On 9 February 2021 Schmidt AJ made the following orders, after hearing an application by South Eastern Sydney Local Health District against the present plaintiff for orders under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 (NSW) against the present plaintiff:
[141] For these reasons I also make orders in the terms sought that:
1. Pursuant to the Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008, s 8(7)(b) the Defendant is prohibited from instituting proceedings in NSW against or relating to: -
(a) the South Eastern Sydney Local Health District (and its statutory predecessors and successors), its staff, consultants, executive officers and agents in relation to any matter arising from the Defendant's employment;
(b) the Nursing and Midwifery Council of New South Wales and the Health Professional Councils Authority, their staff, consultants, executive officers and agents, in relation to any matter arising from the Defendant's professional practice (except with the consent of the Nursing and Midwifery Council);
(c) the subject matter of proceedings brought in the following proceedings:
[28 cases were listed which had been brought by the present plaintiff in tribunals, the Local Court of New South Wales, the District Court of New South Wales, this Court, the Federal Circuit Court and the Federal Court of Australia]
(South Eastern Sydney Local Health District v Clarke [2021] NSWSC 63)
Case numbered (xix) was Federal Circuit Court proceeding SYG3310/2018 - Charmain Daisy Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council of New South Wales, Nursing and Midwifery Board, New South Wales Nurses and Midwives Association and Violet Stojkova.
Cases numbered (x), (xiv), (xvii), (xviii) and (xx) named Julie Herrick as a defendant, and cases (ix), (xx) and (xxiii) named Susan Dale as a defendant.
By way of background, Ms Clarke is a nurse who was dismissed from her employment with the South Eastern Sydney Local Health District in 2015, and has since unsuccessfully brought numerous and frequent proceedings against the Health District, as well as its employees and solicitors. The matters that were not in issue in the proceedings before Schmidt AJ were summarised by her Honour as follows:
1. Ms Clarke was trained as a nurse in South Africa, registered as a nurse in Australia in 2003 and then worked as a nurse at hospitals in Sydney, including at the Royal Hospital for Women, where her employment was terminated in 2015.
2. The result of complaints made about Ms Clarke eventuated in the imposition of conditions on her registration under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law 2009 (NSW). Ms Clarke was required to undergo a health assessment with the eventual result that she has been prevented from working as a registered nurse, a matter of ongoing complaint, including in these proceedings.
3. Ms Clarke's appeal against the imposition of such conditions and requirements was dismissed: Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2017] NSWCATOD 163. There was no appeal from that decision, but in 2020 Ms Clarke lodged an application for extension of time. She also later pursued other applications in relation to her registration, including finally by the orders sought in her October 2020 motion in these proceedings, by which she sought to have this decision reviewed.
4. As at March 2020 the condition that Ms Clarke not practise remained in place: Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council of New South Wales [2020] NSWCATOD 58 at [12]. In those proceedings she had also sought to have the 2017 decision reviewed, but that application was found to be misconceived and thus summarily dismissed, the 2017 judgment being a final decision not affected by jurisdictional error: at [57]-[62].
5. Ms Clarke has a lengthy history of other litigation relating to her former employment in proceedings she has brought, as well as those brought on her behalf by the New South Wales Nurses and Midwives' Association, including before the New South Wales Industrial Relations Commission and the Fair Work Commission.
6. Ms Clarke has brought proceedings arising out of her employment and nursing registration against the Local Health District, its employees and solicitors and the Council and others in the Civil and Administrative Tribunal, the Local Court, the District Court, this Court, the Court of Appeal, the High Court, the Federal Circuit Court, the Federal Court, the Australian Human Rights Commission and the Anti-Discrimination Board. Some of these proceedings are still on foot.
7. In 2016 and again recently, Ms Clarke has also pursued reports she has made to ICAC about various alleged misconduct, which it appears ICAC has not acted on. She has also pursued various complaints to other bodies.
On 15 February 2022 the plaintiff filed a summons seeking the following orders:
1. The plaintiff requests an order under Sec 14 (1) (a) and (2) Vexatious Proceedings Act 2008 to commence proceedings in the Chief Industrial Magistrates Court and or otherwise, the District Court NSW.
2. The plaintiff requests an order under Sec 14 (1(a) and (2) VPA 2008 for the Supreme Court to consider the plaintiff's application under the request for orders made under Sec 16 Granting of Leave (1) (a) (b) & 4A and 4B (a) (b) (c).
3. The plaintiff requests an order made under the Civil Liability Act 2002 Civil Liability Act 2002. The plaintiff requests an order for damage/s, loss and costs under the Civil Liability Act 2002 Sec 5A (1), 5B General Principles under Division 2 Duty of Care (1) (a), (b), (c), (2) (a), (b), (c), (d); 5C Other Principles.
4. The plaintiff requests an order for relief under the Civil Liability Act 2002 - 4 Miscellaneous Provisions Act to Bind the Crown whereby, potential breaches actioned from Defendant are susceptible for claims arising for consideration of the actions potentially under the Crimes Act 1900 Sec 192D, 192E, 307A, 307B and 307C.
5. The plaintiff requests an order for Trade Practices to be affected from the conduct of actions demonstrated to be potentially unethical and criminal and or otherwise civil penalty provisions actioned on proof of wrongful actions that has caused loss, damage and damages.
The plaintiff has included in the material she has filed with this summons another summons which seeks the relief contained in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 above. I infer, therefore, that those prayers constitute the substantive relief which the plaintiff seeks in the proceedings which she seeks leave to bring.
The plaintiff relies in support of the second summons on an affidavit sworn by her on 14 February 2022. That affidavit consisted only of seven paragraphs comprising annexures. The annexed documents deal with the plaintiff's grievances arising out of the way she was dealt with in 2014 and 2015 partly, at least, because of complaints that she made against Julie Herrick and Susan Dale.
What is clear from those annexures is that the claim the plaintiff now seeks to make against the defendant is a reiteration of claims earlier made. In particular, the claims concern the same subject matter of the proceedings earlier brought against the Association.
I do not intend go into detail about what is contained in the various annexures to the plaintiff's affidavit. Very considerable judicial time has been expended in dealing with great numbers of proceedings and applications within proceedings made by the plaintiff arising out of the same events in 2014 and 2015. The plaintiff simply refuses to accept that she is not entitled to litigate the same complaints. This is the third application under the Vexatious Proceedings Act in as many months: see Clarke v Adams [2021] NSWSC 1665 and Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council of New South Wales [2022] NSWSC 15.
The plaintiff litigated matters against the present defendant in the Federal Circuit Court proceedings, referred to at [2] above. The claims against the Association arose out of the representation the Association provided for the plaintiff before the Industrial Relations Commission in 2015. The Association moved successfully to have the proceedings against it summarily dismissed: Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council of New South Wales & Ors (No 2) [2019] FCCA 3035. The plaintiff then sought unsuccessfully to have those proceedings reopened: Clarke v Nursing and Midwifery Council of New South Wales & Ors (No.3) [2019] FCCA 3159.
The correspondence attached to the plaintiff's affidavit suggest that the basis of her present complaint against the Association occurred immediately before the IRC proceedings and concern, specifically, the plaintiff's issues with Ms Herrick and Ms Dale. Those matters fall well within the description of the "the subject matter of proceedings brought" in the proceedings identified in para [141] of Schmidt AJ's judgment. The present claim is a further attempt to litigate the same matters.
Although the Summons refers to "Fraudulent Conduct/Misconduct", the Civil Liability Act and "Trade Practices", there is nothing in the affidavit in support that makes any reference to these matters, nor do the annexures provide any assistance.
In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the present application must be dismissed because the proposed proceedings are vexatious proceedings, and there is no prima facie ground for the proceedings.
Accordingly, I make the following orders:
The summons is dismissed.
I direct the Registry not to accept any further documents for filing in proceedings number 2022/44273.
[2]
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Decision last updated: 30 March 2022