16 Notwithstanding the material that was before him which he apparently accepted the learned sentencing judge assessed the seriousness of the offence as within the mid-range of objective seriousness taking into account that the crime was committed for "financial gain".
17 Whilst one should be careful about generalising in relation to such factors outside the circumstances of any particular case, here, quite clearly, when one understands the background of this young man and what he was doing, he was not selling for greed or for financial gain, he was selling to feed a drug habit that he had acquired. This does not detract from the fact that he committed a serious offence, but what it does mean is that it was an error, and an important one, to characterise this as selling for financial gain and thus to characterise it as an offence falling within the mid-range. In our view, that latter conclusion must clearly have been affected by the finding of financial gain because no other basis in the facts could found such a conclusion.
18 In our view, there was an error of the sentencing judge in this regard. This error led to his Honour characterising the objective criminality of the offence as more serious than it was. It was not within the mid-range of objective seriousness. It was lower than that, in particular given that it was to feed his habit. A less severe sentence was warranted in law: the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW), s 6(3). For this reason the sentence on the first charge should be quashed.
19 Ground 3 concerned the way the sentencing judge took into account as an aggravating factor the fact that there was a series of criminal acts: the Crimes Sentencing Procedure Act (1999) (NSW), s 21A(2)(m). The difficulty with this is that those multiple criminal acts were the foundation for the more serious offence with which he was charged, namely supply of not less than a commercial quantity of the drug for which a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment was provided. They were not strictly elements of the offence charged, as for example they would have been in an offence of on-going supply under the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act, s 25A. In such a case, the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act, s 21A would expressly prohibit a sentencing court from having additional regard to such matters as an aggravating factor. The risk of double counting in the assessment of objective seriousness in that case would thereby be avoided. Here, when the series of criminal acts leads to the more serious criminal charge being properly laid against the applicant, the prohibition against double counting is undermined if the same series of criminal acts is taken into account as an additional aggravating factor, in turn leading to an erroneous characterisation of the offence as one of mid-range seriousness. The above is consistent with Tadrosse [2005] NSWCCA 145; 65 NSWLR 740 at 747 [29].