Charltons CJC Pty Ltd v Fitzgerald
[2013] NSWSC 1945
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2013-09-27
Before
Rein J, Pembroke J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (26 paragraphs)
Judgment 1REIN J: The plaintiff, Charltons CJC Pty Ltd ("Charltons"), conducts an accounting practice and employed Mr Alden Fitzgerald, the first defendant, Mr Kamal Kishore, the second defendant, and Mr Kirat Krishan Prasad, the third defendant, between 1999 and 2012. The fourth defendant, Intuitive Accountants & Associates Pty Ltd ("Intuitive"), was established by Mr Fitzgerald, Mr Kishore and Mr Prasad on 13 July 2012. Mr Fitzgerald left Charltons on 31 July 2012, Mr Kishore Left on 15 August 2012 and Mr Prasad left on 23 August 2012. I shall refer to Mr Fitzgerald, Mr Kishore and Mr Prasad as "the defendants". 2In Charltons CJC Pty Ltd v Fitzgerald [2013] NSWSC 350 Pembroke J concluded that: (1)The defendants, Mr Fitzgerald and Mr Kishore, prior to their departure from Charltons, provided accounting services to persons or entities who were not existing clients of the firm and did not bill those persons or entities on behalf of Charltons and that they effectively diverted from Charltons the business opportunity that those clients represented. These clients of Mr Fitzgerald and Mr Kishore are described as "shadow clients" and I shall use the same terminology (2)After the defendants departure from Charltons, the first three defendants assisted each other and assisted the fourth defendant company, of which they were directors, to solicit and entice away from Charltons a significant number of existing clients from the firm in breach of a valid restraint of trade clause in their respective contracts of employment. 3In Charltons CJC Pty Ltd v Fitzgerald (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 958 Pembroke J considered the precise identification of individual breaches of each client and shadow client and having dealt with each disputed matter gave reasons as to why the declarations as to the breaches ought be made. Pembroke J used the following wording when making a declaration that one of the defendants had breached their Best Endeavours Term and Fiduciary Duties: [Defendant] breached his Best Endeavours Term and Fiduciary Duties by failing to well and faithfully serve Charltons and use his best endeavours to promote the interests and welfare of Charltons, in that, on his own account or that of himself and the other defendants, he performed work for and/or provided services within the scope of Charltons' business to [client/ shadow client] in connection with [details of breach] and his Honour use the following wording when making declarations that a defendant breached their Restraint Terms: [Defendant] breached his Restraint Terms by soliciting or endeavouring to entice away from Charltons, or accepting an approach from or performing work for a Charltons client with whom he had dealings on behalf of Charltons in his last twelve months of employment, in that after the termination of his contract of employment with Charltons, on his own account or that of himself and the other defendants, [employee] solicited and performed work for [client/ shadow client] in connection with [details of breach] When referring to the two forms of declarations made by Pembroke J in the balance of these reasons I will use the abbreviated terms "Best Endeavours Term" and "Restraint Term" to describe the declarations made. 4What remains for determination is the question of damages suffered by Charltons as a result of the breaches determined by Pembroke J. 5In this part of the proceedings, as at the previous hearing Mr Neil SC with Mr D Chin of counsel appeared for the plaintiff and Mr P.M. Kite SC with Mr G. Boyce of counsel appeared for the defendants. Counsel have provided me with extensive submissions on the issue of damages. I shall refer to the plaintiff's written closing submissions of 8 October 2013 as "PCS", the defendants written closing submissions of 29 October 2013 as "DCS" and the plaintiff's written submissions in reply of 7 November 2013 as "PSR". 6There are some general principles applicable to the determination of what loss has been occasioned to Charltons by virtue of the established breaches of the defendants which are not in dispute, namely; (1)In contract damages are awarded with the object of placing the plaintiff in the position it would have been had the contract been performed. The damages can include the difference between what was promised and what was delivered ("the expectation loss") and damages to undo the harm that a plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's promise has caused ("the reliance loss"). (2)What is required, in effect, is a comparison of the position in which the plaintiff actually is placed (by reason of the breaches) and the position it would have been if the breaches had not occurred: Commonwealth v Amman Aviation (1991) 174 CLR 64, 99; Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 1, 11-12. (3)The loss and damage are restricted to what is reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of breach. (4)The task of assessing damages may be difficult and involves a degree of hypothesis and pragmatism and certainty is impossible. (5)The injured plaintiff is entitled to have every reasonable presumption as to the benefit which might have been obtained by the bona fide performance of a defendant's contractual and fiduciary obligations (see Wilson v Northampton and Banbury Junction Railway Co (1874) LR 9 Ch App 279 at 285-286per Lord Selbourne cited in Winkie Meat Works v Ballard [1960] SASR 312 per Ross J. In Houghton v Immer (1997) 44 NSWLR 46 at 59 Handley JA (with whom Mason P and Beazley JA agreed) having noted what was said by Hodgson J (as his Honour then was) in LJP Investments Pty Ltd v Howard Chia Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 24 NSWLR 490 at 508, said: [The Court should] assess compensation robustly, relying on the presumption against wrongdoers and resolving doubts against those whose actions had made the determination problematic This approach was applied in Orica Investments v McCartney [2010] NSWSC 488 [39] per Ball J. (6)The plaintiff bears the onus of proving its loss which includes establishing that the loss for which compensation is claimed was caused by the breaches relied on by it. However, "if the loss in question is the apparent cause or likely result of the breach, the onus shifts to the contract breaker to prove that it was not" Seddon, Bigwood, Ellinghouse Law of Contract, 10th Australian ed, [23.34] and see Reg Glass Pty Ltd v Rivers Locking Systems Pty Ltd (1968) 120 CLR 516 at 523 per Barwick CJ, McTiernan J and Menzies J. (7)In relation to causation, the plaintiff's closing submissions set out the following principles: (a) Common sense is determinative (b) The "but for" test is usually a reflection of common sense (c) Charltons is entitled to recover compensation for loss in respect of which the defendants' conduct need only be a cause of the loss notwithstanding that there may have been other concurrent causes. (d) Charltons need not prove that the defendants' breach of contract was the real and efficient or dominant cause of the loss that it has suffered. It is sufficient that the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendants are a material cause of Charltons' injury or damage. (e) It is for the defendants to show that another concurrent cause was the sole cause of the loss, to the exclusion of any causative influence exerted by the defendants' breaches. citing Chappell v Hart (1988) 195 CLR 232, 268-269, Alexander v Cambridge Credit Corp Ltd (1987) 9 NSWLR 310 at 357; Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1999) 199 CLR 413 at 426, 448, 457, Ithaca Ice Works Pty Ltd v Queensland Ice Supplies & Anor [2002] QSC 222 [16], Simonius Vischer & Co v Holt [1979] 2 NSWLR 322, 346. (8)The usual position is that damages are assessed from the date of breach. 7In a sense, Charlton's case for loss is quite straightforward - it points to the fact that in the year following the departure of the defendants it ceased to earn income from a number of identified clients of the firm, quite a number of whom had been clients for many years and from some of whom Charltons held a retainer. Having identified those lost clients whose work generated approximately 22.5% of Charlton's turnover, Charltons points to activities of the defendants both before and after their departure as found by Pembroke J and of which there is further evidence before me, which on Charltons' case, establish that the loss of the particular client was not coincidental. Charltons also points to evidence that Charltons had had a very stable client list until the defendants terminated their employment contracts at Charltons: see Mr Charlton's affidavit of 12 November 2012, [15], [19], [20] and [21]. 8Charltons' approach is to identify the revenue earned in the financial year ending 2012 for client X and to claim the 2012 earning, of say $20K, from the client but in addition to claim the future revenue lost from X. That calculation relies on a multiplier identified by Mr Fayed of 1.0 at its highest or 0.95 at its lowest (I shall say more about Mr Fayed's evidence later). Therefore, continuing my example of client X who earned $20K in the 2011/2012 financial year - Charltons claims an additional $20K (in total $40K) for future lost income. 9Charltons also claim damages for income denied to Charltons by virtue of work performed by the defendants (largely Mr Fitzgerald) for the shadow clients whilst the defendants were still employed by Charltons. Charltons claims that had Mr Fitzgerald not performed the work that he did for these persons they, or at least a significant portion of them, would have become clients of Charltons and Charltons would have earned income from them. The claim is not only for the income which Charltons did not earn whilst the defendants were employed but for the income that would have been earned in the future, had these persons become clients of Charltons. That claim is put as twice the revenue lost for one year. Evidence was called by the defendants from many of these shadow clients with whom I shall deal separately from the actual clients ("the clients"). 10The defendants dispute a number of aspects of the plaintiff's approach: (1)They contend that all of the former clients of Charltons would have left Charltons even in the absence of any wrongdoing by the defendants. (2)They contend that the plaintiff would be recovering twice if it obtains not only the lost revenue for the 12 month restraint period but also the claimed future loss of revenue. (3)They assert that an allowance must be made for a contingency discount. (4)They challenge the extent of the revenue made by Charltons in the year before departure which then impacts upon the figures utilised. Mr Kite places emphasis on the fact that Mr Charltons accounts show a total revenue less than the billing schedule of Charltons and that Mr Charlton admitted that he could not explain the discrepancy. (5)In relation to shadow clients, the defendants contend that none of those shadow clients would have become clients of Charltons. (6)There are challenges to the precise calculation of earnings in respect of particular clients which take a number of forms. 11The contention that all of the former clients of Charltons would have left Charltons quite apart from the defendants' breach is vigorously challenged by the plaintiff. The contest in this area has descended into considerable detail and the assertion of a principle on which the plaintiff sets considerable store namely that a person cannot rely on his or her own wrong or misconduct ("the own misconduct principle"). The principle which I will explain below is referred to in a number of cases and its availability here is disputed by the defendants. To explain the competing positions on this I shall use, as an example, the case of Medicine Today Group of companies of which Ms Judith Passlow is one of the owners. Ms Passlow says that by reason of Mr Charlton having recommended her entry into a taxation scheme (including one known as the Grant McKenzie Whisky Scheme) between 1998 and 2003 which caused her expense and loss she has for many years had a low opinion of Mr Charlton. The parties agreed that it was not appropriate for the Court to have to consider the truth of her allegations, the plaintiff accepting that Ms Passlow held the low opinion which she said she held and the defendants accepting that evidence of her belief was not evidence of the truth of the matters which she, by expression of her belief, asserted. 12The plaintiff's position is that, although Ms Passlow's negative views concerning Mr Charlton were in part derived from matters with which Mr Fitzgerald had no involvement whatsoever he did help to consolidate and fuel her negative views by taking steps in breach of his obligations (and also by steps which he did not take). The plaintiff claims that the negativity engendered by Mr Fitzgerald's actions (and omissions) was inextricably linked with Ms Passlow's negativity. The plaintiff contends that it was incumbent on the defendants to establish that no part of the negativity of Ms Passlow emanated from actions or omissions of Mr Fitzgerald which, the plaintiff contends, the defendants on the evidence have been unable to do. The defendants contend that Mr Fitzgerald's actions or comments could not realistically have blackened Mr Charlton's image any more since Ms Passlow was already so negative about him.