7.2.2 The Authorities - submissions and consideration
90 As noted, Mr Burton refers to a number of authorities which he contends support his argument.
91 Douglass v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) 45 CLR 95 is called in aid by Mr Burton. In that case Dixon J (as his Honour then was) considered that the word 'included' enabled him to construe the provision in such a way as to achieve its object, stating relevantly (at 107):
… the second of the two alternatives affords the right solution of the problem which that construction raises. The choice between the alternatives really depends upon the force attributed to the word "included." … The object of the provision was to secure to the taxpayer an allowance in respect of tax already paid upon the profits out of which the dividends were paid. Justice seems to require that he should receive an allowance in respect of so much of his taxable income as would not exist but for the inclusion of the dividends in the assessable income. It therefore seems proper to give to the word "included" a force which is in accordance with the meaning which ought fairly to be attributed to the legislation and which it may reasonably bear.
92 Starke J's approach differed. His Honour noted (at 103):
In the present case the whole amount of the dividends has been included in account in ascertaining the taxable income. They are "included in his taxable income," or else the amount of that income would be less.
93 His Honour went on to identify the relevant question and answer as being (at 103-104):
… have such dividends been included in the taxable income of the taxpayer? In the present case they have been so included in account, and if that satisfies the proviso to sec. 16(b), as I think it does, then the question is solved and the taxpayer is entitled to the deduction he claims.
94 In Bank of New South Wales Savings Bank Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1962) 108 CLR 514, Dixon CJ said (at 519-520):
The argument for the taxpayer, needless to say, must depend on the word "included". It is a word that in different contexts may receive different applications. I discussed the word more generally in [Douglass] but I stated my view of the meaning of the word in s. 160AB definitely in Commercial Banking Co. of Sydney Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation in the following passage "The purpose of s. 160AB is to ensure to a taxpayer who invests in particular loans a definite rebate. The assurance is held out to him in order to induce him so to invest, because it is to the public advantage that investments of that character should be made. The purpose is in effect to say - If make this interest from those securities a form of your income, from the tax upon that income you will obtain a rebate. The point of view both of the legislature and of the taxpayer who acted upon the assurance would more naturally be that he was to be assured of a rebate on the amount by which his income is increased by the inclusion of interest upon the specified securities. I construe s. 160AB as in effect meaning that a taxpayer is to be entitled to a rebate in his assessment of an amount of 2s. for every pound of interest by reason of the inclusion of which in his assessable income his taxable income has been increased. It will be seen that upon this meaning the rebate cannot be upon more than the taxable income which, of course, is obvious enough."
(Citations omitted.)
95 I doubt whether Bank of New South Wales Savings Bank Ltd assists either way. It simply makes the point that 'included' is a word that in different contexts may receive different applications. It highlights that the meaning of the term should be consistent with the text, context and purpose of the statute. This cannot be doubted.
96 Turning back to Douglass, Dixon J noted (at 106):
The other method is to treat the word "included" as referring to the amount by which the taxable income is increased by reason of the presence of the dividends in the assessable income. This means that to the extent that the taxable income is greater because of the inclusion of the dividends in the assessable income, the dividends are included in the taxable income.
97 The approach was to whatever extent taxable income increases, that is what 'included' meant. In this case, if any analogy is to be drawn with Douglass, only 50% of Mr Burton's capital gain can be said to have increased what would otherwise have been the assessable income. It follows that the other 50% cannot be said to be included in assessable income. While Douglass, in my view, would rather support the Commissioner's approach its relevance is greatly undercut by the simple observation that the decision predated the introduction of CGT by more than 50 years.
98 Mr Burton also seeks to rely on Commissioner of Taxation v Lean (2009) 73 ATR 34. In this case, Mr Lean, an Australian citizen, made a share sale profit totalling approximately $4.63 million in the US. He transferred the profits to invest in Hong Kong, but lost his original $4.63 million in what was referred to as a 'Ponzi scheme'. The issue concerned s 25-45 of the 1997 Act, which read:
25-45 Loss by theft etc
You can deduct a loss in respect of money if:
(a) you discover the loss in the income year; and
(b) the loss was caused by the theft, stealing, embezzlement, larceny, defalcation or misappropriation by your employee or agent (other than an individual you employ solely for private purposes); and
(c) the money was included in your assessable income for the income year, or for an earlier income year.
Note: If you receive an amount as recoupment of the loss, the amount may be included in your assessable income: see Subdivision 20-A.
99 Stone J (at [8]), described the question as:
[w]hether the proceeds of sale of a capital item [ie the $4.63 million] can be included in a taxpayer's assessable income for the purposes of s 25-45 of the [1997 Act] on the basis that, by reason of s 102-5 of the Act a taxpayer's assessable income includes the taxpayer's net capital gain and the net capital gain is worked out by reference to, amongst other things, the proceeds of sale of the capital item.
100 The Commissioner argued that no part of the $4.63 million could have ever been included in Mr Lean's assessable income, because 'assessable income' is not money, but an amount which is a fiction and a creature created by the 1997 Act. This was rejected by Stone J at first instance (at [43]-[44]) where her Honour said:
43 The Commissioner accepts that the money in respect of which the taxpayer suffered the loss was the money derived from the sale of the [US] shares but submits that what was included in the taxpayer's assessable income was not this money but 50% of the net capital gain from the share sales derived by working through the steps in s 102-5. This, it is argued, "is something altogether different to the money from the proceeds of the sales." Consequently the Commissioner argues that the tribunal erred in law in finding … that the taxpayer included in his 2002 tax return 50% of the share sale profits.
44 The Commissioner's submissions on this point must be rejected. If certain money has been included in the taxpayer's assessable income and if, pursuant to the [1997 Act] (which is applicable in this case) the money was properly so included, then to my mind whether it was derived as "income" per se or as a "capital gain" is not relevant. Section 25-45 does not require that the money be acquired as income but only that it be included in assessable income. Assessable income is defined in s 995-1 as having the meaning given by a number of sections including s 6-15(1) which provides that all assessable income is either statutory income or ordinary income. Section 25-45 does not prescribe the basis of inclusion in assessable income. It makes no distinction between money characterised as ordinary income pursuant to s 6-5 or statutory income pursuant to s 6-10.
101 Her Honour said (at [45]):
Section 102-5 provides that assessable income includes net capital gain. As a matter of statutory interpretation it is the requirement that the money in respect of which the loss is suffered be included in assessable income that is important in the context of s 25-45. It follows that if the [1997 Act] requires that a certain percentage of money derived as a capital gain be included in assessable income then the loss of that money, if it otherwise comes within s 25-45, is deductible.
(Emphasis added.)
102 Her Honour continued (at [46]):
As the amount claimed as a deduction under s 25-45 is limited to money included in assessable income, it follows that where the loss is in respect of the proceeds of sale of a capital asset the amount deductible will be the net capital gain calculated in accordance with s 102-5. As the Commissioner submitted, the proceeds of sale will equal the net capital gain only in the rare circumstance where the cost base of the asset is zero and none of the steps in s 102-5 apply, "that is, the taxpayer has no other capital gains or losses; there are no net capital losses from earlier periods; no discount percentage is applicable; and no relevant concession applies."
(Emphasis added.)
103 I would have thought my reasoning (set out at [77] above) accords with her Honour's approach. The appeal to the Full Court was dismissed: Lean v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 181 FCR 589.
104 On appeal Edmonds J expressed the view that s 25-45 could not apply in the circumstances for the reason that it really concerned items of an income nature. At [33] his Honour noted:
Money equal in amount to the amount of the capital proceeds may well be received by the taxpayer; indeed, in most cases, will be received, but that money is not included in the assessable income of the taxpayer. If that be right, then the money misappropriated on the facts of the present case, could never give rise to an allowable deduction under s 25-45.
(Emphasis added.)
105 Mr Burton suggests that this must be understood as an acceptance of the Commissioner's argument that the money is not at all included in assessable income if what one is looking at is s 102-5. It does not support, Mr Burton submits, the proposition that the Commissioner puts in this case, which is that the capital gain is included in assessable income rateably or proportionately.
106 Mr Burton further relies on the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Anson and what is described as a 'degree of pragmatism'. Anson concerned a double tax problem (though of a different nature than this case). Mr Anson was a UK resident, but he was non-domiciled UK tax resident and only liable for UK tax to the extent that his income was remitted to him in the UK. However, he had been a member of a US limited liability company (LLC) which for US purposes was treated in a similar manner as a partnership. The US LLC of which he had been a member had made gains and paid tax. Some of that had been remitted to him as a resident in the UK and the UK sought to impose tax on the parts remitted to him. Mr Anson sought to claim a tax credit for what had been paid by him as a member of the LLC in the US.
107 A question arose as to whether the UK tax to which Mr Anson was liable was 'computed by reference to the same profits or income' by reference to which the US tax was computed. Lord Reed said (at [114]):
The words 'the same' are ordinary English words. It should however be borne in mind that a degree of pragmatism in their application may be necessary in some circumstances if the object of the Convention is to be achieved, for example where differences between UK and foreign accounting and tax rules prevent a precise matching of the income by reference to which tax is computed in the two jurisdictions.
(Emphasis added.)
108 This and other judicial views relied upon by Mr Burton essentially invite the question as to legislative purpose. But there is nothing in the Commissioner's position which conflicts with the legislative purpose of avoiding double taxation. I accept the Commissioner's contention that double taxation is intended to relate to the same assessable income.
109 In conclusion, I do not think any of the cases assist Mr Burton on the proper approach to construction of s 770-10 and the meaning of 'included in' which is under debate. The construction which accords with the statutory object is that advanced by the Commissioner and set out at the outset of these reasons (at [4]). Nothing raised in argument as to context or purpose detracts from this construction.