Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations

(A) the person is unable to use public transport without substantial assistance, either permanently or for an extended period; and

(B) the person's inability to use public transport without substantial assistance is due to the person's physical or mental disability; and

(C) the person is engaged in the gainful employment for at least 32 hours in every 4 weeks on a continuing basis;

(2) A person satisfies the travel test mentioned in subsection (1) if the person is required to travel to and from the person's home for the purpose of undertaking:

"voluntary work"means work approved by the Secretary undertaken in a voluntary capacity for charitable, welfare or community organisations.

11 On 14 November 2006 a Centrelink delegate dismissed Ms Budd's application on the ground that she was not required to travel in order to undertake her voluntary work and accordingly did not satisfy the travel test in s 1035(2) of the Act. 12 On 10 January 2007 the decision of the Centrelink delegate was reviewed by an Authorised Review Officer who affirmed the decision. 13 On 16 January 2007 Ms Budd appealed from Centrelink's decision to the SSAT. On 11 April 2007 the SSAT affirmed Centrelink's decision. The SSAT concluded that Ms Budd failed to qualify for a mobility allowance because she was not required to travel to and from her home for the purpose of her work. 14 Ms Budd applied to the Tribunal for a review of the SSAT decision and participated in a hearing before the Tribunal by way of telephone. The Tribunal delivered its decision on 21 February 2008 affirming the SSAT decision and dismissing Ms Budd's application: see Budd v Secretary, Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations [2008] AATA 137. In such decision the Tribunal at [8] made the following finding of fact: She seldom goes out of the house and will only do so to get stationary [sic] supplies and post letters. That is the extent of her travelling. Ms Budd also stated in her letter dated 26 November 2006 that she does not leave the house to do her voluntary work and instead writes the poems at home and then sends them to St Clare's Church. In a letter, undated but received by the Tribunal on 5 November 2007, Ms Budd stated that "St Clare's does not need me to do "face to face" work".

15 The Tribunal concluded at [9]: I find that Ms Budd does not satisfy the travel test because the nature of her voluntary work does not require her to travel to and from her home for the purpose of undertaking that work. Ms Budd is able to conduct her voluntary work from home. In making my finding I have taken into consideration the reports of Dr Hugo Rodriguez, the letters from Sister Francis, the letter from Senator John Faulkner and several letters that Ms Budd sent the Tribunal.

MS BUDD'S APPLICATION 16 Where a notice of appeal is not filed within the time limits prescribed by s 44(2A)(a) of the AAT Act, s 44(2B) thereof provides: In the interest of justice, the grounds on which the Federal Court of Australia may allow further time under paragraph (2A)(a) include, but are not limited to, the following grounds: (a) if the Tribunal made an oral statement as to the reasons for the decision and afterwards gave a written statement of reasons for the decision--the written statement contains reasons that were not mentioned in the oral statement; (b) the text of the decision or a statement of reasons for the decision has been altered under section 43AA. 17 The Court considers that neither paragraph (2B)(a) nor paragraph (2B)(b) applies in the present circumstances. 18 In considering whether it is in the interest of justice to grant an extension of time under s 44(2A)(a) of the AAT Act, the Court notes that it is 'not limited to' the grounds contained in paragraphs (2B)(a) and (2B)(b). In Phillips v Australian Girls' Choir Pty Ltd & Anor [2001] FMCA 109 Federal Magistrate McInnis considered the nature of the discretion contained in s 44(2A)(a) of the AAT Act, and said at [10]: In the light of A'Hearn's case, it is clear that at least one of the principles referred to by Wilcox J in the Hunter Valley decision needs to be modified namely that it should not be any longer regarded as law that the inexcusable delay on the part of a solicitor should be visited upon the client and nor should it be a principle that there is in fact a pre-condition to the exercise of discretion in favour of the applicant for extension to show an acceptable explanation for delay or that it's fair and equitable in the circumstances to extend time. In the light of the decision in Ahearn's [sic] case it is useful to set out in modified form the relevant principles in relation to the exercise of the Court's discretion when considering an extension of time in a human rights application based upon those principles distilled by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley as follows:

There is no onus of proof upon an applicant for extension of time though an application has to be made. Special circumstances need not be shown, but the court will not grant the application unless positively satisfied it is proper to do so. The "prescribed period" of 28 days is not to be ignored (Ralkon v Aboriginal Development Commission (1982) 43 ALR 535 at 550).

It is a prima facie rule that the proceedings commenced outside the prescribed period will not be entertained (Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411 at 416). It is not a pre-condition for success in an application for extension of time that an acceptable explanation for delay must be given. It is to be expected that such an explanation will normally be given as a relevant matter to be considered, even though there is no rule that such an explanation is an essential pre-condition (Comcare v A'Hearn [1993] FCA 498; (1993) 45 FCR 441 and Dix v Client Compensation Tribunal (1993) 1 VR 297 at 302).

Action taken by the applicant other than by making an application to the court is relevant in assessing the adequacy of the explanation for the delay. It is relevant to consider whether the applicant has rested on his rights and whether the respondent was entitled to regard the claim as being finalised. (See Doyle v Chief of Staff (1982) 42 ALR 283 at 287).

Any prejudice to the respondent, including any prejudice in defending the proceeding occasioned by the delay, is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension. (See Doyle at p 287).

The mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension. (See Lucic at p 416).

The merits of the substantial application are properly to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted. (See Lucic at p 417).

Considerations of fairness as between the applicant and other persons otherwise in a like position are relevant to the manner of exercise of the court's discretion (Wedesweiller v Cole (1983) 47 ALR 528).

Such principles were applied by Gray J in Pham v Commonwealth of Australia [2002] FCA 669, although in the context of s 46PO(2) of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (Cth). 19 The Court respectfully approves of McInnis FM's articulation of the principles in relation to the discretion contained in s 44(2A)(a) of the AAT Act.

FINDINGS 20 Although an acceptable explanation for the delay is not a pre-condition for the granting of leave, the Court accepts Ms Budd's explanation that, because of her psychological difficulties and her lack of legal representation, she was not aware that a time limit applied to the making of an appeal. The Court also finds that the respondent would not suffer undue prejudice if the Court were to grant leave to Ms Budd to file and serve a notice of appeal out of time. 21 In the present case the Court considers that the merits of Ms Budd's proposed appeal are particularly significant in deciding whether to exercise its discretion under s 44(2A)(a) of the AAT Act. As Ms Budd has not provided the Court with a draft Notice of Appeal the Court will treat the arguments raised in Ms Budd's application and affidavits as her proposed grounds of appeal. 22 The first proposed ground of appeal alleges that the Tribunal denied Ms Budd natural justice. Ms Budd submits that the Tribunal member misconceived 'the medical reports' and failedto 'apply the proper logic and reasoning to my medical reports of Dr Rodriguiez [sic] dated 19 June 2007'. Ms Budd also claims that the Tribunal member misunderstood her evidence; 'went wrong' in 'logic and reasoning'; and denied her a 'fair proper review due to a wrong reasoning error in law'. 23 A denial of natural justice may arise in a variety of different circumstances. It can for example result from a misconstruction of the powers provided to the Tribunal (see Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission and Another [1969] 2 AC 147 at 171) or where a Tribunal identifies a wrong issue, asks itself the wrong question, ignores relevant material, relies upon irrelevant material or, in some circumstances, makes an erroneous finding or reaches a mistaken conclusion: see Craig v The State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 179. 24 In considering Ms Budd's submission that the Tribunal failed 'to apply the proper logic and reasoning' to the medical report of Dr Rodriguez dated 19 June 2007, the Court observes that the Tribunal referred to such medical report in its decision. The Tribunal found that Ms Budd was able to conduct her work from home, and in so finding took into account, among other evidence, the report of Dr Rodriguez dated 19 June 2007. The Court finds that the Tribunal took Dr Rodriguez's evidence into account and did not err in its consideration of such evidence. 25 There is no evidence to support Ms Budd's claim that there has been a denial of natural justice. Ms Budd was afforded a full hearing before the Tribunal and the matters she raises do not constitute any basis for a finding of a denial of natural justice. 26 The second proposed ground of appeal alleges that the Tribunal was wrong in finding that Ms Budd did not qualify for a mobility allowance. Ms Budd also claims that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that she cannot work other than at home because of her condition and that her need to travel by taxi arises from such condition. 27 The challenged finding, namely that Ms Budd does not satisfy the criteria for a mobility allowance, is one of fact and not of law. Section 44(1) of the AAT Act provides: A party to a proceeding before the Tribunal may appeal to the Federal Court of Australia, on a question of law, from any decision of the Tribunal in that proceeding.

28 The Court is satisfied that Ms Budd seeks a merits review of the Tribunal's findings by challenging the factual finding that her circumstances do not satisfy the travel test. 29 The Court observes that it has a limited power to review questions of fact (see Comcare v Etheridge [2006] FCAFC 27 at [13]-[16]), but such power only arises 'after the Court has given consideration of the questions of law which constitute the subject matter of the appeal': see Comcare at [17]. In the current proceeding however no question of law is raised. 30 In these circumstances, the Court cannot substitute its own decision for that of the Tribunal: seeMinister for Aboriginal Affairs and Another v Peko-Wallsend Limited and Others (1986) 162 CLR 24per Mason J at 40-41. 31 Although it is inappropriate for the Court to trespass into the merits, the Court notes that Ms Budd misinterprets the travel test in s 1035(2) of the Act. Her submissions at hearing and her correspondence with the Court continually reiterated that she 'does the work' and that she 'does the travel'. However, the existence of these two facts in isolation does not satisfy the travel test in s 1035(2). The determinative issue before the Tribunal was whether she was required to travel in order to perform the work. The Tribunal found against Ms Budd on such issue and this Court cannot interfere with that finding. 32 It follows from the above that it is not 'in the interest of justice' to grant leave to Ms Budd to file and serve a notice of appeal out of time pursuant to s 44(2A)(a) of the AAT Act. The Court accordingly dismisses the application with costs. I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Cowdroy.

Associate: Dated: 17 October 2008 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person by telephone.

Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor