CEU v University of Technology Sydney
[2017] NSWCATAD 323
At a glance
Source factsCourt
NCAT Administrative and Equal Opportunity
Decision date
2017-08-29
Before
Schmidt J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (7 paragraphs)
Overview
- CEU, who has a history of depression and anxiety, complained that the University of Technology Sydney (UTS) discriminated against her on the ground of disability while she was a student nurse: Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 49L(2). The President of the Anti-Discrimination Board declined the complaint as lacking in substance and CEU has applied to the Tribunal for permission (or 'leave') for the complaint to go ahead: Anti-Discrimination Act, s 92(1)(a) and s 96. The issue is whether it is "fair and just" for the complaint to proceed.
- UTS submits that the Tribunal should not give permission for the complaint to go ahead because the decision to discontinue CEU's enrolment was based on a history of concerning behaviour and her failure to demonstrate, on the clinical placement with Royal North Shore Hospital, that she was suited for further professional experience. UTS also submits that at least one of the reasons for requiring her to undertake a Fitness for Placement Assessment before being allocated a clinical placement, was the voluminous emails that she sent to UTS senior staff. According to UTS that behaviour had no clear connection with any disability CEU may have. In any case, UTS submits that it would have treated any student who exhibited that kind of behaviour and failed the clinical placement component of the course in the same way.
- The Supreme Court set out the principles to be applied when determining whether to grant leave in Ekermawi v Administrative Decisions Tribunal of New South Wales [2009] NSWSC 143 at [28] - [38]. In that case Schmidt J:◦ (1) emphasised that a cautious approach should be adopted because a refusal of leave will "finally determine the rights of the parties under this legislative scheme, which is dealing with important human rights"; (2) found that the Tribunal's discretion is unfettered and is not confined to the grounds on which the President of the Anti-Discrimination Board may decline a complaint; (3) concluded that leave must be granted or refused "depending on what (is) fair and just in the particular circumstances, with an onus falling on the plaintiff to establish that the leave should be granted; and (4) noted that where it is apparent that the complaint lacks substance leave may be refused, if that is what justice dictates.