of the series of transactions. According to the Commissioner, any contention that the ultimate source of the funds was the USD500,000 allegedly dug up in September 2016 should be rejected. 445 The Commissioner's approach was broadly accurate. Many of the transactions were clearly transfers of the same funds, which could safely be disregarded in any attempt to calculate Mr Condon's assessable income in the 2018 income year, if that was the task at hand. The focus then became the source of those funds, which was for the most part contended to be the buried USD currency. However, by purporting to focus exclusively on that buried USD currency, the Commissioner's submissions, with respect, overlooked a number of other relevant transactions by which smaller amounts of money of unknown origin were added into the pool of funds that eventually became the USD817,770.35 amount. 446 The critical issue was the origin of the USD550,000 and USD155,014.66 amounts paid out of Mr Condon's BOA 4992 account on 11 October 2017 and 27 November 2017, respectively. Regrettably, Mr Condon only produced a very limited set of bank statements for the BOA 4992 account. The absence of records in relation to that account was identified as a concern as long ago as the Commissioner's Objection Decision on 23 December 2020. However, Mr Condon nevertheless deposed in his 16 November 2022 affidavit that, at the time of swearing the affidavit, he had been unable to obtain all of the statements for the account. In cross-examination, he elaborated that this was because "the account had been closed for too long". He claimed to have contacted Bank of America seeking copies of the statements, and provided all that he received in response. He later stated that certain hard-copy statements had been seized by the Australian Federal Police and presumably not returned. It is difficult to accept these explanations. In any event, nothing that Mr Condon said explained why he produced only pages 1 and 3 of 6 from the statement for the period 28 October 2017 to 28 November 2017, and only pages 1 and 3 of 4 from the statement for the period 22 September 2017 to 27 September 2017. 447 Ultimately, the evidentiary lacunae must be resolved against Mr Condon. The whole of the evidence in relation to the BOA 4992 account comprised parts of a statement for the period 22 September to 27 September 2017, parts of a statement for the period 28 October 2017 to 28 November 2018, and an unsigned "Funds Transfer Request Authorization" bearing the handwritten date 11 October 2017. These documents established the following: (a) as at 22 September 2017, the account had a balance of USD30.00; (b) on 22 September 2017, a deposit of USD555,000 was received as "Counter Credit"; (c) on 11 October 2017, the amount of USD550,000 was wired to Mr Condon's CBA FX 3226 account; (d) as at 28 October 2017, the account had a balance of USD5,114.74; (e) on 30 October 2017, the amount of USD123,799.92 was wired into the account with a description including the words "SALE OF 9000 SOUTH LAS VEGAS BLVD"; (f) on 1 November 2017, a deposit of USD1,100 was received as an online banking transfer from Mr Condon's BOA 5449 account; (g) on 15 November 2017, a deposit of USD25,000 was received as an online banking transfer from Mr Condon's BOA 5449 account; and (h) on 27 November 2017, USD155,014.66 was wired from the account to "COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AU". 448 Of the initial USD555,000 deposit, it was agreed that USD550,000 was transferred from Mr Condon's BOA 6831 account by way of bank cheque. The money was originally received in his BOA 6831 account in the 30 June 2017 income year. As has been explained in connection with that income year, the source of the majority of that money was alleged to be the buried US currency. The remainder was seemingly sourced from a cash deposit of USD50,000 into Mr Condon's BOA 6831 account, which was left partially unexplained. 449 The source of the USD5,000 that was deposited alongside the USD550,000 bank cheque on 22 September 2017 was also unexplained. It was identified in Mr Condon's Appeal Statement and his 11 June 2021 affidavit to have been comprised of cash. In the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts, it was disputed that the USD5,000 cash was not assessable income. However, despite this attention having been drawn to the amount, there was no further evidence from which it could be determined whether or not that cash was in fact assessable income. 450 Likewise, the origin of the USD1,100 and USD25,000 amounts was not fully explained. Notably, the bank statement for the BOA 5449 account over the period 30 September 2017 to 31 October 2017 showed a deposit of USD1,100 being made on 31 October 2017 - that is, the day before the transfer of USD1,100 from the BOA 5449 account to the BOA 4992 account. It can fairly be assumed that the funds received into the BOA 5449 account were the same as those transferred to the BOA 4992 account. The description of the deposit into the BOA 5449 account, left unexplained, was as follows: WELLS FARGO IFI DES:DDA TO DDA ID:F203WLLXYF INDN:CHRISTOPHER CONDON CO ID:INTFITRVOS PPD 451 In a similar way, Mr Condon received a number of deposits into his BOA 5449 account in the days prior to transferring the USD25,000 to his BOA 4992 account. The bank statement for the BOA 5449 account over the period 1 November 2017 to 30 November 2017 showed a starting balance of only USD2,898.96, which was then augmented by "Counter Credit" of USD4,140.67 on 7 November 2017, "Counter Credit" of USD20,100 on 14 November 2017, and a deposit of USD2,500 on 15 November 2017 (that is, the day of the USD25,000 transfer) bearing the following description: WELLS FARGO IFI DES:DDA TO DDA ID:F203Y2LQ6J INDN:CHRISTOPHER CONDON CO ID:INTFITRVOS PPD 452 The USD20,100 deposit was explained in Mr Condon's 16 November 2022 affidavit as being the amount received by cheque from the Mutilated Currency Division for the damaged notes allegedly dug up in September 2016. His contention that these funds did not reflect taxable income is accordingly, once again, dependent on his account regarding the buried currency being accepted as truthful. For reasons already set out, that account was not believed. In any event, no attempt was made to explain the remaining deposits. 453 Ultimately, Mr Condon's contention that the final amount of USD817,770.35 transferred from his Citi 1235 account to his BOQ USD 8201 account on 6 March 2018 was simply money that had been transferred between various of his United States and Australian bank accounts was shown to be correct. However, this observation alone was insufficient to conclude the necessary inquiry. It was incumbent on him then to trace those transferred funds back to their source in order to demonstrate that they were not assessable income in the earlier income years. This he did not do. 454 On his evidence, a large portion of the amount was derived from the money allegedly dug up in September 2016, but this narrative has already been rejected and the true origin of the money is unknown. It cannot be explained simply by reference to the cash purchased with money from the Bad Boys' line of credit, or the cash purchased from the TPAIA. 455 The next largest portion was derived from the sale of one of Mr Condon's Las Vegas properties. The origin of this portion is sufficiently explicable and, was accepted by the Commissioner, subject to the payment of additional capital gains tax. 456 The remainder was derived from a number of smaller deposits into Mr Condon's United States accounts, which were not explained. While these amounts were relatively small compared to the overall figure of USD817,770.35, they were not altogether de minimis such that they might reasonably be disregarded. The absence of any sufficient explanation must lead inevitably to the conclusion that Mr Condon has not discharged his onus of demonstrating that the various amounts were not assessable income.

Motor vehicles during 2018 income year 457 In connection with the 2018 income year, Mr Condon's written final submissions made reference to two dealings, as follows: (a) On 11 July 2017, he sold his G Truck through Manheim for $12,232. (b) In August 2017, he received $30,000 from Mr Brooks for the sale of his Monster Truck. The payment was received in four instalments from 15 August 2017 to 19 October 2017, each instalment being deposited into his BOQ 9681 account. 458 Again, the Commissioner submitted that all of the payments received in the course of these dealings were sourced from Mr Condon's motor vehicle activities and, in any event, "there can be no certainty that they were monies received in the income year in which they are sought to be brought to account". He also submitted that the Monster Truck payments were "even more confusing" on account of an additional five deposits from 27 December 2017 to 8 January 2018. 459 For the reasons previously given in relation to Mr Condon's dealings with motor vehicles, the Commissioner's primary submission ought to be accepted. The alternative submission should be rejected, as each of the dealings identified in Mr Condon's written submissions was agreed in the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts to have occurred as alleged. 460 While the Commissioner's further submission regarding the additional deposits was not taken to any particular conclusion, the evidence more generally supports a finding, in relation to those deposits, that Mr Condon has not discharged his onus of demonstrating they were not assessable. The identified receipts were said to reflect the belated deposit into his bank account of the $20,000 first instalment for the Monster Truck. However, this characterisation of the deposits relied solely on Mr Condon's recollection, as set out in Schedule D to his affidavit filed on 23 March 2022, while his subsequent evidence as to the deposits was uncertain and implausible. The characterisation of the deposits should not be accepted, with the result that they are effectively unexplained. Mr Condon has therefore failed to demonstrate that they were non-assessable, and has failed to demonstrate the true amount of his assessable income during this income year.

Conclusion as to the 2018 income year 461 While it can be accepted that many of the USD transactions engaged in by Mr Condon in the 2018 income year involved the movement of his own money, there was no clarity around those transactions and the ultimate source of the funds involved remained unexplained. Further, as he failed to establish that the amounts he received from his dealings with motor vehicles were not assessable income, his appeal in relation to this year must fail.

Conclusion 462 Mr Condon has not established what his actual taxable income was for each of the Relevant Years. Accordingly, he has failed to show that the Commissioner's assessments were excessive, within the meaning of s 14ZZO of the TAA, for each income year in question. For the reasons which have been given, his appeal in relation to the assessments for the Relevant Years must be dismissed. No reason was advanced as to why costs should not follow the event, and it is therefore appropriate that Mr Condon should pay the Commissioner's costs in each appeal. I certify that the preceding four hundred and sixty-two (462) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Derrington.

Commissioner's position 1 It was agreed that the Commissioner prepared an asset betterment statement that provided that Mr Condon's net asset position as at 1 July 2014 was -$5,797.62.

Bank accounts 2 It was agreed that, during the Relevant Years, Mr Condon had the following bank accounts: (a) Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 4564 6801 1420 7912 (ANZ 7912); (e) Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 4564 6801 1520 5022 (ANZ 5022); (f) Bendigo Bank 161321914 (BEN 1914); (g) Bank of Queensland 21009681 (BOQ 9681); (h) Bank of Queensland 22691242 (which was purportedly maintained in respect of the Estate of Brian Bowen, though a different account number for the Estate account was also agreed, as set out below) (BOQ 1242); (i) Bank of Queensland 21678201 (BOQ 8201); (j) Commonwealth Bank 269230293226 (which was denominated in USD) (CBA FX 3226); (k) Commonwealth Bank 482300245162 (CBA 5162); (l) Citibank 4724 3735 2063 1431 (Citi 1431); (m) Citibank 431167154 (Citi 7154); (n) CIT 9032561235 DBCP (which was denominated in USD) (Citi 1235 DBCP); (o) CIT 9032561235 DBUT (which was denominated in USD) (Citi 1235 DBUT); (p) National Australia Bank 4530 3070 0101 9124 (NAB 9124); (q) Westpac Banking Corporation 4564 7270 0109 6641 (WBC 6641); (r) Westpac Banking Corporation 4564 7270 0791 7477 (WBC 7477); and (s) Westpac Banking Corporation 4564 7270 1040 9868 (WBC 9868). 3 It was also agreed that, during the Relevant Years, Mr Condon held the following accounts that were not included in the Commissioner's asset betterment statement (all of which were denominated in USD): (a) Bank of Queensland USD-678201 (BOQ USD 8201); (t) Bank of America 0021 6777 5449 (BOA 5449); (u) Bank of America 3250 9991 4992 (BOA 4992); and (v) Bank of America 6455 0000 3250 8552 6831 (BOA 6831). 4 It was agreed that the Commissioner's asset betterment statement included an incorrect balance as at 30 June 2014 in Mr Condon's Citi 7154 account of $1,983.20, and that the actual balance of Mr Condon's Citi 7154 account as at 30 June 2014 was $2,000.

Real property 5 It was agreed that: (a) on 22 March 2011, Mr Condon purchased unit 1020, 9000 Las Vegas Boulevard, Las Vegas, Nevada (Unit 1020) for USD49,900; and (w) on 1 April 2011, Mr Condon purchased unit 1277, 9000 Las Vegas Boulevard, Las Vegas, Nevada (Unit 1277) for USD50,000. 6 It was further agreed that, as at 1 July 2014, Mr Condon held Unit 1020 and Unit 1277, and that there were no liabilities in relation to his real property.

Motor vehicles 7 It was disputed that, as at 1 July 2014, Mr Condon held 17 motor vehicles with a combined estimated value of $364,000. 8 It was also disputed that, on 21 December 2015, he purchased from Manheim Pty Ltd a "G Truck" for $11,989.78 and a "Tipper Truck" for $5,750.32. (In the course of the hearing, it seemed to be accepted that Mr Condon had acquired the Tipper Truck for $5,750.20.) 9 It was disputed that there were no liabilities in relation to his motor vehicles.

Shares - Bad Boys 10 It was agreed that, during the Relevant Years, Mr Condon was the sole shareholder in the company, Bad Boys, holding ten ordinary shares. 11 It was agreed that Bad Boys owned the property at 66 Ingham Road, which, as at 26 October 2009, was valued by the Bank of Queensland at AUD $400,000. 12 It was disputed that there was a $320,000 overdraft drawn against 66 Ingham Road.

Cash 13 It was agreed that, in 2013, Mr Condon transferred USD130,000 to his BOA 5449 account. 14 It was otherwise disputed that: (a) in or around August 2009, Mr Brian Bowen gave Mr Condon USD200,000 in cash as a gift; (x) on 30 October 2009, Mr Condon drew down $300,000 on his BOQ overdraft facility (that is, his BOQ 9681 account); (y) on 30 October 2009, Mr Condon cashed the bank cheque for $300,000 from his BOQ overdraft facility at American Express, Westpac for USD300,000; (z) Mr Condon held USD500,000 as at 30 June 2014, which he buried in the front yard of his mother's house at 9 Urara Street (where he lives); (aa) the USD500,000 that Mr Condon held in the 2017 income year is not taxable income.

Liabilities 15 It was agreed that there were no liabilities in relation to Mr Condon's motor vehicles (notwithstanding that this fact was also disputed, as set out above), real property, shares, and cash. However, it was agreed that there were liabilities in relation to Mr Condon's bank accounts, as included in the Commissioner's asset betterment statement. 16 It was also agreed that, as at 30 June 2018, Mr Condon held $133,034.34 for the benefit of the beneficiaries of Brian Bowen's Estate. 17 It was disputed that Mr Condon owed the following amounts: (a) $60,000 to the O'Connor family; and (a) $30,000 to Ms Jazmin Clancy.

Salary 18 It was disputed that Mr Condon's taxable income for the year ended 30 June 2015 was $153,932 and was made up solely of salary and wage income from TPAIA.

Gambling 19 It was agreed that Mr Condon engaged in gambling throughout the 2015 income year, and that: (a) on 9 November 2014, he won $3,500 on a boxing match bet; (b) on 24 January 2015, he deposited $1,000 into his Sportsbet account from his WBC 7477 account; (c) on 25 January 2015, he withdrew $1,000 from his Sportsbet account, which was deposited on 27 January 2015 into his WBC 7477 account; (d) on 30 January 2015, he deposited from his WBC 7477 account: (i) $300 into his BetEasy account to bet on the election (Mr Condon bet on Campbell Newman to win Ashgrove seat); and (ii) $2,000 into his William Hill account to bet on the seat of Hinchinbrook; (e) on 2 February 2015, he withdrew $630 from his BetEasy account, and these funds arrived in his WBC 7477 account on 3 February 2015; (f) on 4 February 2015, he withdrew $3,320 from his William Hill account, and these funds arrived in his WBC 7477 account on the same day; (g) on 26 May 2015, he made two $3,000 deposits from his WBC 7477 account to his BetEasy account; (h) on 2 June 2015, he withdrew $3,000 from his BetEasy account, and this arrived in his WBC 7477 account on the same day; and (i) on 7 June 2015, he deposited $2,500 into his BetEasy account from his WBC 7477 account.

Funds held on behalf of Rowena Clancy 20 It was agreed that, from around 2010 to 2011 and throughout the Relevant Years, Ms Rowena Clancy (who was Mr Condon's partner from 2009 to around 2015) resided at 66 Ingham Road, the residence owned by Bad Boys. It was also agreed that Ms Clancy made regular cash deposits into Mr Condon's safe and bank accounts. 21 It was disputed that the nature of the funds received from Ms Clancy was not taxable income. The following related matters were also disputed: (a) Mr Condon returned the funds to Ms Clancy when requested (often when she wanted to purchase something she had saved for); (ab) by February 2015, he held at least $50,000 of Ms Clancy's funds for her, and around this time she requested that they be returned; and (ac) on 9 February 2015, he arranged a bank cheque for $50,000 to be drawn from his BOQ 9681 account (cheque #1775334) in favour of Ms Clancy, and he gave this to her but she did not present it until 14 August 2015.

Motor vehicles 22 It was agreed that, in the 2015 income year, Mr Condon sold a 1968 Corvette (VIN 194678S409123) to Mr Phillip Thompson who paid him consideration of $40,000 (in several ad hoc instalments over 2 years) and a boat.

Washington Mendes 23 It was agreed that, in the 2015 income year, Mr Washington Mendes did some work for the TPAIA, which he invoiced through NQ General Business Supply Pty Ltd (NQ General Business Supply). 24 It was disputed that NQ General Business Supply invoiced the TPAIA $15,790.50. It was also disputed that this amount was paid in cash by Mr Condon, who was reimbursed by the TPAIA by a cheque of $15,790.50, and that on 9 February 2015 Mr Condon deposited the cheque for $15,790.50 and another $5,000 into his BOQ 9681 account.

Reimbursements 25 It was agreed that, on 9 September 2015, the TPAIA resolved at a meeting for Mr Condon to use his credit card to incur TPAIA expenses and that he would be reimbursed through MYOB and online banking. 26 It was also agreed that, during the 2015 financial year, Mr Condon received payments totalling $23,907.26 to his WBC 7477 account from his employer, the TPAIA, as reimbursements for expenses he incurred on behalf of the TPAIA.

Foreign currency transactions 27 It was agreed that: (a) Mr Condon contended that there were a number of foreign currency transactions that were transactions of his own money and not assessable income; and (ad) the Commissioner included them as "unexplained deposits", which increased Mr Condon's asset position in the asset betterment methodology. 28 It was also agreed that, throughout the 2015 financial year, Mr Condon transferred a total of AUD $75,968.44 (that is, USD63,327.70) to his BOA 5449 account via five payments from his CBA 5162 account and one payment from his BOQ 9681 account.

Salary 29 It was disputed that Mr Condon's taxable income for the year ended 30 June 2016 was $170,982 and was made up solely of salary and wage income from TPAIA.

Purchase of USD from the TPAIA 30 It was agreed that, in or around October 2015, Mr Condon agreed to purchase USD186,500 (cash) from the TPAIA for AUD $242,000. Mr Condon paid for the USD in four instalments, which was then deposited into a Westpac bank account (ending in 0570) in the name of TPAIA, as follows: (a) $113,051.75 on 14 October 2015; (ae) $64,926.65 on 5 January 2016; (af) $19,477.99 on 12 January 2016; and (ag) $45,448.65 on 12 January 2016.

Motor vehicles 31 It was agreed (notwithstanding that these facts were also disputed, as set out above) that, on 21 December 2015, Mr Condon purchased a G Truck for $11,989.78 and a Tipper Truck for $5,750.20. 32 However, it was disputed that: (a) on 28 July 2015, $3,300 was deposited into Mr Condon's WBC 9868 account from Mr Thompson for the sale of the Corvette mentioned above; (ah) on 21 December 2015, $14,000 was deposited into his CBA 5162 account as payment for a Volkswagen which Mr Condon sold to Mr Wayne Smithers for $14,000; (ai) on 11 January 2016, Mr Condon received $15,000 from Queensland REO (Mr Mendes' company) to his CBA 5162 account. It was claimed that this money was transferred to Mr Condon to buy a new motor from the US for Mr Mendes for the Mustang he had sold to him. The motor was said to have been purchased on or around 21 April 2016 for $16,071.40 using Mr Condon's Westpac credit card ending in 7477; and (aj) on 7 March 2016, Mr Condon sold his Nissan Patrol to TSV Wholesale Cars for $15,950.

Funds held on behalf of Tony O'Connor and Peter O'Connor 33 It was disputed that, in or about 2013, Mr Condon held $200,000 in cash for the O'Connor family in a large safe. It was also disputed that, on 15 March 2016, Mr Condon deposited $140,000 of cash he was holding in his safe on Mr O'Connor's behalf (the Statement of Agreed and Disputed Facts not specifying whether it was Tony O'Connor's or Peter O'Connor's behalf) into his BOQ 9681 account and arranged for a bank cheque to be drawn for that amount from his BOQ 9681 account in favour of Ross Lawyers' trust account.

Funds held on behalf of Rowena Clancy 34 It was disputed that, during the 2016 financial year, Rowena Clancy deposited a total of $5,400 into Mr Condon's BOQ 8201 account. It was also disputed that Mr Condon held this money for Ms Clancy so she would not spend it.

Reimbursements 35 It was agreed that, during the 2016 financial year, Mr Condon received payments totalling $11,042.60 into his WBC 7477 account from the TPAIA as reimbursement of expenses that he paid on behalf of the TPAIA. However, the Commissioner disputed one alleged reimbursement on 28 July 2015 in the amount of $353.79.

Foreign currency transactions (AUSTRAC) 36 It was agreed that Mr Condon contended that there were a number of foreign currency transactions that were transactions of his own money and not assessable income. It was also agreed that the Commissioner had included them as "unexplained deposits" or "unexplained drawings", which increased Mr Condon's tax liability applying the asset position in the asset betterment methodology. 37 It was also agreed, in respect of the 2016 income year, that: (a) the amount of $205,305 was identified in "AUSTRAC" searches for the 2016 year, and these were "outbound payments", being cash that Mr Condon took to the United States of America on flights, which he declared; (ak) the amounts identified were: (i) USD90,000 (AUD $127,677.68) on 10 November 2015; and (ii) USD55,000 (AUD $77,617.84) on 2 February 2016; (j) the source of the USD was part of the USD186,500 Mr Condon bought from the TPAIA in October 2015; (k) on 10 November 2015, Mr Condon deposited USD50,000 of the USD90,000 into his BOA 5449 account; and (l) on 3 February 2016, Mr Condon deposited USD55,000 into his BOA 5449 account.

Salary 38 It was disputed that Mr Condon's taxable income for the year ended 30 June 2016 was $163,480 and was made up solely of salary and wage income from TPAIA. 39 It was agreed that Mr Condon was under the mistaken belief that, having paid tax in the United States, he did not have to pay tax in Australia, that Mr Condon now accepts that his taxable income should have included the capital gain he made on the sale of Unit 1277 in Las Vegas, and that this was disclosed in the objection lodged on or around 17 July 2020, which appears to have been accepted by the Commissioner in his objection decision dated 23 December 2020.

Unit 1277 40 It was agreed that, on 3 August 2016, Mr Condon sold Unit 1277 for USD85,000. It was also agreed that: (a) Mr Condon received USD64,878.34 after paying 15% foreign owner's tax to the IRS; (al) he is liable to pay capital gains tax in Australia for the gain made on the sale of Unit 1277; (am) the amount of capital gain to be included in his taxable income in the 2017 income year for the sale of unit 1277 is AUD $18,404.17; and (an) he is entitled to a foreign income tax offset in respect of that capital gain of AUD $8,493.21.

Payments to the ATO 41 It was agreed that Mr Condon made payments to the ATO: (a) on 9 February 2017, described as ATO PAYMENT SYDNEY AU 74564457040108036741872 for $900; and (ao) on 9 February 2017, described as ATO PAYMENT SYDNEY AU 74564457040108036741880 for $1,062.70.

Reimbursements 42 It was agreed that, during the 2017 financial year, Mr Condon received payments totalling $35,066.23 from the TPAIA as reimbursement of expenses he incurred on behalf of the TPAIA. However, the Commissioner disputed one alleged reimbursement on 7 July 2016 in the amount of $1,105.75.

Motor vehicles 43 It was agreed that: (a) in August 2016, Mr Condon sold his Monster Truck to Kevin Brooks (who goes by "Terry") for $50,000, and Mr Brooks paid him $20,000 in August 2016 (and then a further $30,000 in August 2017); (ap) on 7 September 2016, Mr Condon deposited $8,800 of cash from the sale of the Corvette sold to Mr Phillip Thompson into his WBC 9868 account; and (aq) on 28 October 2016, the appellant sold his Tipper Truck to Maheim Auctions for $5,950, and this amount was deposited into his CBA 5162 account. 44 It was disputed that, on 23 November 2016, Mr Condon received $4,000 from Mr Phillip Thompson into his WBC 9868 account for the sale of the Corvette.

Buried USD cash and foreign currency transactions 45 It was disputed that, in or around early September 2016, Mr Condon dug up cash buried in the front yard of his mother's house and that, when he dug it up, he discovered that some of the cash was damaged. It was also disputed that, on 9 January 2017, Mr Condon deposited USD50,000 cash into his BOA 6831 account which was not in the nature of taxable income, and that the balance of his BOA 6831 account as at 11 January 2017 was USD550,017.27. 46 It was agreed that: (a) on 7 September 2016, Mr Condon travelled to the United States with USD156,000; (ar) on 19 September 2016, he deposited USD147,600 and USD3,600 of this cash into his BOA 5449 account; (as) on 3 October 2016, he sent an email to the Mutilated Currency Division of the Department of Treasury in the United States regarding damaged cash, and requested that approximately $30,000 (USD) of damaged notes be replaced/reimbursed; (at) on or around 9 November 2016, he received a cheque from United States Treasury for USD20,100 for damaged notes (the cheque notes the payment was $9,900 short); (au) on 16 November 2016, he travelled to the United States with USD335,500; (av) on 16 November 2016, he deposited this cash into his BOA 5449 account; (aw) he contends he dug up $500,000 of buried USD cash and that the total undamaged cash was USD470,000 and USD30,000 cash was damaged; (ax) the United States Treasury replaced $20,100 of the damaged cash; and (ay) on 13 December 2016, he travelled to the United States and on that day he attended a BOA branch (in Los Angeles) and arranged for USD500,000 to be transferred from his BOA 5449 account to his BOA 6831 account.

Funds held on behalf of Rowena and Jazmin Clancy 47 It was disputed that, during the 2017 financial year, Rowena Clancy deposited a total of $8,102 into Mr Condon's BOQ 8201 account so that she could save this money, and that Rowena made 38 regular payments into this account in the 2017 financial year. 48 It was also disputed that, during the 2017 financial year, Rowena's daughter, Jazmin, deposited a total of $2,760 into Mr Condon's BOQ 8201 account so that she could save this money, and that Jazmin made 22 regular payments into this account in the 2017 financial year.

Gambling 49 It is disputed that, on or around 3 February 2017, Mr Condon travelled to Adelaide to watch the Anthony Mundine v Danny Green boxing match at Adelaide Oval and won $14,000 on the fight, which he deposited into his WBC 9868 account on 6 February 2017.

Foreign currency transactions (AUSTRAC) 50 It was agreed that Mr Condon contended that there were a number of foreign currency transactions that were transactions of his own money and not assessable income. 51 It was also agreed that the amount of $205,305 was identified in "AUSTRAC" searches for the 2017 year, and that these were "outbound payments", being cash that Mr Condon took to the United States of America on flights which he declared of USD156,000 on 7 September 2016. 52 Finally, it was agreed that Mr Condon deposited USD147,600 and USD3,600 into his BOA 5449 account, and that the difference was the amount he spent.

Salary 53 It was disputed that Mr Condon's taxable income for the year ended 30 June 2018 was $170,507. 54 It was agreed that Mr Condon was under the mistaken belief that, having paid tax in the United States, he did not have to pay tax in Australia. It was also agreed that he now accepts that his taxable income should have included the capital gain he made on the sale of Unit 1020 in Las Vegas, and that this was disclosed in the objection lodged on or around 17 July 2020, which appears to have been accepted by the Commissioner in his objection decision dated 23 December 2020.

Unit 1020 55 It was agreed that: (a) on 26 October 2017, Mr Condon sold Unit 1020 for USD135,000; (m) he received USD123,799.92 after paying 15% foreign owner's tax to the IRS in the US; (n) on 30 October 2017, USD123,799.92 was deposited into his BOA 4992 account; (o) the amount of capital gain to be included in his taxable income in the 2018 income year for the sale of unit 1020 is AUD $55,217; and (p) he is entitled to a foreign income tax offset in respect of that capital gain of AUD $13,139.11.

Reimbursements 56 It was agreed that, during the 2018 financial year, Mr Condon received payments totalling $22,058.46 from the TPAIA as reimbursement of expenses he incurred on behalf of the TPAIA.

Motor vehicles 57 It was agreed that, on 11 July 2017, Mr Condon sold his G Truck to Manheim Fowles for $12,232. 58 It was also agreed that, in August 2017, he received a $30,000 payment from Terry Brooks for the sale of the Monster Truck, and that he deposited these funds in four tranches into his BOQ 9681 account, as follows: (a) $5,000 on 15 August 2017; (q) $10,000 on 17 October 2017; (r) $8,000 on 18 October 2017; and (s) $7,000 on 19 October 2017.

Loans to Terry Brooks 59 It was agreed that Terry Brooks is a close friend of Mr Condon and on occasion Mr Condon would lend him money. It was also agreed that Mr Brooks would pay Mr Condon back, sometimes straight away and other times it took him longer. 60 It was agreed that the loan payments to and from Terry Brooks identified by Mr Condon were not taxable income.

Foreign currency transactions 61 It was agreed that: (a) Mr Condon contended that there was a number of foreign currency transactions that were transactions of his own money and not assessable income, and that the Commissioner had included them as "unexplained deposits", which increased his asset position in the asset betterment methodology, in particular: (i) on 13 October 2017, in the CBA FX 3226 account an "unexplained deposit" of USD550,000 converted to AUD $702,211.21; (ii) on or around 16 January 2018, in the Citi 1235 account an "unexplained deposit" of $116,685; and (iii) an amount of USD817,770.35 in his Citi 1235 account was described as "US FX transaction" converted to AUD $1,052,807.05; (az) on 7 August 2017, Mr Condon withdrew USD550,000 from his BOA 6831 account by way of bank cheque; (ba) Mr Condon intended to close this bank account, but he later changed his mind, and didn't bank the bank cheque until his next visit to the United States; (bb) on 21 September 2017, he flew back to the United States and on 22 September 2017, he deposited the bank cheque of USD550,000 plus an additional USD5,000 in cash into a new BOA 4992 account; (bc) on 1 October 2017, he opened a Commonwealth Bank USD foreign currency account being CBA FX 3226 account; (bd) on 11 October 2017, he transferred the USD550,000 that was held in his BOA 4992 account to his CBA FX 3226 account; (be) on 27 November 2017, he transferred a further USD155,014.66 from his BOA 4992 account to his CBA FX 3226 account and, after the payment of transfer fees, the amount receipted in the CBA FX 3226 account was USD154,986.70; (bf) on 30 November 2017, he withdrew the balance of his CBA FX 3226 account (which was USD706,098.52) and deposited this into his Citi 1235 DBCP account; (bg) on 5 December 2017, the funds in his Citi 1235 DBCP account were converted into a term deposit his Citi 1235 DBUT account (within the same account with the reference "DBUT"); (bh) on 9 January 2018, he withdrew AUD $150,000 from his CBA 5162 account to purchase USD116,685 from World First, which he paid by electronic funds transfer from his CBA 5162 account; (bi) on 16 January 2018, he deposited the USD116,685 purchased from World First into his Citi 1235 account; (bj) as at 31 January 2018, his Citi 1235 account had a balance of: (i) USD707,105.89 on term deposit; and (ii) USD110,664.46 (overnight multi-currency); (bk) on 14 February 2018, the USD110,664.46 in his Citibank overnight multi-currency component of his account went onto term deposit (within the same account) so that the balance of the term deposit became USD817,770.35; (bl) on or around 6 March 2018, he transferred USD817,770.35 from his Citi 1235 account into his BOQ USD 8201 account; and (bm) on or about 7 March 2018, the USD817,770.35 cleared in his BOQ USD 8201 account where it remained for the rest of the financial year. 62 It was disputed that the additional USD5,000 in cash that Mr Condon deposited into a new BOA 4992 account was not taxable income

Funds held on behalf of Rowena and Jazmin Clancy 63 It was disputed that, during the 2018 financial year, Rowena Clancy deposited a total of $21,000 into Mr Condon's BOQ 8201 account, so that she could save this money. It was also disputed that Rowena made 21 regular payments into this account in the 2018 financial year. 64 It was disputed that, during the 2018 financial year, Jazmin Clancy deposited a total of $12,740 into Mr Condon's BOQ 8201 account so that she could save this money, and that Jazmin made 54 regular payments into this account in the 2018 financial year. It was also disputed that Mr Condon still held approximately $30,000 of Jazmin's savings. 65 It was agreed that Mr Condon has been unable to pay any funds to Jazmin Clancy since his bank accounts became the subject of Garnishee Notices by the Commissioner.

Gambling 66 It was disputed that: (a) on 27 August 2017, Mr Condon placed a $5,000 bet on a Floyd Mayweather fight and won $9,000; (t) on 10 December 2017, he won $22,500 profit by betting on a fight; and (u) on 19 June 2018, he placed $9,900 on a boxing match at Garbutt Tab Corp in cash and won $17,820, which he collected in cash on 10 June 2018. 67 It was agreed that, on 10 December 2017, Mr Condon deposited $15,000 into his Sportsbet account from his CBA 5162 account and $5,000 into his William Hill account from his CBA 5162 account. It was also agreed that, on 11 December 2017, he deposited a further $4,000 into his William Hill account from his CBA 5162 account. 68 It was agreed that, in December 2017, Mr Condon withdrew his William Hill balance of $17,400 in two instalments to: (a) $15,300 on 15 December 2017 into his CBA 5162 account; and (v) $2,100 on 18 December 2017 into his ANZ 5022 account. 69 It was also agreed that, on 18 December 2017, he withdrew his Sportsbet balance of $37,500, which was deposited into his CBA 5162 account.

Estate of Brian Bowen 70 It was agreed that: (a) Mr Condon contended that a number of transactions were not assessable income as they related to funds he held in his capacity as executor of Brian Bowen's Estate (the Estate); (bn) Brian Bowen passed away on 20 August 2012; (bo) Mr Condon was the named executor in Brian Bowen's last will and testament; (bp) on or around 6 April 2013, Mr Condon opened a BOQ 9915 account called Christopher Condon as Executor for the Estate of the Late Brian Bowen; (bq) on or around 30 April 2013, $360,148.51 of estate funds previously held by Giudes & Elliott Solicitors was deposited into the BOQ 9915 account; (br) pursuant to the last will of Brian Bowen, Mr Condon was required to hold the residuary estate on trust for the six named beneficiaries until they each attained 25 years of age; (bs) between 6 April 2013 and the first beneficiary attaining 25 years of age, the estate funds in the BOQ 9915 account grew to $391,487.58, and the increase of funds is attributable to interest earned in the account; (bt) on or around 14 July 2017, the first of the six beneficiaries attained 25 years Mr Condon transferred the beneficiary their share of the residuary estate which was $65,257.93; (bu) on 19 October 2017, the BOQ 9915 account was closed and the balance of $327,500.36 was withdrawn; (bv) on 23 October 2017, Mr Condon set up a new account with the Bendigo Bank being BEN 1914 account and transferred the Estate's monies ($327,500.36) that were held in the BOQ 9915 account into the BEN 1914 account; (bw) in January 2018, interest of $1,898.60 was credited to the BEN 1914 account; (bx) the interest earned on the BEN 1914 account is not income of Mr Condon's; (by) on or around 23 January 2018, Mr Condon transferred the Estate monies from the BEN 1914 account into his CBA 5162 account temporarily before reopening a new account being BOQ 1242 account; (bz) on 15, 16, 17 and 19 February 2018, he transferred the funds from his CBA 5162 account to the BOQ 1242 account; (ca) on 22 February 2018, two beneficiaries came of age and he arranged for their share of $132,416 ($66,208 each) to be transferred to them; (cb) the balance Estate funds remained in the BOQ 1242 account until October 2019; (cc) as at 14 May 2018, the closing balance of the BOQ 1242 account was $198,144.75; (cd) on or around 15 August 2018, another beneficiary attained 25 years of age and he transferred them their share of the residuary estate which was $65,495.11; (ce) the Estate funds remained in the BOQ 1242 account accruing interest until the account was closed on 30 October 2019; (cf) all funds and interest earned in the BOQ 1242 account is not income of Mr Condon's as all the funds belonged to the Estate; (cg) on 30 October 2019, Mr Condon withdrew the balance estate funds ($132,782.64) from the BOQ 1242 account; (ch) on 5 November 2019, the balance Estate funds ($132,782.640 were deposited into a Bendigo Bank account with account number 169892361 (BEN 2361); (ci) on 19 May 2020, the Commissioner issued a garnishee notice to Bendigo Bank in relation to all accounts held by Mr Condon; (cj) sometime between 19 May 2020 and 19 June 2020, the Commissioner withdrew the balance of monies ($133,034.34) from the BEN 2361 account; and (ck) by letter dated 10 July 2020, the Commissioner: (i) acknowledged that the funds transferred to him from the BEN 2361 account pursuant to the garnishee notice were funds that Mr Condon was not beneficially entitled to; and (ii) advised Mr Condon that a refund of monies obtained from the Bendigo Bank account via garnishee notice has been issued and a cheque for $133,034.34 had been mailed to him on 8 July 2020.