28 As I told Mr Calabro, I detect nothing, upon a thorough scrutiny of all his materials (as earlier identified above) to suggest any potential basis for an argument that the third or fourth elements of the tort of malicious prosecution might possibly be maintained against the prospective additional parties. As regards the tort of malicious prosecution, I refer to RSC O 6 r 3(b) which places that tort in a category effectively akin to that of an action in libel or slander, in terms of what can be put in a writ. Clearly, the indorsements of claim seen under all of Mr Calabro's writ iterations to date, fail to meet the requirements of O 6 r 1(1). The rule refers to the writ being 'indorsed with a concise statement of the nature of the claim made, and of the remedy or relief required in the action'. The plaintiff's indorsements instead take on the character of repetitious narratives. To date, that aberrant feature has been largely overlooked, presumably, on the basis of a concession made to the plaintiff as an unrepresented litigant. In that respect, see Beech J in earlier reasons in this action, Calabro v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASC 418 [22] referring to Wentworth v Rogers [No 5] (1986) 6 NSWLR 534, 536 537, and Tobin v Dodd [2004] WASCA 288 [15] (EM Heenan J); Neil v Nott (1994) HCA 23; (1994) 68 ALJR 509; and Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87 [10] (Newnes JA & Murphy J).