23 That being so, it is to be noted that neither in the provisions defining the relevant offences, which I have discussed above, nor in any of the provisions of Chapter V, is there any provision which would make it an element of the offences of sexual assault or indecent assault, to use shorthand terms, that not only should the offender intentionally, wilfully or deliberately penetrate or apply force to the complainant, but that he should do so, as the ground of appeal has it, knowing that she was not consenting thereto. In my opinion, the relevant Code equivalent to the common law doctrine of mens rea is to be found in the provisions of s 23 and the requirement that, subject to the express provisions of the Code relating to negligent acts and omissions (to be found in Chapter XXVII), "a person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission which occurs independently of the exercise of his will". The consequence of that view is not at all that the law would permit such offences to be committed as a result of mere carelessness, as senior counsel submitted, although, of course, as has been seen, s 23 does preserve the capacity in certain circumstances for criminal responsibility to flow from what may be described as grossly negligent or reckless behaviour.