The background
7 Mr Katke, the first respondent, is the founder of a United States company called Metagenics. Although Metagenics was the product of the merger of two other United States companies called Metagenics ([16]), this appeal proceeded on the basis that the three companies could all be treated interchangeably. Metagenics also had a wholly owned subsidiary in Australia called Metagenics Australia Pty Ltd (MAPL).
8 One of the employees of Metagenics is Mr Morey, who gave evidence but was not a party to these proceedings. He held various positions in Metagenics including as the Corporate Controller, the Chief Financial Officer, the Chief Operating Officer, and as Secretary on the Board of MAPL ([22]). Another employee, who is a respondent, is Dr Bland. Dr Bland is the Chief Science Officer of Metagenics.
9 Mr Katke was close friends with Mr Michael Brosnan, who regarded Mr Katke as a "mentor" ([154]). Mr Michael Brosnan's father is Mr Leon Brosnan who is also an appellant.
10 The appellants all held shares in Health World Limited (HWL). Apart from Mr Michael Brosnan and Mr Leon Brosnan, the appellants include Mr Gee and Mr A B Grant. Since 1998, Mr Gee, who is a qualified accountant, has been the Managing Director of HWL. He took over the role from Mr A B Grant, who is also a qualified accountant. Mr A B Grant had also been the General Manager of HWL until 1997. He had also been the Company Secretary and had attended Board meetings in that capacity.
11 In September 2003, the appellants entered an agreement with Metagenics which included three of the appellants (Michael Brosnan, Leon Brosnan, and Mary Brosnan) selling to Metagenics 10% of their shares in HWL for $1,249,951, as well as the grant of various options by the appellants for Metagenics to acquire further HWL shares ([25]-[42]).
12 The appellants began negotiating with the respondents for the merger of Metagenics and HWL by the sale of the remainder of the HWL shares. Relevant to those negotiations was whether, and when, Metagenics would have an Initial Public Offering (IPO) in the United States. In the course of the negotiations, Mr Gee put two "protective options" for the HWL shareholders. The first was that the merger transaction ought to occur simultaneously with the IPO and the other was a call option enabling the appellants to repurchase their HWL shares if an IPO did not occur within two years ([493]). Neither of these protective options was agreed by the respondents.
13 On 17 November 2004, Mr Leon Brosnan, Mr Michael Brosnan, Mr A B Grant, and Mr Gee attended a presentation at Metagenics in the United States. The presentation was from Mr Schechner from an investment bank. Mr Schechner described the IPO process in detail ([254] onwards). Mr Schechner explained a twelve week timeline ([260]) which was "dependent upon SEC review, accountant's review, and legal review" ([266]). Mr Schechner also explained that the regulatory framework in the United States called SarbanesOxley made it more difficult to go public and that since the Enron scandal, more rigour was being applied by the auditors to public companies ([269]).
14 Mr Gee's evidence about this presentation included the following ([272]):
Q: You're not suggesting that Mr Schechner, an experienced investment banker, by anything he said, gave you to understand that there would be an IPO and that it would be successful, are you? You're a chartered accountant, many years' experience. You're surely not suggesting that anybody was representing that there would be an IPO as opposed to that there was an intention to have an IPO?
A: There was an intention to have an IPO.
15 Mr Gee and Mr Morey also knew of another obstacle to an IPO. On 11 November 2004, Mr Morey had told Mr Gee that Metagenics "required audited accounts" for the Belgium Metagenics companies ([238]). In order to complete audited accounts, the auditor needed to be satisfied as to the opening balance of the inventory because the opening balance affects the determination of the profit. However, because the auditors had not attended the opening balance stocktake they could not be sure that the procedure had been undertaken correctly and thus they had no confidence in the opening value. In the United States it was common practice to take the "closing" inventory value and "roll back" from that determination so as to identify the opening inventory value at the beginning of the financial year. Because a roll back valuation could not be done in Europe (from an accounting standards point of view), the auditors could not establish a robust opening value for the inventory ([236]-[239]).
16 On 8 February 2005, Mr A B Grant and Mr Gee had a conversation with Mr Katke by conference call from the boardroom of HWL ([326]). Mr Grant said that the extension of the time for the IPO without protective mechanisms in place left the Australian shareholders "exposed" ([329]). Mr Katke said "Guys, we're going to an IPO in 2005" ([329]).
17 On 15 February 2005, Mr Katke repeated this statement in a conference call from the HWL boardroom with Mr Gee, Mr A B Grant, Mr Leon Brosnan, and Mr Michael Brosnan. Mr Gee says that after that conversation the four appellants had a conversation following which each of the four appellants affirmed their trust in Mr Katke and decided to proceed with the merger transaction although the final terms of the transaction were still a matter of negotiation ([331]).
18 The statement by Mr Katke about an IPO had been made previously, with qualifications. Mr Michael Brosnan's evidence about this was as follows ([291]):
A: I spoke to [Mr Katke] regularly, and it was that, "Mate, we're - we're going to an IPO next year". That was in December [2004]. And most of the discussion about the actual merger and agreement with Health World were done through Alan Gee, but for me the phone calls were - were far less formal, to say the least. They were far more casual, but with an emphasis that, you know, we're - we're going to IPO as fast as we possibly can.
Q: Can?
A: Markets - markets permitting.
19 In the 15 February 2005 conversation there was also some discussion about an initial delay in the IPO date. Mr Katke said that the IPO had been delayed from May to November 2005 and Mr Grant said that this gave rise to uncertainty for the appellants because they had thought that the IPO "was going to be in May 2005" but suddenly it had become November 2005 ([333]).
20 On 27 April 2005, the appellants entered into the 2005 Agreement in which they sold all of their remaining HWL shares to MAPL for $39,600,000 ([43]). $6.5 million of the price was cash. Another component of the price was comprised of the transfer to the appellants of shares in Metagenics ([45]).
21 At the time of the 2005 Agreement, Mr Michael Brosnan and Mr Katke were friends. One of the other appellants, Mr Gee, an accountant, gave evidence that the appellants entered the agreement because they took a decision that they trusted Mr Katke "to do … the IPO" of Metagenics stock ([452], ts 189).
22 In November 2006, when Mr Katke was holidaying with Mr Michael Brosnan, Mr Brosnan expressed concern to Mr Katke that HWL had grown much faster than the North American business of Metagenics. Mr Brosnan complained that his shareholding in Metagenics did not reflect the contribution HWL was making and he said that the IPO would not now be completed until 2007 ([438]).
23 On 20 December 2006, Mr Katke agreed to sell Mr Michael Brosnan shares in Metagenics at a price which Mr Katke described as a substantial undervalue, and with a delay for payment and without interest ([438]). Mr Michael Brosnan later explained that he "appreciated" the extra shares which had "helped very much" and that he was "okay to finally move on from this discussion" ([450]).
24 On 27 December 2006, Mr Michael Brosnan emailed Mr Katke saying that he (Mr Brosnan) felt that "I have made a bad deal for myself. At least in the short term" ([445]). Mr Katke responded with an apology for Mr Brosnan's feelings, saying that he had made a bad deal and observed that when Mr Brosnan had made the deal he "felt it was a good deal" ([449]). Some exchanges continued between the two men including an allegation by Mr Brosnan on 8 February 2007 that the values of HWL and Metagenics were "out of whack" ([456]) because, as "time [went] by", the value of HWL had increased at a greater rate than the value of Metagenics ([457]). Mr Brosnan wanted to get the HWL shares back and to give back his Metagenics shares and the $6.5 million ([459]).
25 The dispute grew and grew.
26 On 26 January 2009 at a Metagenics Board meeting (the Australia Day 2009 meeting), Mr Michael Brosnan and Mr Gee were provided with a "North American Business Plan" (Business Plan). The executive directors attending the Australia Day 2009 meeting were Mr Katke, Dr Bland, and Mr Michael Brosnan. The directors were Mr Chu, Mr Hovee, Mr Krajanowski, Mr Leiner, and Mr Zaepfel. Also present as observers were Mr Konney, Mr Morey, Mr Gee, and a paralegal, Ms Baker. Mr Katke acted as Chairman of the meeting ([663]).
27 The Business Plan was said by the appellants to contain 21 representations (the 2009 representations). The representations concerned the following projections ([139]).
28 The following gross revenues and growth rates from its core business:
Revenue Year Gross Revenue US$ Growth Rate
2008 $189M -
2009 $193M 2%
2010 $233M 20.7%
2011 $284M 21.9%
2012 $348M 22.5%
2013 $430M 23.3%