23 A category of litigation where the fear of an adverse cost order may impede access to justice is public interest litigation. Back in 1989, Toohey J, speaking extra-curially, noted the inhibiting effect of a potential adverse costs order on public interest litigation:
"There is little point in opening the doors to the courts if litigants cannot afford to come in. The general rule in litigation that 'costs follow the event' is in point. The fear, if unsuccessful, of having to pay the costs of the other side (often a government instrumentality or wealthy private corporation), with devastating consequences to the individual or environmental group bringing the action, must inhibit the taking of cases to court. In any event, it will be a factor that looms large in any consideration to initiate litigation": J Toohey and A D'Arcy, "Environmental Law - Its Place in the System" in R J Fowler (ed), Proceedings of the International Conference on Environmental Law. 14-18 June 1989, Sydney, Australia (organised by the National Environmental Law Association of Australia and the Law Association for Asia and the Pacific).
24 This passage has been cited with approval by courts in Australia and overseas: see, for example, Oshlack v Richmond River Shire Council (1994) 82 LGERA 236 at 238 per Stein J whose decision was upheld by a majority in the High Court of Australia in Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72, the remarks being also noted at [114] by Kirby J, and R (On the Application of Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2005] EWCA Civ 192; [2005] 1 WLR 2600; [2005] 4 All ER 1 at [31] by the UK Court of Appeal.
25 The legal costs in public litigation may be significant, reflecting the fact that the subject matter of the litigation may be important, complex and of high value. There can be considerable disparity in the financial resources of a public interest plaintiff and the governmental or corporate defendants. The making of a maximum costs order may enable the public interest litigation to continue, but conversely, if a maximum costs order were not to be made, the public interest plaintiff may discontinue the proceedings.
26 Public interest litigation cases in which a form of a maximum costs order has been made include: Corcoran v Virgin Blue Airlines Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 864; R (On the Application of Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry; R (On the Application of Buglife: The Invertebrate Conservation Trust) v Thurrock Thames Gateway Development Corp [2008] EWCA Civ 1209; [2009] Env LR 18; [2009] JPL 1045; and Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc v Delta Electricity [2009] NSWLEC 150.
27 However, it is important not to over-generalise; not all public interest litigation will be discontinued if a court declines to make a maximum costs order. Although the archetypical public interest litigant is seen to be a person of limited financial resources, this is not always so. It may be that the plaintiff has, or has access to, financial resources sufficient to fund the public interest litigation. There may be an overlap of the public interest with private interests. The public interest and private interests are not mutually exclusive categories. Litigation can still properly be characterised as being in the public interest, notwithstanding it also may advance private interests (see Nettheim v Minister for Planning and Local Government (No 2) (unreported, NSWLEC, Cripps CJ, 28 September 1988) pp 3-5, and Alliance to Save Hinchinbrook Inc v Cook & Ors [2005] QSC 355 at [11]). Where public and private interests overlap, the plaintiff may be able to access financial resources from private interests. Public interest litigation may also be able to be funded by lawyers and experts acting on a contingency basis, such as a "no win, no fee" basis. Litigation funders may also be prepared to fund public interest litigation (see Campbell's Cash and Carry Pty Limited v Fostif Pty Ltd (2006) 229 CLR 386 for an example of proceedings funded by litigation funders). As a consequence of these different means of financial support, certain public interest litigation may well be able to continue, regardless of whether a maximum costs order is made.
28 There is also a risk of overgeneralising the beneficial effect the making of the maximum costs order may have on facilitating access to justice. Whilst in many, perhaps most, public interest litigation, the fear of an adverse costs order may be an important inhibiting factor, in other cases a maximum costs order can itself act as a disincentive to public interest litigation. Commonly, if a court determines that it ought to make a maximum costs order, the court considers that fairness dictates that the costs cap should be bidirectional or multidirectional, so that the plaintiff not only has its liability to pay an adverse costs order capped but it also has its entitlement to recover under a favourable costs order capped. Furthermore, in determining the amount of the costs cap, the court may limit the extent and nature of the legal representation the public interest plaintiff who is the beneficiary of a maximum costs order can have to only modest representation, such as a solicitor and/or a single advocate of junior counsel. Examples of maximum costs orders with such restrictions on the public interest plaintiff are: R (On the Application of Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry at [76], [147]; R (On the Application of Buglife: The Invertebrate Conservation Trust v Thurrock Thames Gateway Development Corp at [21]-[25], [45]; and Blue Mountains Conservation Society Inc v Delta Electricity [2009] NSWLEC 150 at [71].
29 Such restrictive maximum costs orders may in fact inhibit access to justice for public interest litigants. In the United Kingdom, a Report from the Working Group on Access to Environmental Justice, Ensuring access to environmental justice in England and Wales, published on 9 May 2008, considered the stifling effect that protective costs orders, capping costs at "modest" levels and imposing limitations on legal representation, were having on public interest litigation. In Appendix 3 (pp 40-41), the Report noted:
"4. As a consequence, caps on claimant costs are being set at levels that (in general even if not necessarily in each particular case) are unsustainable and as a result stifle litigation. If unrealistic caps are set on claimants' costs, lawyers who specialise in such cases will not be able to continue to work in this field. The impact of this requirement therefore threatens to undermine the contribution PCOs can make to access to justice generally and, if applied to environmental cases, to Aarhus compliance.
5. The Court of Appeal approach in Corner House, which limits capped costs to cover junior counsel only, also causes difficulties. By their very nature, complexity and public importance, a significant number of cases worthy of a PCO will justify the instruction of leading counsel. Indeed, there will frequently be leading counsel instructed for the defendant (as well as the developer or other interested third party) and in such cases their automatic exclusion for claimants would result in substantial inequality of arms.
6. There is a fundamental difference in the ways in which the burdens of costs caps fall on the claimant and defendant. The PCO limiting the defendant's costs recovery is paid for by the defendant public body itself (in the same way as if the claimant were legally aided). There is no impact on the fees paid to the defendant's lawyers. Any cap on the claimant's costs is almost inevitably paid for by reducing the fees recovered by the claimant's lawyers. In effect, claimants' lawyers are bearing the burden of subsidising the provision of access to justice for their clients."
30 As the Report notes, therefore, maximum costs orders that take the form of imposing bidirectional or multidirectional capping orders and requiring only modest legal representation, may disadvantage a public interest litigant. The public interest litigant may be deprived of access to lawyers and experts that might otherwise have been prepared to act on a contingency basis (the incentive for the lawyers and experts being that they would recover their full professional fees and not be restricted to only a modest proportion). Restricting the nature and extent of legal representation may also deprive the public interest litigant of the benefit of experienced and able senior counsel and give rise to an unjust disparity in the quality of legal representation between the plaintiff (who is restricted in its legal representation) and the defendants (who are unrestricted in their legal representation). The public interest litigant may also be deprived of funds that might otherwise have been provided by a litigation funder (the incentive for the litigation funder again being recovery of full fees and usually some proportion of any monetary judgment sum). The public interest litigant who is ultimately successful in the proceedings also suffers because the costs cap may prevent full recovery of legal costs, causing either the public interest litigant or their lawyers and experts to subsidise access to justice. For non-governmental organisations, lawyers and experts, who act in the public interest, such subsidisation is not sustainable.