Telstar's conduct
59 A convenient starting point is the submission of counsel for the respondents that Mr Nagy and Mr Pavia were the agents of Mr Coggin in this transaction and were not the agents of Telstar or Mr Cunningham. Nothing could be further from the truth. The reality is that Mr Nagy and Mr Pavia were old comrades in arms from their door to door cookware selling days. And they were sufficiently familiar with Mr Cunningham to wake him up in the early hours of the morning, moor the Lady Christina at his private mooring (no doubt by prior arrangement), and borrow $400 from him to pay the skipper. Messrs Nagy, Pavia and Cunningham at all times worked together in pursuit of their own interests, and against the interests of Mr Coggin. This is most strikingly demonstrated by their exclusion of Mr Coggin from the meeting on 24 December 1999 at which they made the agreement recorded in Mr Cunningham's note ([37] above). They saw the only role of Mr Coggin as being "Joe's Father" who was to provide a boat as collateral for their venture. This is consistent with what Mr Gray told Mrs McIlwee, that Telstar was to make a loan Mr Coggin "for a business venture for Joe Nagy who is the son-in-law of Mr Coggin".
60 Mr Cunningham was the director of a finance company which usually did not lend on secured transactions, let alone maritime ones. Nor, as far as the evidence reveals, did this Brisbane finance company engage in wholesaling of goods in other States. As the respondents' counsel submitted, "this type of transaction was not common for Telstar".
61 The respondents saw the opportunity presented by the serendipitous combination of Messrs Nagy and Pavia's business plans and the availability of Mr Coggin's vessel as too good to miss. I am not at all persuaded that Mr Cunningham was a reluctant participant who succumbed only after persistent supplication by Mr Pavia on the morning of 24 December. The previous day Mr Cunningham had been trying, through Mr Gray, to arrange insurance - an indication that Telstar was already committed to the project. Also on Mr Pavia's version, Mr Cunningham agreed to the idea, without any persuasion, a week before Christmas Eve.
62 The driving forces in the whole project for the acquisition of the Victorian Easy Drink franchise were Mr Nagy and Mr Pavia but Mr Cunningham was a willing participant.
63 Like the certain man who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho (Luke 10.25-30), Mr Coggin fell among men who were, if not thieves in the legal sense, totally opportunistic in the advantage they took of him. To their knowledge, Mr Coggin not only happened to be the owner of an asset which could provide collateral to get finance which seemed otherwise unobtainable, he had filial motives for assisting his daughter and her family.
64 Mr Coggin was suffering from the ill effects of the spider bite and this affected his capacity to make rational business judgments. However this was a relatively minor feature in the circumstances. It would be simplistic to regard this case as one which merely adds spider bites to the classic equitable disability categories of drunkenness, illiteracy etc.
65 What is more significant is the overwhelming weighting of the transaction against any rational assessment of what was in Mr Coggin's interests. He provided a vessel which, as far as the respondents knew, had a value in excess of $200,000 as security for a loan of $65,000. Yet he was charged a truly extortionate rate of interest of 10 per cent per month.
66 Consistent with their opportunistic approach, the respondents took for themselves secret profits in the form of 3 cents per lid, a right to Red Rooster sales and ten per cent on the sale of sub-franchises, all in connection with a business which seems far removed from that of a Brisbane finance company.
67 The respondents changed the transaction from mortgage to sale to meet the insurance difficulty they encountered after Mr Gray spoke to Mrs McIlwee. Mr Coggin, although outnumbered and without any independent legal or business advice (a circumstance of which the respondents were well aware), was sufficiently aware to what was going on to protest at the first agreement Mr Gray proffered to him on 24 December. Hence the second agreement. This was in fact no better than a sale with an option to repurchase, a transaction still quite inadequate from Mr Coggin's point of view since it put the onus on him to repurchase and did not impose any obligation on Telstar, if it resold, to account for any balance. (Whether the second agreement of 24 December 1999 or the agreement of 9 February 2000 was in truth an option to re-purchase is not clear. However, the case put to this Court by the respondents throughout the hearing was that there was a sale to Telstar by Mr Coggin and he only had an option to repurchase.)
68 The fact that there were two agreements signed by Mr Coggin on 24 December is strongly corroborative of Mr Coggin's version that all the time he wanted to create a mortgage or charge, not an outright sale. He did the best he could, albeit ineffectively, to achieve this. It also rebuts the version of a number of the respondents' witnesses to the effect that on the 24th Mr Coggin had everything fully explained to him and went along without demur.
69 A particularly telling piece of evidence is that provided by Mr Cunningham, quoted at [51] above. This was in his own statement, not extracted under cross-examination. As already noted, on the respondents' case what happened was a straight sale, with at best an option for Mr Coggin to repurchase. There has been no suggestion that he exercised any such option. Accordingly, on the case it presented to this Court, Telstar had no obligation at all to account for anything. I suspect that Mr Cunningham could not quite bring himself to acknowledge the full implications of the conduct he was trying to defend.
70 I find that the conduct of Telstar was unconscionable within the meaning of s 51AC.