54 The medical reports are based in part on the objective evidence provided by diagnostic tests and do not depend solely on the history which the appellant gave to the doctors.
55 His Honour took the view that the appellant's inconsistent or incomplete reports of a prior history of back pain meant that there was no evidence from which it was possible to infer that the appellant's pain and other symptoms were referable to the incident of 26 October 2001. I do not agree.
56 It is theoretically possible that a CT scan prior to 26 October 2001 would have revealed that the appellant was already suffering from a disc injury not diagnosed until after that date. However there is no evidence that this was the case. The appellant was suffering from age-related spine degeneration prior to 26 October 2001. However, as counsel for the appellant submitted, the objective fact was that he was doing heavy work on a full-time basis in the Arnott's factory up until 26 October 2001. The appellant had had no treatment more serious than exercise, plaster and Codis since October 1997, and his back condition had not resulted in him taking time off work since 1992.
57 Comparison of the appellant's condition prior to and after the accident, in combination with the objective findings in the medical reports, supports the inference that his current condition was caused by the accident on 26 October 2001. Although the appellant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the injury causing his impairment occurred after 20 October 1999, and that that injury was serious, the court can rely on the inference arising from a comparison of the appellant's condition before and after 26 October 2001. In my opinion this does not impermissibly reverse the burden of proof cast on the appellant. The inference which can be drawn from the facts does not, in the circumstances of this case, depend solely on the finding of the learned judge below as to the appellant's credibility.
58 I therefore reject the respondent's submission that the inaccurate history given by the respondent to some of the doctors meant that there was no reliable evidence that he suffered an injury of any consequence on 26 October 2001. In my opinion the medical evidence, including the evidence provided by the diagnostic tests, when combined with the inference which can be drawn from the difference between the appellant's pre-and post-accident condition, was sufficient to establish on the balance of probabilities that the appellant's inability to work was caused by that accident.
59 It is not necessary for me to point to a specific error made by the learned trial judge. In my view, however, his Honour was led into error by giving insufficient weight to the evidence of the appellant's treating doctors about the physical cause of the pain experienced by the appellant shortly after 26 October 2001 and to the comparison between the appellant's physical condition pre and post 26 October 2001. It was at that date that the appellant's position changed from that of a man whose physical condition allowed him to do heavy physical work, albeit with some back pain, to a man whose injury prevented him from doing such work, or, in the opinion of some of the medical experts, any work at all.
60 My conclusion on this matter makes it unnecessary to consider the ground of appeal relating to the adequacy of his Honour's reasons.
Did the aggravation of the appellant's previous back condition amount to a "serious injury"?
61 Because his Honour found that the appellant had not satisfied the onus of proving that his injury was caused by the accident on 26 October 2001, he did not consider whether the appellant's injury amounted to a "permanent serious impairment or loss of body function". In his particulars of injury the appellant sought leave to commence common law proceedings to recover damages for both pain and suffering and loss of earning capacity. To obtain leave in relation to pain and suffering the appellant must satisfy the "narrative test" for serious injury, which requires him to show that, when compared with other cases in the range of possible impairments or losses of body function, the pain and suffering consequences can "fairly be described as being more than significant or marked, and as being at least very considerable."[13]
62 In the case of loss of earning capacity damages the appellant must also show that at the date of the hearing of the application he had a loss of earning capacity of 40 per centum or more and that after the date of the decision he will continue permanently to have a loss of earning capacity which will be productive of financial loss to 40 per cent or more.[14] Section 134AB(38)(f) provides that a worker's loss of earning capacity: