The Trustee's case under s 120 of the Act
93 Section 120 of the Act provides, relevantly:
120 Undervalued transactions
Transfers that are void against trustee
(1) A transfer of property by a person who later becomes a bankrupt (the transferor) to another person (the transferee) is void against the trustee in the transferor's bankruptcy if:
(a) the transfer took place in the period beginning 5 years before the commencement of the bankruptcy and ending on the date of the bankruptcy; and
(b) the transferee gave no consideration for the transfer or gave consideration of less value than the market value of the property.
…
Refund of consideration
(4) The trustee must pay to the transferee an amount equal to the value of any consideration that the transferee gave for a transfer that is void against the trustee.
What is not consideration
(5) For the purposes of subsections (1) and (4), the following have no value as consideration:
(a) the fact that the transferee is related to the transferor;
(b) if the transferee is the spouse or de facto partner of the transferor - the transferee making a deed in favour of the transferor;
(c) the transferee's promise to marry, or to become the de facto partner of, the transferor;
(d) the transferee's love or affection for the transferor;
(e) if the transferee is the spouse, or a former spouse, of the transferor - the transferee granting the transferor a right to live at the transferred property, unless the grant relates to a transfer or settlement of property, or an agreement, under the Family Law Act 1975;
(f) if the transferee is a former de facto partner of the transferor - the transferee granting the transferor a right to live at the transferred property, unless the grant relates to a transfer or settlement of property, or an agreement, under the Family Law Act 1975.
Protection of successors in title
(6) This section does not affect the rights of a person who acquired property from the transferee in good faith and by giving consideration that was at least as valuable as the market value of the property.
Meaning of transfer of property and market value
(7) For the purposes of this section:
(a) transfer of property includes a payment of money; and
(b) a person who does something that results in another person becoming the owner of property that did not previously exist is taken to have transferred the property to the other person; and
(c) the market value of property transferred is its market value at the time of the transfer.
94 Helen Brent does not dispute that the three transactions identified by the Trustee occurred and that she received the funds and the security. She does not dispute that they involved transfers of property from Peter Brent. She does not dispute that the transfers took place within five years of Peter Brent's bankruptcy commencing. She does not argue ss 120 and 121 of the Act do not apply because of the Family Court consent orders: cf Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Mateo (2003) 127 FCR 217 at [69].
95 Helen Brent defends the proceeding on the basis that the Trustee has not proved, under s 120(1)(b) of the Act, that she gave no consideration, or gave consideration of less value than the market value of the property transferred. Further, she contends that under s 120(6), the Trustee has not proved that she did not acquire the property in good faith, and failed to give consideration of at least the market value of the property transferred. She argues that her equitable interests in the Home Farm and Peter's Farm, or the compromise of her entitlement to make any claims in respect of her equitable interests, provided adequate consideration for the transfers. Helen Brent asserts that the extent of her equitable interests was a one-third interest in each of the Home Farm and Peter's Farm.
96 The burden of proof under s 120 of the Act is on the Trustee: see PT Garuda Indonesia Ltd v Grellman (1992) 35 FCR 515 at 528.
97 The requirement of "in good faith" under s 120(6) means without notice that any fraud or preference contrary to the statute is intended: PT Garuda at 528.
98 It may be accepted that if property is sold and part of the proceeds of sale is transferred to a person on account of his or her equitable interest in the property, the person has provided some consideration for the transfer. In this case, Helen Brent contends that she had equitable interests arising from the circumstances of a joint relationship or joint endeavour between her and members of the Brent family, including Peter, John and Len.
99 Helen Brent relies upon Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101, where it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief in circumstances where he had remained on the family farm and worked without wages in reliance upon a promise that the farm would be subdivided and a portion provided to him. The High Court said at [6]:
…[T]he equity which founded the relief obtained was found in an assumption as to the future acquisition of ownership of property which had been induced by representations upon which there had been detrimental reliance by the plaintiff. This is a well recognised variety of estoppel as understood in equity and may found relief which requires the taking of active steps by the defendant.
100 In Donis v Donis (2007) 19 VR 577, Nettle JA, referring to Giumelli, said at [19]:
In such cases the remedy relates to the understanding of the parties and the expectation that has been encouraged. Prima facie the estopped party can only fulfil his or her equitable obligation by making good the expectation which he or she has encouraged. The estopped party, having promised to confer a proprietary interest on the party entitled to the benefit of the estoppel, and the latter having acted upon the promise to his or her detriment, is bound in conscience to make good the expectation. It follows that the detrimental reliance that supports the estoppel need not constitute in any sense a consideration moving to the party bound. It is a unilateral element of the estoppel and not the price paid for it.
101 In Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505, the High Court, referring to Donis v Donis, observed at [77]:
This category of equitable estoppel serves to vindicate the expectations of the
representee against a party who seeks unconscionably to resile from an expectation he or she has created.
102 In Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, Deane J at 620, identified a principle of equity operating in the following circumstances:
…[T]he principle operates in a case where the substratum of a joint relationship or endeavour is removed without attributable blame and where the benefit of money or other property contributed by one party on the basis and for the purposes of the relationship or endeavour would otherwise be enjoyed by the other party in circumstances in which it was not specifically intended or specially provided that that other party should so enjoy it. The content of the principle is that, in such a case, equity will not permit that other party to assert or retain the benefit of the relevant property to the extent that it would be unconscionable for him so to do.
(Citation omitted.)
103 In Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137, Mason CJ, Wilson and Deane JJ referred at 148 to a general equitable principle:
which restores to a party contributions which he or she has made to a joint endeavour which fails when the contributions have been made in circumstances in which it was not intended that the other party should enjoy them.
104 Their Honours continued at 149:
Their contributions, financial and otherwise, to the acquisition of the land, the building of the house, the purchase of furniture and the making of their home, were on the basis of, and for the purposes of, that joint relationship. In this situation the appellant's assertion, after the relationship had failed, that the Leumeah property, which was financed in part through the pooled funds, is his sole property, is his property beneficially to the exclusion of any interest at all on the part of the respondent, amounts to unconscionable conduct which attracts the intervention of equity and the imposition of a constructive trust at the suit of the respondent.
105 I have rejected Helen Brent's evidence that Peter, John and Len Brent told her that she would have a one-third interest in the Brent family properties, or otherwise engaged in conduct that would cause her to make any assumption to that effect. I have rejected her evidence that she worked and provided care to her elderly relatives in reliance upon any representations made to her or any agreement reached. Her claim of a proprietary interest in the Home Farm and Peter's Farm based upon equitable estoppel cannot succeed.
106 Helen Brent was part of the broader Brent family. The limited assistance she provided at the Home Farm and the factory and the care she provided from time to time are consistent with her position as the wife of John Brent and the affection that she undoubtedly developed for members of the family. Helen Brent also received benefits from the Brent family, including the provision of a home at 78 Brent Road. In my opinion, her exertions and the benefits she received were simply part of the give and take of being a member of a farming family. There is no reliable evidence that the respective contributions were made with any expectations of receiving any material reward in return. I do not accept that Helen Brent's exertions were intended to be reflected in the creation of any ownership interest.
107 The position may be contrasted with the relationship between Helen and John Brent. They were married for 29 years before they separated. Helen Brent's evidence that the Brent family discussed that John would be holding his share of assets for John, Helen and their children is entirely consistent with the nature of their relationship. The married relationship between Helen and John Brent is comparable to the marriage-like relationships considered in Muschinski v Dodds and Baumgartner v Baumgartner. It may readily be accepted that, in the absence of the property settlement between them, it would be unconscionable for John to have retained his beneficial interest in the Home Farm and Peter's Farm to the exclusion of any interest on the part of Helen Brent.
108 However, any equitable interest held by Helen Brent was only in John's share of the property owned by Peter and John Brent as tenants in common. In my opinion, there is nothing in the relationship between Peter Brent and Helen Brent that would make it unconscionable for Peter Brent to retain his full beneficial interest in his share of the property.
109 I find that Helen Brent did not hold any equitable interest in Peter Brent's half-share of the Home Farm and Peter's Farm.
110 Therefore, to the extent that the payments of $200,000 and $401,154.99 were made from Peter's share of the proceeds from the sale of the Home Farm, Helen Brent provided no consideration for the transfers. However, it remains to be decided whether those transfers were made from Peter's entitlement or John's entitlement or both.
111 Peter Brent gave Helen Brent a registered mortgage over his interest in Peter's Farm. Peter did not, and does not, owe Helen Brent any money. The purpose of the mortgage given by Peter Brent was to secure money owing by John to Helen under the Family Court orders. Helen has no equitable interest in Peter's interest in Peter's Farm. Helen Brent provided no consideration to Peter for the mortgage. Therefore the mortgage is void against the Trustee.
112 Even if, contrary to my finding, Helen Brent had equitable interests in the Home Farm and Peter's Farm, it would have been necessary to determine whether the value of those interests was at least as great as the value of the transfers to her. If some consideration is given, s 120 of the Act requires the Court to determine the value of that consideration: Official Trustee v Lopatinsky (2003) 129 FCR 234 at [92], [96]. Helen Brent's quantification of her equitable interests relied upon the alleged representations or agreement that she would have a one-third interest in the properties. She has not otherwise attempted to demonstrate the value of her interests. That exercise would have required, in part, consideration of potentially offsetting factors against the value of her equitable interests, such as payments of about $2,000 per month to her made by Bunjurgen and the mortgage payments in respect of the Abalone Ave property made by John Brent. In my opinion, Helen Brent has the onus of proving the value of her equitable interests: see PT Grauda at 528. She has failed to discharge that burden. Even if it were assumed that she had equitable interests, once the one-third representation is rejected, it could not be concluded that their value was greater than the amounts of the transfers.