ARGUMENTS
19 The plaintiff submits that the principle to be applied in this case is succinctly extracted by Finkelstein J in the passage highlighted above from the judgment of Dixon J in Fraser Henleins Pty Ltd & Crowther v Cody (1945) 70 CLR 100 at 128. That passage is consistent with a series of other decisions concerning the wartime regulations, decided at about the same time, including Vardon v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR 434; Cann's Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1946) 71 CLR 210; and King Gee Clothing Co Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 184.
20 It is submitted for the plaintiff that the resolutions in the present case do not suffer from the defect which existed in Stockford as there is only one rate fixed for each person who does any work in connection with the administration. Once the person and his or her category is known, and the time spent is known, the guide can be arithmetically applied to arrive at the result. Thus, the resolution here does avoid one of the problems which brought down the arrangement in Stockford. Counsel also relied upon the specific monetary limits or caps to avoid the criticism that the arrangements would otherwise be open ended.
21 It is submitted for ASIC, however, that whilst this formula may have the appearance of objectivity and certainty, that appearance is misleading. It is submitted that the charge out rates cannot be applied until various issues involving a considerable degree of subjectivity, assessment, discretionary allocation or apportionment have been determined. It is submitted that these subjective elements include assessing which tasks should be claimed for, apportioning the time taken on tasks that relate to more than just the particular administration in question, allocating the tasks to staff with the appropriate level of seniority, and assessing the actual number of hours to be claimed in respect of each task and of each member of staff having regard to such matters as, for example, work redone as a result of mistake or carelessness, the efficiency or inefficiency of the staff member, the quality of the work and so on. It is submitted that these discretionary elements mean that, in effect, the actual fixing of the amount is left to the administrators rather than to the creditors or to the Court as provided for by the Act. This is said to be an impermissible delegation of power (Racecourse Co-operative Sugar Association Ltd v Attorney-General (Qld) (1979) 142 CLR 460 at 481). It is submitted that all that is fixed is a rate for certain tasks rather than remuneration for the work done or to be done.
22 ASIC pointed to the potential for abuse if the plaintiff's construction were adopted, bearing in mind that creditors may not be sufficiently well informed or have sufficient funds to properly scrutinise what was proposed or to bring the matter to the Court pursuant to s 449E(2). It was also submitted that there are traditional methods of fixing remuneration other than by way of lump sum or time charging, for example, by way of a percentage of the value of assets dealt with. Counsel for ASIC also did not accept that, generally speaking, remuneration could or should be fixed prospectively.
23 It is submitted for ASIC that, according to the plaintiff's construction, the power to 'fix' remuneration is conferred in general terms and applies whether or not the administrator has performed all or any of the services for which he or she is to be remunerated. In other words, remuneration may be both retrospective and prospective. There is nothing to suggest that 'fix' will have a different meaning when considering prospective remuneration as opposed to retrospective remuneration. It is submitted that it would be insufficient when fixing retrospective remuneration on a time basis for decision making bodies simply to be given the hourly charge out rate for approval. More would be required. This should also be the case in fixing prospective remuneration. It is also submitted that, as a court has the power to 'fix' fees, it is to be assumed that the Court would require similar information. As this cannot be given in relation to prospective fixing, it follows that an hourly rate basis is inappropriate for all relevant purposes.
24 It is submitted on behalf of ASIC that the relevant extrinsic material does not support the plaintiff's proposition. The Explanatory Memorandum of the Corporate Law Reform Bill (No 2) 1992 referred to the 1988 Law Reform Commission Report known as the 'Harmer Report' (General Insolvency Inquiry, Australian Law Reform Commission, Report No 45 (1988) (Harmer Report) which, it is submitted, effectively rejected the approach contended for as follows:
'The Commission does not support the concept of prospective approval as proposed so that creditors at a meeting need only be advised that the approved scale was being used. In the Commission's view prospective approval creates a risk of over-servicing and denies creditors an opportunity of reaching an informed view as to whether the remuneration actually paid is justified. The remuneration of liquidators (which is from time to time the subject of complaint) should be properly regulated and subject to the approval of creditors.'
It is said that the Harmer Report formed the basis for the 1992 amendments incorporating s 449E.