The construction of item 312(b)
61 With these principles in mind, I now turn to item 312. I have already observed above (at [47]) that item 312 creates a distinction between applications involving the relocation of pharmacy premises where the existing premises have been approved for a continuous period of at least two years, and those that have not. Item 312(a) deals with the former and item 312(b) deals with the latter. As I have also observed at [49] above, the effect of item 312(a) is that no additional requirements are placed upon relocation applications made after this two year period, beyond those set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the 2011 Rules. However, where the relocation application is made within this two year period, item 312(b) is intended to place additional requirements on the application. The rationale for this distinction is already explained above (at [48]).
62 In identifying what additional requirements are imposed by item 312(b), Ms Clare is correct in her contention that one should begin with a consideration of s 10 of the 2011 Rules because that section dictates when the Authority must approve an application for relocation of pharmacy premises. She is also correct in focusing on s 10(a)(iii) because, for present purposes, that is the critical provision in s 10. It provides that the Authority must recommend an application for relocation of pharmacy premises if "all the requirements set out in Schedule 2 and Part 1 of Schedule 3 are met". The word "requirements" is not defined in the 2011 Rules so it must take its ordinary meaning, which is: "that which is required; a thing demanded or obligatory": see Macquarie Dictionary online, sense 1. It necessarily follows that Schedule 2 and Part 1 of Schedule 3 contain certain requirements or obligations an applicant for relocation must meet. The requirements or obligations described in Schedule 2 are quite clear (see at [30] above). It can be seen from the terms of those requirements that they have universal application to all of the seven kinds of relocation applications described in Part 1 of Schedule 1 (set out at [26] above). Similarly, the requirements or obligations prescribed by items 311 and 312(a) of Part 1 of Schedule 3 are relatively clear (see at [64] below).
63 The question then is: what are the additional requirements in item 312(b) that must be met? On this question, as I understand it, Ms Clare contends that, since s 10(a)(iii) requires a relocation application to meet "all" the requirements in Part 1 of Schedule 3; and since the heading to Part 1 of Schedule 3 states that it applies to "All applications"; and, finally, since there is nothing in the language of item 312 to justify it being read down, she is able to rely upon item 312(b)(ii) to support her application for relocation under item 124.
64 In considering these contentions I will begin with the heading to Part 1 of Schedule 3. I do not consider that heading affects the construction of the items within Part 1 of Schedule 3 in the way advanced by Ms Clare. Instead, I consider that heading signifies that all applications have to meet the requirements in that Part insofar as the items in that Part can be properly characterised as requirements. In this respect, there is no difficulty with item 311 because, by its terms, it prescribes certain procedural requirements that apply to all kinds of relocation applications. Similarly, item 312(a), by its terms, requires an approval for the existing premises to have been in force for a continuous period of at least two years by the time an application for relocation is made. However, some difficulties do arise with the sub-clauses of item 312(b) because, by their terms, they could only apply to a particular kind of relocation application, for example, item 312(b)(i) specifically refers to relocations in the same facility. Furthermore, each sub-clause of item 312(b) is separated by the word "or" indicating it must be considered separately and not conjunctively. Before turning to consider what requirements are prescribed in item 312(b), I will address Ms Clare's first contention above.
65 In that respect, I consider Ms Clare's approach to the construction of s 10(a)(iii) and item 312(b) effectively treats those provisions as expanding the circumstances in which an approved pharmacist can relocate his or her premises within the first two years of the last approval, rather than placing additional requirements or limitations on such pharmacy relocations. This approach would run contrary to the statutory scheme I have outlined above, which operates to limit pharmacy relocations generally beyond the period of two years after the last approval and places additional limitations on relocations within that period. These limitations are, as explained above, directed to ensuring the integrity of the network of dispensing pharmacies operating under the PBS. This construction would therefore result in the absurd outcome that there would be more opportunities to relocate a pharmacy within the first two years after approval than there would be after that period. For these reasons, I do not consider this construction can be accepted.
66 To address Ms Clare's third contention above and to identify what, if any, requirements are prescribed in item 312(b), it is necessary to examine the text and structure of that item. First, as I have already observed above at [49], sub-clauses (i), (ii), (vi) and (vii) of item 312(b) all restate in identical terms (or, in the case of sub-clause (vi), very similar terms) items 122, 123 and 121, respectively, from Part 1 of Schedule 1. This terminology does two things: it serves to identify those three kinds of relocation application in the terms described in Part 1 of Schedule 1; and it serves to distinguish those three kinds of relocation applications from the remainder of the provisions in item 312(b). More significantly, none of those sub-clauses includes additional words or provisions that attach any identifiable requirements or obligations for those three kinds of relocation applications. In my view, these aspects of the text of those sub-clauses therefore serve to indicate that no additional requirements are to be attached to those three kinds of relocation applications. In relation to relocation applications of the kinds described in items 122 and 123, this conclusion is further supported by the fact that all the requirements necessary to achieve the statutory purpose of maintaining convenient community access to such relocated approved pharmacies are already set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1 (see at [56] above). It should also be noted that no concerns about community access arise in connection with relocation applications of the kind described in item 121 because, as is already noted above, that item applies to relocation applications involving the expansion or contraction of approved pharmacy premises and does not involve a relocation as such. I should add that there is an alternative construction which I have identified below (at [68]) which counters some of these propositions, but not the ultimate outcome.
67 If items 121 to 123 (inclusive )of Part 1 of Schedule 1 are identified, distinguished and placed in a separate category by the language used in sub-clauses (i), (ii), (vi) and (vii) of item 312(b), then there is only one other item in Part 1 of Schedule 1 remaining: item 124. It would therefore seem to follow that the requirements in Part 1 of Schedule 3 to which s 10(a)(iii) refers are directed to item 124. Of course, they may also be directed to the transitional items in 125 to 127 (inclusive), but this does not detract from the conclusion that they are directed to item 124 and not to items 121 to 123 (inclusive). Singling out item 124 in this way is consistent with its atypical character, as discussed above (at [57]), and why one may expect to find that item treated differently in the statutory scheme underpinning the PBS. It is also consistent with the fact that the terms of item 124 have not been replicated in any of the sub-clauses of item 312(b) in the same way that the terms of items 121 to 123 (inclusive) have. Furthermore, it is significant that the language of sub-clauses (iii) to (v) of item 312(b) bespeaks of the notion of requirement expressed in s 10(a)(iii). That is to say, to identify some reason or purpose for the relocation of pharmacy premises within the first two years after they become approved pharmacy premises. Finally, the circumstances described in sub-clauses (iii) to (v) of item 312(b) are of the kind that one might expect could cause a pharmacist to seek to relocate his or her premises a short distance within that two year period. That is, to attend to renovations or refurbishment, or because of some exceptional circumstances.
68 All these aspects of the language and structure of item 312(b) therefore support the construction that the requirements in sub-clauses (iii) to (v) are the requirements in that item of Part 1 of Schedule 3 that s 10(a)(iii) prescribes have to be met. They also support the conclusion that those requirements only apply to a relocation application of the item 124 kind and not to those in items 121 to 123 (inclusive). Alternatively, even if sub-clauses (iii) to (v) (inclusive) of item 312(b) could be construed so as to set additional requirements for relocation applications of the kinds described in items 121 to 123, neither construction permits a construction that item 312(b)(ii) is a "requirement" that an applicant relying on item 124 can depend on to avoid having to meet one of the requirements in those sub-clauses.
69 For these reasons, taking into account the text and structure of s 10(a)(iii) and item 312(b) of Part 1 of Schedule 3, together with the statutory scheme and purpose of the PBS outlined above, I consider Ms Clare's application under item 124 had to meet one of the requirements of sub-clauses (iii) to (v) in item 312(b) and, conversely, she could not rely upon sub-clause (ii) of that item. I have therefore reached the same conclusion as the Tribunal member, but by a different course.
70 Before I leave this issue, I need to briefly deal with some other matters that Ms Clare raised. The first is whether the Tribunal could have determined the item 312(b)(ii) issue when the Authority had earlier conceded it in its pleading. The second is related; it is whether the Authority was bound by its Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions in the same way as a party is bound by pleadings such that it could not raise this issue before the Tribunal.
71 As to the first matter, the Tribunal is an administrative decision-maker and, subject to ensuring it affords the parties before it procedural fairness, it is not bound to determine the substantive issues raised for determination according to the way in which they are "pleaded" by the parties: see Grant v Repatriation Commission (1999) 57 ALD 1, [1999] FCA 1629 (Grant) at [17]-[18] per Merkel, Goldberg and Weinberg JJ. Ultimately, the Tribunal is required to make the decision it considers is appropriate in all the circumstances; its function is to arrive at the correct or preferable decision: see Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 at 424-5 per Brennan J. And specifically addressing the situation that arose before the Tribunal here, the Court said in Grant (at [20]):
The fact that an error of law was not raised previously does not preclude the appellant from raising it on appeal provided the respondent has been afforded an opportunity to be heard on the issue: ...
(Case citations omitted)
72 Ms Clare's second matter is not sustainable for at least two reasons. First, pleadings deal with issues of fact and the issue in question here was an issue of law, namely the correct construction of s 10 and item 312(b) of the 2011 Rules. In those circumstances, it was therefore open to the Authority to change its mind about the construction of those statutory provisions and to advance any reasonably sustainable construction at the hearing before the Tribunal. The fact its revised construction of item 312(b)(ii) was ultimately adopted by the Tribunal attests to the fact it was reasonably sustainable. Secondly, if Ms Clare suffered any prejudice by the Authority's withdrawal of its concession on this issue, her remedy lay in applying for an adjournment of the hearing. She did not adopt that course and she did not claim before me that she had suffered any unfairness by the Tribunal's decision to proceed with the hearing.
73 Finally, Ms Clare devoted much of her written submissions to the question of ambiguity and the use the Tribunal made of extrinsic materials. Because of the way in which I have approached the construction of item 312(b)(ii), I do not consider it is necessary to address those submissions.