Commonwealth Bank of Australia v State of Victoria

Background 6 On 16 March 2010, Mr Andric executed a mortgage over the First Property in favour of CBA. This mortgage was registered on 29 March 2010 in dealing number AHI130178X (First Mortgage). The First Mortgage was security for a loan advanced by CBA to Mr Andric pursuant to a loan agreement dated 10 March 2010 (First Loan Agreement). 7 On 29 April 2010, Mr Andric executed a mortgage over the Second Property in favour of CBA. This mortgage was registered on 14 May 2010 in dealing number AH220045S (Second Mortgage). The Second Mortgage was security for a loan advanced by CBA to Mr Andric pursuant to a loan agreement dated 26 March 2010 (Second Loan Agreement). 8 From 6 August 2018 and 4 November 2015, respectively, Mr Andric was in default under the First and Second Mortgage. A demand for default under the First Mortgage was issued on 7 August 2018 and expired unsatisfied. A similar demand was issued on 6 November 2015 for default under the Second Mortgage and also expired unsatisfied. 9 On 19 September 2019, the estate of Mr Andric was sequestrated under the Act and David Charles Quin was appointed as Trustee of his bankrupt estate. The Trustee did not take steps to be the registered proprietor of the First Property or the Second Property. 10 On 9 December 2020, Gadens (as solicitors for CBA), issued notices to vacate in respect of the First Property and Second Property. The First Property and Second Property were vacated on 21 January 2020 and 16 January 2020, respectively. On 21 July 2020, Mr Andric authorised CBA to gain access to, and take possession of, the First Property and the Second Property. 11 On 17 August 2020, the Trustee disclaimed the First Property and the Second Property because there was no equity in either of the properties. On 14 December 2020, as a result of the Trustee's disclaimer pursuant to s 133(1) of the Act, the Registrar of Titles registered a Registrar's Caveat over the title of the First Property and Second Property. 12 On 15 January 2021, CBA entered vacant possession of the First Property and Second Property. As explained earlier, the First Property is currently being offered for sale by CBA and the Second Property was sold on 17 April 2021.

Consideration 13 The rights of the Trustee to disclaim the First Property and Second Property are contained in s 133(1) of the Act. Section 133(1) provides that: Subject to this section, the trustee may, notwithstanding that he or she has endeavoured to sell or has taken possession of the property or exercised any act of ownership in relation to it and notwithstanding, in the case of property the transfer of which is required by a law of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory of the Commonwealth to be registered, that he or she has not become the registered owner of that property, by writing signed by him or her, at any time disclaim the property. 14 Where a person is made bankrupt, the equitable title to the property will vest in the trustee: s 58(1) of the Act. Until the trustee becomes the legal registered proprietor, legal title remains with the bankrupt proprietor who holds the legal interest on trust for the trustee. In ING Bank (Australia) Limited v state of Queensland [2017] FCA 411, Derrington J discussed the trustee's entitlement to disclaim the totality of rights in relation to the land at [19]-[20]: There is nothing unusual in this construction of s 133(1). After all, by reason of the making of the sequestration order, the equitable title to the Property vested in the trustee who then beneficially held all of the right, title and interest in it. In effect, the substantive ownership of the rights to the Property belonged to the trustee and not to the bankrupt. To the extent to which the bankrupt held any residual legal interest in the Property by reason of the operation of the Torrens system registration, it held that interest, at best, as a "bare trustee" with the only entitlement to deal with it by doing what is necessary to cause it to be transferred to the trustee in bankruptcy (Byrnes v Kendle (2011) 243 CLR 253). Even then, the entitlements of the bankrupt as the holder of the legal title are diminished by the provisions usually found in Torrens system legislation whereby a trustee in bankruptcy is entitled to cause the transmission of the legal title to themselves without the consent of the legal holder. See, for instance s 115 of the Land Title Act 1991 (Qld). The necessary conclusion from the above is that, on the proper construction of s 133(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, a trustee in bankruptcy is able to disclaim the totality of the ownership rights, titles and interests in relation to Torrens system land owned by the bankrupt at the date of bankruptcy even though no transfer of the title to the trustee has been effected on the relevant register of title. The enabling effect of s 133(1) permits the trustee to disclaim both the equitable ownership and rights which have vested in the trustee as well as the legal title which remained in the bankrupt. [Emphasis added] 15 Pursuant to s 133(2) of the Act, the effect of the Trustee's disclaimer is such that the Trustee is discharged from all personal liability in respect of the properties disclaimed and Mr Andric's rights, interests and liabilities are terminated. Section 133(2) does not affect the rights or liabilities of any other person. It follows that the Trustee's disclaimer of the First Property and Second Property does not affect CBA's rights under its mortgages. 16 The consequence of the Trustee's disclaimer is that Mr Andric's fee simple estate is escheated to the Crown in the right of the State: ING Bank at [22] (Derrington J). Pursuant to s 133(9) of the Act, a person claiming an interest in disclaimed property is entitled to apply to the Court for an order vesting the property in him or her. The Court may make such an order where it considers it is just and equitable to do so. CBA, as a registered mortgagee, is entitled to apply for a vesting order under s 133(9) of the Act. 17 There are a number of authorities which support the proposition that a registered mortgagee has the requisite interest and is entitled to a vesting order pursuant to s 133(9). 18 In Re Tulloch Ltd (1978) 3 ACLR 808 at 814, Needham J concluded that a mortgagee of Torrens title land is entitled to be granted a vested order. Agreeing with this proposition, Rares J in National Australia Bank Ltd v New South Wales [2009] FCA 1066 held at [29]: .…I am of opinion that the land should be vested under s 133(9) in the bank for the purpose for which it originally was mortgaged, namely to secure payment to the bank of all principal, interest and other moneys due to it notwithstanding the effect of the disclaimer. If, after a sale, there is a shortfall the bank will be able to prove for it as an unsecured creditor in the bankrupts' estate. 19 I am satisfied that CBA, which holds as mortgagee an interest in the land, is a person with an interest in the disclaimed property. Apart from the present application, there are "no further steps" CBA can take to "make good its security position" and without the vesting order, CBA will be deprived of the benefit of its security: see National Australia Bank Ltd v State of New South Wales [2014] FCA 298 at [12] (Perram J); Westpac Banking Corporation v State of Victoria [2019] FCA 1549 at [19] (Kerr J). There is no apparent reason why CBA should not have the First Property and Second Property vested in it.

Disposition 20 Accordingly, I consider it just and equitable that vesting orders be made. I certify that the preceding twenty (20) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Anastassiou.