the full court decision in post logistics
63 The Full Court in the Post Logistics appeal considered the approach to be taken in imposing a penalty in civil penalty proceedings for a contravention of the Act. In that case, an employee was walking next to a forklift vehicle being driven by Mr Cox, an employee of Post Logistics Australasia Pty Ltd holding a roll of shrink wrap which was attached to an object on a pallet which was being moved by the forklift vehicle. The employee, Ms Borg, was walking too close to the forklift vehicle with the consequence that the forklift vehicle ran over her foot and she suffered a broken toe.
64 The primary judge imposed a penalty of $80,000. In imposing that penalty, the primary judge, Buchanan J, observed:
[35] An area as important as workplace health and safety should be accompanied by the greatest level of practicality which can be brought to bear on the ultimate task of providing a safe working environment. Nobody sets out to create an unsafe workplace. I entertain great doubt whether concepts of deterrence are appropriate in the context of a case such as the present. What is involved is the necessity to reinforce a positive obligation of protection rather than to emphasise an obligation not to commit a civil wrong. It is unnecessary, in my view, for the Court, when giving effect to the statutory objectives in the OHS Act, or when fixing a punishment for a particular breach, to do so by reference to "deterring" somebody from such a breach. Adoption of a concept such as this from the criminal law risks becoming a ritual incantation deflecting attention from what is a practical issue - namely, how to provide appropriate incentive and encouragement (as well as punishment) to enhance workplace safety.
65 The applicant, Comcare, appealed. One of the grounds of appeal was that the primary judge had failed to have regard to the concept of deterrence in imposing the penalty.
66 The Full Court (Rares, Cowdroy and Griffiths JJ) considered the appropriate approach to imposing a penalty in respect of contraventions of s 16 of the Act.
67 The Full Court observed that in determining the penalty, primacy should be given to the particular statutory context, and that the objects and purposes of the Act were central to determining the factors that were relevant to take into account. The penalty imposed, said the Full Court, should be one which gives effect to the statutory purpose. The Full Court observed at [43]:
Deterrence, both general and specific, is a fundamental purpose of the role of civil pecuniary penalties. First, the object in s 3(g) of the OH&S Act evinced a legislative intention to provide for effective remedies where the obligations imposed by s 16 on an employer, such as the respondent, were not met.
68 The Full Court then went on to observe that the approach taken in a number of first instance decisions in this Court, which had regard to specific and general deterrence in fixing a civil pecuniary penalty under the Act, was consistent with the objects of the Act.
69 However, the Full Court went on to identify two qualifications to this general approach. First, said the Full Court, there may be good reason why the concept of specific deterrence has no or little relevance in the circumstances of a particular case.
70 Secondly, observed the Full Court, there was a "need to ensure that any list of relevant considerations guiding the exercise of discretion to impose a civil penalty not be permitted to fetter the proper exercise of the discretion which is expressed in relatively unconfined terms in the Act". The Full Court then referred to the observations made by Flick J and Barker J in the cases of Comcare v Post Logistics Australasia Pty Ltd (2008) 178 IR 200 and John Holland Rail respectively, in which each had expressed concern about the inflexible use and application of the so-called "Madgwick factors" which were founded upon the factors relevant to the sentencing of employers criminally convicted of health and safety offences under the New South Wales legislation. The Full Court said at [68]:
We agree with the reservations expressed by Flick and Barker JJ concerning the Madgwick factors. If a court applied the Madgwick factors dogmatically or inflexibly, there is a significant chance an error would be committed in the reasoning process. As Mahoney JA stated in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1995) 36 NSWLR 374 at 394, "If justice is not individual, it is nothing". The various factors for consideration in assessing a penalty for breach of the OH&S Act may have greater or lesser importance in any given case, depending on the various objective and subjective elements of the breach. The penalty assessment process cannot be reduced to an inflexible set of criteria.
71 The Full Court then went on to say at [69] that they considered that the "Madgwick factors" provided "a useful foundation or starting point for an assessment of a civil pecuniary penalty", and they were consistent with a body of authority, and "the theoretical principles concerning the role of deterrence" and properly recognised deterrence as a relevant consideration in imposing a civil penalty under the Act.
72 The Full Court also observed that "although a court was not required to specifically refer to these factors, in most cases it would be prudent to do so".
73 The Full Court went on to cite with approval the following observations of Barker J in Comcare v Transpacific Industries Pty Ltd (2012) 129 ALD 486 (Transpacific) at [38]:
I do not disagree with observations recently made by Buchanan J in Comcare v Post Logistics Australasia Pty Limited [2011] FCA 1422 (Post Logistics 2011), where his Honour expressed his concerns about adopting an automatic application of a checklist drawn from criminal law sentencing principles, as suggested in Trooper Lawrence. I agree there is a danger in any ritual incantation of a set of considerations in deciding what penalty is appropriate in a particular case. In the present case, the fundamental need to impose a penalty that highlights the importance of compliance with occupational health and safety law in order to ensure the safety of employees at work must always be kept at the forefront of the penalty assessment process. That is not to say that notions of "deterrence", either specific or general, are irrelevant, for, in my view, they plainly are closely allied to this primary objective of ensuring the objects of the OHS Act are met. It is important that a particular respondent who admits contravention of the OHS Act or is found guilty of contravening the OHS Act should suffer a sufficient penalty, having regard to the seriousness of the contravention, so as to remind them of the significance of their responsibilities under the OHS Act. It is also important to remind employers more generally of the significance of their responsibilities under the OHS Act. No doubt the concept of "deterrence" can be expressed in different ways; but so long as the penalty is assessed with the importance of meeting the occupational health and safety obligations under the OHS Act are steadfastly borne in mind - not mere punishment or retribution against a contravener - then, in my view, the penalty assessment process will be properly undertaken.
74 The Full Court upheld the appeal and then re-assessed the penalty.
75 The reference in the aforementioned observations by Barker J in Transpacific to the observations of Buchanan J was a reference to observations Buchanan J made in Comcare v Post Logistics Australasia Pty Limited [2011] FCA 1422 - the first instance decision which was the subject of the appeal in the Post Logistics appeal. It is relevant to observe that in those observations, amongst other things, Buchanan J had expressed reservations about applying criminal sentencing canons in relation to factors such as an early admission of a contravention and contrition in civil penalty proceedings. However, Buchanan J accepted that those considerations were relevant to penalty and could be taken into account along with other factors in the context of considering the appropriate penalty. Barker J in John Holland Rail at [143] also recognised these factors as being relevant; but not in the context of supporting an expectation that an arithmetical "discount", analogous to criminal law sentencing canons, would be applied.
76 Whilst the Full Court criticised the approach taken by Buchanan J specifically in relation to deterrence, it did not comment adversely upon Buchanan J's observations advising caution in relation to the importation of criminal law sentencing canons founded upon an early plea of guilty and contrition, into the process of imposing a penalty in respect of a contravention of the Act. More importantly, though the Full Court endorsed an approach to penalty by reference to the exercise of an unfettered discretion (free from the strictures of the canons of criminal law sentencing) with the object of imposing a penalty which gives effect to the objects of the Act and recognises the differences inherent in the individual circumstances of each case.
77 I now turn to consider the matters raised by the respondents in relation to the objective seriousness of the contraventions and the application of the "Madgwick factors".
78 In Trooper Lawrence, Madgwick J observed at [116] that the overriding principle in assessing penalty is that the amount of the penalty should reflect the Court's view of the seriousness of the offending conduct in all the relevant circumstances.
79 Madgwick J then went on at [120] to identify the following factors which are now known as the "Madgwick factors":
(i) the penalty must be such as to compel attention to occupational health and safety generally, to ensure that workers whilst at work will not be exposed to risks to their health and safety;
(ii) it is a significant aggravating factor that the risk of injury was foreseeable even if the precise cause or circumstances of exposure to the risk were not foreseeable;
(iii) the offence may be further aggravated if the risk of injury is not only foreseeable but actually foreseen and an adequate response to that risk is not taken by the employer;
(iv) the gravity of the consequences of an accident does not of itself dictate the seriousness of the offence or the amount of penalty. However the occurrence of death or serious injury may manifest the degree of the seriousness of the relevant detriment to safety;
(v) a systemic failure by an employer to appropriately address a known or foreseeable risk is likely to be viewed more seriously than a risk to which an employee was exposed because of a combination of inadvertence on the part of an employee and a momentary lapse of supervision;
(vi) general deterrence and specific deterrence are particularly relevant factors in light of the objects and terms of the Act;
(vii) employers are required to take all practicable precautions to ensure safety in the workplace. This implies constant vigilance. Employers must adopt an approach to safety which is proactive and not merely reactive. In view of the scope of those obligations, in most cases it will be necessary to have regard to the need to encourage a sufficient level of diligence by the employer in the future. This is particularly so where the employer conducts a large enterprise which involves inherent risks to safety;
(viii) regard should be had to the levels of maximum penalty set by the legislature as indicative of the seriousness of the breach under consideration;
(ix) the neglect of simple, well-known precautions to deal with an evident and great risk of injury, take a matter towards the worst case category;
(x) the objective seriousness of the offence, without more may call for the imposition of a very substantial penalty to vindicate the social and industrial policies of the legislation and its regime of penalties.
80 I accept and place considerable weight on the fact that, as the respondents conceded, an accident arising from the circumstance which led to the death of Mr Phelan was foreseeable. But, I also place weight in the fact that there is no suggestion that the accident was actually foreseen.
81 I place no weight on the respondents' contention that the vehicle was able to carry out its "normal operations", in other words, moving along the rail tracks, with a functional braking capacity. In my view, that takes too narrow a view of "normal operations". This is because integral to the process of placing the vehicle into a position to move along the rail tracks, was the need first to convert it from a road vehicle to a rail vehicle. It is of little comfort that it was only during part of the process for operating the vehicle, namely, whilst moving along the rail tracks, in rail mode, that the vehicle had a safe functional braking system.
82 Nor do I place any weight on the fact that it was possible for the vehicle to be off-tracked in a manner which did not disable its braking capability and thereby put at risk the health and safety of workers. It seems to me that the minimum requirement for the introduction of a vehicle on to an engineering site is that it have a safe functional braking system. The difficulty with this particular vehicle, however, was that unless it was off-tracked in a specific manner which was not clearly identified in the cabin of the vehicle, it did not satisfy that minimum requirement. As the first respondent accepted, it failed to ensure that the vehicle had an effective braking capability by failing to recognise the hazard inherent in the vehicle's braking system which called for a trained operator, and by failing to train its hi-rail vehicle operators. Furthermore, the third respondent accepted that it had failed in its duty by designing a braking system which provided only a limited braking capability, and failing to warn the first respondent of the limitation on the vehicle's capacity to brake.
83 I place no weight in favour of the respondents on the fact that there was a horn on the vehicle. This is because the horn to which the respondents referred was part of the original factory supplied tractor equipment. The presence of the tractor horn on the vehicle did not reflect a recognition by the first and third respondents of the need to install an adequate warning system to accommodate the risks associated with a failure in the braking system of the vehicle during the off-tracking process. As it transpired, the blowing of the tractor horn proved to be an inadequate means of warning Mr Phelan of the oncoming runaway vehicle.
84 I do place some, but not a great deal of weight on the fact that there was a radio on board the vehicle. The radio was a means whereby the operator could communicate with the supervisor whilst he was operating the vehicle as it carried out its operations moving along the tracks in rail mode. The presence of the radio, therefore, included a safety element as well as an operational element. However, the presence of the radio in the cabin did not reflect a recognition by the first and third respondents of the specific risks associated with the lack of braking capacity of the vehicle during the off-tracking operation.
85 I do not place any weight in favour of the respondents on the fact that Mr Lovett was given a familiarisation session by an experienced operator. This is because the operator who conducted the session had not received training in the safe operation of the vehicle, and it was during this session that Mr Lovett was encouraged to embark upon the dangerous practice of raising the front and rear hi-rail wheels simultaneously. In short, the familiarisation session did not assist in the promotion of health and safety at work.
86 In relation to the third respondent, I also place little weight on the fact that, in accordance with its existing procedures, the third respondent conducted a risk assessment process in respect of the modification of the Fastrac tractor before the vehicle was released for use on John Holland Group engineering sites. This is because the risk assessment analysis which was undertaken by the officers of the third respondent did not address the risks associated with off-tracking or on-tracking and the attendant risk that the braking capability of the vehicle may be disengaged during that time. It is the case that the risk assessment did identify the need for training operators of the vehicle but that was not in the context of the special risks associated with on-tracking and off-tracking. The need for training was identified at a higher level of generality; and did not specifically address training about the risks to the effective operation of the braking system as designed, during the on-tracking and off-tracking operation.
87 Further, I place no weight on the fact that the third respondent made some alterations to the operator's procedure handbook published by the manufacturer in respect of the tractor. Such additional alterations as were made comprised only one typewritten page, was at a very basic level and did not recognise the risks associated with the front and rear hi-rail wheels being raised simultaneously.
88 The respondents also contended that there was no need for the Court to have regard to specific deterrence in imposing the penalty. The respondents said that they had of their own accord, following the fatal accident, taken effective measures to ensure that a hi-rail vehicle could not again get out of control by reason of the failure of a braking system during the off-tracking or on-tracking operation. There was, therefore, no need to include any element of the penalty which was directed towards ensuring that the respondents took steps to preclude any repetition of the circumstances which led to the fatal accident. The respondents also pointed to Mr Cipolla's evidence of the respondents' longstanding and conscientious commitment to ensuring health and safety at the workplace, the promotion of a health and safety culture, and to the results of the applicant's audit.
89 I accept that following the fatal accident, the first and third respondents have taken a number of steps to ensure deficiencies in their safety systems and safety procedures, which led to the accident, were eliminated. Thus, for example, the third respondent has taken engineering steps to ensure that the front hi-rail wheels and the rear hi-rail wheels of a hi-rail vehicle cannot be raised simultaneously and has introduced a secondary braking system. Further, the first respondent has reviewed the manner in which hi-rail vehicles are deployed and, reviewed and introduced new training requirements in relation to the operation of hi-rail vehicles. I also accept that the improved measures have very substantially reduced the risk that such an accident will again occur.
90 However, notwithstanding the laudable steps taken by the respondents in reducing the risk of serious accident arising from the on-tracking and off-tracking of a hi-rail vehicle, and the results of the applicant's audit, it is, still necessary, in my view, to include in the penalty, a substantial element in recognition of the need for specific deterrence. This is because, as is demonstrated by the facts of this case, the operation of an effective health and safety system at the workplace requires as Madgwick J said, "constant vigilance" and the need to adopt a proactive rather than a reactive approach to safety.
91 Mr Cipolla's evidence went to some lengths in identifying the safety systems that were in place, at the date of the fatal accident, for the health and safety at the workplace of the John Holland Group of companies, and those companies' commitments to ensuring the safety of their employees. However, notwithstanding that commitment and the existence and operation of those extensive safety measures, those measures failed to prevent the fatal accident on 30 December 2011. The respondents have, in this proceeding, admitted that in December 2011 there were still gaps in their safety systems in relation to the manufacture and operation of hi-rail vehicles which each of the respondents has identified in their agreed statement of facts and proposed declarations.
92 The failure by the first and third respondents to take the steps identified by them in relation to the manufacture and operation of the hi-rail vehicle, were significant failures. Another failure which is troubling is the failure of the respondents to respond to the safety notice warning which was sent by the Office of Rail Safety Western Australia (see [38] above). The disturbing aspect of this failure is the fact that Mr Ross, the then national rail safety manager of the John Holland Group of companies, did not know that the first respondent was operating hi-rail vehicles. The evidence in relation to Mr Ross's ignorance did not descend into detail. However, Mr Ross's ignorance in conjunction with the serious failures to which the first and third respondents have admitted, leave open the inference that the safety systems which related to the manufacturing and operation of hi-rail vehicles within the John Holland Group of companies in December 2011 were seriously deficient.
93 The evidence demonstrates, therefore, that notwithstanding that the John Holland Group of companies were in December 2011 conscientious in relation to ensuring work safety in the workplace, there was, in December 2011 still substantially more that the first and third respondents could have done in relation to ensuring safety in respect of the manufacture and operation of hi-rail vehicles. In other words, the first and third respondents could have been more vigilant and proactive than they were.
94 Further, the fatal accident in this case, was the third fatal accident in five years which had occurred at sites in Australia under the control of the first respondent. The other two fatalities did not involve hi-rail vehicles and I do not take these fatalities into account as relevant previous convictions. However, I do refer to these fatalities as instances of the need for the first respondent to be reminded that it needs to be constantly vigilant and proactive in relation to safety at the workplace in relation to all aspects of its diverse operations - whether they be in relation to hi-rail vehicles, the movement of precast concrete decking or employees walking across unsecured grid mesh.
95 The need to remind the first and third respondents of the importance of constant vigilance in relation to workplace safety, is particularly important because the first and third respondents operate in an industry which on a daily basis requires their employees to carry out inherently dangerous activities or to operate, and work in the vicinity of, vehicles which have the propensity to put their lives at risk. Constant vigilance was not present in the circumstances of this tragic case. The result was that a man lost his life. The objects of the Act are advanced if the respondents are reminded of this as an incentive to do better and to be constantly alert and proactive in relation to workplace safety issues.
96 The respondents did not take issue with the contention that general deterrence was a relevant consideration in imposing the penalty.
97 I accept that the John Holland Group of companies have made, and continue to make, financial and other contributions to community projects and have adopted enlightened and inclusive employment practices. However, in my view, little weight can be attached to this factor in the assessment of the penalty. The objects of the Act, and the duties imposed thereunder, are directed to all employers, whether or not they are good corporate citizens. The Act is directed towards one specific aspect of the way in which the employer conducts its business operations, namely, the employer's conduct in relation to protecting the safety of its employees at the workplace. It is that specific aspect of an employer's conduct which forms the focus of attention in relation to the imposition of a civil penalty.
98 I do place weight on the fact that the first and third respondents cooperated with the applicant during the investigation and admitted the contraventions at a very early stage of this proceeding and have cooperated with the applicant in the efficient conduct of this proceeding. I also observe, in passing, that the manner in which the parties and their legal representatives have cooperated in the conduct of this proceeding to reduce the matters in dispute, reflects an admirable appreciation and application of the overarching principle for the conduct of civil litigation in this Court, as set out in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
99 In addition, although there may be some conceptual difficulty in the notion of a corporation expressing "contrition"; I do also take into account, in their favour, the matters relied upon by the respondents under that rubric.
100 However, I do not accept the respondents' contention that I should apply a 25% discount in respect of the "early plea" and an additional 10% to 15% discount in respect of the other factors, to a penalty I might otherwise have applied. As I have said, in my view, such an approach would be antithetical to the flexible approach to the imposition of penalties endorsed by the Full Court in the Post Logistics appeal.
101 The task of the Court is to impose a penalty which reflects the objective seriousness of the contravention, gives effect to objects of the Act and which will maintain the public confidence in the Act as a means of regulating workplace health and safety.
102 There was some attempt by the respondents to distinguish between the culpability of the first and third respondents. In this regard, the first respondent contended that the Court should take into account that the third respondent did not warn it that the front and rear hi-rail wheels should not be raised simultaneously. However, in my view, this is not a sufficient reason to distinguish between the relative culpability of the respondents, in light of the fact that, as the first respondent admitted, it culpably failed on its own account to recognise that fault in the operation of the vehicle.
103 Accordingly, in my view, the same penalty should be imposed on each of the first and third respondents.
104 Each of the parties contended that the objective seriousness of the fatal incident did not warrant the imposition at the highest end of the range of civil penalty. I agree. However, in my view, the facts in this case demonstrate that there were serious defects in the structure and implementation of the first and third respondents' safety systems for the manufacture and operation of hi-rail vehicles. The contraventions in this case are serious, and the penalty should reflect this finding. As I have also mentioned, I do recognise and give weight to the considerations to which I have referred at [98] and [99] above. These factors mediate to some extent the matters to which I referred when discussing specific deterrence. But, notwithstanding that mediation, a penalty should be imposed at a high level in order to serve the purpose of reminding the first and third respondents, conscientious as they may be, of the need for constant vigilance when it comes to workplace health and safety, to warn other employers to the same effect and to encourage the public and employees to maintain confidence in the operation of the Act as a means of protecting the health and safety of employees whilst at work.
105 Taking all of the factors into account and applying an "instinctive synthesis", I have come to the view that each of the first and third respondents should pay a penalty of $180,000.
106 I am of the view that the agreed facts support the making of the declarations in the agreed minute of declarations referred to above. I will, therefore, make the declarations in terms of that minute. I also order that each of the first and third respondents pay a penalty of $180,000.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and six (106) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Siopis.