CONSIDERATION
19 Without going to any principles enunciated in the authorities, the wording of s 250B(1) is straightforward. Certain documents must be "received by the company at least 48 hours before the meeting". Section 250B(3) specifies what constitutes receipt by the company. Section 250B(1) sets out no further requirement than receipt by the company and a prescribed period between receipt by the company and the proposed meeting.
20 There is nothing in the legislation to indicate that an intermediary cannot be employed to facilitate the mandated delivery to the company, and if receipt by the company occurs within the permitted period, s 250B(1) is relevantly complied with.
21 There has been some discussion in the authorities regarding the requirements set out in s 250B(1) - see Bisan Ltd v Cellante (2002) 173 FLR 310 ('Bisan'); Re Golden West Resources Ltd (2008) 170 FCR 409; Lachlan Reit Ltd v Garnaut [2010] VSC 399; Carpathian Resources Ltd v Highmoor Business Corporation [2010] FCA 1294; City Pacific Ltd v Bacon (2009) 72 ACSR 418; Carson v Dynasty Metals Australia Ltd [2011] FCA 621; and Northwest Capital Management v Westate Capital Ltd (2012) 264 FLR 424 ('Northwest Capital Management').
22 In my view, based upon the wording of s 250B(1) and the weight of authorities, s 250B(1) does not in itself prevent proxy forms being handled by any third party prior to receipt by the company.
23 To the extent that Bisan may contain comments to the contrary, I adopt the approach of Edelman J in Northwest Capital Management at [117] where his Honour said:
The decision in Bisan Ltd is confined to the factual circumstance where a proxy is directed to a third party by both notice of meeting and by the proxy form itself. That circumstance is not relevant to this case where the proxy votes concerned were sent to Mr Thompson and Mr Keene, after the issuer of the proxy had been told in the notice of meeting that, to be effective, proxy forms must either be delivered or posted to NWPL at its registered office or be faxed to NWPL. There is nothing in s 250B which prohibits the sender of a proxy to entrust it to either of these people to ensure that it is received by NWPL as they had been informed in the notice was required.
24 However, be this as it may, the difficulty with the Notice before the Court is that the Notice (and the enclosed proxy form) indicate that the proxy forms effectively needed to be assessed by Link and would only be valid and accepted by Link if signed and received at least 72 hours before the proposed EGM. Link was and is not an agent of CellOS, but was engaged by the convening shareholders. The Notice effectively gave a direction to entrust to a third party (not an agent of the company) a proxy form which was then in certain circumstances to be provided to CellOS - but this was only to occur after the assessment of the proxy form by that third party, which proxy form had to be received no later than 72 hours before the proposed EGM.
25 Therefore, the requirements of the Notice were inconsistent with s 250B(1). According to the Notice, to be valid and effective the proxy form had to be received by a third party (not an agent of CellOS), and the period prescribed was not that set out in the legislation, even if it was anticipated that the proxy form would eventually be received by CellOS at least 48 hours before the proposed EGM. It is to be observed that a company itself could reduce the period of 48 hours between receipt by the company and the meeting (see s 250B(5)). Presumably the company would only do this where it considered that it did not require 48 hours to process the proxy forms for the proper conduct of the meeting. However, in this case the convening shareholders have effectively extended the period referred to in s 250B(1) by another 24 hours, and thus have given less time for the shareholders to exercise their rights to vote by proxy.
26 For the sake of completeness, I mention that s 249F(2) requires a convening shareholder to call a meeting in the same way as a general meeting of the company is called, but only "so far as is possible". I do not consider that this permits any alteration to the operation of s 250B.
27 The requirements set out in the Notice which are contrary to s 250B have the potential to cause substantial injustice to shareholders, particularly the 1,600 shareholders resident in Singapore, the majority of whom are likely to vote by proxy.
28 Whilst there is an important statutory right given to the convening shareholders to call and arrange for a general meeting, this can have the potential to disrupt and distract from the management of a company. Strict adherence to the provisions of the Corporations Act is normally required in the calling of a meeting under s 249F, subject to the operation of s 249F(2) as alluded to above.
29 Further, the defects in the Notice would cause substantial injustice that could not be remedied by any order of the Court other than declaring the Notice invalid, the Notice having already been sent. CellOS is calling a general meeting on 31 March 2017 in any event, which will encompass a consideration of the matters that the convening shareholders wish to canvass at proposed EGM. I am also not satisfied that the validation of the Notice by court order would not cause, or be likely to cause, substantial injustice to any person.
30 Therefore, the oral application moved by the Defendants on the day of the hearing under s 1322(4) to have the Notices declared not invalid despite their directing non-compliance with s 250B, is refused even if s 1322(4) was otherwise applicable to the circumstances of this proceeding.