(3) This section applies to an instrument in addition to, and without limiting the effect of, any provision of the instrument or of the Act under which it is made."
82 "Instrument" is defined in s 3(1) of the Interpretation Act to mean "an instrument (including a statutory rule or an environmental planning instrument) made under an Act, and includes an instrument made under any such instrument."
83 A reference to an instrument being "made" under an Act is defined in s 21(1) of the Interpretation Act to include an instrument being issued or granted under an Act.
84 An authority granted, renewed or transferred under the Mining Act falls within the concept of an "instrument" for the purposes of the Interpretation Act. It is a written legal document whereby rights and responsibilities are created and is designed to carry into effect the Mining Act: see R v NG [2002] VSCA 108; (2002) 5 VR 257 at [48], [52] and [56]; X v ACC [2004] FCA 1475; (2004) 139 FCR 413 at [27]-[29] and cases therein cited and MLC Properties v Camden Council (1997) 96 LGERA 52 at 58-59. Accordingly, an authority granted, renewed or transferred under the Mining Act is to be read and construed to the extent that it can be as a valid instrument: Peters v Attorney General for NSW (1988) 16 NSWLR 24 at 41.
85 A court construing an instrument may be required to construe words and provisions in quite varied ways in order to give effect to the instruction in s 32 of the Interpretation Act. Indeed, as observed in Sportodds Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales [2003] FCAFC 237; (2003) 133 FCR 63 at [21], the court "can make significant changes to the apparently plain meaning of the text when it is clear that the relevant Parliament intended that that should occur". There are, however, limitations: "the court cannot 'construe' the relevant provision, whether by reading down or by expunging invalid provisions, where the effect of doing so is to create a provision which the Parliament did not intend": Sportodds Systems Pty Ltd v New South Wales at [19].
86 In this case, A216 properly can be construed so as to confine the period for which A216 is renewed within the limits of power in s 114(3) of the Mining Act, namely for five years until 22 February 2011 rather than until 28 February 2011. Such a construction would not cause the authority to "operate differently or produce a different result from that which was intended" (Peters v Attorney-General for NSW at 41) of effect a "change to the substantial purpose and effect" of A216 (Harrington v Lowe at 328). It would not create an authority which either the Parliament or the Minister did not intend to create. This is not a case where the Parliament or the Minister intended the renewed authority of A216 "to operate fully and completely accordingly to its terms, or not at all": Victoria v The Commonwealth [1996] HCA 56; (1996) 187 CLR 416 at 502.
87 If for some reason s 32 of the Interpretation Act was not applicable to the authority of A216, then application of the common law rules of severance would lead to the same result: Harrington v Lowe at 328 and R v NG at [57]-[59].
88 I also agree with CMA and the Minister that the breach in this case of s 114(3) of the Mining Act is not the kind of breach of statutory provision that would result in invalidity of A216. Having regard to the language of s 114 and s 114(3), and the scope and object of the Mining Act, I do not discern that "it was a purpose of the legislation that an act done in breach of the provision should be invalid": Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority at [93]. As Spigelman CJ noted in Attorney-General of NSW v World Best Holdings Ltd [2005] NSWCA 261; (2005) 63 NSWLR 557 at [107], the word "an" in this test "indicates that a court must look at what Parliament intended to be the consequences of the particular breach under consideration".
89 In this case, the particular breach of s 114(3) arose from the Minister's error in inserting in the Instrument of Renewal as the date on and from which A216 was to be renewed, 22 February 2006 rather than 1 March 2006 as had been recommended in the Ministerial Briefing he had approved, and then not changing the expiry date of the five year period from 28 February 2011 which had been already inserted in the Instrument of Renewal, to 22 February 2011. The consequence was that the period of A216 exceeded the maximum five year period by six days, in breach of s 114(3) of the Mining Act. I do not consider that Parliament intended that such a breach should have the consequence that the whole authority should be rendered invalid.
90 Finally, I agree with CMA and the Minister that s 137(1) of the Mining Act is applicable to the particular breach of s 114(3) in the 2006 renewal of A216. The applicable form of s 137(1) which applies is the former and not the current s 137(1). Section 137 in its current form was inserted into the Act by the Mining Amendment Act 2008, which commenced on 1 August 2008. Clause 111 of Schedule 6 of the Mining Act provides:
"Sections 137, 210B and 234A, as substituted or inserted by the 2008 Act, apply to an authority, mineral claim or opal prospecting licence in force immediately before the section commenced but do not apply to any decision made before that commencement."
91 The effect of cl 111 is that the new s 137 only applied to decisions made after it came into force (although those decisions can relate to authorities that were in force immediately prior to it being enacted). Consequently, in relation to the decisions made by the Minister in 1998 and 2006 to renew A216 and the decision made by the Minister in 2006 to approve the transfer of part of A216 to CMA, the former s 137 applies. The former s 137(1) provides:
"The grant, renewal or transfer of an authority may not be challenged in any legal proceedings commenced later than 3 months after the date on which notice of the grant, renewal or transfer of the authority is published in the Gazette".
92 Notice of the renewal of A216 on 2 February 2006, was published in the Gazette on 3 March 2006. The applicant commenced these proceedings by summons filed on 7 July 2009, over three years and three months after notice was published.
93 The Minister's renewal of A216 satisfied the threefold principle in R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox [1945] HCA 53; (1945) 70 CLR 598 at 615 as being a bona fide attempt to exercise the power under s 114 of the Mining Act, relating to the subject matter of the Mining Act, and being reasonably capable of reference to the power given to the Minister. Furthermore, I do not construe the requirement in s 114(3) of the Mining Act "as being of such significance in the legislative scheme that it constitutes a limitation or requirement that is variously expressed in the authorities as 'essential', 'indispensable', 'imperative' or 'inviolable'": Lesnewski v Mosman Municipal Council [2005] NSWCA 99; (2007) 138 LGERA 207 at [76] and see also Woolworths Ltd v Pallas Newco [2004] NSWCA 422; (2004) 61 NSWLR 707; (2004) 136 LGERA 288 at [81], [84].
94 Accordingly, by operation of s 137(1) of the Mining Act, the renewal of A216 in 2006 may not be challenged in these proceedings on the ground of breach of s 114(3) of the Mining Act.
95 For each of these reasons, I reject the applicant's challenge that A216 was renewed in 2006 in breach of s 114(3) of the Mining Act.