SOP Act provisions
67 It is convenient to commence with a summary of the object and other relevant provisions of the SOP Act.
68 The object of the SOP Act is to ensure that persons who carry out work under a construction contract are entitled to receive and are able to recover progress payments for the work that they have undertaken: s 3(1) of the SOP Act. A person is granted a statutory entitlement to progress payments for work undertaken regardless of whether the relevant construction contract provides for progress payments: s 3(2) of the SOP Act. The procedure for recovering a progress payment under the SOP Act is set out at s 3(3). In summary, it provides for the (a) making of a payment claim, (b) provision of a payment schedule, (c) referral of any disputed claim to an adjudicator for determination, and (d) payment of the progress payment so determined.
69 As Sackville AJA explained in Seymour Whyte Constructions Pty Ltd v Ostwald Bros Pty Ltd (in liq) (2019) 99 NSWLR 317; [2019] NSWCA 11 at [72] (Leeming, Payne and White JJA and Emmett AJA agreeing):
The High Court has on two occasions quoted the explanation of the original design of the Security of Payment Act given by the responsible Minister when introducing amending legislation in 2002:
"The Act was designed to ensure prompt payment and, for that purpose, the Act set up a unique form of adjudication of disputes over the amount due for payment. Parliament intended that a progress payment, on account, should be made promptly and that any disputes over the amount finally due should be decided separately. The final determination could be by a court or by an agreed alternative dispute resolution procedure. But meanwhile the claimant's entitlement, if in dispute, would be decided on an interim basis by an adjudicator, and that interim entitlement would be paid."
The Minister went on to say that cash flow was the "lifeblood of the construction industry" and that the Government was:
"determined that, pending final determination of all disputes, contractors and subcontractors should be able to obtain a prompt interim payment on account, as always intended under the Act."
(Footnotes omitted.)
70 Part 3 Div 2 of the SOP Act relevantly provides for "Adjudication of disputes". Section 17(1) outlines the circumstances in which a claimant may apply for an adjudication of a payment claim. These circumstances include (a) if the amount in the payment schedule is less than the amount of the payment claim (b) if the respondent fails to pay the whole or part of the scheduled amount by the payment date and (c) if the respondent fails to provide a payment schedule pursuant to its obligations under Div 1. An adjudicator is to then determine the amount of the progress payment (if any), the date on which the adjudicated amount is payable and the rate of interest on the adjudicated amount: s 22(1). An adjudicated amount is due on a "relevant date" that is either five business days after the determination is served on the respondent or at a later date determined by the adjudicated: s 23(1). The consequences of a respondent not paying the adjudicated amount are set out in s 24.
71 Section 24(1) of the SOP Act relevantly provides that a claimant may request an adjudication certificate from the relevant adjudicating authority and serve a notice on the respondent of their intention to suspend carrying out construction work. Section 25(1) provides that a claimant may file an adjudication certificate as a judgment for a debt in any court of competent jurisdiction. If a respondent seeks to have a judgment under s 25(1) set aside, the respondent is not entitled to bring any cross-claim, raise any defence or challenge the adjudicator's determination and must pay as security, the unpaid portion of the adjudicated amount pending the final determination of those proceedings: s 24(4). Section 32(1) preserves any right that a party to a construction contract may have under Pt 2 or generally in respect of the contract. Section 32(3) provides that in any proceeding in relation to any matter arising under a construction contract, the court or tribunal must allow for any amount paid to a party to the contract in any order it makes and may make orders as it considers appropriate, for the restitution of any amounts paid.
72 The decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Grosvenor Constructions (NSW) Pty Limited (in administration) v Musico [2004] NSWSC 344 was the first occasion on which a Court considered whether a stay of the execution of orders or judgments arising from the filing of an adjudication certificate should be granted, in circumstances where any moneys paid would be irrecoverable because of the claimant's insolvency or liquidation.
73 The plaintiff in Grosvenor Constructions obtained an adjudication certificate under the SOP Act in an amount of $486,324.77 and filed it as judgment debt pursuant to s 25 of the SOP Act. The defendants sought a stay of the execution of the judgment debt on the basis that the company had been placed under external administration. In a report to creditors the administrator had advised that there was a deficit of $4,263,210 and identified a return to creditors of 11 cents in the dollar.
74 After referring to the practice of the Court to grant stays of judgment pending the determination of an appeal where there is a risk that the plaintiff may be unable to repay the money if the appeal were to succeed, Einstein J stated:
31 Similarly, there is no reason why, in appropriate cases, a stay cannot be ordered in circumstances such as the present. Clearly the analogy with appeals is not a perfect one. Whilst payments under the Act are interim, it nonetheless is the policy of the Act that successful claimants be paid. For that reason, there is a sound reason for making stays less readily available in relation to debts arising under the Act, in contrast to the position in relation to appeals arising from curial proceedings. For example, in cases such as the present, the Court might require more than a "real risk that [the respondent] will suffer prejudice or damage, if a stay is not granted" (Kalifair Pty Ltd v Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd (2002) 55 NSWLR 737, at 741-742 [18] (emphasis added)).
32 However I accept that in a case such as the present, where there is a certainty that the defendants' rights will be otherwise rendered nugatory, and that it will suffer irreparable prejudice, the proper and principled exercise of the Courts discretion is to grant a stay.
…
35 In the present case, if no stay is granted, an interim arrangement would be in practice converted into a final order. The effect of not granting a stay would be that the defendants' rights to recoup the adjudicated amount in the "appeal" pursuant to s 32 of the Act would be rendered nugatory, and the defendants would thus suffer irreparable prejudice.
75 In Veolia Water Solutions v Kruger Engineering (No 3) [2007] NSWSC 459, the plaintiff sought a permanent stay of a judgment in respect of a determination pursuant to s 25(1) of the SOP Act obtained against it by a company subject to a DOCA. The plaintiff contended before McDougall J, that the judgment should be stayed because any success it might otherwise achieve on its cross-claim would be rendered nugatory. McDougall J generally adopted the statements of principle by Einstein J in Grosvenor Constructions but relevantly stated at [39]:
However, in any particular case, the application of those principles, and the balancing of the various considerations, will require careful attention. For example, each case will require close analysis of the extent or certainty of the risk of prejudice or damage, if a stay is not granted…
76 The following two factors of particular significance to the exercise of the discretion to grant a stay were identified by McDougall J at [72]:
(1) On the one hand, the policy of the Security of Payment Act, that successful applicants be paid promptly (recognised by Einstein J in Grosvenor at para [31]); and
(2) On the other, the likelihood of irreparable prejudice, where that prejudice would flow from the refusal of the stay because cross-claims would be rendered worthless (recognised by Einstein J in Grosvenor at para [32]).
77 Justice McDougall then stated that in assessing whether the refusal of a stay would cause irreparable prejudice it was necessary for the Court to look closely at the strength of the cross-claim to determine whether there was a real risk of prejudice if the stay were not granted (at [73]-[74]).
78 The availability of a stay with respect to the registration of judgments under the SOP Act was also referred to by Sackville AJA in Seymour Whyte in which he stated (Leeming, Payne and White JJA and Emmett AJA agreeing):
253 The authorities have recognised that s 25(4) of the Security of Payment Act, which applies in proceedings commenced by a respondent to set aside a judgment based on an adjudication determination, does not prevent a respondent seeking other relief such as a stay of the judgment pending a decision on a proof of debt or a cross-claim. They have also recognised that there is nothing in the Security of Payment Act to prevent a set-off available under s 553C(1) operating to satisfy a judgment obtained by a claimant under Pt 3 of the Security of Payment Act, where the claimant is in liquidation.
254 In the light of these principles, it has generally been accepted that a respondent which can establish that it has a seriously arguable claim arising out of the construction contract may be able to obtain a stay of execution of a judgment obtained under Pt 3 of the Security of Payment Act or equivalent relief (such as an order requiring a claimant to provide security). Such relief ordinarily may be granted only if:
"the failure to do so would have the practical effect of making permanent that which … the legislature intended [by the Security of Payment Act] to be only interim."
(Footnotes omitted.)
79 Section 32B of the SOP Act is in the following terms:
32B Application of Part to a claimant in liquidation
(1) A corporation in liquidation cannot serve a payment claim on a person under this Part or take action under this Part to enforce a payment claim (including by making an application for adjudication of the claim) or an adjudication determination.
(2) If a corporation in liquidation has made an adjudication application that is not finally determined immediately before the day on which it commenced to be in liquidation, the application is taken to have been withdrawn on that day.
80 In the Second Reading Speech of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Amendment Bill 2018 (NSW) (SOP Act Amendment Bill), the purpose of the introduction of s 32B in the SOP Act was explained in the following terms:
The bill will insert section 32B to prevent the Act applying to a claimant corporation in liquidation. This reform will ensure that the Act operates consistently with the object of promoting cash flow. The prime objective of the Act is to keep cash flowing in the contracting chain by enforcing timely payment. On this basis, the Act operates on a "pay-now-argue-later" basis, enabling claimants to obtain payment on an interim basis but preserving a respondent's final rights. If a claimant in liquidation were able to access the Act, any payment a respondent would be required to make to the claimant would not be interim as intended. This is because the respondent would not be able to sue for recovery as the payment would enter the general pool for distribution to the claimant's creditors.