17 There are other problems with the motion. It seeks dismissal of the judgment of 28 September 2008 extending the operation of a caveat over the Turramurra property and dismissal of the amended summons filed on 11 December 2009. The motion may arguably be out of time for seeking to set aside orders entered on 28 September 2008. The motion seems to seek summary dismissal of the amended summons. Given that the amended summons now only seeks consequential relief, the principal declaratory relief sought having been granted on 3 December 2009, it is not easy to comprehend what the author of the motion had in mind.
18 As I have indicated earlier in the course of this judgment, Chateau's case is now in a state of clear readiness to obtain the orders which it seeks on the amended summons. On what I have seen, if the defendants were present and legally represented today, I would expect that this matter would proceed to finality within the day. Minor issues have been the subject of submissions today. Some of these issues may result in further amendments to the summons. I set them out below. Those issues are the following.
19 First there is the question, if Chateau were otherwise to make out its claim for orders for judicial sale of the Turramurra property, whether Chateau would be granted leave itself to purchase the property. In light of the discussion with the Court Mr Ilkovski has submitted that Chateau proposes to amend its summons to make it clear that it will now only seek leave to bid at a public auction.
20 Secondly, an issue exists as to whether the liquidator Mr Malanos or perhaps the Public Trustee should be in charge of the proposed sale. Another possibility is that the sale could be put in the hands of the defendants themselves, a course which is open on the authorities concerning orders for judicial sale. This is a discretionary matter I will have to consider.
21 Thirdly, an issue arises about the setting of a reserve price for any auction sale that were to take place pursuant to the orders I am being asked to make. I have indicated that I am reluctant to delegate to a trustee for sale the setting of a reserve price for an auction. Chateau has indicated that it will not oppose the reserve being determined by the Court.
22 What then is to be done? Looked at as a whole the Zepinic's correspondence with the Court and Chateau is in substance an application for adjournment. Despite this Dr and Mrs Zepinic have not sought to appear at this hearing in person and have not sought to engage legal representatives.
23 On most kinds of application, the communications that these defendants have made with the Court would not provide any grounds for adjournment of this hearing. There are two related aspects of this matter, though, that make an adjournment different from in the ordinary case. The orders Chateau seeks if made will seriously interfere with the ordinary right of the Zepinics to enjoy ownership of the Turramurra property. The orders proposed involve a very substantial alteration to their ordinary property rights.
24 The full effect of the orders Chateau seeks is clear from the amended summons, served about a week before this hearing. The gravity of the orders sought and the short notice in relative terms for the seeking of relief of such a kind with defendants who are overseas, prompts the Court to pause before proceeding today.
25 Mr Ilkovski has urged upon me that I should make the orders requested and then stay them for a period. I do not see that there is much advantage in this course. Chateau can do nothing with stayed orders. Very little time should be lost by reason of the orders that I am proposing to make.
26 On the other side, I recognise that there is potential unfairness to Chateau in an adjournment. It would be unjust for the defendants to gain an advantage of any kind merely by not appearing at this hearing and by not engaging lawyers to appear to represent their interests. Notwithstanding the correspondence received from the Zepinics, which claims an inability to attend Court, there are grounds to hold the view that the Zepinics may be attempting to gain such an advantage. However, I will not decide such questions now. In indicating that there may be grounds for such a view I refer to the matters set out in my previous judgment: ( Chateau Constructions (Aust) Ltd v Zepinic & Anor [No 3] [2009] NSWSC 1373 at [29]-[38], [66] and [67]) . I also refer to the material in Mr Loel's affidavit of 21 December 2009 identifying changes of legal representation that have already occurred with the Zepinics in these proceedings:
15. During the course of the proceedings between Chateau and Dr and Mrs Zepinic in the Consumer Trader and Tenancy Tribunal, in the District Court of New South Wales and in these proceedings, the Zepinics have instructed, at least, the following firms of solicitors:
(a) LAC Lawyers, from about January 2007 to about March 2007
(b) Schreuder Partners Lawyers, from about March 2007 to about October 2007;
(c) Gray & Perkins Lawyers, from about December 2007 to about September 2008;
(d) Makinson & D'Apice Lawyers, from about December 2008 to about February 2009;
(e) Macquarie Lawyers, from about 5 March 2009 to about 11 September
(f) Hancock Allis & Roskov Lawyers & Notaries Public, from about 14 August 2009 to about November 2009.
27 It may be that despite all this history there is a genuine reason that Dr and Mrs Zepinic cannot attend and also cannot obtain legal representation to be here today.
28 I have decided that I will give the defendants one last opportunity to appear before the Court to answer the relief sought in the amended summons. I am familiar with the history of this matter. It will be adjourned back before me. I will adjourn the current hearing so that this judgment, and in particular what I am about to say, can be given to the Zepinics and so that they will have one last opportunity to respond and appear or engage a lawyer to appear for them.
29 I wish to make clear the gravity of the orders that Chateau seeks and their consequences for Dr and Mrs Zepinic. If the orders Chateau seeks are made the Turramurra property will be vested in a trustee for sale and sold. The process of selling the Turramurra property could be taken entirely out of the hands of the defendants. Such orders involve a serious displacement of the Zepinic's ordinary rights over their property. The law will permit such orders to be made if the circumstances justify them. I hope that the Zepinics appreciate the gravity of the situation and appreciate that at an adjourned hearing there is a distinct possibility that these orders will be made.
30 I will adjourn the proceedings until 18 February 2010 for hearing before me. I expect the defendants to be ready to present their motion which has now been filed in these proceedings, if that motion is to be pursued against the relief sought in the amended summons. Looking ahead now there is ample time for Dr and Mrs Zepinic to engage lawyers to represent them, for them to file evidence, and for them to serve evidence well in advance of a February hearing, so that Chateau has time to react to that evidence and proceed.
31 In light of the history of this matter, the defendants should understand that any attempts to further delay the hearing of the amended summons would only be contemplated in the most exceptional and compelling of circumstances. If the defendants do not attend or if they engage lawyers at the last minute who are not ready for a hearing on that occasion, they can expect that the matter will proceed.
32 On the next occasion I would also expect Dr and Mrs Zepinic to give the Court a proper and detailed explanation of why they have not appeared today in person or by a legal representative. I do not regard the correspondence with the Court and Dr Zepinic's affidavit on their own as an adequate explanation.
33 ORDERS: