9 Counsel were unable to refer me to any cases as to whether a corporation can be a person aggrieved by a decision made before its incorporation nor, for that matter, any cases as to whether an individual can be a person aggrieved by a decision made before his or her birth. The respondents' contentions are based on the premise that the Judicial Review Act permits applications to be made only by persons whose interests are adversely affected by a decision at the time of its making. However it has been held in a case concerning the ADJR Act that the question of standing or "aggrievement" is to be determined by reference to the facts existing at the time of the institution of the proceedings: Queensland Newsagents Federation Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1993) 46 FCR 38 at 46. I think there are good reasons to interpret the Tasmanian legislation in that way.
10 There are no doubt many situations in which impeachable administrative decisions can have impacts in respect of interests arising after the making of the decisions. For example, a person might inherit or purchase a property that is adversely affected by an amendment to a planning scheme that was not made in accordance with the law. It would be absurd if relief under the Judicial Review Act was available only to a person who owned the property at the time of the impeachable decision, and a new owner was compelled to seek a declaration or an injunction in accordance with case law that that Act was intended to render obsolete.
11 In my view it would promote the purposes and objects of the legislation to adopt an interpretation whereby the question whether a person or corporation is a "person who is aggrieved" should ordinarily be determined by reference to the facts existing when the proceedings are instituted. Despite the applicant not having been created when the decision in question was made, in my view it must be a "person who is aggrieved" if it had a sufficient interest in the subject matter of its originating application when it was filed.
12 It claims to have such an interest on the basis that it is a body that was formed to represent the interests of its members, whose interests were adversely affected by the decision in question. I accept the affidavit evidence as to the role of the corporation adduced on behalf of the applicant. It was formed to represent the interests of farmers and landholders in the Bothwell district who held irrigation rights under the Irrigation Clauses Act 1973, who drew water from Lake Crescent and the River Clyde, and who depended on the supply of water from those sources.
13 An unincorporated association named the Clyde Valley Irrigators Group was established in or about 2003. Its function was to represent the interest of irrigators in the Clyde Valley. It held meetings on an ad hoc basis. It incurred expenses and collected money to meet those expenses, initially on an ad hoc basis. It made a representation to the Resource Planning and Development Commission, apparently in accordance with the Water Management Act, s25, about the draft management plans prior to their adoption by the Minister. One of its convenors wrote on its behalf to an officer of the Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment about the draft plans on 30 January 2005. The two management plans adopted in October 2005 by the decision in question did not operate during the irrigation season of 2005. They first operated in 2006. A number of representatives of the Clyde Valley Irrigators Group wrote to the Minister on 27 November 2006. By mid-December 2006 it became apparent that the town of Bothwell was in danger of running out of water.
14 On 2 January 2007 there was a meeting between a number of irrigators, the Minister, and officers of the second respondent and the Central Highlands Council. Two days later, a meeting of irrigators was held in order to receive a report as to the meeting of 2 January and to discuss potential actions. It was then resolved to incorporate the association using the name "Clyde Group".
15 It seems clear that members of the applicant corporation have proprietary and financial interests that are affected by the decision in question, since they depend on water from Lake Crescent and the Clyde to operate their farms, and for domestic supplies. However the fact that the members of a representative body have standing does not, without more, mean that the representative body has standing: North Coast Environment Council Inc v Minister for Resources [1994] FCA 1556; (1994) 55 FCR 492 at 512; Right to Life Association (NSW) Inc v Secretary, Department of Human Services and Health [1995] FCA 1060; (1995) 56 FCR 50 at 67; Manuka Business Association Inc v Australian Capital Territory Executive (1998) 146 FLR 464 at 468.
16 It has never been held that the principles governing the award of declarations and injunctions under the general law have been superseded by different criteria under judicial review legislation: North Coast Environment Council Inc v Minister for Resources (supra) at 511 - 512. In that case, Sackville J held that various principles established in Australian Conservation Foundation v Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493 were applicable to proceedings under judicial review legislation. In Australian Conservation Foundation v Commonwealth at 530 - 531, Gibbs J (as he then was) stated the applicable principles as follows: