REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SELWAY J:
60 A Judge of this Court has reserved a question of law for the answer of the Full Court, namely "Whether s 30DE of the Civil Aviation Act, 1988 (Cth) is valid?".
61 Pursuant to Order 50 Rule 1 of the Federal Court Rules a question to be reserved must be in the form of a "special case". Such a procedure requires that all facts necessary for the determination of the question of law be stated in the special case. At common law a Court hearing the special case could not inquire beyond those facts - indeed, subject to the relevant statutory context, it usually could not even draw inferences from the facts as stated in the special case: see Commissioner of Stamps (SA) v Telegraph Investment Co Pty Ltd (1995) 184 CLR 453 at 482-484. In this instance no facts are stated. However, the question reserved by His Honour in this case is a question of law relating to constitutional validity. In relation to such a question the Court can make such factual inquiries, even on a case stated, as may be necessary for it to determine the question of constitutional validity: see Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70 at 87-88 (where the High Court ascertained further facts when hearing an appeal from a decision of the South Australian Supreme Court on a case stated from a Magistrate). Whether the Court should make such inquiries is another matter: see Sport Odds Systems Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales [2003] FCAFC 237 (Sport Odds) at [47]-[50]. However, in this instance the relevant fact necessary to answer the constitutional question is not contentious, and is readily ascertainable from the Court's file. Notwithstanding that the procedure adopted in this case would not seem to conform with the requirements of Order 50 Rule 1, there is no reason why the Court cannot answer the question reserved.
62 The relevant fact in this case is that which establishes a sufficient jurisdictional basis for this Court to answer the constitutional question raised by the question reserved. That fact serves to show that the legal question reserved is not advisory or hypothetical, but properly arises in these proceedings. The relevant fact is that the applicant (CASA) alleges in these proceedings that:
(a) The respondents are each the holder of a "civil aviation authority" as defined in the Civil Aviation Act, 1988 (Cth) (the CAA);
(b) CASA has reason to believe that each of the respondents has engaged in conduct that contravenes s 30DB of the CAA. That section provides:
The holder of a civil aviation authorisation must not engage in conduct that constitutes, contributes to or results in a serious and imminent risk to air safety.
(c) CASA has suspended the authorisation of each of the respondents pursuant to s 30DC of the CAA. That section provides:
(1) Where CASA has reason to believe that the holder of a civil aviation authorisation has engaged in, is engaging in, or is likely to engage in, conduct that contravenes section 30DB, CASA may suspend the authorisation by giving written notice to the holder.
Note: CASA is not required to give the holder a show cause notice before making a decision under this subsection.
(2) The notice of the decision must include a summary of Subdivisions C and D. However, a failure to include such a summary does not affect the validity of the notice.
(3) The suspension ends at the end of the fifth business day after the day on which the holder was notified of the suspension, unless before that time CASA makes an application to the Federal Court under section 30DE.
Note: If CASA makes an application in time, the suspension continues in force until it comes to an end under the rules in section 30DJ.
(d) Before the end of the fifth business day after the day on which the respondents were notified of the suspension, CASA applied to this Court for an order under section 30DE(2) of the CAA.
63 Assuming that these allegations can be established, this Court's jurisdiction arises out of s 30DE of the CAA which provides:
(1) If CASA suspends a civil aviation authorisation under section 30DC, CASA may, before the end of the fifth business day after the day on which the holder of the authorisation was notified of the suspension, apply to the Federal Court for an order under this section.
(2) If the Federal Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the holder has engaged in, is engaging in, or is likely to engage in, conduct that contravenes section 30DB, the Court must make an order that prohibits the holder from doing anything that is authorised by the authorisation but that, without the authorisation, would be unlawful.
(3) In deciding under subsection (2), the Federal Court must have regard to section 3A and subsection 9A(1).
(4) Subject to section 30DF, an order continues in force for the period determined by the Federal Court when making the order, being the period (not more than 40 days) that the Court considers reasonable to allow CASA to complete an investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to CASA's decision to suspend the authorisation.
64 The period of suspension can extend for up to 40 days from the date of the order. Plainly enough the date of the order may be later than the date on which CASA makes its application to the Court, but the suspension continues during the interim: see ss 30DC(3) and 30DJ of the CAA. Under s 30DF of the CAA the Court can extend (by up to 28 days) or reduce the period of suspension ordered under s 30DE of the Act.
65 It would seem clear that the purpose of the suspension is to prevent the holder of an authorisation from exercising the rights conferred by the authorisation during the period that CASA requires to complete its investigation. This is clear enough by the terms of s 30DE(4) of the CAA which requires the Court when making an order to fix a period of not more than 40 days "… that the Court considers reasonable to allow CASA to complete an investigation …". It is reinforced by the requirements of s 30DG of the CAA which impose a duty upon CASA to complete its investigation by the end of the period of suspension imposed by the Court.
66 Once the investigation is completed CASA may vary, suspend or cancel the authorisation if "satisfied that a serious and imminent risk to air safety" would otherwise exist (s 30DI(1)(a) of the CAA). CASA's powers in this regard are subject to compliance with the requirements of s 30DH of the Act requiring notice to the authority holder and affording the authority holder a right to show cause why the relevant powers should not be exercised. This Court has no role in relation to that decision, save for its usual review jurisdiction under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 (Cth) and under s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act, 1903 (Cth). Save for the power conferred by s 30DE, the CAA does not seek to vest the judicial power of the Commonwealth on any court in relation to the ultimate question of whether the actions of an authority holder were in breach of s 30DB of the CAA and whether (and if so what) action should be taken in relation to such a breach. Those issues are left for CASA to resolve and determine.
67 The question reserved raises the issue of whether s 30DE of the CAA exceeds the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament in seeking to confer on this Court power other than the judicial power of the Commonwealth.
68 It is a necessary inference from the structure and text of the Commonwealth Constitution and, in particular, of Chapter III of the Constitution that the judicial power of the Commonwealth is separate and distinct from other governmental powers: see Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1 (Wilson) at 10-11. One consequence of this distinction is that the "judicial power of the Commonwealth" cannot be conferred on any body other than the courts identified in s 77 of the Constitution: see New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR 54 at 62. Of course there are qualifications arising from other provisions of the Constitution, such as s 49 (the privileges of the Commonwealth Parliament) and s 122 (the Territory power).
69 Another consequence is that the Commonwealth Parliament cannot confer on federal courts any power other than the "judicial power of the Commonwealth" or a power that is ancillary or incidental to a judicial purpose: see The Queen v Kirby Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254 at 296. Again there are some qualifications arising from other provisions of the Constitution, such as s 122.
70 The necessary distinction between "judicial power" and other powers is a functional distinction. The judicial function can only sensibly be understood and described by reference to what courts do and historically have done, and by the way in which they do it and historically have done it: see Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173 (Nicholas) at 185. Broad descriptions of the nature of judicial power and of the judicial function can and have been attempted. Judicial power is commonly understood to involve the authoritative determination of whether legal rights exist or whether they have been transgressed or whether legal duties have been breached together with the consequent imposition of any penalty or the ordering of any legal remedy: see, for example, Huddart Parker & Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330 at 357; Wilson at 11; Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510 at 555. However, such definitions are not exhaustive. As it was put by McHugh J in Nicholas at 219:
'… They are simply descriptive of factors that are usually present when a tribunal is called on to exercise judicial power. Thus, although much emphasis has been given to the need for judicial power to involve binding and authoritative decisions between subjects or between subjects and the Crown, it is clear that not every binding and authoritative decision made in the determination of a dispute between such parties will constitute the exercise of judicial power. Similarly, although judicial power requires a determination of existing rights and duties according to law, an exercise of an administrative or arbitral power may also involve a determination of existing rights and duties. It is also probably necessary for a decision to be enforceable before it can be said to have been given in the exercise of judicial power although the enforcement need not be undertaken by the Court responsible for the exercise of the power. For present purposes, however, it is unnecessary to attempt any more precise definition of judicial power than that which appears in Huddart, Parker and Fencott.' [footnotes omitted]
71 In this case the respondents have submitted that there are a number of factors which, taken together, serve to distinguish the Court's power under s 30DE of the CAA from the "judicial power of the Commonwealth". Those factors included:
(a) The power conferred by s 30DE does not involve the determination of existing rights;
(b) The power is in aid of or for the purpose of an administrative power;
(c) The power requires the Court to consider policy factors;
(d) The decision is not final;
(e) The process of decision making is inconsistent with the judicial process;
(f) The discretion conferred on the Court is too broad.
72 There are a number of problems with this method of analysis in this case. Not least is that some of the factors identified by the respondents cannot be accepted, at least on the broad basis upon which they were put. For example, the respondents argued that the reference to "section 3A and subsection 9A(1)" in s 30DE(3) of the CAA had the effect that the Court was required to take into account in determining whether to make an order, any Ministerial policy directions that may be given to CASA under various provisions of the Act. Whatever subsection (3) does mean, it clearly does not have the effect of requiring the Court to give effect to Ministerial directions.
73 Similarly the argument put by the respondents that the discretion conferred on the Court by s 30DE(2) is so broad as to be consistent with the judicial function, cannot be accepted. True it is that a broad discretionary power to create new rights is indicative of legislative rather than executive power. But s 30DE(2) of the CAA does not confer legislative power. It is a precondition of the conferral of power under that subsection that the Court be "satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the holder has engaged in, is engaging in, or is likely to engage in, conduct that contravenes section 30DB". The statutory requirement to be "satisfied that there are reasonable grounds" causes some problems in interpretation involving, as it does, an onus of proof ("satisfied") as to an objective fact ("reasonable grounds to believe") where the objective fact itself involves issues of judgment and assessment: see, for example, Tepper v Kelly (1988) 47 SASR 271 at 272-273; Loughlan v Magistrates' Court of Victoria [1993] 1 VR 685 at 692 and contrast R v Zotti (2002) 82 SASR 554. However, notwithstanding those problems in interpretation, the words "satisfied that there are reasonable grounds" are capable of being interpreted and applied by a court, as the above cases show.
74 The words "engaged in, is engaging in or is likely to engage in conduct the contravenes section 30DB" of the CAA are similarly capable of being interpreted and applied by a court. The respondents argued that the requirement in s 30DB that there be a "serious and imminent risk to air safety" involved a broad subjective discretion that was inappropriate for a judicial function. However, it does not involve any broader discretion than does the determination of whether an act or omission is negligent, or reckless. These determinations are plainly consistent with the judicial function. It is possible that trial courts will make errors in their initial understanding of the meaning of s 30DB of the CAA, at least until that meaning is clarified by the usual judicial process of reasoned decisions, appeals and precedent. However, that is true whenever the Parliament chooses to use a form of words which involve some ambiguity or at least which require fresh judicial interpretation. In my view the statutory formulation in s 30DE of the CAA of the basis for this Court's jurisdiction does not have the consequence that the jurisdiction conferred is other than the judicial power of the Commonwealth.
75 However, the basic problem with any analysis based solely upon the consideration of a number of factors, whether individually or cumulatively, is that it provides no sound basis for identifying what is, and what is not judicial power at least in those instances where the issue is not clear and obvious. The areas of overlap between, for example, many judicial and executive functions is considerable: see Pasini v United Mexican States (2002) 209 CLR 246 (Pasini) at 265. One of the functions of the executive is the enforcement of the law. Although the executive is required to defer to the judiciary as to what the law is, there can be no objection otherwise to the executive determining for itself what the law requires in any particular instance. Indeed, subject to the proper role of the courts, the executive is required to do so: A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532 at 562; P & C Cantarella v Egg Marketing Board [1973] 2 NSWLR 366 at 383. For that purpose administrative tribunals and other administrative decision makers can determine legal issues in the context of making administrative decisions: see Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577, 584-585. In making those decisions they are usually required to adopt procedures which bear some similarity to those adopted in some courts. As McHugh J noted in the above quotation from Nicholas, there are many decision making functions which could lawfully be conferred by the Parliament either on an administrative body or on a court. In relation to those functions the distinction between what is a judicial function and what is not will largely be dependent upon what body has been chosen to perform the task, rather than anything inherent in the task itself: see R v Hegarty; Ex parte City of Salisbury (1981) 147 CLR 617 at 628; HA Bachrach Pty Ltd v Queensland (1998) 195 CLR 547 at 562. Not only is there no "bright line" distinction between judicial and other governmental functions there is, in fact, no line at all in relation to these significant areas of functional overlap.
76 Given these large areas of functional overlap between judicial and other governmental powers it is often not of any great assistance merely to identify a range of factors that may or may not be present in any particular case on the basis that those factors are indicative of the character of the particular governmental power. What is likely to be more useful is to look at existing categories of functions that have been judicially or historically accepted as being functions that can be characterised as judicial or non-judicial and then to identify in what manner and to what extent those functions differ from those in the case at hand. History, practice and judicial analysis may also be referred to for the purpose of identifying the relevance and significance of any differences that may be identified. The purpose of the inquiry is to identify by analogy whether the function being conferred in the case at hand can properly be characterised as judicial power or not.
77 In this case the category of functions having some apparent similarity to the power conferred by s 30DE of the CAA is the power to issue search warrants. There is an example in s 32AF of the CAA:
(1) An investigator may apply to a magistrate for a warrant under this section in relation to particular premises.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), the magistrate may issue the warrant if satisfied, by information on oath, that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is, or there may be within the next 72 hours, on the premises a particular thing that may afford evidence of the commission of an offence against this Act or the regulations.
(3) The magistrate must not issue the warrant unless the investigator or someone else has given the magistrate, either orally or by affidavit, any further information the magistrate may require about the grounds on which the issue of the warrant is being sought.
78 The power to be exercised by a magistrate under s 32AF(2) has some similarity to the power conferred on the Court by s 30DE of the CAA. Both powers are related to an investigation process being undertaken by the executive; both powers are conditional upon the relevant decision maker being "satisfied" that there are "reasonable grounds"; both powers relate to a breach of a duty imposed by the CAA.
79 It is clear that the power of a Magistrate under s 32AF of the CAA to issue a search warrant is a non-judicial power. The power is exercised by a Magistrate as a persona designata, not as a judicial officer. It is a power that cannot be conferred on a Court. That has been clearly established in the cases: see Aston v Irvine (1955) 92 CLR 353 at 363; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 92; Hilton v Wells (1985) 157 CLR 57 at 67; Love v Attorney General (NSW) (1990) 169 CLR 307 (Love) at 319-323; Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427 at 444; Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348 at 359-360. The Solicitor General for the Commonwealth (intervening) accepted that the function conferred by s 32AF of the CAA was an executive function - not a judicial one. The reason why the relevant function has historically been so treated is clear enough. At least within the common law tradition, the investigation of criminal offences has not been treated as part of the judicial function. This may be contrasted with the tradition in France and other civil law countries where the judiciary do have a role in the investigation of crime. As discussed below, it may also be contrasted with the traditional role and function of common law courts, particularly those exercising equitable jurisdiction, to make pre-trial and even pre-action orders in civil proceedings so as to assist the parties in the investigation and preparation of their respective cases.