The second problem which I mentioned is concerned with the question whether the expression "jurisdiction", which is used three times in s. 77 of the Constitution, refers to both original and appellate jurisdiction. If it does then Parliament may create Federal appellate courts in addition to the High Court and it may declare that the appellate jurisdiction of such courts shall be exclusive of "that which belongs to or is invested in the Courts of the State". On the other hand if it does not then s. 31 (1) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act must be invalid for the only constitutional provision upon which it may be rested is s. 77 (i.). It is clear, however, from a survey of the provisions of Chap. III that the High Court is the supreme appellate tribunal within the Commonwealth and that if other federal appellate courts may be created they will be subordinate to the High Court. It is equally clear that, pursuant to s. 73, the High Court would have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from judgments and orders of any such court and that, notwithstanding the creation of any such court, the High Court would continue to have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from judgments and orders of any other federal court and from the Supreme Courts of the States and from any court exercising Federal jurisdiction. In each case the jurisdiction of the High Court would be subject only to such exceptions and regulations as Parliament might prescribe. These and other considerations which arise upon examination of Chap. III tend to support the contention that the provisions of s. 77 (i.) were intended to relate to original jurisdiction only and that it was not intended to authorize the Parliament of the Commonwealth to create a hierarchy of Federal courts with appellate courts interposed between Federal courts exercising original jurisdiction and State courts exercising original federal jurisdiction on the one hand and the High Court on the other. But in my view the language of s. 77 does not admit of any such restricted meaning. Nor, indeed, has it been so understood. In Ah Yick v. Lehmert [1] the High Court was squarely faced with the question whether s. 39 of the Judiciary Act 1903 validly operated to confer jurisdiction upon the court of general sessions in Victoria to hear and determine an appeal from a conviction before a magistrate in respect of an offence against s. 7 of the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 Cth.. Section 39 (2) of the Judiciary Act 1903 provided that "The several Courts of the States shall within the limits of their several jurisdictions, whether such limits are as to locality, subject matter, or otherwise, be invested with federal jurisdiction, in all matters in which the High Court has original jurisdiction, or in which original jurisdiction can be conferred upon it, except as provided in the last preceding section, and subject to the following conditions and restrictions". It was clear that the only possible source of constitutional authority for this provision was s. 77 of the Constitution and speaking of the contention that this section did not authorize Parliament to invest new Federal courts or State courts with Federal appellate jurisdiction Griffith C.J. said: "Whether the Court of General Sessions had jurisdiction to entertain this appeal depends upon the terms of the Constitution and of the Judiciary Act 1903. The Constitution (sec. 71), provides that: "The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, and in such other federal Courts as the Parliament creates, and in such other Courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction." I pause there to remark that judicial power is an attribute of sovereignty which must of necessity be exercised by some tribunal, that that tribunal must be constituted by the sovereign power, and that the limits within which the judicial power is to be exercised by the tribunal must be defined. In the case of the High Court, the extent to which that court may exercise judicial power is defined by the Constitution; in the case of other Courts it is not defined by the Constitution, and must, again of necessity, be defined by the Commonwealth law which creates those Courts or invests them with federal jurisdiction. The term "federal jurisdiction" means authority to exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth, and again that must be within limits prescribed. Then "federal jurisdiction" must include appellate jurisdiction as well as original jurisdiction. The whole scheme of the Constitution assumes that the judicial power includes both in the case of the High Court, and from the history of the Constitution and the practice in English-speaking countries, it must be taken for granted that the judicial power was known by the framers of the Constitution to include both, and that those framers intended that the judicial power might be exercised by Courts of original jurisdiction or by Courts of appellate jurisdiction. Then sec. 73 of the Constitution defines the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. Amongst other matters of appellate jurisdiction the High Court is authorized to hear appeals from all Courts having federal jurisdiction, "with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as the Parliament prescribes," and none have been prescribed which affect the present case. Sec. 75 defines and enumerates five classes of cases in which the High Court has original jurisdiction, and sec. 76 four others in which Parliament may confer original jurisdiction upon the High Court. In all other matters, as at present advised, I think the High Court has no original jurisdiction, and cannot, quâ High Court, have it. Then sec. 77 provides that Parliament may make laws - "(i.) Defining the jurisdiction of any federal Court other than the High Court," and "(iii.) Investing any Court of a State with federal jurisdiction." Now, the power to create a federal Court depends upon sec. 71. The judicial power exists as an attribute of sovereignty, and, so far as it is not left to the High Court, it is for the Parliament to say what jurisdiction each Court shall have. Taking sec. 71 into consideration, sec. 77 (i.) means that the Parliament may establish any Court to be called a federal Court, and may give it jurisdiction to exercise any judicial power of the Commonwealth, which the Parliament may think fit to confer upon it, either by way of appellate or original jurisdiction. Sub-sec. (iii.) must receive a precisely similar interpretation. Parliament may invest any Court of a State with authority to exercise federal judicial power, again to the extent prescribed by the Statute. There is nothing to restrict that judicial power to original jurisdiction any more than to appellate jurisdiction, and there is no reason why there should be a restriction. There can be no doubt that Parliament might think fit to invest one Court exclusively with original jurisdiction, another with appellate jurisdiction, and another with both. There is nothing to limit that power. Any power that falls within the words "federal jurisdiction" may be conferred on any Court which Parliament thinks fit to invest with federal jurisdiction" [1] . With this view Barton J. agreed whilst Isaacs J. in the State of New South Wales v. The Commonwealth [2] expressed a similar opinion. The same view seems to me to be implicit in the reasoning of the Court in Lorenzo v. Carey [3] and to be expressly accepted by the observations of Starke J. in The Commonwealth v. Limerick Steamship Co. Ltd. and Kidman [1] . I do not understand it ever to have been said that s. 77 of the Constitution extends so far as to authorize the Parliament to create new Federal appellate courts with a general jurisdiction, either exclusive or otherwise, to hear and determine appeals from State courts exercising State jurisdiction. But if it should be suggested the answer is clear. The constitutional authority to create new federal courts is limited. The extent of the jurisdiction which Parliament may confer on any such court is determinable solely by reference to the matters mentioned in ss. 75 and 76. Within the same limits, and not otherwise, Parliament may define the extent to which the jurisdiction of any federal court shall be exclusive of that which belongs to or is invested in the courts of the State. To create a new federal court as an exclusive appellate court from State courts exercising a general State jurisdiction would at one and the same time exceed both the power to create new Federal courts and the power to define the extent to which the jurisdiction of any such court should be exclusive of that which belongs to or is invested in the courts of the State. But the views which I have expressed may, perhaps, be taken to suggest that Parliament may create a new federal court with jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from judgments or orders of State courts in matters answering to the descriptions contained in ss. 75 and 76 even in the absence of legislation investing those courts with federal jurisdiction in such matters. In the latter circumstance the judgments or orders in question would be given or made in the exercise of State jurisdiction. But if upon a literal reading of s. 77 such a course be thought to be permissible, sufficiently cogent reasons to the contrary, which have been judicially recognized, readily present themselves upon an examination of the Federal structure erected by the Constitution. Moreover the existence of a right of appeal to the High Court from orders of State courts in such matters, other than the general right of appeal from the Supreme Courts of the several States pursuant to s. 73, depends, not upon the character of the matters involved, but upon whether or not the orders or judgments appealed against have been made in the exercise of Federal jurisdiction, or, in other words, upon whether the court from which the appeal has been brought has exercised Federal or State judicial authority. This, of course, depends in turn upon the extent to which Parliament has seen fit to exercise its legislative authority under s. 77 (iii.) and not merely upon a consideration of the matters with respect to which legislative authority has been conferred by that section. I see no reason to suppose that similar considerations should not apply with equal force in considering the extent to which any new or existing federal court may be invested with appellate jurisdiction. Indeed, to conclude otherwise would be to permit direct interference with the exercise by the courts of the States of State judicial functions, and such a notion is, as I have already said, inconsistent with the maintenance of Federal and State judicial authority under the Federal system erected by the Constitution. These considerations are not displaced by asserting that the substance of the matters specified in ss. 75 and 76 determined their selection as matters appropriate for the exercise of Federal jurisdiction and, therefore, that in considering whether jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals in such matters from inferior courts of the State may be conferred upon a new or existing Federal court, it is unnecessary to distinguish between orders and judgments made or given in the exercise of Federal jurisdiction and those made in the exercise of State jurisdiction. It may, of course, be said that the order of any such inferior court will produce exactly the same result in the matter and have precisely the same legal effect whether made in the exercise of one type of jurisdiction or the other. But, in my view, although s. 77 (i.) may authorize the creation of new appellate tribunals, it does not authorize Parliament to invest any Federal court with jurisdiction to entertain appeals from the orders and judgments of State courts made or given in the exercise of State judicial authority, even though such orders and judgments have been made or given in any one of the matters specified in ss. 75 and 76. Indeed, it is difficult to see how it can be said that such an appellate jurisdiction would constitute part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth and the provisions of s. 77 (i.) must be taken to be limited by this concept.